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Abstract 
An Empirical Study of the Purpose of the Irish Protected Disclosures Act 2014 
The Protected Disclosures Act 2014 enacted on 15 July 2014, is Ireland’s first pan-sectoral 
whistleblowing law. The purpose of the Protected Disclosures Act 2014 is described in its 
preamble as being ‘An Act to make provision for and in connection with the protection of 
persons from the taking of action against them in respect of the making of certain disclosures 
in the public interest and for connected purposes.’ The aim of this research is to determine 
whether the 2014 Act is fulfilling its purpose of providing protection to disclosers, as set out 
in its preamble. This thesis contributes to knowledge by identifying the weaknesses of the 
Protected Disclosures Act 2014 that are undermining its purpose and makes suggestions for 
reform in order to remedy these weaknesses at an early stage before the protected disclosures 
protection system in Ireland becomes futile.  
For the purpose of this research, an assessment of the case law under the Protected 
Disclosures Act 2014 from 15 July 2014 to 16 July 2018 was undertaken to highlight certain 
patterns emerging from the use, interpretation, and application of the Protected Disclosures 
Act 2014. An assessment of the prescribed persons system under the Protected Disclosures 
Act 2014 was also undertaken in order to ascertain whether the system is functioning as 
intended. In addition, an analysis of prescribed persons’ compliance with the governmental 
guidance on protected disclosures procedures was carried out. This analysis focussed on the 
non-statutory framework implemented by the government to complement the legislative 
framework. The research also included an evaluation of the difficulties faced by 
organisations when implementing protected disclosures procedures in relation to balancing 
the rights of the discloser and the rights of the alleged wrongdoer. This thesis concludes that 
the Protected Disclosures Act 2014 is not fulfilling its purpose and that urgent action is 
required to be taken, in line with the recommendations made in this thesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iii 
 
Acknowledgements 
I am very fortunate to have so many wonderful people to thank for helping me to get to 
where I am today. First and foremost, I wish to thank my parents, Nuala and Gerry Kierans, 
for all the love, support, encouragement, and nurturing that they have bestowed on me. I am 
very privileged to have received so much guidance from both of them throughout my life 
and they have been with me through every step of this endeavour. Secondly, I wish to thank 
my best friend and sister, Leanna Kierans, who was consistently a shoulder to lean on during 
the PhD process. She always said the right thing and made things better, as well as always 
giving me a reason to laugh. I would also like to make a special mention and thank TJ Waters 
for his love, support, and patience during this process. I am blessed to have such a kind and 
caring person in my life.  
Thank you also to my long-time friend Frances Colclough, my brothers Ross and Ronan 
Kierans, sister-in-law Claire Kierans, niece Amy Kierans, brother-in-law Darragh Timlin, 
Aoife Ronan, my godmother Naomi Noonan, goddaughter Emily Noonan, cousin Kate 
Noonan and dear friend Alice Harrison.  
Of course, I am forever indebted to my director of studies, Professor David Lewis, for his 
constant guidance, support, direction, and efficient and helpful feedback. It is an honour to 
follow along the inspiring research path carved out by Professor Lewis. I hope that my work 
can one day make even a fraction of the impact that his has had on whistleblower protection 
worldwide. 
I would also like to thank my first supervisor, Professor Laurent Pech for his assistance in 
this process and for his support during my time lecturing in Middlesex University. I would 
also like to thank Middlesex University for the partial funding it provided to assist me in my 
PhD. 
Thank you also to Transparency International Ireland, notably CEO John Devitt, for 
engaging me in different forms to assist in their groundbreaking work of whistleblower 
protection in Ireland. Thank you to the Sutherland School of Law in UCD for allowing me 
to pursue and fulfil my dream of sharing my knowledge and passion in this area by permitting 
me to design and deliver a course on Whistleblowing Law & Practice.  
Thank you further to Shelley Horan BL and Associate Professor Anthony Kerr SC for their 
mentorship at different times in my studies and career.  
iv 
 
I dedicate this thesis to all of those brave men and women who stand up for what is right. 
Edmund Burke said ‘The only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to do 
nothing’. I hope that my research will help ensure that people can raise concerns and never 
have to fear a negative consequence but only hope for a resolution of the wrongdoing. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
 
Table of Contents 
Abstract…………………………………………………………………………………….ii 
Acknowledgments………………………………………………………………………...iii  
Table of Abbreviations……………………………………………………………………xi 
Table of Irish Words……………………………………………………………………...xv 
Table of Cases……………………………………………………………………………xvi 
Table of Legislation…………………………………………………………………….xxiii 
List of Tables…………………………………………………………………………….xxx 
List of Bar Charts………………………………………………………………………xxxi 
Chapter 1: Introduction…………………………………………………………………...1 
1.1 Research question and original contribution to knowledge……………………………..1 
Chapter 2: The theoretical and historical context of the enactment of the Protected 
Disclosures Act 2014……………………………………………………………………….6 
2.1 Introduction……………………………………………………………………………..6 
2.1(a) Objectives…………………………………………………………………………….6 
2.1(b) Methodology…………………………………………………………………………6 
2.2 Defining ‘whistleblowing’ and ‘whistleblower’………………………………………...7 
2.3 Why is there a need for whistleblowers?.........................................................................11 
2.4 Why is there a need to protect whistleblowers?...............................................................14 
2.5 What is ‘protection’?.......................................................................................................25 
2.6 History of whistleblowing in Ireland…………………………………………………..29 
2.7 The development of whistleblowing law in Ireland……………………………………34 
2.7(a) The sectoral approach to whistleblowing law………………………………………34 
2.7(b) The generic approach to whistleblowing law……………………………………….36 
2.7(c) The Protected Disclosures Act 2014………………………………………………..40 
2.8 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………..42 
 
Chapter 3: An analysis of case law under the Protected Disclosures Act 2014………44 
3.1 Introduction.…………………………………………………………………………...44 
3.1(a) Objectives…………………………………………………………………………...44 
vi 
 
3.1(b) Methodology………………………………………………………………………..45 
3.2 Forum…………………………………………………………………………………..47 
3.2(a) Introduction…………………………………………………………………………47 
3.2(b) Advantages of a WRC claim………………………………………………………...48 
3.2(b)(i) Costs……………………………………………………………………………...48 
3.2(b)(ii) Fees……………………………………………………………………………...51 
3.2(b)(iii) Processing times………………………………………………………………...53 
3.2(b)(iv) Alternative dispute resolution…………………………………………………...54 
3.2(b)(v) Proceedings conducted in private………………………………………………..57 
3.2(c) Disadvantages of a WRC claim……………………………………………………..57 
3.2(c)(i) Filing times……………………………………………………………………….57 
3.2(c)(ii) Compensation.…………………………………………………………………...58 
3.3 Sector…………………………………………………………………………………..58 
3.3(a) Introduction…………………………………………………………………………58 
3.3(b) Protected disclosures procedures……………………………………………………59 
3.3(c) Training……………………………………………………………………………..61 
3.4 Type of claim…………………………………………………………………………..62 
3.4(a) Introduction…………………………………………………………………………62 
3.4(b) Unfair dismissal…………………………………………………………………….63 
3.4(c) Interim relief………………………………………………………………………...66 
3.4(d) Penalisation exclusive of unfair dismissal…………………………………………..69 
3.5 Length of service……………………………………………………………………….75 
3.5(a) Introduction…………………………………………………………………………75 
3.5(b) Claims by workers with less than one-year’s continuous service……………………78 
3.6 Nature of disclosure: relevant wrongdoings……………………………………………80 
3.6(a) Introduction…………………………………………………………………………80 
3.6(b) Case law analysis……………………………………………………………………83 
vii 
 
3.6(b)(i) Personal grievances………………………………………………………………84 
 
3.7 Channel of disclosure…………………………………………………………………..87 
3.7(a) Introduction…………………………………………………………………………87 
3.7(b) Case law analysis……………………………………………………………………88  
3.7(c) Why do some workers who have made an internal disclosure, subsequently make an 
external one?.........................................................................................................................90 
3.8 Reference to protected disclosures procedures…………………………………………93 
3.8(a) Introduction…………………………………………………………………………93 
3.8(b) Case law analysis……………………………………………………………………94 
3.9 Win/lose………………………………………………………………………………..97  
3.9(a) Introduction…………………………………………………………………………97 
3.9(b) Why is there a high rate of unsuccessful claims under the 2014 Act?.........................99 
3.10 Remedy and quantum………………………………………………………………..105 
3.10(a) Introduction………………………………………………………………………105 
3.10(a)(i) Unfair dismissal………………………………………………………………..105 
3.10(a)(ii) Interim relief…………………………………………………………………..107 
3.10(a)(iii) Penalisation exclusive of unfair dismissal……………………………………108 
3.10(a)(iv) Tort claim under s 13 of the 2014 Act…………………………………………109 
3.10(b) Case law analysis…………………………………………………………………109 
3.10(b)(i) Unfair dismissal case law remedies……………………………………………110 
3.10(b)(ii) Personal liability in unfair dismissal claims…………………………………...112 
3.10(b)(iii) Penalisation case law remedies………………………………………………114 
3.10(b)(iv) Motivation in successful penalisation and unfair dismissal claims…………...117 
3.10(b)(v) Interim relief case law remedies………………………………………………118 
3.11 Subject to appeal…………………………………………………………………….119 
3.11(a) Introduction………………………………………………………………………119 
3.11(b) Case law analysis…………………………………………………………………120 
viii 
 
3.12 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………..122 
Chapter 4: The prescribed persons’ system under the Protected Disclosures Act 
2014………………………………………………………………………………………129 
4.1 Introduction…………………………………………………………………………..129 
4.1(a) Objectives………………………………………………………………………….129 
4.1(b) Methodology………………………………………………………………………130 
4.2 What is the role of prescribed persons under the 2014 Act?...........................................132 
 
4.2(a) Introduction………………………………………………………………………..132 
 
4.2(b) Why are disclosures made to a prescribed person?...................................................133 
 
4.2(c) What are the legal requirements for making a disclosure to a prescribed 
person?................................................................................................................................136 
 
4.2(d) What persons are prescribed and who should be prescribed under s 7 of the 2014 
Act?....................................................................................................................................138 
 
4.3 Are protected disclosures being made to prescribed persons?.......................................142 
 
4.3(a) Introduction………………………………………………………………………..142 
 
4.3(b) Data from case law research………………………………………………………142 
 
4.3(c) Data from annual reports…………………………………………………………..142 
 
4.3(c)(i) Are prescribed persons complying with their statutory obligation to publish annual 
reports?...............................................................................................................................144 
 
4.3(c)(ii) Are disclosures being made to prescribed persons? If so, how many have been 
made?..................................................................................................................................146 
 
4.3(d) Data from survey responses………………………………………………………..150 
 
4.4 Do prescribed persons understand their role under the 2014 Act?.................................156 
 
4.4(a) Introduction………………………………………………………………………..156 
 
4.4(b) Data from survey responses………………………………………………………..156 
 
4.5 Are prescribed persons complying with their obligations under s 21(1) to establish and 
maintain protected disclosures procedures and under s 21(4) to have regard to the DPER 
Guidance?...........................................................................................................................161 
 
4.5(a) Introduction………………………………………………………………………..161 
4.5(a)(i) The impact of the existence/non-existence of Procedures in legal proceedings…164 
ix 
 
4.5(a)(ii) DPER Guidance …………………………………………………………..........165 
4.5(b) Are prescribed persons complying with their obligations under s 21(1) of the 2014 
Act to establish and maintain protected disclosures procedures?........................................167 
 
4.5(c) Analysis of whether prescribed persons are complying with their statutory obligations 
under s 21(4) of the 2014 Act……………………………………………………………..170 
4.5(c)(i) Breakdown of the compliance rate of prescribed persons’ Procedures with the issues 
in the DPER Guidance……………………………………………………………………173 
 
4.5(c)(ii) Application……………………………………………………………………..178 
4.5(c)(iii) What is a protected disclosure?...........................................................................187  
4.6 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………193 
Chapter 5: Implementing protected disclosures procedures: practical issues for 
recipients of disclosures in relation to the discloser and the alleged wrongdoer……..205 
5.1 Introduction…………………………………………………………………………..205 
5.1(a) Objectives………………………………………………………………………….205 
5.1(b) Methodology………………………………………………………………………206 
5.2 Confidentiality………………………………………………………………………..206 
 
5.2(a) Introduction………………………………………………………………………..206 
5.2(b) The 2014 Act………………………………………………………………………208 
5.2(c) The DPER Guidance………………………………………………………………210 
5.2(d) WRC Code of Practice……………………………………………………………..213 
5.2(e) Prescribed persons’ Procedures analysis…………………………………………..214 
5.3 Anonymous disclosures………………………………………………………………217 
5.3(a) Introduction………………………………………………………………………..217 
5.3(b) The DPER Guidance………………………………………………………………218 
 
5.3(c) WRC Code of Practice……………………………………………………………..219  
 
5.3(d) Prescribed persons’ Procedures analysis…………………………………………..219 
5.3(e) The case for and against anonymous disclosures…………………………………..221 
 
5.4 Rights of the alleged wrongdoer………………………………………………………226 
 
5.4(a) Introduction………………………………………………………………………..226 
 
5.4(b) The DPER Guidance………………………………………………………………226 
x 
 
5.4(c) Irish Congress of Trade Unions, ‘Drafting a Whistleblowing Policy, Guidelines for 
Trade Union Negotiators on The Protected Disclosures Act 2014’……………………….227 
 
5.4(d) Prescribed persons’ Procedures analysis…………………………………………..228 
5.4(e) Natural justice and fair procedures………………………………………………...229 
5.4(e)(i) What are natural justice and fair procedures?........................................................230 
5.4(e)(ii) At what stage of the disclosures process do natural justice and fair procedures 
apply?.................................................................................................................................232 
5.4(e)(iii) The balancing of rights of the discloser and the alleged wrongdoer……………235 
5.5 Data protection………………………………………………………………………..241 
5.5(a) Introduction………………………………………………………………………..241 
5.5(b) Protections for data subjects……………………………………………………….244     
5.5(c) Lawfulness of data processing……………………………………………………..248 
5.5(c)(i) Compliance with a legal obligation……………………………………………...249  
5.5(c)(ii) Legitimate interests test………………………………………………………...250  
5.5(d) Information to be provided by data controller to data subject when data has not been 
obtained from data subject………………………………………………………………..252  
5.5(e) Limitations on data subjects rights…………………………………………………253 
5.5(f) Application of restrictions in the context of a whistleblowing scheme……………..254 
5.5(g) Delay of notification to data subject……………………………………………….256 
5.5(h) Maliciously false statements……………………………………………………....257 
 
5.6 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………258 
 
5.6(a) Practical steps for organisations……………………………………………………263 
 
5.6(b) Recommendations for statutory and non-statutory changes………………………267 
 
Chapter 6: Conclusion…………………………………………………………………..270 
6.1 Introduction…………………………………………………………………………..270 
6.2 Summary and evaluation……………………………………………………………...270 
6.3 Limitations……………………………………………………………………………280 
6.4 Future research………………………………………………………………………..280 
6.5 Original contribution to knowledge…………………………………………………..282 
Bibliography…………………………………………………………………………….283 
xi 
 
 
Abbreviation Full title 
1977 Act 
 
Unfair Dismissals Act 1977 
1996 Act 
 
Employment Rights Act 1996 
1999 Bill 
 
Whistleblowers Protection Bill 1999 
2005 Act 
 
Safety, Health and Welfare at Work Act, 
2005 
2013 Bill 
 
Protected Disclosures Bill 2013 
2014 Act 
 
Protected Disclosures Act 2014 
2015 Act 
 
Workplace Relations Act 2015 
2018 Act 
 
Data Protection Act 2018 
Acas 
 
Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration 
Service  
C&AG 
 
Comptroller and Auditor General 
CER 
 
Commission for Energy Regulation 
Charleton Tribunal 
 
The Disclosure Tribunal/ Tribunal of 
Inquiry into protected disclosures made 
under the Protected Disclosures Act 2014 
and certain other matters following 
Resolutions 
CIÉ 
 
Coras Iompar Éireann 
CLRG  
 
Company Law Review Group 
CNIL 
 
French data protection authority 
Committee 
 
Joint Committee on Finance, Public 
Expenditure and Reform 
CORU 
 
Regulating Health and Social Care 
Professionals 
CPCC 
 
Competition and Consumer Protection 
Commission 
CRU 
 
Commission for Regulation Utilities 
Data Protection Working Party 
 
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party  
 
DPER Department of Public Expenditure and 
Reform  
 
Table of Abbreviations 
xii 
 
DPER Guidance Government Reform Unit, Department of 
Public Expenditure and Reform, ‘Guidance 
under section 21(1) of the Protected 
Disclosures Act 2014 for the purpose of 
assisting public bodies in the performance 
of their functions under the Act’ (2016) 
 
DPER Statutory Review 
 
Statutory Review of the Protected 
Disclosures Act 2014 
Draft EU Commission Directive on 
whistleblowing 
 
Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on 
the protection of persons reporting on 
breaches of Union law, 2018/0106 (COD) 
Draft Heads 
 
Draft Heads of the Protected Disclosures in 
the Public Interest Bill 2012 
EAT 
 
Irish Employment Appeals Tribunal 
EC 
 
UK Early Conciliation 
ECHR  European Convention on Human Rights 
[1950] 
 
ECtHR 
 
European Court of Human Rights 
EDPS 
 
European Data Protection Supervisor 
ET 
 
UK Employment Tribunal 
EU Charter Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union [2016]  
 
GDPR  
 
 
Council Regulation (EC) 679/2016 of 27 
April 2016 on the protection of natural 
persons with regard to the processing of 
personal data and on the free movement of 
such data, and repealing Directive 
95/46/EC (General Data Protection 
Regulation) [2016]  
 
HEA Higher Education Authority 
HIA 
 
Health Insurance Authority 
HIQA 
 
Health Information and Quality Authority 
HSA 
 
Health and Safety Authority 
IAASA 
 
 
Irish Auditing and Accounting Supervisory 
Authority 
xiii 
 
IAW 
 
Integrity at Work 
ICTU 
 
Irish Congress of Trade Unions 
ICTU Guide Irish Congress of Trade Unions, ‘Drafting a 
Whistleblowing Policy, Guidelines for 
Trade Union Negotiators on The Protected 
Disclosures Act 2014’ (August 2014) 
 
IRA 
 
Irish Republican Army 
LRC 
 
Labour Relations Commission 
Minister  Minister for Public Expenditure and 
Reform 
 
MSM 
 
Main Securities Market 
MSPB 
 
US Merit Systems Protection Board 
NERA 
 
National Employment Rights Authority 
NRA 
 
National Roads Authority 
OECD 
 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development 
PIDA 
 
Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 
Procedures Protected Disclosures Procedures  
 
PSI 
 
Pharmaceutical Society of Ireland 
Revenue 
 
Office of the Revenue Commissioners 
RPA 
 
Railway Procurement Agency 
SEC 
 
State Examinations Commission 
SFPA  
 
Sea Fisheries Protection Authority 
SOX US Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 
 
Trade Secrets Directive 
 
 
 
European Parliament and Council Directive 
2016/943/EC of 8 June 2016 on the 
protection of undisclosed know-how and 
business information (trade secrets) against 
their unlawful acquisition, use and 
disclosure [2016] OJ L157/1 
 
xiv 
 
TII  Transparency International Ireland 
Tusla 
 
Child and Family Agency 
UKEAT 
 
UK Employment Appeal Tribunal 
WRC Workplace Relations Commission 
 
WWTW Guide Whistling While They Work A good-
practice guide for managing internal 
reporting of wrongdoing in public sector 
organisations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xv 
 
 
Irish Word English Translation 
Bunreacht na hÉireann  
 
Irish Constitution 
An Garda Síochána/ Garda Síochána The Police Service 
Dáil/ Dáil Éireann Lower House of the Irish legislature 
Fianna Fáil 
 
‘The Republican Party’, an Irish political 
party 
Garda Police (singular) 
Gardaí Police (plural) 
Oireachtas  
 
Irish legislature 
Seanad/ Seanad Éireann 
 
Upper House of the Irish legislature 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table of Irish Words 
xvi 
 
Table of Cases  
Ireland 
Labour Relations Commission 
Monaghan v McGrath Partnership r-151162-pd-1415R 
Employment Appeals Tribunal 
Carroll v Congregation of the Holy Spirit T/A Registered Charity Chy 076 UD 981/2015 
Kieran v Our Lady’s Hospital for Sick Children UDD 1129/1992 
 
Workplace Relations Commission 
Accounts Administrator v A University ADJ-00000305 
Accounts Administrator v A University ADJ-00004380 
A Childcare Worker v A Creche ADJ-00002421 
A Commercialisation Specialist v A Government Agency ADJ-00007228 
A Complainant v A Respondent ADJ-00004519 
A Fire Station Officer (retired) v A Local Authority ADJ-00004684 
An Employee v An Agency ADJ-00008429 
An Employee v An Employer ADJ-00000258 
An Employee v An Employer ADJ-00000708 
An Employee v A Nursing Home ADJ-00000456 
An Employee v A Public Body ADJ-00005583 
An Office Administrator v A Removals and Storage Company ADJ-00008404 
A Public Servant v A Government Department ADJ-00004925 
A Senior Account Manager v A Print Management and Logistics Company ADJ-00005984 
A Senior Official v A Local Authority ADJ-00001721 
A Service Engineer v A Provider of Plant Machinery ADJ-00007236 
A Worker v An Agricultural Estate ADJ-00000860 
A Worker v A Communications Provider ADJ-00001380 
A Worker v A Nursing Home ADJ-00000267 
A Worker v A Service Station ADJ-00006640 
Bank Official v Banking Sector ADJ-00005011 
Carr v Donegal CC r-153749-pd-14  
xvii 
 
CEO v Accountant ADJ-00009156 
Claimant v Employer ADJ-00008888 
Claimant v Respondent ADJ-00002571 
Employee v Employer ADJ-00003371 
Mr A v A Public Body ADJ-00006360 
Mr A(1) v A Government Department ADJ-00006381 
Mr A(2) v A Government Department ADJ-00009800 
Researcher v Employment Agency ADJ-00010550 
Training Co-ordinator v A Social Support Service ADJ-00002320 
Labour Court 
AIB v Murphy PDD 1/2018 
Allied Foods Ltd v Sterio HSD 97/2009 
Donegal CC v Carr [2017] 28 ELR 259 
Enterprise Ireland v Carroll PDD 3/2018 
Fingal CC v O’Brien PDD 4/2018 
Galway CC v Connolly PDD 2/2018 
Kerry Parents & Friends Association v O’Connor Flemming PDD 2/2017 
Loxam Ltd v Brunkard UD 1755 
Monaghan v McGrath Partnership [2017] 28 ELR 8 
O’Neill v Toni and Guy Blackrock Ltd [2010] ELR 21  
QFF Distribution Ltd v O’Reilly PDD 1/2017 
Southside Travellers Action Group v O’Keefe UDD 1828 
University of Limerick v Roche PDD 3/2017 
University of Limerick v Copley PDD 4/2017 
Circuit Court 
Dougan and Clarke v Lifeline Ambulances Ltd [2018] 29 ELR 210 
Kelly v AlienVault Ireland Ltd & AlienVault Inc (2016) Irish Examiner, 3 Nov  
Philpott v Marymount Hospital and Hospice Ltd (2015) IECC 1 
High Court 
Agbonlahor v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2007] 4 IR 309 
 
xviii 
 
Commissioner of An Garda Síochána v Oberoi [2014] ELR 17 
 
Doe v The Revenue Commissioners [2008] IEHC 5 
 
Fennelly v Assicurazioni Generali SpA [1985] 3 ILTR 73  
 
Garvey v Ireland [1981] IR 75  
 
HSE v A [2011] 3 IR 22  
 
Kennedy and Arnold v Ireland and A-G [1987] IR 587  
 
Khan v HSE [2008] IEHC 234  
 
Lyons v Longford Westmeath Education and Training Board [2017] IEHC 272 
 
Marine Terminals v Loughman [2009] IEHC 620 
 
Shortt v Commissioner of An Garda Síochána [2005] IEHC 311 
 
Stoskus v Goode Concrete Ltd [2007] IEHC 432 
 
Vogel v Cheeverstown House Ltd [1998] 2 IR 496  
 
X v Flynn (HC, 19 May 1994) 
 
Court of Criminal Appeal 
McCann [1998] 4 IR 397  
 
Supreme Court 
 
A-G v Open Door Counselling [1988] IR 593  
 
Bailey v Flood [2000] IESC 11 
 
Berry v Irish Times [1973] IR 368  
 
Borges v Fitness to Practice Committee [2004] 1 IR 103  
 
Burns v Governor of Castlerea Prison [2009] 3 IR 682  
 
Conway v Irish National Teachers Organisation [1991] 2 IR 305  
 
Dalton v Frendo (SC, 15 December 1977) 
 
Glover v BLN Ltd [1973] IR 388  
 
Gunn v Bord an Choláiste Náisiúnta Ealaíne is Deartha [1990] 2 IR 168  
 
xix 
 
Haughey, Re [1971] IR 217  
 
Haughey v Moriarty [1999] 3 IR 1  
 
Keady v Commissioner of An Garda Síochána [1992] 2 IR 197  
 
Maguire v Drury [1994] 2 IR 241  
 
McGee v A-G [1974] IR 284  
 
Megaleasing UK Ltd, Megaleasing Holdings Ltd and Quantum Data SA v Barrett [1992] 1 
IR 219  
 
Mooney v An Post [1998] 4 IR 288  
 
National Irish Bank v RTÉ [1998] 2 IR 465  
 
National Irish Bank Ltd (under investigation), Re and Companies Act, 1990 (No. 1), Re 
[1999] 3 IR 145  
 
Norris v A-G [1984] IR 36  
 
O’Brien v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd [2001] 1 IR 1  
 
Redmond v Flood [1999] 3 IR 79  
 
Ryan v A-G [1965] IR 294  
 
Shortt v Commissioner of An Garda Síochána [2007] 4 IR 587  
  
United Kingdom 
Employment Tribunal 
Best v Medical Marketing International Group Plc (in voluntary liq) (ET Case No 
1501248/2008, 2 July 2013) 
 
Fernandes v Netcom Consultants UK Ltd (ET Case No 22000060/00, 24 January 2000) 
 
Employment Appeal Tribunal 
 
Cavendish Munro Professional Risk Management Ltd v Geduld [2010] ICR 325  
 
Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis v Shaw [2012] ICR 464  
 
Darnton v University of Surrey [2003] ICR 615  
 
Eiger Securities LLP v Korshunova [2017] ICR 561  
 
Finchman v H M Prison Service (UKEAT/0925/01/RN, 19 December 2001) 
 
xx 
 
HCA International Ltd v May-Bheemul (UKEAT/0477/10, 23 March 2011) 
 
HM Prison Service v Johnson [1997] ICR 275  
 
International Petroleum Ltd v Osipov (UKEAT/0058/17/DA, UKEAT/0229/16/DA, 19 July 
2017) 
 
Korashi v Abertawe Bro Morgannwg University Local Health Board [2012] IRLR 4  
 
Kraus v Penna plc [2004] IRLR 260  
 
Linfood Cash & Carry Ltd v Thomson [1989] ICR 518  
 
Milne v The Link Asset and Security Co Ltd (UKEAT/0867/04, 26 September 2005) 
 
Parkins v Sodexho [2002] IRLR 109  
 
Ramsey v Walkers Snack Foods Ltd [2004] ALL ER (D) 237 (Feb)  
 
Sharma v London Borough of Ealing (UKEAT/0399/05, 5 January 2006) 
 
Surrey CC v Henderson (UKEAT/0326/05/ZT, 23 November 2005) 
 
Tait v Redcar and Cleveland BC (UKEAT/0096/08/ZT, 2 April 2008) 
 
Virgo Fidelis Senior School v Boyle [2004] IRLR 268  
 
Watkinson v Royal Cornwall NHS Trust (UKEAT/0378/10/DM, 17 August 2011) 
 
Court of Session 
Miklaszewicz v Stolt [2001] IRLR 656  
 
Court of Appeal 
Babula v Waltham Forest College [2007] ICR 1026  
 
Chesterton Global Ltd v Nurmohamed [2018] ICR 731  
 
Gogay v Hertfordshire CC [2000] IRLR 703  
 
Kilraine v London Borough of Wandsworth [2018] IRLR 846  
 
Kuzel v Roche Products Ltd [2008] ICR 799 
 
Lodwick v Southwark LBC [2004] ICR 884  
 
Melia v Magna Kansei Ltd [2006] ICR 410 
 
Miles v Gilbank [2006] ICR 1297  
xxi 
 
 
Scott v Commissioners of Inland Revenue [2004] IRLR 713 
 
Sheriff v Klyne Tugs (Lowestoft) Ltd [1999] ICR 1170  
 
Small v The Shrewsbury and Telford Hospital NHS Trust [2017] EWCA Civ 882 
 
Vento v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police [2003] ICR 318  
 
House of Lords 
Norwich Pharmacal Co v Commissioners of Custom and Excise [1974] AC 133  
 
R v Home Sec Ex p Tarrant [1985] 1 QB 251  
 
Rookes v Barnard [1964] AC 1129  
 
Wilson and Clyde Coal Co Ltd v English [1938] AC 57  
 
Supreme Court 
R (UNISON) v Lord Chancellor (Equality and Human Rights Commission intervening) 
(Nos 1 and 2) [2017] ICR 1037 
European Union 
European Court of Justice 
Von Colson and Kamann v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen (C 14/83) [1984] ECR 1891 
 
European Court of Human Rights 
 
A, B and C v Ireland [2010] ECHR 2032 
 
Babylonova v Slovakia [2006] ECHR 630 
 
Bucur and Toma v Romania [2013] ECHR 14 
 
Guja v Moldova [2008] ECHR 144 
 
Handyside v United Kingdom [1976] ECHR 5 
 
Heinish v Germany [2011] ECHR 1175 
 
I v Finland [2008] ECHR 623 
 
Langner v Germany [2015] ECHR 803  
 
Matuz v Hungary [2014] ECHR 1112 
 
Nikolova v Bulgaria [2013] ECHR 1291 
 
xxii 
 
Reklos and Davourlis v Greece [2009] ECHR 200 
Rotaru v Romania [2000] ECHR 192 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xxiii 
 
Table of Legislation 
Table of Statutes 
Australia 
Public Interest Disclosure Act 2012 
Public Interest Disclosure Act 2013 
Bolivia 
 
Law 458 for Whistleblower and Witness Protection 2013 
 
Canada 
 
Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act 2005 
 
Czech Republic 
 
Banks Act No 21/1992 
 
Capital Market Undertakings Act (Financial Acts) No 256/2004 
 
Savings and Credit Cooperatives Act No 87/1995 
 
Ecuador 
 
Criminal Code 1971 
 
France 
 
LOI n° 2016-1691 du 9 décembre 2016 relative à la transparence, à la lutte contre la 
corruption et à la modernisation de la vie économique (1) 
 
Hungary 
 
Complaints and Announcements of Public Concern Act (the ‘Whistleblower Act’) 165 of 
2013  
 
Ireland 
Bunreacht na hÉireann 1937 
 
Central Bank (Supervision and Enforcement) Act 2013 
 
Charities Act 2009 
 
Civil Service Regulation Act 1956 
 
Companies Act 2014 
 
xxiv 
 
Competition Act 2002 
 
Courts and Civil Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2013 
 
Courts of Justice Act 1924 
 
Courts (Supplemental Provisions) Act 1961 
 
Data Protection Bill 2018  
 
Data Protection Act 2018 
 
Defamation Act 2009 
 
Employment Equality Acts 1998-2015 
 
Ethics in Public Office Act 2001 
 
European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003 
 
Garda Síochána Act 2005 
 
Health Act 2004 
 
Health Act 2007 
 
Industrial Relations Act 1946 
 
Industrial Relations Act 1990 
 
Interpretation Act 2005 
 
Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission Act 2014 
 
Legal Services Regulation Act 2015 
 
Local Government Act 1941 
 
Mediation Act 2017 
 
National Minimum Wage Act 2000 
 
Payment of Wages Act 1991 
 
Protected Disclosures Bill 2013 
 
Protected Disclosures Act 2014 
 
Protected Disclosures in the Public Interest Bill 2012 
 
xxv 
 
Protections for Persons Reporting Child Abuse Act 1998 
 
Safety, Health and Welfare at Work Act 2005 
 
Statute of Limitations 1957 
 
Unfair Dismissals Acts 1977-2015 
 
Universities Act 1997 
 
Whistleblowers Protection Bill 1999 
 
Whistleblowers Protection Bill 2010 
 
Whistleblowers Protection Bill 2011 
 
Workplace Relations Act 2015 
 
Italy 
 
Legislative Decree 1993/285 
 
Legislative Decree 2001/165, amended by Law No 2017/179  
 
Legislative Decree 2015/72 
 
Kosovo 
 
Draft Law on Protection of Whistleblowers 2018 
 
The Netherlands 
 
Whistleblowers Centre Act 2016 
 
New Zealand 
 
Protected Disclosures Act 2000 
 
Norway 
 
Working Environment Act 2005  
 
Paraguay  
 
Instructive Order 2014/7 from the Attorney General’s Office 
 
Romania 
 
Law No 2004/571 
 
xxvi 
 
Serbia 
 
Law on the Protection of Whistleblowers Act, no 2014/128 
 
Singapore  
 
Corruption, Drug Trafficking and other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) Act (Cap 
65A) 
 
Terrorism (Suppression of Financing Act) (Cap 325) 
 
South Africa 
 
Protected Disclosures Act 2000 
 
United Kingdom 
Bribery Act 2010 
 
Employment Rights Act 1996 
 
Employment Tribunals Act 1996 
 
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Bill 2012 
 
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 
 
Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998  
 
Public Interest Disclosure (Amendment) Bill 2013-14 
 
Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 
 
Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 
 
United States 
 
Whistleblower Protection Act 1989 
 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
 
Table of Statutory Instruments 
Ireland 
Circuit Court (Fees) Order 2014, SI 2014/23 
 
District Court (Fees) Order 2014, SI 2014/22 
 
European Union (Market Abuse) Regulations 2016, SI 2016/349 
 
xxvii 
 
European Union (Protection of Trade Secrets) Regulations 2018, SI 2018/188 
 
European Union (Single Supervisory Mechanism) Regulations 2014, SI 2014/495 
 
Industrial Relations Act 1990 (Code of Practice on Protected Disclosures Act 2014) 
(Declaration) Order 2015, SI 2015/464 
 
Protected Disclosures Act 2014 (Commencement) Order 2014, SI 2014/327 
 
Protected Disclosures Act 2014 (s 7(2)) Order 2014, SI 2014/339 
 
Supreme Court, Court of Appeal and High Court (Fees) Order 2014, SI 2014/49 
 
Unfair Dismissals (Calculation of Weekly Remuneration) Regulations 1977, SI 1977/287 
 
United Kingdom 
The Courts and Tribunals Fee Remissions Order 2013, SI 2013/2302 
 
The Employment Tribunals and the Employment Appeal Tribunal Fees Order 2013, SI 
2013/1893 
 
The Employment Tribunals (Constitution and Rules of Procedure) Regulations 2013, SI 
2013/1237 
 
The Prescribed Persons (Reports on Disclosures of Information) Regulations 2017, SI 
2017/507 
 
The Public Interest Disclosure (Prescribed Persons) (Amendment) Order 2014, SI 2014/596   
 
Table of European Legislation 
Conventions and Treaties 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2016] OJ C 202/389 
 
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2016] OJ 
C202/47 
 
Council of Europe Civil Law Convention on Corruption 4 November 1999, Eur TS No 174 
 
Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption 27 January 1999, Eur TS No 
173  
 
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 4 November 1950, 213 
UNTS221 (ECHR) 
Regulations 
Council Regulation (EC) 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the 
European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit 
institutions [2013]  
xxviii 
 
 
Council Regulation (EC) 45/2001 of 18 December 2000 on the protection of individuals with 
regard to the processing of personal data by the Community institutions and bodies and on 
the free movement of such data [2001]  
 
Council Regulation (EC) 679/2016 of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons 
with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and 
repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) [2016]  
 
Council Regulation (EC) 575/2013 of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit 
institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) 648/2012 [2012]  
 
European Central Bank Regulation (EC) 468/2014 of 16 April 2014 establishing the 
framework for cooperation within the Single Supervisory Mechanism between the European 
Central Bank and national competent authorities and with national designated authorities 
(SSM Framework Regulation) [2014]  
 
European Parliament and Council Regulation 596/2014 of 16 April 2014 on market abuse 
(market abuse regulation) and repealing Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council and Commission Directives 2003/124/EC, 2003/125/EC and 2004/72/EC  
Directives 
Commission Implementing Directive 2015/2392/EC of 17 December 2015 on Regulation 
(EC) 596/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards reporting to 
competent authorities of actual or potential infringements of that Regulation OJ L332/126 
 
Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
protection of persons reporting on breaches of Union law, 2018/0106 (COD) 
 
Council Directive (EC) 2013/36 of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit 
institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, 
amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC OJ 
L176/338 
 
Council Directive (EC) 1995/46/EC of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with 
regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data [1995] OJ 
L281/31 
 
European Parliament and Council Directive 2016/943/EC of 8 June 2016 on the protection 
of undisclosed know-how and business information (trade secrets) against their unlawful 
acquisition, use and disclosure [2016] OJ L157/1  
 
Recommendations 
Council of Europe, Recommendation CM/REC (2014)7 of the Committee of Ministers to 
Member States on the Protection of Whistleblowers, adopted by the Committee of Ministers 
on the 30 April 2014 at the 1198 meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies (SPDP Council of 
Europe 2014) 
 
Resolutions 
xxix 
 
Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution 1729 (2010) Protection of “whistle-
blowers” 
 
European Parliament, Resolution 2013/2064(INI) Volunteering and voluntary activity in 
Europe 
 
Table of International Treaties and Conventions 
 
African Union, Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, 11 July 2003, 43 ILM 
1  
 
Inter-American, Convention against Corruption, 29 Mar 1996, 35 ILM 724 
 
OECD, Convention on Bribery of Foreign Official in International Business Transactions, 
17 Dec 1997, 37 ILM 1 
 
Southern African Development Community, Protocol against Corruption, 14 August 2001 
 
UN General Assembly, Convention against Corruption, 21 Nov 2003, A/RES/58/4  
 
UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 Dec 1948, 217 A (III) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
xxx 
 
List of Tables 
3.1   Case law analysis of the length of service of complainants………………………….77 
4.1   Number and rate of disclosures received by prescribed persons: annual reports…...147 
4.2   Compliance rate of prescribed persons with their obligations under s 21(4) of the 2014 
Act………………………………………………………………………………………..171 
4.3   Breakdown of the compliance rate of prescribed persons’ Procedures with the issues 
in the DPER Guidance…………………………………………………………………...175 
6.1    Recommendations for statutory and non-statutory reform…………………………274 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xxxi 
 
List of Bar Charts 
4.1   Rates of disclosures to prescribed persons: survey results and annual report data……153 
4.2   Number of disclosures received by prescribed persons: survey results and annual report 
data……………………………………………………………………………………….155 
4.3   Prescribed persons’ levels of understanding regarding protected disclosures Procedures, 
the provisions of the 2014 Act, the scope of matters in respect of which they are prescribed, 
and investigation procedures for protected 
disclosures………………………………………………………………………………..158 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1. Research question and original contribution to knowledge 
The Protected Disclosures Act 2014 (‘2014 Act’) came into operation in Ireland on 15 July 
2014.1 The purpose of the 2014 Act is described in its preamble as being ‘An Act to make 
provision for and in connection with the protection of persons from the taking of action 
against them in respect of the making of certain disclosures in the public interest and for 
connected purposes.’2 The central question in this thesis is whether the 2014 Act is fulfilling 
its purpose of providing protection to disclosers, as set out in its preamble. In order to answer 
this central research question, a number of ancillary questions were asked, including: (i) 
What can we learn about how the 2014 Act is operating from an analysis of the case law 
under the 2014 Act? (ii) Is the prescribed persons’ system established under the 2014 Act 
operating effectively? (iii) How can organisations balance their obligations to respect the 
rights of both the discloser and the alleged wrongdoer when implementing protected 
disclosures procedures (‘Procedures’)? The period for this research is from 15 July 2014 to 
16 July 2018.3 
This thesis contains four substantive chapters. Chapter 2 looks at the various definitions of 
‘whistleblowing’ and ‘whistleblower’ and sets out the definition of these terms that are used 
for the research in this thesis. This chapter also examines the vital role played by 
whistleblowers and the necessity to provide protection to whistleblowers, two themes that 
underpin the objectives of the 2014 Act. This chapter then proceeds to address the historical 
context of whistleblowing in Ireland and looks at how the attitude towards whistleblowers 
has changed through the annals. Finally, this chapter looks at the development of statutory 
whistleblowing law in Ireland, outlining the original approach to whistleblowing law, ie the 
sectoral approach, before moving onto the successive approach to whistleblowing law, ie the 
generic approach, which led to the enactment of the 2014 Act. The purpose of this chapter 
is to provide an overview of both the theoretical and historical influences on the drafting of 
the 2014 Act. By providing an overview of the theoretical and historical backgrounds to the 
drafting of the 2014 Act, this is intended to provide a foundation for the understanding of 
                                                 
1 Protected Disclosures Act 2014 (Commencement) Order 2014, SI 2014/327. 
2 Protected Disclosures Act 2014. 
3 It is acknowledged that the consequence of selecting 16 July 2018 as the cut-off point for the research herein 
means that developments in the UK, Ireland, and at EU level, are not included, despite their relevance. 
However, the research was intended to cover the four-year period after the enactment of the 2014 Act and any 
relevant developments outside of that timeframe will inform future research. 
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the assessments of the 2014 Act undertaken in the subsequent chapters in order to determine 
whether its purpose is being achieved. 
Chapter 3 consists of an analysis of case law under the 2014 Act. In order to analyse the case 
law, ten issues were selected for assessment. These included the following issues: (i) Forum; 
(ii) Sector; (iii) Type of claim; (iv) Length of service; (v) Nature of disclosure: relevant 
wrongdoings; (vi) Channel of disclosure; (vii) Reference to Procedures; (viii) Win/lose; (ix) 
Remedy and quantum; and (x) Subject to appeal. The objective of the case law analysis was 
to determine how the 2014 Act is being interpreted and applied by the relevant fora since its 
enactment and to highlight the advantages and disadvantages for complainants and 
respondents in a claim under the 2014 Act. The analysis undertaken was also intended to 
identify patterns emanating from the use, interpretation, and application of the 2014 Act, and 
to identify areas requiring reform in order to ensure that the purpose of the 2014 Act is being 
fulfilled.   
Chapter 4 assesses the prescribed persons’ system under the 2014 Act in order to determine 
whether it is operating effectively. The research undertaken for this chapter was designed 
firstly to explain the role of prescribed persons under the 2014 Act. Secondly, it was designed 
to ascertain whether protected disclosures are being made to prescribed persons and in 
making that assessment, this included an investigation into whether prescribed persons are 
complying with their obligation under s 22 of the 2014 Act to publish annual reports on 
protected disclosures. Thirdly, the research conducted examined whether prescribed persons 
understand their role under the 2014 Act. Fourthly, the research was designed to ascertain 
whether prescribed persons are complying with their obligations under s 21(1) of the 2014 
Act to establish and maintain Procedures and under s 21(4) of the 2014 Act to have regard 
to the Guidance issued by the Department of Public Expenditure and Reform for the purpose 
of assisting public bodies in the establishment and maintenance of their Procedures.4 The 
amalgamation of the approaches outlined was intended to highlight any weaknesses in the 
prescribed persons’ system that undermine the purpose of the 2014 Act. By identifying these 
weaknesses, it was hoped that suggestions could be made to strengthen the system and ensure 
that it is operating effectively.  
                                                 
4 Government Reform Unit, Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, ‘Guidance under section 21(1) of 
the Protected Disclosures Act 2014 for the purpose of assisting public bodies in the performance of their 
functions under the Act’ (DPER 2016). 
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Chapter 5 addresses the practical issues for recipients of disclosures in relation to the rights 
of the discloser and the alleged wrongdoer when implementing Procedures. In order to 
explore this difficulty, four key issues were addressed in this chapter. Firstly, a study was 
undertaken of the obligations on organisations in respect of the right of a worker to have 
their identity protected, subject to certain exceptions, when making a protected disclosure. 
This study was followed by an assessment of the rules relating to anonymous disclosures 
and the advantages and disadvantages of such disclosures. Both of these issues were then 
assessed in light of the rights of the alleged wrongdoer under natural justice and fair 
procedures. A final analysis was undertaken of the rights of the alleged wrongdoer under 
data protection rules when they are the subject of a protected disclosure. The objective of 
this research was to outline the scope and nature of the rights of the discloser and the alleged 
wrongdoer, to highlight when these rights may conflict with one another, and to provide 
guidance as to the best approach that an organisation can take to this conflict, in light of the 
purpose of the 2014 Act. 
Chapter 6, the concluding chapter, summarises and evaluates the findings of the research 
undertaken for this thesis, explains the limitations to the research, and sets out 
recommendations for reform so that the purpose of the 2014 Act is achieved. It also makes 
suggestions for future research in this area. 
This thesis contributes to knowledge in a number of ways. Firstly, the 2014 Act has been 
subject to limited research due to the infancy of the legislation. Since the enactment of the 
2014 Act, there has been no comprehensive analysis undertaken of it. By examining the 2014 
Act at this early stage valuable contributions can be made to its improvement in order to 
ensure that workers making a protected disclosure are afforded the most effective statutory 
and non-statutory protections and that their disclosures are given the best opportunity of 
being addressed, before problems become embedded in the legislative system and its 
complementary framework. Further, by assessing the 2014 Act at this stage, the research 
undertaken can provide a roadmap for other researchers who are researching new 
whistleblowing laws in their own countries.  
Secondly, there has been no assessment undertaken of the entire case law under the 2014 
Act in the four-year period after its enactment. The identification of erroneous decisions and 
the highlighting of best practice will assist decision makers under the 2014 Act in their 
interpretation and application of the provisions of the 2014 Act and assist lawyers in their 
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provision of advice and representation. In addition to highlighting strengths and weaknesses 
in a litigation context, the identification of patterns emerging from the case law will also 
assist the government in its approach to amending the legislation in order to ensure that its 
purpose is being attained. Further, the ten issues selected for assessment in the case law 
under the 2014 Act can provide a framework for researchers in other countries to evaluate 
the case law under their whistleblowing law regimes. This framework can also be used by 
researchers after the transposition of the draft EU Commission Directive on whistleblowing 
into national law by Member States to assess its impact from a litigation perspective across 
the EU. 
Thirdly, the prescribed persons’ system under the 2014 Act has also not been subject to a 
comprehensive assessment. The analysis of the websites, Procedures, and protected 
disclosures annual reports of prescribed persons has not been undertaken in Ireland. The 
research undertaken for this thesis highlights a number of key concerns that require urgent 
action in order to ensure that the system is operating as intended. The assessments also 
highlight that some of the statutory obligations imposed on public bodies are not being 
complied with by prescribed persons and therefore statutory amendments, as well as the 
introduction of non-statutory guidance, and the establishment of oversight mechanisms, are 
necessary in order to ensure compliance. In addition, the method of research undertaken in 
this thesis has developed a framework for prescribed persons’ research that can be replicated 
by researchers in other jurisdictions. Also, when the draft EU Commission Directive on 
whistleblowing is transposed into national law across the EU this framework for prescribed 
persons’ research can be applied by researchers in Member States to assess the effectiveness 
of the ‘competent authority’ system established under that Directive.  
Fourthly, by addressing the practical dilemmas faced by organisations when implementing 
Procedures, in the context of the issues assessed, valuable guidance is provided for 
organisations in order to ensure that the rights of both the discloser and the alleged 
wrongdoer are respected and to reduce the risk of matters ending up before the courts. The 
identification of where conflict may arise for organisations, and the suggested solutions to 
this conflict, also assist the government in its development of statutory rules and non-
statutory material. 
This thesis concludes that the 2014 Act is not fulfilling its purpose of protecting workers 
who make a protected disclosure, whilst acknowledging that inevitably there will be change 
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to the national legislative system when the draft EU Commission Directive on 
whistleblowing is adopted. The case law analysis demonstrates that there is currently 
confusion regarding some of the provisions of the 2014 Act and that there is also an 
inconsistent application of the legislation. The prescribed persons’ system needs a radical 
overhaul to ensure that workers are aware that they can make disclosures to prescribed 
persons and prescribed persons need to understand their obligations under the 2014 Act. 
Further, the lack of information, guidance, and statutory rules regarding the conflict for 
organisations in balancing the rights of the discloser and the alleged wrongdoer when dealing 
with protected disclosures means that there is a risk that the discloser’s right to protection of 
identity, subject to certain conditions, is not being respected appropriately and is, therefore, 
increasing the worker’s risk of penalisation/ detriment for having made a protected 
disclosure. 
This thesis is divided into two volumes. Volume I consists of the chapters that are outlined 
above, whilst Volume II consists of documentation that presents the research findings 
referenced in Volume I in graphical form. Both volumes are intended to be read in 
conjunction with one another.  
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Chapter 2: The theoretical and historical context of the enactment of the Protected 
Disclosures Act 2014 
2.1 Introduction 
The Protected Disclosures Act 2014 (‘2014 Act’) was enacted on 15 July 2014. At the time 
of writing, the 2014 Act had reached its fourth anniversary. The drafting of the 2014 Act 
was influenced by both internationally developed theories relating to whistleblowing and 
whistleblower protection, as well as Ireland’s particular historical past. As outlined in 
Chapter 1, the purpose of the 2014 Act is described in its preamble as being ‘An Act to make 
provision for and in connection with the protection of persons from the taking of action 
against them in respect of the making of certain disclosures in the public interest and for 
connected purposes.’5 The theoretical and historical context underpinning the enactment of 
the 2014 Act sheds light on why this particular purpose was selected for the 2014 Act. 
In order to provide an overview of the theoretical and historical context of the enactment of 
the 2014 Act, the following issues are addressed in this chapter: 
1. Defining ‘whistleblowing’ and ‘whistleblower’. 
2. Why is there a need for whistleblowers? 
3. Why is there a need to protect whistleblowers? 
4. History of whistleblowing in Ireland. 
5. The development of whistleblowing law in Ireland. 
2.1(a) Objectives 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of both the theoretical and historical 
influences on the drafting of the 2014 Act. Both of these influences require a detailed 
examination in order to provide a basis on which the assessment of the purpose of the 2014 
Act can be undertaken in this thesis.  
2.1(b) Methodology 
The research undertaken for this chapter consisted of doctrinal research of international and 
national reports, articles, books, statutory rules, case law, and parliamentary debates. 
                                                 
5 Protected Disclosures Act 2014. 
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2.2 Defining ‘whistleblowing’ and ‘whistleblower’ 
The modern meaning of the term ‘whistleblowing’ was coined in 1972 by the US consumer 
advocate Ralph Nader, who defined it as ‘an act of a man or woman who, believing that the 
public interest overrides the interest of the organization he serves, blows the whistle that the 
organization is involved in corrupt, illegal, fraudulent or harmful activity.’6 This 
manifestation was one of the first definitions given to the term ‘whistleblowing’. However, 
nearly fifty years since its modern carnation, there is notably no universally accepted 
definition of ‘whistleblowing’ or ‘whistleblower’. The term ‘whistleblowing’ is a general, 
informal term, which is interchangeable with the term ‘disclosure’.7  
There have been many definitions of whistleblowing proposed by different interested parties, 
such as whistleblowing organisations, international non-governmental organisations, EU 
institutions, and academics alike. For example, Near and Miceli define ‘whistleblowing’ as 
‘the disclosure by organization members (former or current) of illegal, immoral or 
illegitimate practices under the control of their employers, to persons or organizations that 
may be able to effect action.’8 This definition has been described as covering any form of 
organisational wrongdoing, including wrongdoing that harms not only the organisation but 
also individuals in the organisation, and society generally.9 This definition of whistleblowing 
is considered to be the most widely used definition in whistleblowing research.10 It has been 
recognised that using a standard definition by most researchers has facilitated empirical 
investigation of the differences between whistleblowers and others reporting wrongdoing 
and of different types of whistleblowers.11 
The International Labour Organization defines ‘whistleblowing’ as the ‘reporting by 
employees or former employees of illegal, irregular, dangerous or unethical practices by 
                                                 
6 Ralph Nader, Peter J Petkas, and Kate Blackwell, Whistle Blowing: The Report of the Conference on 
Professional Responsibility (Grossman 1972) vii. 
7 Oireachtas Library and Research Service, ‘Spotlight: Disclosure of information: duty to inform and 
whistleblowing’ (L&RS 16 December 2011) 2. 
8 Janet P Near and Marcia P Miceli, ‘Organizational Dissidence: The Case of Whistle-blowing’ (1985) 4(1) 
Journal of Business Ethics 1, 4.  
9 Michael T Rehg and others, ‘Antecedents and Outcomes of Retaliation against Whistleblowers: Gender 
Differences and Power Relationships Organization Science’ (2008) 19(2) Organization Science 221, 222. 
10 David Lewis, AJ Brown and Richard Moberly, ‘Whistleblowing, its importance and the state of research’ in 
AJ Brown and others (eds), International Handbook on Whistleblowing Research (Edward Elgar 2014) 4. 
11 Marcia P Miceli, Suelette Dreyfus and Janet P Near, ‘Outsider ‘whistleblowers’: Conceptualizing and 
distinguishing ‘bell-ringing’ behaviour’ in AJ Brown and others (eds), International Handbook on 
Whistleblowing Research (Edward Elgar 2014) 71. 
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employers.’12 This definition is a narrow one as it refers to reporting by ‘employees’ and 
‘former employees’ only, as opposed to a wide range of workers and it does not refer to 
whom the report should be made. It also limits the wrongdoing to actions by the employer 
specifically. 
The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe’s Committee on Legal Affairs and 
Human Rights defines ‘whistleblowers’ as ‘concerned individuals sounding the alarm in 
order to stop wrongdoings that place fellow human beings at risk’.13 This definition 
underscores the position adopted either explicitly or implicitly in numerous whistleblowing 
statutes that protection should not extend to persons who make disclosures of a personal 
grievance only.14 
Transparency International15 has developed a guiding definition of ‘whistleblowing’ in their 
‘International Principles for Whistleblower Legislation’ and states that it is ‘the disclosure 
of information related to corrupt, illegal, fraudulent or hazardous activities being committed 
in or by public or private sector organisations16 – which are of concern to or threaten the 
public interest – to individuals or entities believed to be able to effect action.’17 This 
definition is considered to be a middle of the road definition of the slightly broader basic 
definition of that developed by Near and Miceli.18  
The draft EU Commission Directive on whistleblowing refers to ‘whistleblowers’ in its 
explanatory memorandum as being ‘persons who report (within the organisation concerned 
or to an outside authority) or disclose (to the public) information on a wrongdoing obtained 
in a work-related context’.19 This definition emphasises the workplace context of 
                                                 
12 International Labour Organization, ‘ILO Thesaurus’ (ILO) <http://ilo.multites.net/default.asp> accessed 19 
February 2019. 
13 Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution 1729 (2010) Protection of “whistle-blowers”, para 
1. 
14 The issue of personal grievances in the context of protected disclosures are addressed in Chapter 3. 
15 Transparency International is a politically non-partisan anti-corruption organisation with more than 100 
chapters across the world. Its mission is to stop corruption and promote transparency, accountability, and 
integrity at all levels and across all sectors of society. For more information, see: <www.transparency.org> 
accessed 17 February 2019. 
16 This includes perceived or potential wrongdoing. 
17 Transparency International, ‘International Principles for Whistleblower Legislation, Best Practices for Laws 
to Support Whistleblowers and Support Whistleblowing in the Public Interest’ (TI 2013) 4. 
18 David Lewis, AJ Brown and Richard Moberly, ‘Whistleblowing, its importance and the state of research’ in 
AJ Brown and others (eds), International Handbook on Whistleblowing Research (Edward Elgar 2014) 4. 
19 Explanatory Memorandum to the Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on the protection of persons reporting on breaches of Union law, 2018/0106 (COD) 1. 
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whistleblowing but unlike some other definitions, acknowledges that disclosures made in 
the wider public domain can also constitute whistleblowing. 
In the Irish context, the Oireachtas Library and Research Service, which carried out an 
examination in 2011 into disclosures of information, defines ‘whistleblowing’ as ‘a process 
whereby a person perceives an activity to be illegal, unethical or immoral and discloses this 
activity.’20 Whilst the Company Law Review Group (‘CLRG’)21 stated in its 2007 annual 
report that ‘whistleblowing’ is usually interpreted to mean ‘the reporting, in good faith, of a 
breach or potential breach of the law, and the according of a measure of protection to the 
person reporting, against penalisation by the entity about whom the report has been made.’22 
Both of these definitions pre-date the 2014 Act and therefore conflict somewhat with the 
2014 Act, but as highlighted in the CLRG definition and reflected in the provisions of the 
2014 Act, whistleblowing concerns both a disclosure and the affording of protection to 
disclosers. 
Lewis et al recognise that the variations in the definition of ‘whistleblowing’ and 
‘whistleblower’ highlight that the ‘debate is alive and well regarding the reasons for, and 
nature of, the recognition that societies are giving to the role of individual citizens in 
reporting wrongdoing by or within their organizations and institutions.’23 They emphasise 
that there are two issues underpinning these debates. First, there is a growing recognition 
that individuals who make disclosures need support and protection, and second, there is a 
particular value to the information disclosed by such persons as being the ‘trigger for 
institutional, regulatory and societal responses to deal with wrongdoing.’24 
There may not be a universally accepted legal definition of ‘whistleblowing’, but it is 
recognised that the concept of ‘whistleblowing’ must be presented in a clear and 
comprehensive manner in whistleblowing legislation.25 The Australian Senate Select 
                                                 
20 Oireachtas Library and Research Service, ‘Spotlight: Disclosure of information: duty to inform and 
whistleblowing’ (L&RS 16 December 2011) 2. 
21 The Company Law Review Group is a statutory advisory expert body that advises the Minister for Business, 
Enterprise & Innovation on the review and development of company law in Ireland. For more information, see: 
<www.clrg.org> accessed 30 January 2019. 
22 Company Law Review Group, ‘Report of the Company Law Review Group 2007’ (CLRG 2007) para 6.4.1. 
23 David Lewis, AJ Brown and Richard Moberly, ‘Whistleblowing, its importance and the state of research’ in 
AJ Brown and others (eds), International Handbook on Whistleblowing Research (Edward Elgar 2014) 5. 
24 ibid.  
25 The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe’s Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights in 
its Resolution on the protection of whistleblowers invited all Member States to review their whistleblower 
protection and in doing so keeping in mind the principle that ‘Whistle-blowing legislation should be 
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Committee on Public Interest Whistleblowing emphasised that ‘what is important is not the 
definition of the term, but the definition of the circumstances and conditions under which 
employees who disclose wrongdoing should be entitled to protection from retaliation.’26 
A 2011 study prepared by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(‘OECD’),27 which examined a number of legal definitions of ‘whistleblowing’, concluded 
that key characteristics common to a legal definition of ‘whistleblowing’ could include: (i) 
the disclosure of wrongdoings connected to the workplace; (ii) a public interest dimension, 
eg the reporting of criminal offences, unethical practices, etc, rather than a personal 
grievance; and (iii) the reporting of wrongdoings through designated channels and/or to 
designated persons.28 
These key characteristics, as identified by the OECD, are reflected in the provisions of the 
2014 Act. In order for a disclosure to fall within the scope of the 2014 Act, a worker must 
make a disclosure of ‘relevant information’ through one or more specific disclosure 
channels.29 Information will be considered ‘relevant information’ if (i) in the reasonable 
belief of the worker, the information tends to show one or more relevant wrongdoings, and 
(ii) the information came to the attention of the worker in connection with their 
employment.30 
As the aim of this research is to determine whether the 2014 Act is fulfilling its purpose of 
providing protection to disclosers, as set out in its preamble, the statutory definition of a 
protected disclosure (ie whistleblowing) under the 2014 Act is used throughout the thesis for 
the purpose of the research. This definition will also serve as the basis for any future research 
of the 2014 Act undertaken by the researcher. This approach will ensure consistency and 
                                                 
comprehensive’. Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution 1729 (2010) Protection of “whistle-
blowers”, para 6.1. 
26 The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, ‘In the Public Interest, Report of the Senate Select 
Committee on Public Interest Whistleblowing’ (Commonwealth of Australia August 1994) para 2.12. 
27 The mission of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development is to promote policies that 
will improve the economic and social well-being of people around the world. It provides a forum in which 
governments can work together to share experiences and seek solutions to common problems. For more 
information, see: <www.oced.org> accessed 17 February 2019. 
28 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, ‘G20 Anti-Corruption Action Plan Protection 
of Whistleblowers, Study on Whistleblower Protection Framework, Compendium of Best Practices and 
Guiding Principles for Legislation’ (OECD 2011) 8. 
29 Protected Disclosures Act 2014, s 5(1). 
30 ibid s 5(2). 
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will allow appropriate comparisons to be made between the research undertaken in this thesis 
and in future research undertaken by the researcher.  
2.3 Why is there a need for whistleblowers? 
Transparency International has recognised that early disclosure of wrongdoing or the risk of 
wrongdoing can protect human rights, help to save lives, and safeguard the rule of 
law.31  Public, private, and non-profit sector workers have access to up-to-date information 
concerning their workplaces’ practices and are usually the first to recognise ethical or legal 
violations. Therefore, the role that a whistleblower plays is indispensable in uncovering 
those wrongdoings.  
The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe’s Committee on Legal Affairs and 
Human Rights recognised the important role played by whistleblowers in Resolution 
1729(2010) on the basis that ‘their actions provide an opportunity to strengthen 
accountability and bolster the fight against corruption and mismanagement, both in the 
public and private sectors.’32 
Further, in 2014, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe adopted 
Recommendation (2014)7 on the Protection of Whistleblowers.33 This Recommendation 
again emphasised the essential role played by whistleblowers and provides that the 
Committee of Ministers recognise that ‘individuals who report or disclose information on 
threats or harm to the public interest (“whistleblowers”) can contribute to strengthening 
transparency and democratic accountability.’34  
Disclosing wrongdoing in public and private sectors has become an evolving interest in the 
governments of OECD countries.  The OECD has emphasised that by putting facilities in 
place that encourage the reporting of misconduct by employees substantially helps 
organisations to both detect and respond swiftly to wrongdoings such as fraud and corruption 
in the private sector and mismanagement and misuse of public funds in the public sector.35 
                                                 
31Transparency International, ‘Whistleblowing, Solution’ (TI) 
<www.transparency.org/topic/detail/whistleblowing> accessed 20 February 2019. 
32 Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution 1729 (2010) Protection of “whistle -blowers”,  
para 1.  
33 Council of Europe, Recommendation CM/REC (2014)7 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on 
the Protection of Whistleblowers, adopted by the Committee of Ministers on the 30 April 2014 at the 1198 
meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies (SPDP Council of Europe 2014).  
34 ibid. 
35 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, ‘G20 Anti-Corruption Action Plan Protection 
of Whistleblowers, Study on Whistleblower Protection Framework, G20 Compendium of Best Practices and 
Guiding Principles for Legislation on the Protection of Whistleblowers’ (OECD 2011) 4. 
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The OECD has also highlighted that encouraging and facilitating whistleblowing helps 
authorities monitor compliance and detect violations of anti-corruption laws.36 Further, the 
OECD has stressed that protecting whistleblowers from retaliation is integral to efforts to 
combat corruption, promote public sector integrity and accountability, and support a clean 
business environment.37  
Whistleblowing is considered to be among the most effective, if not the most effective means 
to expose and remedy corruption, fraud, and other types of wrongdoing in the public and 
private sectors.38 In Ireland, the Mahon Tribunal in its Final Report expressed the view that 
whistleblower protection plays an important role in the detection of corruption offences.39 
This view is reflected in a number of different studies. For example, a worldwide survey of 
KPMG professionals who investigated 750 fraudsters between March 2013 and August 
2015, uncovered that 44% of fraudsters were detected as a result of a tip, complaint, or a 
formal whistleblowing hotline.40 Further, the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners 
identified that in 2,690 cases of real occupational fraud, from 125 countries, and in twenty-
three industry categories, tips were by far the most common initial detection method, with 
40% of occupational fraud being detected as a result of a tip.41 Of those tips, 53% came from 
employees, whilst 14% were anonymous.42 The report also identified that 50% of corruption 
came to light because of tips.43  
The important role played by whistleblowers generally has been highlighted in a 
comprehensive research project carried out by the University of Greenwich and Protect.44 
                                                 
36 ibid. 
37 ibid. 
38 Blueprint for Free Speech, ‘Whistleblower Protection Rules in G20 Countries: The Next Action Plan’ 
(Blueprint for Free Speech 2014) 11. Blueprint for Free Speech is an Australian based, internationally focused, 
not-for-profit organisation, concentrating on research into ‘freedoms’ law. Its areas of research include public 
interest disclosures, defamation, censorship, right to publish, shield laws, media law, internet freedom, 
intellectual property, and freedom of information. The organisation has expertise in whistleblowing legislation 
around the world, with a database of analyses of more than twenty countries’ whistleblowing laws, protections, 
and gaps. For more information, see: <www.blueprintforfreespeech.net> accessed 17 February 2019. 
39 Tribunal of Inquiry into Certain Planning Matters and Payments, Final Report (2012) 2531. Frank Dunlop 
and James Gogarty blew the whistle on corruption in the planning process in Ireland from the late 1980s to the 
late 1990s, which resulted in the establishment of the Flood/Mahon Tribunal. Full report is available at: 
<https://planningtribunal.ie/reports/> accessed 17 February 2019.   
40 KPMG International, ‘Global profiles of the fraudster: Technology enables and weak controls fuel the fraud’ 
(KPMG May 2016) 9. 
41 Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, ‘Report to the Nations 2018, Global Study on Occupational Fraud 
and Abuse’ (ACFE 2018) 17. 
42 ibid 4.  
43 ibid 13. 
44 University of Greenwich and Protect, ‘Whistleblowing: The Inside Story A study of the experiences of 1,000 
whistleblowers’ (Protect May 2013). This project looked at the experiences of 1,000 whistleblowers in the 
United Kingdom. The experiences of whistleblowers were coded at the point of contact when the whistleblower 
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The research project found that the outcome in 54% of cases was that the wrongdoing 
disclosed by the whistleblower ceased to occur.45 In 74% of the cases, the wrongdoing 
disclosed was causing harm to not only the organisation involved but also to the wider 
public.46 According to the findings of this project, prior to the whistleblower contacting 
Protect, in 33% of the cases, the wrongdoing had been ongoing for between six to twenty-
four months; in 10% of the cases the wrongdoing had been ongoing for between two to five 
years; and in 4% of the cases the wrongdoing had been ongoing for more than five years.47 
Further, the incidence of recurring wrongdoings was a staggering 86% as opposed to a one-
off occurrence that amounted to 14% of the cases.48 These figures indicate that without the 
whistleblower coming forward, there was a significant risk that the wrongdoing would recur 
over a notable period. Nonetheless, it must be remarked that in 43% of the cases, the 
wrongdoing had been taking place for less than six months, and in 10% of the cases, the 
wrongdoing was anticipated but had not occurred. This finding indicates that whistleblowers 
are motivated to speak up at an early stage if they witness wrongdoing and can act as an 
early warning system for an organisation.49 
In Ireland, the important role played by whistleblowers has been highlighted by the European 
Commission, which estimated that comprehensive and well-implemented whistleblower 
protection in Ireland would potentially allow for the identification of corrupted funds in 
public procurement in the range of €57.4 million to €95.6 million annually.50 In the 2016 
                                                 
sought advice from Protect through their advice line between 20 August 2009 and 30 September 2010. Protect 
is an independent authority in the UK which seeks to ensure that concerns about malpractice are properly raised 
and addressed in the workplace. It was established in 2003. It pursues its aim by providing a free confidential 
advice line, support, and services to organisations, policy work, and public education activities. It was also 
involved in settling the scope and detail of the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998. For more information, see: 
<www.pcaw.org.uk/> accessed 17 February 2019. 
45 ibid 32. The results for the final outcomes for the wrongdoing in this research project were based on thirty-
nine cases. The data were based on small numbers due to the way that Protect take information from callers. 
Protect offer advice and support to whistleblowers during their whistleblowing journey but rarely receive 
feedback from the whistleblower at the end of the process. Thus, Protect has a lot of information about the 
circumstances that cause the whistleblower to raise their concern and what affect this has on them and their 
working lives but it has relatively little information in relation to the final outcomes. Protect are unable to 
follow up in many cases due to the high volume of cases received by them and due to the limitations of their 
resources. 
46 ibid 10. This figure is based on information for 994 of the cases in the sample. The result of 74% is made up 
as follows: in 57% of the cases there was only outsider harm, whilst in 17% of the cases there was both outsider 
and insider harm. 
47 ibid 11. These figures are based on information for 530 of the cases in the sample. 
48 ibid. These figures are based on information for 998 of the cases in the sample. 
49 ibid. 
50 Directorate-General for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs (European Commission), 
Estimating the Economic Benefits of Whistleblower Protection in Public Procurement Final Report (European 
Commission July 2017) 68. The report states further that ‘As not all corruption and unlawful actions result in 
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Transparency International Ireland (‘TII’)51 Integrity at Work (‘IAW’) survey,52 it found that 
more than one in ten employees have reported wrongdoing at work.53 It was suggested that 
this equated to some 160,000 Irish workers having blown the whistle at work at some point 
during their career.54 This finding highlights the prevalence of wrongdoing being identified 
and disclosed by workers in Ireland. 
2.4 Why is there a need to protect whistleblowers?  
Legal, organisational, and national cultural contexts often discourage employees from 
making disclosures about alleged wrongdoings that are causing them concern. 
Whistleblowers may face severe personal and professional retaliation for making a 
disclosure, including dismissal, psychological damage, threats, or even physical harm. 
‘Retaliation’ may be defined as ‘undesirable action taken against a whistleblower-in direct 
response to the whistle blowing-who reported wrongdoing internally or externally, outside 
the organization’.55 
The Mahon Tribunal in Ireland, in its Final Report, noted in respect of whistleblowers that 
‘Corruption is frequently an offence committed by wealthy and/or powerful members of the 
Community and those reporting it may well fear the consequences of doing so for their own 
careers and employment prospects. Whistleblower protection may help alleviate those fears, 
thus facilitating the reporting of corruption offences.’56 
                                                 
a loss of public funds, we estimated that the amount of public funds that could be potentially recovered in the 
area of public procurement amount to €10.3 million to €17.2 million annually.’ 50 ibid. 
51 Transparency International Ireland, founded in 2004, is a chapter of the politically non-partisan anti-
corruption organisation, Transparency International. Its vision for Ireland is described as being ‘an Ireland that 
is open and fair – and where entrusted power is used in the interest of everyone. TI Ireland’s mission is to 
empower people with the support they need to promote integrity and stop corruption in all its forms.’ For more 
information, see: <www.transparency.ie> accessed 17 February 2019. 
52 In 2016, Transparency International Ireland carried out their Integrity at Work survey, which was conducted 
on its behalf by Behaviour & Attitudes (Behaviour & Attitudes is Ireland’s leading independent market 
research agency. For more information, see: <https://banda.ie/> accessed 4 October 2018). The purpose of the 
survey was to gauge Irish employers and employees attitudes towards and awareness of whistleblowing, and 
of the 2014 Act. This was the first survey of its kind conducted at national level and included 878 employees 
and 350 employers from the private and not-for-profit sectors. Transparency International Ireland, ‘Speak Up 
Report 2017’ (TII 2017) 36. 
53 ibid. 
54 ibid. 
55 Michael T Rehg and others, ‘Antecedents and Outcomes of Retaliation against Whistleblowers: Gender 
Differences and Power Relationships Organization Science’ (2008) 19(2) Organization Science 221, 222. 
56 Tribunal of Inquiry into Certain Planning Matters and Payments, Final Report (2012) 2659. 
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Further, the Nyberg Report into Ireland’s banking crisis found that a contributor to the crisis 
was that those expressing contrarian views often risked sanctions and loss of employment. 
It stated that: 
The very limited number of warning voices was largely ignored … It also appears 
that some stayed silent in part to avoid possible sanctions. The Commission suspects, 
on the basis of discussions held with a wide number of people, that there may have 
been a strong belief in Ireland that contrarians, non-team players, fractious observers 
and whistleblowers would be informally (though sometimes even publicly) 
sanctioned or ignored, regardless of the quality of their analysis or their place in 
organisations.57  
Transparency International also identified this finding in its assessment of the National 
Integrity System in Ireland, where it stated:  
In the context of Ireland’s banking crisis, it is notable that only a small number of 
individuals with knowledge of serious malpractice and corporate governance failures 
came forward with information. Although cultural factors may have contributed to 
this silence, there is also substantial evidence to suggest that fear of retaliation is a 
significant factor inhibiting people from speaking out in the public interest.58 
Comprehensive protection, including both the legal safeguard and the supporting 
institutional assistance for whistleblowers, has become an increased concern of OECD 
countries. At the Seoul Summit in November 2010, G20 Leaders identified the protection of 
whistleblowers as one of the high priority areas in their global anti-corruption agenda.59 
Further, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe’s Committee on Legal Affairs 
and Human Rights, in recognising that potential whistleblowers are often discouraged by a 
fear of reprisal or the lack of follow-up given to their warnings, unanimously adopted a 
resolution on whistleblowing calling on all Member States to introduce comprehensive laws 
to protect whistleblowers.60 Also, International Conventions, such as the UN Convention 
against Corruption,61 the Council of Europe Civil Law Convention on Corruption,62 the 
                                                 
57 Commission of Investigation into the Banking Sector in Ireland, ‘Misjudging Risk: Causes of the Systematic 
Banking Crisis in Ireland, Report of the Commission of Investigation into the Banking Sector in Ireland’ 
(March 2011) 97. 
58 Transparency International, ‘National Integrity Systems, Country Addendum, Ireland’ (TI 2012) 15. 
59 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, ‘G20 Anti-Corruption Action Plan Protection 
of Whistleblowers, Study on Whistleblower Protection Framework, G20 Compendium of Best Practices and 
Guiding Principles for Legislation on the Protection of Whistleblowers’ (OECD 2011) 2. 
60 Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution 1729 (2010) Protection of “whistle -blowers”.  
61 UN General Assembly, Convention against Corruption, 21 Nov 2003, A/RES/58/4, art 33. 
62 Council of Europe Civil Law Convention on Corruption 4 November 1999, Eur TS No 174, art 9. 
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Inter-American Convention against Corruption,63 and others,64 have recognised the 
fundamental importance in protecting whistleblowers and commit the signatories to 
implement appropriate whistleblower protection legislation. Most recently, the draft EU 
Commission Directive on whistleblowing has set down minimum standards of 
harmonisation on whistleblower protection across Member States and will require all 
Member States to comply with these minimum standards, with the possibility to introduce 
or retain more favourable provisions regarding the rights of whistleblowers.65 
It has been recognised, however, that the rate of whistleblower suffering varies 
dramatically.66 There have been a number of studies conducted across different national 
contexts, sectors, organisation cultures, and so forth, which looked at the rates of suffering 
by whistleblowers.  
What has been identified in respect of the different studies is that when a study consists of a 
small and unrepresentative sample of respondents, there is a high rate of suffering identified, 
especially if the sample is explicitly chosen from contexts where it is known that the 
whistleblowing event has gone wrong.67 For example, in a South African study, all eighteen 
whistleblowers had suffered.68 Further, in an Australian study, thirty-four of thirty-five 
whistleblowers had suffered,69 whilst in a Swedish study of twenty-eight public sector 
whistleblowers, twenty-four had suffered.70 In the study carried out by the University of 
Greenwich and Protect of the experiences of one thousand whistleblowers in the UK, it was 
found that in 327 cases, 69% of whistleblowers directly indicated that their personal position 
changed for the worse after their first attempt to raise a concern.71 Although this study 
                                                 
63 Inter-American Convention against Corruption, 29 Mar 1996, 35 ILM 724, art 3. 
64  African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, 11 July 2003, 43 ILM 1, art 5; 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, ‘Anti-Corruption Action Plan for Asia and the 
Pacific’ (OECD 30 November 2001) pillar 3; Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption 27 
January 1999, Eur TS No 173, art 22; OECD, Convention on Bribery of Foreign Official in International 
Business Transactions, 17 Dec 1997, 37 ILM 1, annex 6; Southern African Development Community, Protocol 
against Corruption, 14 August 2001, art 4. 
65 Explanatory Memorandum to the Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on the protection of persons reporting on breaches of Union law, 2018/0106 (COD) 6. 
66 Marcia P Miceli, Janet P Near and Terry Morehead Dworkin, Whistle-blowing in Organizations (Routledge 
2008) 23. 
67 Rodney Smith, ‘Whistleblowers and suffering’ in AJ Brown and others (eds), International Handbook on 
Whistleblowing Research (Edward Elgar 2014) 233. 
68 Tina Uys, ‘Rational Loyalty and Whistleblowing: the South African Context’ (2008) 56(6) Current 
Sociology 904, 909. 
69 K Jean Lennane, ‘Whistleblowing: A Health Issue’ (1993) 307(6905) British Medical Journal 667, 668. 
70 Ulla-Carin Hedin and Sven-Axel Månsson, ‘Whistleblowing Processes in Swedish Public Organisations: 
Complaints and Consequences’ 15(2) European Journal of Social Work 151, 160. 
71 University of Greenwich and Protect, ‘Whistleblowing: The Inside Story A study of the experiences of 1,000 
whistleblowers’ (Protect May 2013) 27.  
17 
 
concerned a greater number of respondents than in the aforementioned studies, the sample 
consisted of whistleblowers who were seeking advice from Protect, and therefore, are more 
likely to be in a position where the whistleblowing event had gone wrong. 
Studies that consist of a larger, systematic, sampling of workforce also have limitations as 
to their value regarding the rates of suffering experienced by whistleblowers, as not all of 
the workforce sampled will have observed wrongdoing and of those who have, a smaller 
subsample will have reported the alleged wrongdoing and furthermore, a smaller subsample 
again will have suffered.72 For example, from the analysis of data collected from 
questionnaires completed by a stratified random sample of federal employees in 1980, 1983, 
and 1992, reprisal was reported by 17% to 38% of identified whistleblowers.73 In another 
US study in 2013, which surveyed 6,420 employees in the for-profit sector, 21% of those 
who reported misconduct that they observed in the workplace indicated that they faced some 
form of retribution as a result.74 Similarly, an Australian study of whistleblowers in the 
public sector in 2006 found that of 877 employees, 22% were treated badly by co-workers, 
managers, or both.75 Further, the Freedom to Speak Up review of whistleblowing in the 
NHS, which received 19,764 responses to its survey,76 found that of 4,292 staff in NHS trusts 
who had raised concerns, 19.7% reported being ignored by management, 9.1% reported 
being ignored by co-workers, 17.3% reported being victimised by management, and 8.2% 
reported being victimised by co-workers.77 With regard to primary care staff, the review 
found that of 973 staff in GP practices and community pharmacies who had raised concerns, 
18.8% reported being ignored by management, 7% reported being ignored by co-workers, 
16.2% reported being victimised by management, and 6% reported being victimised by co-
workers.78 Remarkably, in a study of whistleblowing in Norway, which consisted of sending 
                                                 
72 Rodney Smith, ‘Whistleblowers and suffering’ in AJ Brown and others (eds), International Handbook on 
Whistleblowing Research (Edward Elgar 2014) 233. 
73 Marcia P Miceli and others, ‘Can Laws Protect Whistle-Blowers? Results of a Naturally Occurring Field 
Experiment’ (1999) 26(1) Work Occupations 129, 142. 
74 Ethics Resource Center, National Business Ethics Survey of the US Workplace (Ethics Resource Center 
2014) 13. 
75 Rodney Smith and AJ Brown, ‘The good, the bad and the ugly: whistleblowing outcomes’ in AJ Brown (ed), 
Whistleblowing in the Australian Public Sector Enhancing the theory and practice of internal witness 
management in public sector organisations (ANU E Press 2008) 123. 
76 This figure of 19,764 responses consisted of 15,120 staff in NHS trusts and 4,644 staff working in primary 
care, ie GP practices and community pharmacies. David Lewis, Alessio D’Angelo and Lisa Clarke, ‘The 
independent review into creating an open and honest reporting culture in the NHS, Quantitative Research 
Report, Surveys of NHS staff, trusts and stakeholders’ (January 2015) 7. This report is available at: 
<http://freedomtospeakup.org.uk/our-research/> accessed 28 March 2019. 
77 ibid 33.  
78 ibid 59.  
18 
 
a questionnaire to a representative sample of the Norwegian workforce in 2005, found that 
of 252 whistleblowers, only 3.2% indicated that they suffered retaliation from leaders or 
board.79 
The first national survey conducted in Ireland on the topic of whistleblowing in the private 
and non-profit sectors, asked the question ‘Did sharing your concern have an impact on how 
you were treated?’80 Of the 101 respondents to this question, 50% responded that it had no 
impact on them, 28% said that it had a positive impact on them, whilst 21% said it had a 
negative impact on them.81 These findings again undermine the perception that 
whistleblowers suffer and give weight to the statement made by De Maria that ‘The non-
suffering whistleblower is a contradiction in terms’.82  
However, an important factor that impinges on the assessment of rates of suffering and 
retaliation in the studies outlined is that ‘Researchers have not developed a consensual 
approach to categorizing and measuring specific types of whistleblower suffering’.83  This 
omission, coupled with the different contexts of the various surveys of whistleblowers 
experiences, means that the rates of retaliation cannot be explicitly established with regards 
to all whistleblowers.  
Even if, as Smith argues, that ‘Contrary to the popular wisdom, most whistleblowers do not 
suffer’,84 there is still a necessity to ensure the protection of those whistleblowers who may 
suffer. As Miceli and Near emphasise, the suggestion that most whistleblowers do not suffer 
‘is not to deny that retaliation occurs or to minimize its devastating impact where it does 
occur … any retaliation against a whistleblower who is acting in good faith is too much 
retaliation.’85 It has been identified that the risk of retaliation may be based on different 
                                                 
79 Bjørkelo and others, ‘Silence is golden? Characteristics and experiences of self-reported whistleblowers’ 
(2011) 20(2) European Journal of Work and Organizational 206, 219. 
80 Transparency International Ireland, ‘Speak Up Report 2017’ (TII 2017) 36. 
81 ibid. 
82 William De Maria, Deadly Disclosures: Whistleblowing and the Ethical Meltdown of Australia (Wakefield 
Press 1999) 25. 
83 Rodney Smith, ‘Whistleblowers and suffering’ in AJ Brown and others (eds), International Handbook on 
Whistleblowing Research (Edward Elgar 2014) 234. Smith suggests that ‘The development of standard 
questionnaire items on suffering, whistleblower characteristics, organizational characteristics, reporting paths, 
and the like is essential if we want to know whether, for example, national cultures really do affect the rates, 
types and causes of whistleblower suffering. The same point holds true if we are to make comparisons of 
whistleblower suffering across the public, private and not-for-profit community sectors, or within different 
organizational cultures (police versus civilian, for example,) or in the same sorts of organizations over time 
(the Ethics Resource Center surveys of US companies are a start in this last area)’. ibid 248. 
84 ibid 234. 
85 Marcia P Miceli and Janet P Near, Blowing the whistle: the organizational and legal implications for 
companies and their employees (Lexington Books 1992) 81. 
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factors, as Near and Miceli explain ‘the power of the whistle-blower influences the level of 
retaliation suffered in some situations, as do characteristics of the wrongdoing itself and 
characteristics of the whistle-blowing process.’86  
The issue of protection for whistleblowers is not only important with regards to ensuring that 
individuals do not suffer retribution for their actions but also to minimise the risk of 
deterrence to others from coming forward when they observe wrongdoing in the workplace. 
There are mixed findings as to the deterrent effect of retaliation on whistleblowing. For 
example, in a study of twenty-one articles examining whistleblowing and retaliation against 
whistleblowers,87 it found that the threat of retaliation is negatively related to the intent to 
blow the whistle, whilst appearing to be unrelated to actual whistleblowing behaviours.88 
The researchers noted that the ‘threat or fear of retaliation appears to greatly reduce the 
likelihood that an observer of wrongdoing will intend to blow the whistle, but does not 
impact actual whistleblowing. Therefore, it appears that once the intention to whistle-blow 
is formed, fear of retaliation for whistleblowing does not serve to de-motivate action.’89  
Further, in a study of 725 executives and managers in the US, which examined a variety of 
individual, organisational, and moral perception variables concerning the likelihood of their 
blowing the whistle on less serious fraud, found that: 
The present study also concludes that, of all the variables examined, being an 
upperlevel or middle-level manager were the other two variables that have the most 
powerful influence on the likelihood of blowing the whistle on less serious fraud. 
This is consistent with prior research in this area, which concluded that interlevel 
differences exist between upper-level, middle-level, and first-level managers on 
whistleblowing with upper-level managers generally less threatened by fear of 
retaliation and more willing to blow the whistle.90 
Data from three surveys of federal employees conducted since 1980 by the US Merit 
Systems Protection Board (‘MSPB’) that were analysed by Near and Miceli found that 
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retaliation is used by managers to discourage potential future whistleblowers.91 They also 
noted, however, that when comparing the differences in z-scores between 1980 (the baseline 
data collected as the Civil Service Reform Act 1978 was implemented) and 1992, the rate of 
whistleblowing increased from 26% to 48%; anonymous versus identified whistleblowing 
increased from 26% to 45%; and retaliation increased from 17% to 38%.92 These findings 
highlight that although the rates of retaliation were increasing, so were the rates of 
whistleblowing, thus indicating that retaliation is not always a deterrent to blowing the 
whistle. Nonetheless, this has to be read in conjunction with the findings that the rate of 
anonymous versus identified whistleblowing also increased, indicating that whistleblowing 
may increase if anonymous whistleblowing is facilitated, thus reducing the risk of retaliation. 
In the IAW study conducted in Ireland, it identified that 33% of employees surveyed said 
that a key influencing factor for reporting wrongdoing in the workplace is if they could report 
anonymously. However, 28% of the employees surveyed said that a key influencing factor 
was if they were guaranteed confidentiality, whilst only 6% said that a key influencing factor 
was if they knew they would be compensated for any harm they might suffer as a result of 
making their report.93  
Liyanarachchi and Newdick explain that ‘Despite the mixed nature of empirical results, the 
general pattern is that the harsher the retaliation, the less likely an individual is to blow the 
whistle. Accordingly, the strength of potential retaliation is likely to influence an individual's 
decision to blow the whistle.’94 This position is substantiated by the findings of a study 
conducted by Liyanarachchi and Newdick on the impact of moral reasoning and retaliation 
on whistleblowing.95 The findings indicated that the mean propensity to blow the whistle 
increases as the threat of retaliation becomes weak96 and led the researchers to conclude that 
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the strength of retaliation has a significant impact on participants’ propensity to blow the 
whistle.97  
In 2017, the European Commission conducted a public consultation in advance of the 
drafting of its draft Directive on whistleblowing. Of the 5,707 respondents, 99.4% agreed 
that whistleblowers should be protected.98 This finding indicates that although not all 
whistleblowers suffer as a result of making their disclosure, there is still a strong belief that 
protection is necessary and warranted. 
In addition to protection from retaliation and minimising the deterrent effect of retaliation, 
whistleblower protection legislation is also necessary to protect a person’s right to freedom 
of expression under art 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights (‘ECHR’)99 and 
Article 40.6.1(i) of Bunreacht na hÉireann (‘Irish Constitution’).100 The European Court of 
Human Rights (‘ECtHR’) has deemed the freedom of expression as constituting one of the 
essential foundations of a democratic society, stating that it is ‘one of the basic conditions 
for its progress and for the development of every man’,101 and explained that this includes 
expressions that may be offensive, shocking, or disturbing.102 It has been recognised that due 
to the subjective belief element of whistleblowing that whistleblowing qualifies as speech 
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and therefore could attract the protection of freedom of expression.103 The ECtHR has 
confirmed that art 10 ECHR applies to the workplace.104 This protection, however, is not 
absolute and can be subject to interference, as long as the interference is prescribed by law, 
pursues a legitimate aim, and is necessary in a democratic society. In order to determine 
whether an interference is lawful in a whistleblowing case, the ECtHR has generally applied 
six criteria,105 which are distilled by and set out in the explanatory memorandum to the 
Council of Europe’s Recommendation (2014)7 on the Protection of Whistleblowers, as:  
i. whether the person who has made the disclosure had at his or her disposal 
alternative channels for making the disclosure; 
 
ii. the public interest in the disclosed information. The Court in Guja v. Moldova 
noted that “in a democratic system the acts or omissions of government must be 
subject to the close scrutiny not only of the legislative and judicial authorities but 
also of the media and public opinion. The interest which the public may have in 
particular information can sometimes be so strong as to override even a legally 
imposed duty of confidence”; 
 
iii. the authenticity of the disclosed information. The Court in Guja v. Moldova 
reiterated that freedom of expression carries with it duties and responsibilities and 
any person who chooses to disclose information must carefully verify, to the extent 
permitted by the circumstances, that it is accurate and reliable. The Court in Bucur 
and Toma v. Romania bore in mind Resolution 1729 (2010) of the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe and the need to protect whistleblowers on the 
basis that they had “reasonable grounds” to believe that the information disclosed 
was true; 
 
iv. detriment to the employer. Is the public disclosure so important in a democratic 
society that it outweighs the detriment suffered by the employer? In both Guja v. 
Moldova and Bucur and Toma v. Romania the employer was a public body and the 
Court balanced the public interest in maintaining public confidence in these public 
bodies against the public interest in disclosing information on their wrongdoing; 
 
v. whether the disclosure is made in good faith. The Court in Guja v. Moldova stated 
that “an act motivated by a personal grievance or a personal antagonism or the 
expectation of personal advantage, including pecuniary gain, would not justify a 
particularly strong level of protection”; 
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vi. the severity of the sanction imposed on the person who made the disclosure and 
its consequences.106 
 
The Guja principles, as reflected in the explanatory memorandum above, have been 
described as setting a ‘relatively high threshold for applicants to overcome before protection 
may be obtained.’107 Lewis et al argue that this protection is ‘not an adequate substitute for 
providing specific incentives or protection for the bulk of whistleblowing’108 and that in 
advance of making their disclosure, whistleblowers must know whether their actions will be 
supported and what remedies may be afforded to them.109 The proportionality test applied 
by the ECtHR means that the discloser’s freedom of expression would be weighed against 
the interests of the employer, thus resulting in uncertainty of protection for disclosers. The 
proportionality test for whistleblowing cases established in Guja, has been applied in 
subsequent cases, such as, in the case of Heinish v Germany,110 where the ECtHR stated ‘the 
Court finds that the public interest in having information about shortcomings in the provision 
of institutional care for the elderly by a State-owned company is so important in a democratic 
society that it outweighs the interest in protecting the latter’s business reputation and 
interests.’111 Also, in Rubins v Latvia,112 although the ECtHR did not apply the Guja 
principles in their entirety, it applied a proportionality test and stated: 
In the context of employment disputes the Court has noted that employees owe to 
their employer a duty of loyalty, reserve and discretion (see, for instance, Kudeshkina 
v. Russia, no. 29492/05,§ 85, 26 February 2009, Heinisch v. Germany, 
no. 28274/08, § 64, ECHR 2011 (extracts) ), and that in striking a fair balance 
the limits of the right to freedom of expression and the reciprocal rights and 
obligations specific to employment contracts and the professional environment must 
be taken into account (see Palomo Sánchez and Others, cited above, § 74).113  
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Thus, when weighing up the conflicting interests of an employee and an employer, the nature 
and extent of the duty of loyalty will have an impact on this assessment.114  
The authenticity test is also relevant to the balancing exercise. However, requiring the 
discloser to verify the contents of the information to be disclosed carefully in order to 
determine whether it is accurate and reliable, subject to the extent permitted by the 
circumstances,115 can be considered a restrictive criterion. The application of this test has 
been criticised for being unclear in respect of how the authenticity criterion is applied, 
especially when contrasted with the tests to be applied under national whistleblowing 
legislation in relation to a discloser’s reasonable belief for different levels of disclosure.116 
A further restrictive feature of the case law of the ECtHR is the requirement of good faith.117 
This requirement can be considered anachronistic and does not feature in some national 
whistleblower protection legislation,118 whilst in others, it is merely a remedy issue and does 
not deprive a discloser of protection.119 The Kosovan draft Law on Protection of 
Whistleblowers specifically provides that neither the good faith test nor the authenticity test 
needs to be satisfied by the discloser, stating that ‘The whistleblower is not required to prove 
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his or her good faith and authenticity of reported information.’120 The ECtHR may wish to 
revisit this good faith test in cases before it when the draft EU Commission Directive on 
whistleblowing is adopted, as it does not contain a good faith test.121 
Lewis et al conclude that despite the protections under convention and constitutional 
provisions, both employment law and civil law remedies will ‘remain the backbone of 
achieving more effective whistleblowing regimes.’122 Therefore, although whistleblowers 
may be protected in relation to their freedom of expression under constitutional and human 
rights law, it is vital that specific legislation is introduced to protect whistleblowers 
exercising that right. The risk with specific whistleblowing legislation, however, is that it 
may limit the circumstances under which a discloser may be protected, and therefore a legal 
system should offer both basic freedom of expression guarantees and specific statutory 
provisions for disclosures and protections.123 
2.5 What is ‘protection’? 
Protection from reprisal for whistleblowers requires the establishment of pro-active 
legislative measures. The awarding of compensation under whistleblowing legislation to a 
person who has suffered professional or personal retaliation for having made a protected 
disclosure is a limited reactive measure. An award of compensation may amount to a 
deterrent effect for employers and others from the taking of action against whistleblowers; 
however, this is an individual remedy and may not be sufficient to ensure the protection of 
others who blow the whistle. This anti-retaliation model for whistleblower protection law 
has been held to be unsuccessful in both the US and Australia.124 In order for legislative 
protection to be successful, there must be an integrated approach. Dworkin and Brown have 
identified four legislative models for whistleblowing law: (i) anti-retaliation or 
organizational justice; (ii) reward or bounty;125 (iii) institutional or structural; and (iv) public 
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or media.126 Dworkin and Brown recognise that these models can compete with one another 
and due to the differing underlying perspectives of whistleblower legislation127 that it can be 
difficult to achieve an integrated approach.128 Nonetheless, they conclude that ‘legislative 
efforts that effectively integrate and reconcile these different approaches provide the most 
likely path to greater success in protecting whistleblowers and encouraging 
whistleblowing.’129 Therefore, protection for whistleblowers requires pro-active measures 
to be established, in addition to anti-retaliation measures.  
There are proactive measures that can be introduced in whistleblowing protection legislation. 
For example, under the third legislative model identified by Brown and Dworkin,  the 
‘institutional or structural’ model, this can include a requirement to provide for effective 
communication channels, which does not have to be limited to internal disclosure channels 
but can also include external communication channels.130 Internal disclosure channels would 
include the imposition of a requirement on organisations to establish mandatory 
whistleblowing procedures or incentivising organisations to establish whistleblowing 
procedures.131 External communication channels could include the establishment of a 
whistleblowing ombudsman,132 a national whistleblowing authority/agency (public sector 
and/or private sector),133 or prescribed persons.134 A recent study established that there is a 
trend to establish governmental whistleblowing agencies to implement whistleblowing 
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legislation.135 However, the study identified that of those agencies established in the 
countries included in the study,136 there were different tasks associated with their role, ie 
provision of information, advice and/or support;137 investigation or referral of the 
wrongdoing disclosed;138 investigation of a claim of retaliation suffered by the discloser;139 
and/or prevention.140 The study held the Dutch Whistleblowers Authority (‘Huis voor 
klokkenluiders’) as standing out in relation to the agencies assessed in respect of the services 
that it provides, despite the recent criticism levied at it.141 The Dutch Whistleblowers 
Authority provides services to both the public and private sector, and these services include 
the provision of free, confidential advice, as well as information on integrity policy and 
achieving an open organisational culture. If requested, it may initiate an investigation into 
the abuse disclosed and/or the treatment of the whistleblower. However, according to its 
annual reports in 2016 and 2017, it failed to complete an investigation.142  
The study acknowledged the emphasis on the importance of the provision of whistleblower 
protection in a holistic manner, whilst also recognising that there is a lack of research into 
the effectiveness of such an approach.143 The study found that only the Dutch144 and 
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Norwegian145 governments currently provide funds for specific psychosocial care for 
whistleblowers and that the Israeli Ombudsman is going to provide a similar service in the 
future.146   
Further institutional or structural provisions in whistleblower protection legislation could 
include a requirement to conduct risk assessments of retaliation against disclosers. For 
example, in Australia, the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2012, requires a public sector 
entity’s procedures to include ‘(a) clear obligations on the entity and its public officials to 
take action to protect disclosers; and (b) risk management steps for assessing and 
minimising— (i) detrimental action against people because of public interest disclosures; 
and (ii) detriment to people against whom allegations of disclosable conduct are made in a 
disclosure.’147 Further, under the Australian Public Interest Disclosure Act 2013, the 
principal officer of an agency must establish procedures for facilitating and dealing with 
public interest disclosures relating to the agency and those procedures must include assessing 
risks that reprisals may be taken against the person who makes those disclosures.148 Brown 
and Olsen emphasise the importance of risk assessments and state: 
[T]he accurate, objective assessment of risk is a precondition for the effective 
management of many whistleblowing incidents. Unless an agreed understanding is 
reached about the sources and levels of risk from an early point in the reporting 
process, the prospects for successfully managing either the expectations or the real 
experiences of whistleblowers are immediately more doubtful. Risk assessment is 
crucial to closing the gaps in whistleblowers’ understanding of how others might 
perceive their report and reducing the potential for conflict, including conflict with 
management about whether effective support was provided.149 
                                                 
145 The psychosocial care clinic for whistleblowers who have suffered retaliation is funded by the Norwegian 
Ministry of Health. This clinic has provided psychosocial care to more than 200 whistleblowers since its 
establishment in 2012. According to the study carried out by Loyens and Vandekerckhove, this clinic will 
probably be closed down due to financial constraints, which is the official reason, but also according to an 
interviewee in the study, it is because the Norwegian government feels uncomfortable with the existence of the 
clinic due to a perception that the clinic is a ‘symptom of a culture that is against whistleblowers and freedom 
of speech.’ Kim Loyens and Wim Vandekerckhove, ‘Whistleblowing from an International Perspective: A 
Comparative Analysis of Institutional Arrangements’ (2018) 8(3) Administrative Sciences 11 
<https://www.mdpi.com/2076-3387/8/3/30/htm> accessed 31 March 2019. 
146 ibid. 
147 Public Interest Disclosure Act 2012, s 33(2). 
148 Public Interest Disclosure Act 2013, s 59(1)(a). 
149 AJ Brown and Jane Olsen, ‘Whistleblower mistreatment: identifying the risks’ in AJ Brown (ed), 
Whistleblowing in the Australian Public Sector Enhancing the theory and practice of internal witness 
management in public sector organisations (ANU E Press 2008) 145. 
29 
 
Other institutional or structural provisions in whistleblower protection legislation could 
include requirements relating to the provision of training and education150 on issues 
associated with whistleblowing and whistleblower protection. Moberly argues that ‘Training 
supervisors could provide a solution to the problem of managers misperceiving a 
whistleblower’s motivations or not responding appropriately to whistleblowers’.151 There is 
evidence that training managers about how to deal with cases where employees have 
reported wrongdoing can increase managers preparedness to intervene when: (i) co-workers 
cease to associate with the employee at work; (ii) co-workers begin spreading rumours about 
the employee; (iii) a manager makes negative comments about the employee’s personality; 
and (iv) a manager plans to refer the employee for psychiatric assessment.152 
Therefore, whistleblower protection laws cannot consist of simply providing compensation 
when retaliation occurs. Robust whistleblower protection legislation must also provide for 
proactive measures to be taken by recipients of disclosures in order to reduce the risk of 
retaliation against a discloser. 
2.6 History of whistleblowing in Ireland 
It has been suggested that in Ireland the concept of whistleblowing is contentious given the 
historical connotations of informing on a person.153 Since Ireland’s political dominance by 
Britain, native informers were widely perceived to have assisted the British authorities in 
their rule of Ireland. ‘Informer’ became synonymous with ‘traitor’.154 This perception was 
evidenced during the Irish War of Independence when 184 civilians who were accused of 
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spying were killed by the Irish Republican Army (‘IRA’).155 The majority of these were shot 
dead and as Ó Ruairc explains ‘As a warning to others their bodies were usually deposited 
in public places with an accompanying label reading ‘Shot by IRA – Spies and informers 
beware!’’156 
This attitude transgressed into modern times as can be seen in the 1973 case of Berry v Irish 
Times.157 This case concerned a publication in the defendant’s daily newspaper, which 
included a photograph of a man carrying a placard on which was written ‘Peter Berry- 20th 
Century Felon Setter-Helped Jail Republicans in England’. Beneath the photograph, there 
was a news item about two Irishmen who were stated to be serving sentences of 
imprisonment after convictions in England for having taken part in a raid for arms in that 
country. The plaintiff, Peter Berry, who was head of the Department of Justice at the time, 
argued that the words meant and were understood to mean ‘that the plaintiff had helped in 
the jailing of Irish republicans in England.’158   
Berry failed in his defamation case but Mr Justice McLoughlin dissenting commented:  
He is called a felon setter because he has designated republicans, by giving 
information as to names and locations, addresses perhaps in England, and so assisted 
to have such persons jailed. Put in other words, the suggestion is that this Irishman, 
the Plaintiff, has acted as a spy and informer for the British police concerning 
republicans in England, thus putting the Plaintiff into the same category as the spies 
and informers of earlier centuries who were regarded as loathing and abomination by 
all decent people.159  
Even the Plaintiff himself stated ‘I can think of nothing more ugly, more horrible in this life 
than to be called an informer. It has a peculiarly nauseating effect in Irish life.’160 
In 1999, during the second stage of the Dáil Debate on the Whistleblower Protection Bill 
1999, a member of the Oireachtas stated that Irish people ‘have an abhorrence of being called 
a tell-tale or of informing on another. This stems from our history when we were, for eight 
hundred years under the yoke of the British Crown.’161 
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Despite this historical attitude, there have been a number of high profile whistleblowers in 
Ireland who put their head above the parapet, including Tom Clonan who blew the whistle 
on the sexual harassment of women in the Defence Forces; Eugene McErlean, an internal 
auditor, who uncovered the overcharging of AIB customers and reported it to the Financial 
Regulator; Louise Bayliss who went public over plans to keep mental health patients in a 
locked unit over the Christmas period; Bernadette Sullivan, a former nurse who blew the 
whistle on Dr Michael Shine, who sexually assaulted a number of boys at Our Lady of 
Lourdes Hospital, Drogheda; and assistant principal officer Marie Mackle in the Department 
of Finance who consistently warned about an overheating property market during 2005 and 
2006. Nonetheless, it took the controversy surrounding Garda whistleblower, former 
Sergeant Maurice McCabe (‘McCabe’), to bring to the fore the maltreatment of many 
whistleblowers in Ireland. 
There has been a sea of change in Ireland towards whistleblowers and whistleblowing since 
the treatment of McCabe, by those in the highest echelons of public life, came to light. A 
‘storm of public controversy’162 followed the comments made by former Garda 
Commissioner Martin Callinan (‘Callinan’) in relation to McCabe and another Garda 
whistleblower, John Wilson (‘Wilson’), during a hearing of the Dáil’s Public Accounts 
Committee on 23 January 2014 into the management of the fixed charge notice system, when 
he made the following statement: 
Clearly, here, however, we have two people, out of a force of over 13,000, who are 
making extraordinary and serious allegations. There is not a whisper anywhere else 
or from any other member of the Garda Síochána, however, about this corruption, 
malpractice and other charges levelled against their fellow officers. Frankly, on a 
personal level I think it is quite disgusting.163 
McCabe and Wilson had raised a number of concerns regarding certain practices and 
procedures in the force, in particular, corruption in the form of the quashing of penalty points 
in illegitimate circumstances, which resulted in a loss of millions of euro of potential revenue 
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to the exchequer.164 There were various investigations into the disclosures,165 culminating in 
the Disclosure Tribunal (‘Charleton Tribunal’), which investigated the treatment of 
McCabe.166 
It was determined in the Charleton Tribunal that there was a campaign of calumny against 
McCabe by Callinan and that he was actively aided in this campaign by his press officer 
Superintendent David Taylor.167 Mr Justice Charleton remarked on the treatment of McCabe, 
stating that:  
What has been unnerving about more than 100 days of hearings in this tribunal is 
that a person who stood up for better standards in our national police force, Sergeant 
Maurice McCabe, and who exemplified hard work in his own calling, was 
repulsively denigrated for being no more than a good citizen and police officer … 
The question has to be asked as to why what is best, what demands hard work, is not 
the calling of every single person who takes on the job of service to Ireland. Worse 
still is the question of how it is that decent people, of whom Maurice McCabe 
emerges as a paradigm, are so shamefully treated when rightly they demand that we 
do better.168 
Both the O’Higgins Commission and the Charleton Tribunal spoke highly of McCabe. Mr 
Justice O’Higgins described McCabe in the following terms: 
Sergeant McCabe acted out of genuine and legitimate concerns, and the commission 
unreservedly accepts his bona fides. Sergeant McCabe has shown courage, and 
performed a genuine public service at considerable personal cost. For this he is due 
the gratitude, not only of the general public, but also of An Garda Síochána. While 
some of his complaints have not been upheld by this commission, Sergeant McCabe 
is a man of integrity, whom the public can trust in the exercise of his duties. Assistant 
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Commissioner Byrne told the commission that, “Sergeant McCabe is regarded as a 
highly efficient sergeant, competent”. This assessment is shared by the 
commission.169  
Mr Justice Charleton concluded that: 
Maurice McCabe has done the State considerable service by bringing these matters 
to the attention of the wider public and he has done so not out of a desire to inflate 
his public profile, but out of a legitimate drive to ensure that the national police force 
serves the people through hard work and diligence. He is an exemplar of that kind of 
attitude. Notwithstanding everything that happened to him, he remains an officer of 
exemplary character and has shown himself in giving evidence to the tribunal as 
being a person of admirable fortitude.170 
The controversy resulted in changes to the penalty points system,171 as well as the resignation 
of two Garda Commissioners, two Ministers for Justice, one confidential recipient in the 
Garda Síochána, and a Secretary General of the Department of Justice and Equality. Further, 
it shone a light on the necessity for robust whistleblower protection, the requirement for 
employers to respond appropriately to whistleblowing, as well as being a catalyst for 
improving the public perception of whistleblowers.172   
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2.7 The development of whistleblowing law in Ireland 
2.7(a) The sectoral approach to whistleblowing law 
The position in Ireland originally as regards whistleblowing and whistleblower protection 
involved a sectoral approach. A sectoral approach to whistleblower protection required the 
passing of legislation to protect potential whistleblowers in selected state, private, or 
professional sectors. The approach did not offer protection to everyone.173 The CLRG in its 
2007 Report stated that it was the understanding of the Review Group that the sectoral 
approach ‘implies confining consideration of the appropriateness of whistleblowing and 
related protection, to breaches of the legislation under consideration.’174 The sectoral 
approach was formalised in 2006. 
Prior to the formal adoption of the sectoral approach to whistleblower protection, there were 
a number of whistleblower protection provisions in place. For example, these provisions 
related to the protection of: persons reporting suspicions of child abuse or neglect to 
authorised persons;175 persons reporting alleged breaches of the Ethics in Public Office 
Acts;176 persons reporting competition law to the relevant authority (and also protections 
specific to employees for doing so);177 employees against penalisation for exercising any 
right under the Safety, Health and Welfare at Work Act 2005;178 and Gardaí and Garda 
civilian employees reporting corruption or malpractice in the police force.179  
In March 1999, a Private Members’ bill, the Whistleblowers Protection Bill 1999 (‘1999 
Bill’)180 was published by the Labour Party as a result of a series of political corruption 
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scandals.181 Former Deputy Pat Rabbitte, who originally introduced the 1999 Bill, stated that 
the purpose of the Bill was ‘to challenge and help transform the traditional culture of secrecy 
that surrounds the conduct of business and public affairs in this country.’182 The 1999 Bill 
proposed a set of new statutory rights for employees, whether in the public or private sector, 
to report and transmit information they received of illegality or malpractice during the course 
of their employment. The 1999 Bill was welcomed by government and was accepted, in 
principle, at Second Stage183 and referred to the Dáil Select Committee on Enterprise and 
Small Business.184 The then Minister for Finance, Charlie McCreevy TD, indicated during 
his statement on the report of the Committee of Public Accounts on the DIRT inquiry in the 
Dáil on 30 March 2000, that whistleblower provisions would be adopted through 
amendments to the 1999 Bill, stating: 
The Sub-Committee further recommended that a scheme and procedure for bank 
officials to report suspected wrongdoing be introduced. I understand that the Tánaiste 
and Minister for Enterprise, Trade and Employment will be bringing forward 
proposals in this area in the near future. These are expected to take the form of 
amendments to the Whistleblowers Protection Bill 1999 which was initiated in the 
Dáil last year as a Private Member's Bill.185 
  
The 1999 Bill then spent the next seven years on the order paper through two parliaments 
(the government having been returned to power in the general election of 2002) receiving 
regular positive reference from the government yet without being enacted. The 1999 Bill 
was eventually dropped in 2006, on the basis of legal advice that indicated that such generic 
provisions would be unworkable in Ireland.186 This legal advice was never made public.187 
Former Minister for Labour Affairs, Tony Killeen TD (‘Killeen’) elaborated on this decision 
stating ‘a single all-encompassing legislative proposal on whistleblowing would be complex 
and cumbersome, take considerable time to enact, and would not be user friendly to the 
general public.’188  
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In March 2006, prior to the official dropping of the 1999 Bill, the government decided that 
rather than introducing an overarching law on whistleblowing, Ministers would instead be 
required, where appropriate, to consider the inclusion of whistleblowing provisions in 
impending legislation for which they had responsibility. The decision was described in the 
following terms by Killeen as: 
The Government decided on 7 March 2006 to formalise the sectoral approach as part 
of its policy in addressing the issue of whistleblowing by requiring Ministers, in 
consultation with the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel, with legislation either on 
the Government’s legislative programme for the current Oireachtas session or 
currently in the course of preparation to include, where appropriate, whistleblowing 
provisions therein. Such an approach also acknowledges situations where the 
provision of whistleblowing provisions may not be appropriate.189 
Following the formal adoption of the sectoral approach, whistleblowing protection 
provisions were expanded and adopted over a range of different statutes, and these 
provisions took the form of either statutory mandatory disclosures or statutory voluntary 
disclosures. Oversight bodies were also established to oversee the enforcement of the 
legislation.190 
In January 2010, the 1999 Bill was reintroduced in the Dáil as a Private Members Bill, the 
Whistleblowers Protection Bill 2010. However, this fell on the dissolution of the government 
in February 2011.191 A further Bill, the Whistleblowers Protection Bill 2011, which again 
proposed a generic framework for whistleblower protection in the public and private sectors, 
was introduced by the Independent Group of Deputies192 but again lapsed on the dissolution 
of the thirty-first Dáil. During this time, the sectoral approach was the sole approach to 
whistleblower protection until the enactment of the 2014 Act. 
2.7(b) The generic approach to whistleblowing law 
The government of the thirty-first Dáil had included in its Programme for Government a 
commitment to introduce whistleblower legislation stating ‘we will put in place a 
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Whistleblowers Act to protect public servants that expose maladministration by Ministers or 
others, and restore Freedom of Information.’193 
The government initially intended for there to be a referendum on the issue of whistleblower 
protection in October 2011 at the same time as a referendum on reducing judges’ pay, a 
referendum on providing the Oireachtas with powers to conduct investigations, and the 
Presidential election.194 The Taoiseach stated that the work ‘in respect of the preparation of 
the legislation for those is underway. They are being treated as a priority.’195 
Despite this, the plans for the referendum on whistleblower protection were abandoned as a 
result of a decision by the then Attorney General, Máire Whelan, in July 2011, to refuse to 
approve the wording of the referendum.196 In response, the former Minister for Public 
Expenditure and Reform, Brendan Howlin (‘Howlin’), said that he hoped that the matter 
would go before voters in 2012.197 Howlin had a personal interest in the matter as a result of 
pressure placed on him in 2000, when he was Labour’s justice spokesperson, to reveal the 
sources of information about alleged corruption in the Garda Síochána in Donegal to the 
Morris Tribunal. Howlin, in responding to questions during an Oireachtas debate on the 
matter stated:  
I have more than a passing interest in the issue of whistleblowing, having had to 
traipse to the High Court and the Supreme Court to protect the rights of individuals 
to give information to Members of the House on allegations of wrongdoing. I know 
how stressful this can be. At one stage I was on the hazard for €500,000 in legal 
fees.198 
The government changed direction in 2012 in relation to their approach to whistleblower 
protection and instead began to focus on drawing up generic legislation.199 The Draft Heads 
of the Protected Disclosures in the Public Interest Bill 2012 (‘Draft Heads’) were published 
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by Howlin on the 27 February 2012.200 Howlin said that his Department had ‘looked at best 
international practice’201 and that the Draft Heads would use the UK and New Zealand 
legislation as templates.202  
On welcoming the publication, Howlin stated: 
This Government is committed to a significant political reform agenda. A key part 
of this, as set out in the programme for Government, is our commitment to legislate 
to protect whistleblowers who speak out against wrongdoing, or cover-ups, whether 
in public or the private sector.  This could encompass, for example, criminal 
misconduct, corruption, the breach of a legal obligation, risk to health and safety, 
damage to the environment or gross mismanagement in the public service. 
The Heads of Bill published today will provide, for the first time for employees in 
Ireland, a single overarching framework protecting whistleblowers in a uniform 
manner in all sectors of the economy. This is a huge advancement from the previous 
piecemeal approach where the patchwork of protections resulted in fragmented and 
confusing standards of protection. A key element of the proposed legislation is that 
it treats all parties equally and fairly within an integrated legal framework that is open 
and transparent.203 
The Draft Heads were welcomed by many, including TII, with CEO John Devitt stating ‘this 
legislation could be as important as the original Freedom of Information Act in protecting 
the public interest. There are some improvements to be made, but I think we’re on the right 
track.’204 Risk Management International, the Irish-based specialists in strategic and 
operational risks and investigations, said that the legislation was ‘timely and badly 
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needed’.205 Fianna Fáil206 welcomed the Draft Heads with Seán Flemming, the then public 
expenditure and reform spokesperson for the party, stating ‘we welcome the Bill. We’re very 
pleased that it is going to be broad-ranging and robust … we support the principle of the Bill 
and we’re pleased that it is coming so quickly.’207 
The Irish Congress of Trade Unions (‘ICTU’) also welcomed the Draft Heads. In 2010, 
ICTU had called on the government to: 
Introduce a robust set of legal rights, to protect workers in the public or private sector, 
so that they can disclose and report matters such as malpractice, misconduct, the 
violation of laws, rules, regulations, damage to health, safety or environment 
concerns, corruption and fraud and the 'cover up' of these employees who report 
wrongful conduct by their employers must be protected from reprisals.208  
ICTU’s Legal Affairs Officer Esther Lynch (‘Lynch’) said that the introduction of the Draft 
Heads ‘represents a giant step in the right direction, but in order for the proposed measures 
to work, they must be backed by effective safeguards for whistleblowers and real sanctions 
for those who target them.’209 Lynch also said that while whistleblower protection legislation 
alone would not prevent wrongdoing, it was ‘a necessary component and something trade 
unions have called for consistently. With effective whistleblower protection in place, 
wrongdoing can be quickly exposed.’210 
After the publication of the Draft Heads, the Joint Committee on Finance, Public 
Expenditure and Reform (‘Committee’) met six times during April-June 2012 and heard 
submissions on the legislation from interested parties such as ICTU, the Irish Business and 
Employers Confederation, IMPACT, TII, the Irish Nurses and Midwives Organisation, the 
National Union of Journalists, and the Irish Bank Officials Association. A report containing 
detailed observations on the legislation was then prepared by the Committee211 for Howlin 
                                                 
205 Deaglán De Bréadún, ‘Group welcomes whistleblower law’ The Irish Times (Dublin, 28 February 2012). 
206 Fianna Fáil is an Irish political party. For more information, see: <www.fiannafail.ie> accessed 14 
December 2018. 
207 Deaglán De Bréadún, ‘Whistleblower Bill to cover public and private sectors’ The Irish Times (Dublin, 30 
January 2012) <www.irishtimes.com/news/whistleblower-bill-to-cover-public-and-private-sectors-1.453932> 
accessed 17 February 2019. 
208 Irish Congress of Trade Unions, ‘ICTU Demands Protection for Workers Who Blow the Whistle’ (ICTU, 
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whistle> accessed 17 February 2019. 
209 Irish Congress of Trade Unions, ‘Whistleblower law must be backed by effective protection and sanctions’ 
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210 ibid. 
211 Joint Committee on Finance, Public Expenditure and Reform, Report on hearings in relation to the Scheme 
of the Protected Disclosures in the Public Interest Bill, 2012 (31/FPER/010, 2012). 
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who had stated that he had ‘an open mind on this legislation and will happily embrace any 
ideas that might improve it.’212 
Following the publication of this report, the Protected Disclosures Bill 2013 (‘2013 Bill’) 
was published on 3 July 2013, with the 2013 Bill reaching Final Stage on 1 July 2014.  
2.7(c) The Protected Disclosures Act 2014 
The 2014 Act was welcomed as a move away from the preceding sectoral approach to 
whistleblowing law as it proposed to extend whistleblowing protections beyond the limited 
categories of people who were protected by the sectoral legislation. The sectoral protections 
were considered to be relatively weak when faced with powerful constituencies.213 Further, 
due to the diffusion of the provisions across the statute book, there appeared to be a low 
incidence of their use in Ireland.214 The sectoral system was also considered to have led to 
confusion, a lack of awareness of the protections, and a reduction in potential 
whistleblowing.215 Also, TII’s analysis of the sectoral approach demonstrated that this 
approach to whistleblower protection was leaving thousands of people with little or no 
guidance or protection against legal action and retaliation for speaking out against 
wrongdoing.216 In order to rectify these deficiencies, the government endeavoured to 
produce a robust, generic approach to whistleblower protection and the introduction of the 
2014 Act fulfilled its commitment in the programme for government to introduce a single 
overarching framework for the protection of workers in the public, private, and non-profit 
sectors.  
The aim of the 2014 Act has been described as ‘not merely mirroring international best 
practice, but as far as possible, representing a “best in class” legal framework.’217 The main 
objectives of the 2014 Act are: 
(i) To ensure the protection of workers in all sectors of the economy by applying the 
provisions of the 2014 Act to public, private, and non-profit organisations.  
                                                 
212 Joint Committee on Finance, Public Expenditure and Reform Deb 18 April 2012. 
213 Andrew Sheridan, ‘Blowing the Whistle’ (Aug/Sept 2010) Law Society Gazette 20, 22. 
214 ibid 23. 
215 Oireachtas Library and Research Service, ‘Spotlight: Disclosure of information: duty to inform and 
whistleblowing’ (L&RS 16 December 2011) 12. 
216 Transparency International Ireland, ‘An Alternative to Silence: Whistleblower Protection in Ireland’ (TII 
January 2010) 4. 
217 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Committing to Effective Whistleblower 
Protection (OECD Publishing 2016) 173. 
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(ii) To provide for a ‘stepped’ disclosure regime in which a number of distinct disclosure 
channels are available (ie internal, regulatory, and external) and through which the worker 
can, subject to different evidential thresholds, make a protected disclosure. 
(iii) To safeguard a worker who has made a protected disclosure from being subjected to 
detriment, as well as providing immunity against civil liability and criminal liability in 
certain circumstances. 
(iv) To make available certain remedies providing redress for workers who suffer retaliation 
for having made a protected disclosure. 
(v) To confer ‘protected disclosure’ status on disclosures made under existing sectoral 
whistleblowing legislation and to ensure, as much as possible, a uniform standard of 
protection. 
(vi) To highlight employer’s responsibility of implementing effective internal mechanisms 
to investigate protected disclosures and to develop an organisational culture that supports 
disclosers, as a key element of corporate risk management overall, in order to identify 
potential or actual wrongdoing, and to take appropriate corrective action as soon as 
possible.218  
These objectives reflect the changing attitude towards whistleblowers in Ireland and 
appreciate the positive role that whistleblowers play in uncovering wrongdoings. They have 
been developed in a manner that moves away from the fragmented nature of the sectoral 
approach towards a more unified, all-encompassing whistleblower legislation.   
At an early stage, it was considered that the enactment of the 2014 Act had ‘led to a 
significant change in the perceived environment for whistleblowing.’219  Further, the 2014 
Act has been lauded in the international sphere. For example, Blueprint for Free Speech, 
commenting on the 2014 Act, stated: 
Perhaps no whistleblower law passed recently in Europe benefited from more public 
debate and expert input than Ireland’s Protected Disclosures Act (PDA).  
 
Enacted in 2014, the law contains provisions that are among the strongest in Europe, 
if not the world. Several years of consistent campaigning by advocates, led by the 
Ireland chapter of Transparency International, ensured a law that contains nearly all 
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key European standards for protecting and compensating people who report crime 
and corruption.  
 
One important takeaway is that the high level of effectiveness and transparency of 
the lawmaking process itself has – thus far – nurtured effective and transparent 
enforcement of the PDA in real-life cases.220 
In April 2018, the European Commission in a communication to the European Parliament, 
the European Council, and the European Economic and Social Committee, on strengthening 
whistleblower protection at EU level, listed Ireland as being one of ten Member States that 
have comprehensive whistleblowing legislation in place.221  
Further, in a study carried out by Blueprint for Free Speech in 2018, which measured the 
whistleblower laws and policies for all EU countries against nine key European and 
international standards, Ireland scored the highest mark, achieving a score of 67.7%.222 Also, 
the positive light in which the 2014 Act is being viewed is reflected in Transparency 
International’s ‘A Best Practice  Guide for Whistleblowing Legislation’, which referred 
specifically to the 2014 Act on numerous occasions as being a good practice example of 
whistleblowing legislation.223  
2.8 Conclusion 
This chapter explored both the theoretical and historical contexts that shaped the 2014 Act. 
The theoretical reasons underpinning the purpose of the 2014 Act included firstly, the 
recognition that whistleblowers play a significant role in uncovering wrongdoing, which has 
been substantiated by a number of studies; and secondly, that whistleblowers need 
protection. The various studies carried out on the issue of whistleblower retaliation have 
demonstrated differing rates of suffering in a range of contexts, but it has been recognised 
that any retaliation is too much retaliation, and this can, to varying degrees, impact on 
whether an individual decides to blow the whistle. 
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The historical context underpinning the drafting of the 2014 Act is both sensitive and 
complex. The attitude towards whistleblowers in Ireland has transgressed from an 
association of being a ‘spy’, ‘traitor’, or ‘informer’, to one that is much more positive of late, 
especially due to the McCabe controversy. 
The 2014 Act was published some fifteen years after the first proposal of generic 
whistleblowing law. The original approach of the government of adopting whistleblowing 
provisions into sectoral legislation was ultimately considered to be confusing, fragmented, 
and of providing differing levels of protection to different workers in different sectors. The 
2014 Act was intended to improve on the sectoral approach by providing a much more robust 
protection regime than the preceding sectoral approach. The question arises, however, 
whether the 2014 Act does provide robust protection to whistleblowers. In order to assist in 
this determination, the next chapter will look at the case law decided under the 2014 Act 
between 15 July 2014 and 16 July 2018.  
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Chapter 3: An analysis of case law under the Protected Disclosures Act 2014 
3.1 Introduction  
The purpose of the Protected Disclosures Act 2014 (‘2014 Act’) is described as being ‘An 
Act to make provision for and in connection with the protection of persons from the taking 
of action against them in respect of the making of certain disclosures in the public interest 
and for connected purposes.’224 By providing protection to workers who make a protected 
disclosure, the 2014 Act is intended to act as a deterrent to employers and others from the 
taking of action against such workers, yet in reality, the 2014 Act is not proactive in 
providing protection. The 2014 Act is reactive in nature, in that it provides redress if a worker 
suffers retaliation for having made a protected disclosure. It does provide protection in 
respect of certain civil225 and criminal immunities,226 but arguably, the bringing of a claim 
against a worker that they have committed a civil or criminal breach could constitute 
retaliation in and of itself. The question arises, however, is the 2014 Act fulfilling its purpose 
of protecting workers who make protected disclosures? The 2014 Act has been interpreted 
and applied by the relevant fora for just over four years and arguably now is an appropriate 
time to assess the 2014 Act in action.  Therefore, an analysis of the case law under the 2014 
Act between 15 July 2014 and 16 July 2018 was undertaken for this purpose.  
3.1(a) Objectives 
The objective of the case law analysis undertaken in this chapter is to shed light on how the 
2014 Act is being interpreted and applied by the relevant fora since the enactment of the 
2014 Act. In addition, the case law analysis is designed to provide essential information as 
to use of the 2014 Act by complainants and respondents, the advantages and disadvantages 
                                                 
224 Protected Disclosures Act 2014. 
225 ibid s 14. Section 14(1) provides that a person who makes a protected disclosure in compliance with the 
requirements of the 2014 Act is immune from civil liability. However, this immunity from civil liability 
excludes a cause of action in defamation. Nonetheless, s 14(2) amends the Defamation Act 2009, sch 1, pt 1 
and provides that if a person who makes a protected disclosure is alleged to have committed the tort of 
defamation, the person may have a defence of qualified privilege in such circumstances. Therefore, a statement 
that constitutes a protected disclosure is one that is privileged without explanation or contradiction and will be 
protected in the absence of malice. Section 14 applies to a ‘person’ who makes a protected disclosure, however, 
as only a worker can make a protected disclosure under the 2014 Act, the use of this term is an anomaly.  
226 ibid s 15. This section provides immunity from criminal liability for any offence prohibiting or restricting 
the disclosure of information in circumstances where a person has made a protected disclosure. This immunity 
also covers a disclosure that the person reasonably believes was a protected disclosure. Again, this provision 
applies to a ‘person’ as opposed to a worker. The affording of protection to a person who reasonably believes 
that their disclosure was a protected disclosure could potentially apply to a person who falls outside of the 
definition of ‘worker’ under the 2014 Act as long as they have a subjective belief that is objectively reasonable. 
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of the legislative provisions, any potential pitfalls, whether the 2014 Act is open to abuse, 
any patterns emerging, and ultimately, whether the 2014 Act is fit for purpose. 
3.1(b) Methodology 
In order to locate the Workplace Relations Commission (‘WRC) and Labour Court 
decisions, the WRC website was accessed on various dates between 27 July 2017 and 16 
July 2018.227 There were three separate search tools utilised to locate the case law. Firstly, 
in order to locate the unfair dismissal decisions under s 11 of the 2014 Act, the ‘Legislation’ 
search tool was used, and the ‘Unfair Dismissals Acts’ was selected from the drop-down 
menu of available legislation. In this category, fifteen cases were located out of 1819 cases 
decided before the WRC and Labour Court under the Unfair Dismissal Acts from 15 July 
2014 until 16 July 2018. 
The second search tool was the selection of the ‘Protected Disclosures Act, 2014’ from the 
drop-down menu in the ‘Legislation’ box. In this category, twenty-two decisions were 
located in the period set for the research. 
Thirdly, ‘Protected Disclosure’ was selected from the ‘Topic’ dropdown menu, and ten cases 
were located using this method. 
By using all three-search tools, forty-three cases were located. There was some overlap 
between the cases located using each search tool, but similarly, there were noticeable 
omissions between the cases located using the ‘Legislation’ search tool and the ‘Topic’ 
search tool as the latter only contained ten decisions relating to protected disclosures.  
The decision of the Labour Relations Commission (‘LRC’) was located by contacting a 
colleague who had represented the complainant before the Labour Court as the decision was 
made under the old regime whereby the decisions of the LRC were not made publicly 
available. Another decision was not available on the WRC website, but as the Labour Court 
appeal had been published, the researcher was aware that such a decision existed. In order 
to locate the decision, the office of the solicitor who represented the respondent before the 
                                                 
227 Workplace Relations, ‘Decisions & Determinations’  (WRC) 
<www.workplacerelations.ie/en/Decisions_Determinations/> accessed 27 July 2017, 10 August 2017, 16 
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Labour Court was contacted and a copy of the ‘Rights Commissioner/Adjudicator 
Recommendation/Decision’ was furnished via email to the researcher. 
With respect to the decisions before the civil courts, the researcher was familiar with the 
three interim relief decisions, which came to her attention during the course of her work, 
including representation of the applicant in the High Court appeal of the Circuit Court 
decision of Philpott v Marymount University Hospital and Hospice Ltd.228 Searches of legal 
databases, bailii.org, justis, westlaw Ireland and UK, courts.ie, and lexis nexis were 
undertaken regularly to identify further decisions under ss 13229 and 16230 of the 2014 Act 
before the civil courts, but this did not yield any results. 
In order to analyse the case law, there were particular issues identified to assess.231 These 
included the following: 
1. Forum 
2. Sector  
3. Type of claim  
4. Length of service 
5. Nature of disclosure: relevant wrongdoings 
6. Channel of disclosure 
7. Reference to protected disclosures procedures 
8. Win/lose 
9. Remedy and quantum 
10. Subject to appeal 
                                                 
228 Philpott v Marymount University Hospital and Hospice Ltd [2015] IECC 1. 
229 Protected Disclosures Act 2014, s 13 provides for an action in tort for a person who suffers a detriment 
because of having made a protected disclosure. This protection also extends to a person who suffers a detriment 
because a third person made a protected disclosure. The cause of action under s 13 lies against the person who 
caused the detriment. 
230 ibid s 16 provides for the protection of identity of a person who makes a protected disclosure, subject to 
certain exceptions. 
231 For a graphical representation of the findings of the case law analysis, see: Appendices 1(a), (b), and (c) 
‘Case Law Matrix’. 
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The research undertaken for this chapter also consisted of doctrinal research of international 
and national reports, articles, books, statutory rules, case law, and parliamentary debates. 
3.2 Forum 
3.2(a) Introduction 
Prior to October 2015, claims could be brought before a multiplicity of different employment 
law fora, ie before the LRC, the Rights Commissioner Service, the Employment Appeals 
Tribunal (‘EAT’), the Labour Court, and the Equality Tribunal. This system was deemed to 
be very complex, so much so that even practitioners found it difficult to access and 
understand.232 It has also been described as being ‘overrun with “legalism” and as a “cold 
and unfriendly” place for lay litigants and trade union officials.’233 The system was therefore 
dismantled and replaced with a new system whereby claims were to be initiated before the 
WRC,234 with a right of appeal to the Labour Court235 and a right of appeal from the Labour 
Court to the High Court on a point of law only.236 The new system was intended to produce 
key improvements to the employment law system, such as: reducing the time within which 
all complaints would be acknowledged from up to eight months in some cases to within five 
working days;237 reducing the waiting periods for adjudication hearings from up to two years 
to within three months of the complaint being lodged;238 replacing three separate avenues of 
appeal with one appeal route;239 and ensuring that all adjudication and appeal decisions 
would set out reasons in writing, where before no reasons were provided for some first 
instance adjudication decisions.240  
Since 2014, there have been forty-eight decisions made under the 2014 Act. All forty-eight 
cases were assessed for the purpose of the analysis in this section. Three of these decisions 
were made by the Circuit Court, the EAT made one, the LRC made one, thirty-one were 
made by the WRC, eleven of the WRC decisions were appealed to the Labour Court and one 
                                                 
232 Department of Business, Enterprise and Innovation, ‘Blueprint to Deliver a World-Class Workplace 
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case before the Labour Court concerned a protected disclosures claim that was not made 
before the WRC. Research did not locate any s 13 tort claims or s 16 breach of 
confidentiality241 claims before the civil courts. 
The majority of the cases under the 2014 Act were taken before the WRC. The WRC is 
designed with the objective that disputes can be resolved in a ‘speedy, inexpensive and 
relatively informal’ manner.242 There are both advantages and disadvantages to utilising this 
forum.  
3.2(b) Advantages of a WRC claim 
3.2(b)(i) Costs 
The advantage for a complainant making a claim under the 2014 Act before the WRC is that 
if they are unsuccessful, there is no award of costs against them; each party bears their own 
costs,243 unlike the practice before the civil courts where the general rule is that ‘costs follow 
the event’.244 This position on costs is an attractive feature of the WRC as due to the 
imbalance of power and resources between an employer and an employee, the threat of a 
costs order against an employee could act as a disincentive to initiating a claim. However, 
there are countervailing arguments to the non-imposition of costs orders. Barry argues that 
potential costs orders focuses minds and addresses the risk of parties abusing the adjudicative 
process.245 He suggests that a similar provision is introduced in Ireland to that in the UK 
under The Employment Tribunals (Constitution and Rules of Procedure) Regulations 2013 
(‘2013 Regulations).246 He argues that such a provision would ‘strike a correct balance to 
                                                 
241 Protection of identity under s 16 of the 2014 Act is discussed in Chapter 5. 
242 Department of Business, Enterprise and Innovation, ‘Blueprint to Deliver a World-Class Workplace 
Relations Service’ (DBEI April 2012) 18. This mirrors the objective in the UK set out in the ‘Report of the 
Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers’ Associations’ (also known as the ‘Donovan Report’) 
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Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers’ Associations (Cmd 36231968) 578. 
243 There are a limited range of circumstances under statute which provide for the costs or expenses to be 
awarded to a party to proceedings or a witness in proceedings before the WRC or the Labour Court: 
Employment Equality Act 1998, s 99A(1); National Minimum Wage Act 2000, ss 26(2) and 29(1); Industrial 
Relations Act 1946, s 21(4). 
244 Raymond Byrne and others, Byrne and McCutcheon on the Irish Legal System (6th edn, Bloomsbury 2014) 
241. 
245 Brian Barry, ‘The Workplace Relations Bill 2014 - An Important Opportunity for Workplace Relations 
Reform’ (2014) 11(4) Irish Employment Law Journal 106, 111. 
246 The Employment Tribunals (Constitution and Rules of Procedure) Regulations 2013, SI 2013/1237, reg 
76(1) which provides that the UK Employment Tribunals (‘ET’) may make an order for costs where ‘(a) a 
party (or that party’s representative) has acted vexatiously, abusively, disruptively or otherwise unreasonably 
in either the bringing of the proceedings (or part) or the way that the proceedings (or part) have been conducted; 
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ensure that the adjudication process is not open to abuse, without the costs issue becoming 
a barrier to adjudication.’247  
Nonetheless, despite the fact that under the 2013 Regulations costs should only be awarded 
in limited circumstances,248 there has been concern expressed in relation to the costs orders 
that have been made in Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 (‘PIDA’)249 claims in the UK. 
Protect have reported that in 2009-11, the total amount of costs orders made against 
claimants and respondents was £123,000 and £12,000, respectively, and that this increased 
substantially in 2011-13 with £753,135 being awarded in costs against claimants and 
£183,992 against respondents.250 There is clearly a disproportionate amount of costs orders 
being made against claimants by ETs in PIDA claims. Protect argue that the regime of ET 
costs orders should be reviewed and specifically that PIDA claims should be reviewed 
separately to other ET cases on public interest grounds.251 It points out that this trend of 
increasing costs orders in PIDA claims may undermine the objectives of the legislation, 
which are to protect workers from reprisal and to create a change of culture in organisations 
in relation to listening to concerns raised by workers, by discouraging them from pursuing 
                                                 
or (b) any claim or response had no reasonable prospect of success.’ Under the old employment law regime in 
Ireland, the Redundancy (Redundancy Appeals Tribunal) Regulations 1968, SI 1968/24, reg 19(2) gave the 
EAT the power to order a party to pay to another party a specified amount in respect of travelling expenses and 
any other costs or expenses reasonably incurred by that other party in connection with the hearing, where in 
the opinion of the EAT that party had acted frivolously or vexatiously. Regulation 19(3) provided further that 
‘costs shall not be awarded in respect of the costs or expenses in respect of the attendance of counsel, solicitors, 
officials of a trade union or of an employers' association appearing before the Tribunal in a representative 
capacity.’ 
247 Brian Barry, ‘The Workplace Relations Bill 2014 -An Important Opportunity for Workplace Relations 
Reform’ (2014) 11(4) Irish Employment Law Journal 106, 111.  
248 Employment Tribunals (Constitution and Rules of Procedure) Regulations 2013, SI 2013/1237, reg 76(2)-
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an order where a party has been in breach of any order or practice direction or where a hearing has been 
postponed or adjourned on the application of a party; (3) Where in proceedings for unfair dismissal a final 
hearing is postponed or adjourned, the Tribunal shall order the respondent to pay the costs incurred as a result 
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postponement or adjournment of that hearing has been caused by the respondent’s failure, without a special 
reason, to adduce reasonable evidence as to the availability of the job from which the claimant was dismissed 
or of comparable or suitable employment; (4) A Tribunal may make a costs order of the kind described in rule 
75(1)(b) where a party has paid a Tribunal fee in respect of a claim, employer’s contract claim or application 
and that claim, counterclaim or application is decided in whole, or in part, in favour of that party; (5) A Tribunal 
may make a costs order of the kind described in rule 75(1)(c) on the application of a party or the witness in 
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evidence at a hearing.’  
249 The sections of PIDA have been incorporated into the Employment Rights Act 1996 (‘1996 Act’). 
250 Protect, ‘Whistleblowing: Time for Change, A 5 year review by Public Concern at Work’ (Protect July 
2016) 28. This is the most recent data available on this issue. 
251 Protect, ‘Is the law protecting whistleblowers? A review of PIDA claims’ (Protect 2015) 16. 
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claims under PIDA.252 Lewis et al argue that costs are more likely to be sought and awarded 
in PIDA claims than in some other areas of employment law on the basis that in such claims 
passions are aroused, much work goes into preparing a PIDA case, and due to the ingredients 
in the cause of action.253 They emphasise that the power to award costs is not a compensatory 
power but is a disciplinary one.254 In the UK Employment Appeal Tribunal’s (‘UKEAT’) 
decision of HCA International Ltd v May-Bheemul255 the respondent, appealing the decision 
of the ET not to award the costs of the ET hearing in their favour, argued that it would be 
‘perverse not to award costs to the successful party where there is a finding that the losing 
party's central allegation is untrue, or where the central allegation has not been established 
at trial and is held to be wrong.’256 The respondent argued that the claimant had failed to 
establish the central allegation of her case, namely that she had been subjected to detriments 
on the ground that she had made protected disclosures. The UKEAT disagreed, however, 
and upheld the decision of the ET not to make a costs order. The UKEAT stated that: 
Whilst the protected disclosures relating to fraudulent activity were ultimately found 
not to be based on objectively reasonable grounds, they were nevertheless found and 
accepted to be based on genuinely held beliefs … the objective unreasonableness of 
genuine belief, and a consequent failure on a Claimant's part to establish the 
necessary legal elements of the claim, does not equate to unreasonable conduct of 
the proceedings.257 
Therefore, as long as there is a genuine held belief that the central allegation of the claimant 
is true, then an order of costs would not be appropriate. However, if there is no genuine 
belief, then it is more likely that a finding of a claim having no reasonable prospect of success 
is reached, thus making a cost order appropriate.258 It is worth noting, however, that costs 
orders by an ET are meant to be exceptional, as explained by Lord Justice Pill in Lodwick v 
Southwark LBC259 where he stated that ‘Costs remain exceptional ( Gee v Shell (UK) Ltd 
[2003] IRLR 82 ) and the aim is compensation of the party which has incurred expense in 
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winning the case, not punishment of the losing party ( Davidson v John Calder (Publishers) 
Ltd [1985] ICR 143 ).’260  
Despite the exceptional nature of ET costs orders, the concerns raised by Protect as to the 
significant rise in costs orders in PIDA claims and the deterrent effect of costs on the filing 
of PIDA claims261 underscores the necessity for the WRC to avoid adopting such a practice 
and to continue the regime that it already applies. 
3.2(b)(ii) Fees 
Another feature of the WRC system that encourages the initiation of claims before this forum 
is that there are no fees for doing so. There is a range of fees that would have to be paid for 
applications filed before the civil courts.262 The Workplace Relations Act 2015 (‘2015 Act’) 
does provide for the possibility for WRC fees to be introduced.263 This provision has only 
been implemented insofar as if a complainant wishes to make an appeal to the Labour Court 
but fails to appear at the first instance hearing at the WRC, they will have to pay a fee of 
€300 when lodging their appeal.264 The non-imposition of fees is a welcome approach when 
one looks at the negative consequences of the introduction of fees in the UK. ET fees were 
introduced in the UK on 29 July 2013.265 The fees were introduced for three reasons: (i) to 
transfer some of the cost burden from general taxpayers to those that use the system, or cause 
the system to be used; (ii) to incentivise earlier settlements, and to disincentivise 
unreasonable behaviour, such as pursuing weak or vexatious claims; and (iii) to bring the 
ET and UKEAT into line with other similar parts of the justice system.266 However, despite 
these objectives, in the year after the fees were introduced,267 there was a 78% reduction in 
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264 The Labour Court, ‘The Labour Court User’s Guide’ (The Labour Court March 2017) 1. 
265 The Employment Tribunals and the Employment Appeal Tribunal Fees Order 2013, SI 2013/1893. The 
statutory basis for this Order derived from Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, s 42(1). PIDA claims 
were considered to be Type B claims and therefore attracted a rate of £250 for the issue fee and £950 for the 
hearing fee. The Employment Tribunals and the Employment Appeal Tribunal Fees Order 2013, SI 2013/1893, 
sch 1; Remission of fees was available to certain claimants and appellants who satisfied the disposable capital 
test or if the Lord Chancellor was satisfied that there were exceptional circumstances justifying remission. ibid 
art 17, in accordance with sch 3 and substituted by The Courts and Tribunals Fee Remissions Order 2013, SI 
2013/2302. 
266 Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, Tribunals Service, ‘Resolving Workplace 
Disputes: A Consultation’ (BEIS January 2011) 50. These objectives were reiterated in the Ministry of Justice’s 
consultation paper, Ministry of Justice, ‘Charging Fees in the Employment Tribunals and the Employment 
Appeal Tribunal’ (MOJ December 2011) 11-12. 
267 2013/14 Q3 to 2014/15 Q2. 
52 
 
the number of claims accepted by ETs compared to the year before their introduction and in 
the second year,268 there was a reduction of 62%.269 When looking at PIDA claims, in 
particular, there were 2,744 claims made under PIDA that were received and accepted by 
the ET during 2012-13, with a fall of almost 20% with 2,212 PIDA claims being received 
and accepted by the ET in the year after the fees were introduced.270 The UK Ministry of 
Justice’s review report of the introduction of fees in ETs determined that this reduction in 
cases was due to the introduction of fees and stated:  
104. Our analysis of the counterfactual trend in ET receipts (i.e. the number of claims 
that we would have expected to have received in the ETs had fees not been 
introduced) concluded that the volume of single claims would have fallen by around 
eight percent by June 2014 as a result of the improving economy … 
105. The actual fall since fees were introduced has been much greater and we have 
therefore concluded that it is clear that there has been a sharp, substantial and 
sustained fall in the volume of case receipts as a result of the introduction of fees.271  
This finding is reflected in the UK Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service (‘Acas’) 
surveys undertaken in 2015 and 2016, which inter alia looked at the reasons for non-
submission/withdrawals of ET claims by claimants. In the 2015 survey, the participants were 
claimants (and their representatives) who had already engaged with the tribunal system via 
an Acas Early Conciliation Notification but who had not submitted an ET claim and did not 
have an intention to do so, nor were their claims resolved using a COT3 settlement.272 
Twenty-six per cent of participants indicated that the reason why they did not submit an ET 
claim was that tribunal fees were off-putting.273  This was the single most frequent reason 
given. Participants who responded that the tribunal fees were off-putting were further asked 
why this was the case. The majority of participants stated that ‘I could not afford the fee’ 
(68%).274 This was followed by ‘The fee was more than I was prepared to pay’ (19%); ‘The 
value of the fee equalled the money I was owed’ (9%); and ‘I disagree with the principle of 
having to pay the fee to lodge the claim’ (6%).275 In their 2016 survey, the issue of tribunal 
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269 Ministry of Justice, ‘Review of the introduction of fees in the Employment Tribunals Consultation on 
proposals for reform’ (MOJ January 2017) Annex E: Employment Tribunals and Employment Appeal Tribunal 
caseload. 
270 Protect, ‘Is the law protecting whistleblowers? A review of PIDA claims’ (Protect 2015) 17. 
271 Ministry of Justice, ‘Review of the introduction of fees in the Employment Tribunals Consultation on 
proposals for reform’ (MOJ January 2017) paras 104-105. 
272 Acas, ‘Evaluation of Acas Early Conciliation 2015’ (ACAS 2015) 96. 
273 ibid 97. 
274 ibid 98. 
275 ibid. 
53 
 
fees was the second most common reason for withdrawal of an ET case, with 20% of the 
participants indicating that the reason why they withdrew their ET case was that they felt 
that tribunal fees were off-putting.276  
Therefore, although the objectives of introducing ET fees were well-intentioned and 
legitimate, as acknowledged by the Supreme Court,277 the significant reduction in complaints 
before the ET meant that the impact of the introduction of the fees went far greater than 
anticipated and undoubtedly acted as a deterrent to individuals to file genuine claims. The 
Supreme Court ultimately found that ET fees were unlawful as they restricted a potential 
claimant’s right of access to justice. The Supreme Court stated that: 
In order for the fees to be lawful, they have to be set at a level that everyone can 
afford, taking into account the availability of full or partial remission. The evidence 
now before the court, considered realistically and as a whole, leads to the conclusion 
that that requirement is not met. In the first place, as the Review Report concludes, 
“it is clear that there has been a sharp, substantial and sustained fall in the volume of 
case receipts as a result of the introduction of fees”.  
While the Review Report fairly states that there is no conclusive evidence that the 
fees have prevented people from bringing claims, the court does not require 
conclusive evidence: as the Hillingdon case indicates, it is sufficient in this context 
if a real risk is demonstrated. The fall in the number of claims has in any event been 
so sharp, so substantial, and so sustained as to warrant the conclusion that a 
significant number of people who would otherwise have brought claims have found 
the fees to be unaffordable.278   
ET fees were abolished on 26 July 2017, and a fee refund scheme was introduced in October 
2017. Since its introduction, there have been 9,742 applications for refunds of fees received 
and as of 31 March 2018, 7,733 payments have been made, which totals £6,555,595.279 The 
experience in the UK of imposing ET fees underscores the necessity to preserve the status 
quo in Ireland where WRC and Labour Court fees have not been implemented, bar the single 
situation of when a complainant makes an appeal to the Labour Court but who failed to 
appear at the WRC hearing. 
3.2(b)(iii) Processing times 
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Another advantage of a WRC claim is that the time frame within which a claim is generally 
processed is relatively short. The WRC reports that 92% of adjudication complaints are 
processed in less than six months where submissions are received in a timely manner, and 
no requests for postponements are received and granted.280 On analysis of twenty-eight 
cases281 before the WRC under the 2014 Act, the average time from receipt to hearing was 
six months and from hearing to the issuing of a decision was four months. Therefore, the 
average time taken to process the claim was ten months. This data does not take into account 
any postponements282 as these details are not readily available from all the written decisions 
and therefore cannot be taken into consideration, and as such, the data cannot adequately 
represent the time it takes to process a claim before the WRC under the 2014 Act. 
Nonetheless, taking both sets of data, from the WRC report and the researcher’s own analysis 
into consideration from a complainant’s perspective, the time for a claim to be processed 
before the WRC is significantly shorter than the average length of time it takes for a claim 
to be processed before the civil courts, where the average length of proceedings in 2017 was 
753 days in the High Court and 534 days in the Circuit Court.283 
3.2(b)(iv) Alternative dispute resolution 
If a complaint filed with the WRC is deemed capable of resolution by mediation by the WRC 
Director General, the complaint may be referred to a mediation officer.284 In 2017, the WRC 
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facilitated 197 face-to-face mediations and 376 telephone mediations.285 When these 
numbers are combined, these mediations achieved a 46% settlement rate,286 which resulted 
in 220 complaints being triaged away from the Adjudication Service.287  
These findings can be contrasted with the UK ‘Early Conciliation’ (‘EC’) service introduced 
in April 2014, which became mandatory in May 2014, and requires that those intending to 
lodge an ET claim to contact Acas in the first instance to see if the matter can be resolved 
without having to resort to adjudication.288 Prior to the service being made mandatory, there 
were 22,630 conciliation notifications to Acas in 2012/13.289 The number of conciliations 
grew exponentially once it was made mandatory, with 83,423 conciliation notifications 
being made in 2014/15,290 92,127 in 2015/16,291 92,251 in 2016/17292 and 109,364 in 
2017/18.293 Of those who participate in EC, the numbers who reach COT3 settlements are 
relatively low, at 15% in the six months after the process was made mandatory,294 17% in 
2015/16,295 18% in 2016/17,296 and 15% in 2017/18.297 Nonetheless, those that did not 
submit an ET claim having participated in EC were quite high at 63% in the first six months 
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after the process was made mandatory,298 65% in 2015/16,299 64% in 2016/17,300 and 58% 
in 2017/18.301 According to the Acas survey results in 2015, 61% of survey participants 
reported that Acas was a factor (to varying extents)302 in helping them to reach their decision 
not to submit an ET claim.303  However, in 2016, there was a drastic reversal of these results, 
where 81% of claimants (and their representatives) who were asked to what extent Acas was 
a factor in them deciding to withdraw their ET claim, stated that Acas conciliation did not 
play a role in their decision, with 17% indicating that it was a factor (to varying extents)304 
in helping them to reach that conclusion.305 
The workplace dispute mediation service provided in Ireland by the WRC may be an 
attractive option for a complainant as it could result in an inexpensive and speedy resolution 
of their dispute in a voluntary mutually agreeable manner, which avoids the adversarial 
process of a hearing before the WRC. A further attraction of mediation is that an agreement 
could be made that the employer would investigate and remedy the wrongdoing disclosed 
by the worker. As Lewis points out ‘Many whistleblowers are ethically driven and are 
determined to get an investigation of their concerns and ensure that any proven wrongdoing 
is rectified. These outcomes are unlikely to be achievable via tribunal adjudication but might 
form the basis of an amicable settlement.’306 Nonetheless, it has been recognised that 
mediation of complaints in this area can be complex and challenging due to heightened 
emotions on the part of the complainant, which can result in such mediations taking longer 
than those in other areas of employment law.307 Further, agreements reached via mediation 
must also be careful not to breach s 23 of the 2014 Act, which provides that any provision 
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in an agreement that intends to prohibit or restrict the making of a protected disclosure or 
exclude or limit the operation of any provision of the 2014 Act is void.308 Further, s 23 voids 
any provision in an agreement that precludes a person from bringing any proceedings under 
or by virtue of the 2014 Act or precludes a person from bringing proceedings for breach of 
contract in respect of anything done in consequence of the making of a protected 
disclosure.309 It will be difficult to police such mediation agreements, and therefore the WRC 
mediation officer must be familiar with the rules relating to such agreements under the 2014 
Act to ensure that the worker’s rights are respected in that regard. 
3.2(b)(v) Proceedings conducted in private 
The advantage of a WRC decision from the perspective of a complainant who wishes to 
maintain confidentiality is that the proceedings are conducted in private310 and the parties to 
proceedings under the 2014 Act are anonymised in the written decisions.311 This anonymity 
may also be seen as being advantageous from an employer’s perspective as it may protect 
the employer from any adverse publicity that could arise from proceedings under the 2014 
Act. Nonetheless, if the case is appealed to the Labour Court, the proceedings are held in 
public (unless there are special circumstances requiring otherwise)312 and the parties will be 
identified when the case is published on the workplace relations website upon final 
determination of the matter.  
3.2(c) Disadvantages of a WRC claim 
3.2(c)(i) Filing times313 
The disadvantage for a complainant of filing their claim before the WRC is the short time 
frame within which the claim must be filed.  Complaints must initially be presented in 
writing314 to the Director General of the WRC within six months of the date of the alleged 
contravention.315 The date on which a complaint or dispute is referred is the date it is received 
by the WRC.316 If a complaint is not received within the six-month time frame, an extension 
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may be granted by an Adjudication Officer up to a maximum time limit of twelve months 
where, in the opinion of the Adjudication Officer, the complainant has demonstrated 
reasonable cause for the delay.317 For civil claims initiated under s 13 of the 2014 Act, a six-
year limitation period applies.318 This six-year limitation period is a much more extensive 
time frame and an attractive one for potential complainants. The fact that 24% of claims 
under the 2014 Act before the WRC and the Labour Court failed because they were not 
submitted before the WRC within the six-month period highlights the potential benefit of 
bringing a tort action before the civil courts under s 13 of the 2014 Act.319  
3.2(c)(ii) Compensation320  
Another disadvantage of bringing a claim before the WRC is the cap on compensation that 
can be awarded to a successful complainant.321 There is no provision for an award of 
damages to be capped in a claim before the civil courts under s 13 of the 2014 Act and the 
only limitation on the amount that can be awarded is the monetary jurisdiction of the 
particular court in which the claim is brought.322 A further disadvantage to a claim before 
the WRC compared to a claim before the civil courts is the potential that compensation 
awarded by the WRC can be reduced by up to 25% if the investigation of the relevant 
wrongdoing was not the sole or main motivation for making the disclosure.323 There is no 
similar provision in relation to a s 13 tort claim before the civil courts under the 2014 Act.  
3.3 Sector 
3.3(a) Introduction 
The 2014 Act was the first pan-sectoral whistleblowing legislation enacted in Ireland. It 
applies to workers in the public, private, and non-profit sectors. From the information 
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available from the case law,324 54% (nineteen) of the claims under the 2014 Act arose in the 
private sector, 26% (nine) in the public sector,325 9% (three) in the non-profit sector, and in 
11% (four) of the cases, there was no information as to which sector the claim arose.  
3.3(b) Protected disclosures procedures 
As can be seen from the data above, based on the case law analysis of thirty-five cases, the 
majority of the claims arose in the private sector. This data is similar to the findings in the 
UK, where 66% of PIDA claims in 2011-13 were in the private sector, whilst just like in 
Ireland, 26% (nine) of the claims in 2011-13 arose in the public sector.326  
Looking only at the rates of claims from the public and private sectors in Ireland, 32% (nine) 
of the claims arose in the public sector and 68% (nineteen) arose in the private sector. 
According to the Central Statistics Office, between 2014 Q1 and 2018 Q2, there were on 
average, 384,278 people working in the public sector (including semi-state bodies) and 
1,298,750 people working in the private sector.327 This equates to 23% of people in Ireland 
working in the public sector and 77% of people working in the private sector (leaving aside 
the non-profit sector). 
On first glance, it would appear that the lower rate of cases emanating from the public sector 
in Ireland could simply be due to the fact that the majority of workers are working in the 
private sector, rather than in the public sector. However, if all other things were equal, it 
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would be expected that the rate of claims from the public and private sector would be in 
exactly the same proportion as the number of people working in these sectors. Hence, since 
the proportion of workers in the sectors is 23% in the public sector and 77% in the private 
sector, it would be expected that the proportion of claims would be 23% in the public sector 
and 77% in the private sector. This is not the case, however, and as already stated, 32% of 
the claims arose in the public sector and 68% arose in the private sector. Therefore, this 
indicates that the public sector is overrepresented in claims under the 2014 Act.  
It would have been expected that the requirement on public bodies under the 2014 Act to 
establish and maintain protected disclosures procedures (‘Procedures’)328 would mean that 
disclosures are being handled more appropriately than in the private sector, including 
providing protection to workers who raise concerns. It is estimated that 94% of public bodies 
have complied with this legal obligation.329 However, according to the findings of 
Transparency International Ireland’s (‘TII’) Integrity at Work (‘IAW’) survey, 34% of 
private/not-for-profit sector employers had introduced a system to promote whistleblowing 
in the workplace, and only 10% of employers indicated that they had a whistleblowing policy 
or guidance.330 Nonetheless, the evidence that the public sector is overrepresented in claims 
under the 2014 Act means that the imposition of a legal obligation to establish and maintain 
Procedures alone is not sufficient to ensure the protection of workers who make protected 
disclosures. This data underpins the necessity for training in the area of protected disclosures 
(discussed at section 3.3(c)) so that workers making such disclosures are afforded 
appropriate protection. 
The draft EU Commission Directive on whistleblowing proposes that member states must 
ensure that public and private sector legal entities331 establish internal channels and 
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Procedures both for reporting and for following up on reports.332 It remains to be seen 
whether the imposition of an obligation on certain legal entities in the private sector to 
establish and maintain Procedures will reduce the number of cases originating from the 
private sector and this is something that should be assessed when the draft EU Commission 
Directive on whistleblowing is adopted and transposed into national law.  
3.3(c) Training 
There is evidence of limited protected disclosures training in the public sector. For example, 
on 22 September 2016, TII launched its IAW initiative,333 which is designed to promote 
supportive workplace environments for anyone who makes disclosures of wrongdoing; this 
is achieved through training, best practice exchange, online resources, and specialist advice 
and guidance. The IAW programme is partly funded by the Department of Public 
Expenditure and Reform (‘DPER’). The IAW training has been provided to a small number 
of public sector organisations,334 totalling 480 participants.  
Further, DPER published a ‘Request for Tenders to Establish a Multi-Supplier Framework 
for the Provision of Training Services under Protected Disclosures Act 2014’ in May 2017. 
The successful framework members, RSM Ireland and Byrne Wallace Solicitors335  are 
required to provide two types of training. The first training consists of a general overview 
for public sector employees of the 2014 Act, which is designed to develop both general 
knowledge and awareness of the 2014 Act, whilst the second training is advanced training 
for staff who are tasked with developing internal Procedures or who are designated as 
confidential recipients. The training also extended to staff who were required to follow up 
on any allegations made in a protected disclosure.336 The framework agreement is twenty-
four months in length with the possibility of two twelve-month renewals and is therefore 
                                                 
332 ibid art 4(1). 
333 For more information on Transparency International Ireland’s Integrity at Work initiative, see: Transparency 
International Ireland, ‘About Integrity at Work’ (TII) <www.transparency.ie/integrity-work> accessed 10 
October 2018. 
334 Department of Justice; National Disability Authority; Policing Authority; Irish Congress of Trade Unions; 
Action Aid, Valuation Office; Legal Aid Board; the Charities Regulator; Courts Service; Probation Service; 
Garda Síochána; Higher Education Authority; Insolvency Service of Ireland; International Protection Office; 
Irish Film Classifications Office; Irish Prison Service; Road Safety Authority; and Property Registration 
Authority of Ireland.   
335 ETenders, ‘Contract award notice’ (Etenders, 7 September 2017) <https://irl.eu-
supply.com/ctm/Supplier/PublicTenders/ViewNotice/195643> accessed 30 July 2018. 
336 Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, ‘Government Reform Agenda Protected Disclosures Act 
2014’ (DPER). 
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ongoing.337 At the time of writing, in responding to a request by the researcher, RSM 
indicated that it had not provided any trainings, whilst Byrne Wallace responded that the 
training had been provided to the Department of Defence and the Department of Housing, 
Planning and Local Government. 
The publication of a tender for protected disclosures training in the public sector is welcome. 
However, it is arguable that this should have been made available at the time that the 2014 
Act was enacted, and not some three years’ post-date, when public bodies were potentially 
receiving protected disclosures but not managing them correctly and affording disclosers 
appropriate protection.   The public sector needs to engage with the opportunities available 
to receive training in this area. Otherwise, the compliance by public bodies with their 
obligations under s 21 of the 2014 Act is merely a tick the box exercise with no commitment 
demonstrated to dealing appropriately with both disclosures and the discloser. In time, it 
would be worth analysing both the annual reports of those organisations who received 
protected disclosures training and the case law, to assess whether the organisation’s 
environment promotes and encourages the making of disclosures; the steps taken to address 
the wrongdoing; and whether the worker needed to bring a claim for redress under the 2014 
Act. 
3.4 Type of claim  
3.4(a) Introduction 
Workers are protected under the 2014 Act from acts of penalisation and detriment for having 
made a protected disclosure. Depending on the nature of the employment relationship, 
different forms of protection apply. Employees are protected from penalisation and 
detriment whilst workers other than employees are only protected from detriment. Protection 
against detriment is also extended to third parties under s 13 of the 2014 Act. 
Thirty-seven of the forty-eight cases were assessed to determine the type of claim brought 
under the 2014 Act, as eleven WRC cases were appealed to the Labour Court and were the 
same claim. The majority of the claims under the 2014 Act were penalisation claims, with 
48% (eighteen) of the claims being brought under s 12. Forty-one per cent (fifteen) of the 
claims were unfair dismissal claims under s 11, whilst 8% (three) of the claims were interim 
                                                 
337 Etenders, ‘Contract notice’ (Etenders, 16 May 2017) <https://irl.eu-
supply.com/ctm/Supplier/PublicTenders/ViewNotice/191634> accessed 30 July 2018. 
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relief claims. Three per cent (one) of the claims were both penalisation and unfair dismissal 
claims; however, as can be seen below, s 12(2) of the 2014 Act prohibits claims for unfair 
dismissal under s 11 and for penalisation under s 12, so the initiation and hearing of both 
claims simultaneously is erroneous. None of the cases identified under the 2014 Act 
concerned a claim under s 13, and therefore this section is not subject to an assessment 
herein. 
There is a wide definition of ‘penalisation’ under the legislation. An employer is prohibited 
from carrying out any act or omission that affects a worker to the worker’s detriment and 
this includes: (i) suspension, lay-off or dismissal; (ii) demotion or loss of opportunity for 
promotion; (iii) transfer of duties, change of location or place of work, reduction in wages 
or change in working hours; (iv) the imposition or administering of any discipline, reprimand 
or other penalty (including financial penalty); (v) unfair treatment; (vi) coercion, intimidation 
or harassment; (vii) discrimination, disadvantage or unfair treatment; (viii) injury, damage 
or loss; and (ix) threat of reprisal.338 The definition of penalisation in the 2014 Act arguably 
gives an open-ended list of various forms of treatment which may constitute penalisation as 
the definition of penalisation in the 2014 Act uses the phrase ‘in particular includes’339 and 
on that basis additional matters could also be claimed as penalisation. 
Protection from penalisation is separated into two forms of protection under the 2014 Act. 
The first is protection under s 11 from unfair dismissal and the second is protection under s 
12 from all other acts or omissions that are defined as penalisation under s 3(1) of the 2014 
Act. 
3.4(b) Unfair Dismissal 
Section 11(1) of the 2014 Act amends the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977 (‘1977 Act’) to 
provide that the dismissal of an employee is automatically unfair if it results wholly or 
                                                 
338 Protected Disclosures Act 2014, s 3(1). 
339 Ryan v A-G [1965] IR 294 (SC) 313 where Mr Justice Kenny conducted a literal/grammatical analysis of 
Article 40.3.1 and 2 of the Constitution and held that Article 40.3 contained a guarantee to protect an 
unspecified number of personal rights. Article 40.3.2 provides that ‘The State shall, in particular, by its laws 
protect as best it may from unjust attack and, in the case of injustice done, vindicate the life, person, good 
name, and property rights of every citizen’. Mr Justice Kenny stated that ‘The words "in particular" show that 
sub-s. 2 is a detailed statement of something which is already contained in sub-s. 1 which is the general 
guarantee. But sub-s. 2 refers to rights in connection with life and good name and there are no rights in 
connection with these two matters specified in Article 40. It follows, I think, that the general guarantee in sub-
s. 1 must extend to rights not specified in Article 40.’ 
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mainly from an employee having made a protected disclosure.340 This protection only applies 
to employees.341 Employees are protected from the first day of their employment.342  
There appears to be inconsistency in the case law as to the approach taken with respect to 
determining whether there was an unfair/constructive dismissal under the 2014 Act. In six 
cases,343 the approach taken by the WRC was first to determine whether there was an 
unfair/constructive dismissal and then to assess whether the dismissal was wholly or mainly 
as a result of the employee having made a protected disclosure. This approach was explained 
in A Childcare Worker v A Creche344 where the Adjudication Officer stated that: 
The pertinent questions to be addressed in the instant case are whether a dismissal 
within the meaning of the act has occurred or not in the first instance and if so 
whether in all the circumstances that dismissal arose as a direct result of the 
complainant having made a protected disclosure within the meaning of the Protected 
Disclosure Act, 2014.  
In the six cases mentioned, the Adjudication Officer made no assessment of whether a 
protected disclosure was made, even in the two successful cases. There did not appear to be 
any mechanical process in the deliberations of the Adjudication Officers in those decisions.  
A better approach would be first for the WRC to satisfy itself that the complainant 
established that there was a dismissal as defined under s 1 of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977. 
If the Adjudication Officer is satisfied that a dismissal has occurred, it should then assess 
whether the respondent rebutted the presumption in s 5(8) of the 2014 Act that the alleged 
disclosure is a protected disclosure. At that stage, if the presumption in s 5(8) is not rebutted, 
the Adjudication Officer should then assess whether the employer either: (i) proved that the 
dismissal was fair; or (ii) that it failed to prove that the dismissal was not wholly or mainly 
                                                 
340 Unfair Dismissals Act 1977, s 6(ba), as inserted by Protected Disclosures Act 2014, s 11(1)(b). 
341 The definition of ‘employee’ under the 2014 Act extends to members of the Garda Síochána and to civil 
servants (within the meaning of the Civil Service Regulation Act 1956). Further, the Unfair Dismissals 
(Amendment) Act 1993, s 13, provides that agency staff are deemed to be employees for the purposes of 
claiming unfair dismissal under the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977.  
342 Protected Disclosures Act 2014, s 11(1)(c). 
343 A Worker v A Nursing Home ADJ-00000267; An Employee v An Employer ADJ-00000258; Carroll v 
Congregation of the Holy Spirit T/A Registered Charity Chy 076 UD 981/2015; Mr A(2) v A Government 
Department ADJ-00009800; A Childcare Worker v A Creche ADJ-00002421; Researcher v Employment 
Agency ADJ-00010550. 
344 A Childcare Worker v A Creche ADJ-00002421. 
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because the employee made a protected disclosure.345 This was the approach taken by the 
WRC/Labour Court in eight cases.346 
An example of this approach can be seen in the first successful unfair dismissal claim under 
the 2014 Act, An Employee v A Nursing Home347 where the complainant, a staff nurse, 
claimed that she was dismissed for having made a number of protected disclosures relating 
to the health and safety of the residents of the respondent’s nursing home. At the time of the 
dismissal, the complainant did not have twelve months’ service and therefore the 
Adjudication Officer was required to consider whether her dismissal was linked to her 
making a protected disclosure in line with the 2014 Act to the Health Information and 
Quality Authority (‘HIQA’). The Adjudication Officer did not state that she accepted that 
there was a dismissal, but it is presumed she accepted this as she then proceeded to address 
the subsequent issues on foot of their being a dismissal. The Adjudication Officer first 
confirmed that a protected disclosure was made as per the definition in the legislation. She 
then proceeded to investigate the link between that disclosure and the dismissal. She found 
that the respondent had not established that any of the actions taken against the complainant 
were not connected with the protected disclosure and also that the respondent had 
commenced and instigated the disciplinary procedure in an attempt to dismiss the 
complainant in advance of her reaching twelve months’ service.  She, therefore, concluded 
that the dismissal of the complainant was an unfair dismissal, as the complainant would not 
have been subjected to disciplinary proceedings, including dismissal, if it had not been for 
the protected disclosures made by the complainant. She also concluded that the respondent 
had not followed the rules of natural justice. She held that these actions were clearly linked 
to the protected disclosures made by the complainant to HIQA and awarded the complainant 
two years’ compensation, discussed below in the ‘Remedy and quantum’ section. The 
approach adopted by the Adjudication Officer herein in her deliberations is a sounder 
                                                 
345 In the UK decision of Kuzel v Roche Products Ltd [2008] ICR 799, the Court of Appeal emphasised that if 
the tribunal is not satisfied that the reason for the dismissal was that which was asserted by the employer then 
it is open to the tribunal to find that the reason for the dismissal was what the employee had asserted. However, 
the Court of Appeal clarified further that just because the tribunal does not accept the reason for the dismissal 
proffered by the employer that it must find that the employee was dismissed for the reason asserted by the 
employee. The Court of Appeal stated, ‘It may be open to the tribunal to find that, on a consideration of all the 
evidence in the particular case, the true reason for dismissal was not that advanced by either side.’ ibid [60]. 
346 An Employee v A Nursing Home ADJ-00000456; A Worker v A Communications Provider ADJ-00001380; 
A Service Engineer v A Provider of Plant Machinery ADJ-00007236; A Worker v A Service Station ADJ-
00006640; A Senior Account Manager v A Print Management and Logistics Company ADJ-00005984; An 
Office Administrator v A Removals and Storage Company ADJ-00008404; An Employee v An Agency ADJ-
00008429; Southside Travellers Action Group v O’Keefe UDD 1828. 
347 An Employee v A Nursing Home ADJ-00000456. 
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approach than the alternate one adopted in the aforementioned cases.  
It is fundamental that it is determined whether a protected disclosure has been made as if 
this is not undertaken then the reason for the dismissal cannot be assessed properly, 
especially taking into consideration the presumption in s 5(8) that a disclosure is a protected 
disclosure. Thus, in A Service Engineer v A Provider of Plant Machinery348 the Adjudication 
Officer found that the respondent had rebutted the presumption in s 5(8) of the 2014 Act as 
the complainant’s disclosures related to payment of overtime and hours worked by him and 
these were held to be matters that related squarely to his contract of employment. Therefore, 
the complainant’s disclosure did not constitute a protected disclosure for the purpose of the 
2014 Act, and as he had less than twelve months’ service, he could not rely on the unfair 
dismissals legislation to advance his complaint. 
3.4(c) Interim relief 
Section 11(2) of the 2014 Act provides that employees who bring a claim for redress for a 
dismissal which is an unfair dismissal by virtue of s 6(2)(ba) of the 1977 Act may also make 
an application for interim relief under sch 1 of the 2014 Act.349 This is the first time that 
interim relief has been introduced into an employment law statute in Ireland.350 An employee 
must present their application for interim relief before the Circuit Court before the end of the 
period of twenty-one days immediately following the date of dismissal, whether before, on 
or after that date.351 The twenty-one-day time limit for the presentation of an interim relief 
application is arguably quite short as by the time the employee has been dismissed and seeks 
legal advice on the matter they may be out of time. Nonetheless, it is much more generous 
than the seven-day time limit in the UK for the bringing of such applications.352 
The Circuit Court will make an order if, on hearing the employee’s application for interim 
relief, it appears to the Circuit Court that it is likely that there are substantial grounds for 
contending that the dismissal results wholly or mainly from the employee having made a 
protected disclosure.353 The remedies that can be ordered by the Circuit Court in an interim 
                                                 
348 A Service Engineer v A Provider of Plant Machinery ADJ-00007236. 
349 Protected Disclosures Act 2014, s 11(2); ibid sch 1.  
350 Injunctions in employment disputes have been granted in Ireland since the decision of Mr Justice Costello 
in Fennelly v Assicurazioni Generali SpA [1985] 3 ILTR 73 (HC). 
351 Protected Disclosures Act 2014, sch 1, s 1(2). 
352 Employment Rights Act 1996, s 128(2). 
353 Protected Disclosures Act 2014, sch 1, s 2(1). 
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relief application are discussed in more detail in the ‘Remedy and quantum’ section below. 
The first reported case in which interim relief was sought was Philpott v Marymount 
University Hospital and Hospice Ltd.354 The applicant herein claimed that he was dismissed 
by virtue of having made ‘protected disclosures’ within the meaning of the 2014 Act. He 
sought an order from the court for the continuation of the terms of his contract of 
employment pending the determination of his unfair dismissal proceedings before what was 
then the EAT. The applicant had seven months’ service at the date of termination of his 
contract of employment.  
The applicant made his disclosures pursuant to a ‘formal protected disclosures document 
dated the 7 January 2015’ that was sent to the Board of the respondent. In this document, the 
applicant claimed that charity funding was being used for needs other than palliative care, 
that there were significant issues with the respondent’s building which posed and continued 
to pose critical risk to the health and safety of patients, staff, and the public, and that there 
was mismanagement by the respondent of financial resources. The respondent asserted that 
the applicant was dismissed by reason of significant interpersonal difficulties between the 
applicant and other members of staff, in particular, the executive team.  
The Circuit Court refused the applicant’s application on the grounds that he had not satisfied 
the test that his beliefs and disclosures were reasonable. His Honour Judge O’Donovan 
stated: 
This is an interim application for relief akin to injunctive relief. This Court has only 
to satisfy itself that the beliefs and disclosures were reasonable and although the 
Court accepts without reservation the sincerity of the plaintiff, objectively on the 
facts, in the Court’s view, he has not satisfied that test. Accordingly, the Court refuses 
interim relief. 
It appears from the short judgment issued by the Circuit Court that the court put more weight 
on whether the applicant’s belief was objectively reasonable rather than on his subjective 
belief.  
On the 28 July 2016, the first interim relief order was granted under the 2014 Act in the 
matter of Dougan and Clarke v Lifeline Ambulances Ltd.355 It was contended by the 
                                                 
354 Philpott v Marymount University Hospital and Hospice Ltd [2015] IECC 1. 
355 Dougan and Clarke v Lifeline Ambulances Ltd [2018] 29 ELR 210 (CC). The second, and only other 
successful interim relief application was in the matter of Kelly v AlienVault Ireland Ltd and AlienVault Inc 
(2016) Irish Examiner, 3 Nov (CC). These cases are discussed further in the ‘Remedy and quantum’ section. 
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applicants, that a protected disclosure was made by them to the Office of the Revenue 
Commissioners (‘Revenue’) in January 2016, that the respondent had been involved in 
‘serious wrongdoing’.356  Both applicants had sought an order from the court for 
reinstatement in the positions from which they had been dismissed pending the 
determination by the WRC or settlement of their unfair dismissal claims. His Honour Judge 
Comerford held that he could not find that the applicants’ dismissal was wholly or mainly 
due to the protected disclosure they had made to Revenue on the evidence presented to him. 
However, he held that the applicants did meet the threshold of establishing that there were 
substantial grounds for contending that their dismissal was wholly or mainly due to the 
protected disclosure.357 His Honour Judge Comerford made an order for the continuation of 
the applicants’ contracts of employment from the date of termination until the determination 
or settlement of the dispute for the purposes of pay or any other benefit derived from the 
employment, seniority, pension rights and other similar matters, and also for the purposes of 
determining the period of reckonable employment.358  
The attraction of an interim relief claim from an employee’s perspective is that if they are 
successful, they can continue to be paid until the substantial hearing, which will not have to 
be reimbursed to their employer if they are unsuccessful at that stage.  
Further, a possible advantage for the employee of their application being heard in public 
before the Circuit Court could mean that the employer is more likely to settle the dispute at 
an early stage in order to avoid the allegations of wrongdoing being heard, and the parties 
being identified, in open court. The respondent in Dougan and Clarke did not settle the claim 
until after the interim relief application, but counsel for the respondent argued that for the 
purpose of the interim relief application, the court ought to proceed on the basis that the 
presumption in s 5(8) had not been displaced. He submitted that the disclosures constituted 
protected disclosures and therefore it would be unnecessary to open them to the court on the 
basis that they concerned the respondent’s tax affairs. Thus, although the respondent did not 
                                                 
356 Paul Cullen, ‘Whistleblowers accuse David Hall of ‘serious wrongdoing’ after whistleblowing’ The Irish 
Times (Dublin, 29 July 2016) <www.irishtimes.com/news/crime-and-law/courts/district-court/whistleblowers-
accuse-david-hall-of-serious-wrongdoing-1.2738889> accessed 13 March 2019; Paul Cullen, ‘David Hall 
ambulance firm ordered to keep paying whistleblowers’ The Irish Times (Dublin, 29 July 2016) 
<www.irishtimes.com/news/crime-and-law/courts/district-court/david-hall-ambulance-firm-ordered-to-keep-
paying-whistleblowers-1.2739356> accessed 13 March 2019.  
357 Dougan and Clarke v Lifeline Ambulances Ltd [2018] 29 ELR 210 (CC) 218. 
358 ibid. This remedy is discussed below in the ‘Remedy and Quantum’ section. 
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settle the case at this stage, it took a substantial risk in not trying to rebut the presumption in 
s 5(8) in order to avoid the allegations of wrongdoing being aired in the public domain. 
Another advantage for the employee is that it may result in a settlement after a successful 
interim relief application, which was no doubt a significant factor in the settlement of the 
claim in Dougan and Clarke before it progressed to the substantial hearing.  
Nevertheless, there are disadvantages to the employee in bringing the claim before the 
Circuit Court, namely, the risk of costs being awarded against them if they are unsuccessful 
in their application and exposing any weaknesses in their case to the respondent.  
3.4(d) Penalisation exclusive of unfair dismissal 
Acts and omissions that constitute penalisation, other than unfair dismissal, are dealt with 
under s 12 and sch 2 of the 2014 Act. The protection from penalisation under s 12 and sch 2 
applies to employees only. Under the 2014 Act, an employer may be held vicariously liable 
in circumstances where they cause or permit any other person to penalise or to threaten 
penalisation against an employee for having made a protected disclosure.359  
An employee is not entitled to bring a claim for penalisation under this section and for unfair 
dismissal under s 11.360 This can be contrasted with the position in the UK where there is no 
limitation in relation to the initiation of an unfair dismissal claim and a detriment claim 
simultaneously. In that regard, a complainant can, therefore, be properly compensated for 
both acts of retaliation against them. For example, in the UK decision of Melia v Magna 
Kansei Ltd361 the claimant was compensated for the detriment that he suffered, prior to his 
resignation on 9 November 2001, when he was bullied, suspended, and subjected to an 
investigation for alleged misuse of his employer’s computer system on the ground that he 
had made a protected disclosure. The compensation awarded consisted of damages for injury 
to his feelings occasioned by the detriment. The claimant was also awarded compensation 
for the loss that he sustained because of his constructive dismissal. The position adopted in 
Ireland means that an employee who is dismissed wholly or mainly for having made a 
protected disclosure cannot also claim for any act of penalisation that they suffered before 
the dismissal, which leaves them without a remedy for any other wrongs suffered by them 
                                                 
359 Protected Disclosures Act 2014, s 12(1). Further, a person in employment as a member of the Defence 
Forces, the Judge Advocate-General, the chairman of the Army Pensions Board or the ordinary member thereof 
who is not an officer of the Medical Corps of the Defence Forces, are precluded from bringing an application 
under s 12/sch 2 of the 2014 Act.  
360 ibid s 12(2). 
361 Melia v Magna Kansei Ltd [2006] ICR 410 (CA). 
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for having made a protected disclosure. For example, in An Employee v A Nursing Home,362 
the Adjudication Officer held that the complainant was dismissed for having made a 
protected disclosure. However, prior to her dismissal she was subjected to isolation and gave 
evidence that she began to feel ‘frozen out’ after having made her protected disclosure. She 
submitted that there was a marked change in the attitude of management towards her after 
she made her protected disclosure and that she was not informed about policy changes and 
other relevant information that was communicated to her colleagues. Also she was allegedly 
threatened by her employer when she was ‘verbally attacked’ for ten minutes in full view of 
passers-by, including members of staff and family members of residents. During this 
altercation, the complainant alleged that she was told that she ‘better be careful’ and ‘how 
dare’ she question the necessity of certain practices. Prior to her dismissal, she went on sick 
leave due to stress arising from the situation, and she required sleeping tablets whilst she 
was on sick leave, as well as being prescribed anti-depressants for low mood. Unfortunately, 
due to the limitation in s 12(2) of the 2014 Act, the complainant herein could not be 
compensated for those detrimental acts but only for the unfair dismissal. 
As stated above, the majority of the claims under the 2014 Act, ie 48% (eighteen) of the 
claims, were brought under s 12.363 There were twenty-seven penalisation cases, seventeen 
before the WRC, nine of which were appealed to the Labour Court, and one case pre-dated 
the establishment of the WRC and was heard by the LRC. Of those cases, only three were 
successful, which equates to only 11%. 
The test for determining whether a worker has been penalised for having made a protected 
disclosure was laid down by the Labour Court in the decision of Monaghan v McGrath 
Partnership.364 This case concerned a complaint by the complainant, that in consequence of 
having made protected disclosures to her employer, the respondent, regarding the treatment 
of patients at its nursing home and to HIQA, she suffered penalisation in the form of 
intimidation, bullying, alienation, harassment, victimisation and suspension from duty on 
basic pay only from 20 June 2014 to 7 November 2014 and suspension without pay from 7 
November 2014. At first instance, the Adjudication Officer had held that the worker’s issues 
                                                 
362 An Employee v A Nursing Home ADJ-00000456. 
363 This percentage was calculated using thirty-seven cases as eleven of the forty-eight cases were appealed so 
those eleven cases have the same type of claim. 
364 Monaghan v McGrath Partnership [2017] 28 ELR 8 (LC). 
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with her employer were not related to any protected disclosures as defined by the 2014 Act 
and accordingly that there was no penalisation.365  
In order to determine a complaint of penalisation under the 2014 Act, the Labour Court held 
that it must: (i) establish that a protected disclosure had been made; and (ii) if it is established 
that a protected disclosure was made by the worker, then it must examine whether a 
penalisation within the meaning of the 2014 Act has occurred.366 
With regard to the first aspect of the test, the Labour Court referred to the definition of a 
‘protected disclosure’ under s 5, however, it did not shed any light on the question of what 
constitutes a protected disclosure. The Labour Court based its determination solely on the 
evidence before it that the respondent had been informed by the complainant at a staff 
appraisal meeting on 29 April 2014 of information concerning alleged wrongdoings relating 
to the endangerment of the health and safety of patients that the worker reasonably believed 
was occurring in the nursing home and which had come to her attention in connection with 
her employment.367  
With respect to the second aspect of the test, this required an examination of whether the 
worker had been subjected to penalisation as defined under the 2014 Act for having made a 
protected disclosure. The Labour Court referred to s 27 of the Safety, Health and Welfare at 
Work Act, 2005 (‘2005 Act’) to guide them in this determination. Section 27 of the 2005 
Act provides for protection against dismissal and penalisation and is broadly similar to the 
penalisation protection under the 2014 Act. In assessing this question, the Labour Court 
relied on its decision of O’Neill v Toni and Guy Blackrock Ltd368 where it was held that in 
order to make out a complaint of penalisation, the complainant is required to establish that 
the detriment that he or she is alleging was imposed ‘for’ having committed one of the acts 
protected by s 27(3) of the 2005 Act. Based on this interpretation of penalisation under the 
2005 Act in the O’Neill case, the Labour Court stated that the act or omission that is being 
complained of must have been incurred because of, or in retaliation for, the worker having 
made a protected disclosure.369  
                                                 
365 Monaghan v McGrath Partnership r-151162-pd-1415R. 
366 Monaghan v McGrath Partnership [2017] 28 ELR 8 (LC) 15. 
367 ibid. 
368 O’Neill v Toni and Guy Blackrock Ltd [2010] ELR 21 (LC). 
369 Monaghan v McGrath Partnership [2017] 28 ELR 8 (LC) 15. 
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The Labour Court elaborated on this test further, and stated that where there is more than 
one causal factor in the chain of events leading up to the act or omission complained of, the 
making of the protected disclosure must be an operative cause of the penalisation, meaning 
that ‘but for’ the worker having made the protected disclosure he or she would not have been 
subjected to the act or omission complained of.370 The Labour Court directed that in 
assessing this question, a consideration of the motive or reasons which influenced the 
decision maker to subject the worker to the act or omission complained of must be 
undertaken.371 
The Labour Court was of the view that even though the O’Neill case involved a question of 
penalisation under the 2005 Act, the general principle enunciated in this case remained valid 
to the case under consideration.372 
In applying this interpretation of penalisation, the Labour Court assessed the allegations of 
penalisation separating the allegations into three distinct claims of: (i) intimidation, bullying, 
alienation, harassment, and victimisation; (ii) suspension from 20 June 2014 to 7 November 
2014; and (iii) suspension from 7 November 2014, and found that only the second claim of 
penalisation could be upheld. The Labour Court stated that: 
In such circumstances, the Court must find that the making of a protected disclosure 
to her employer was an operative reason for placing the Complainant on suspension 
from work for the period from 20 June until 7 November 2014. The Court finds that 
the detriment giving rise to the complaint incurred because of, or in retaliation for, 
the disclosure of information related to the alleged abuse and alleged wrongdoings 
regarding patient care made by the Complainant on 29 April 2014. For all of the 
forgoing reasons, the Court is satisfied that were it not for that complaint the 
Complainant would not have been placed on suspension.373 
The Labour Court, therefore, varied the decision of the Adjudication Officer and allowed the 
appeal in part in finding that the complainant was penalised for having made a protected 
disclosure when she was placed on suspension from 20 June 2014 to 7 November 2014 and 
ordered that the respondent pay her compensation in the amount of €17,500.374 
The second successful penalisation case was A Complainant v A Respondent,375 where the 
WRC determined that a suspension and disciplinary sanction constituted penalisation and 
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that this was imposed in order to penalise the complainant for having made a protected 
disclosure under the 2014 Act. The Adjudication Officer stated that:  
The process of investigation and discipline were a sham in this case and there was 
therefore no justification whatsoever in imposing a disciplinary sanction against the 
complainant other than to penalise him for having made a protected disclosure under 
the Act. 
In these circumstances therefore I am satisfied that the disclosure made in May was 
an operative consideration leading to the discipline and consequently that there was 
a causal link between the penalisation imposed and the protected disclosure made. 
The third successful penalisation case was An Employee v A Public Body,376 where the WRC 
held that the complainant had been subjected to unfair treatment under s 3(1)(e) of the 2014 
Act because he had made a protected disclosure in respect of an inefficient use of taxpayers’ 
funds. This unfair treatment was found to be a failure on the part of the respondent to inform 
the complainant that an extremely serious potential security threat to the complainant and 
his family did not exist, despite knowing for fifteen months that this was the case and being 
aware of the effects of the matter on the complainant’s family. 
Interestingly, in the two successful penalisation cases outlined above that followed the 
McGrath Partnership case, neither referred to this case. Of those penalisation claims where 
it was determined that a protected disclosure had been made but that there was no 
penalisation, the ‘but for’ test laid down in McGrath Partnership was referred to in 67% 
(four) of the cases.377  
As discussed in the ‘Win/Lose’ section below, the majority of the penalisation claims lost 
on procedural grounds.378 Of those claims that lost on procedural grounds, 56% (three) were 
unsuccessful because they were deemed to be out of time. This time limit for presenting a 
claim to the Director General of the WRC has been applied quite stringently, and in a 
penalisation claim, the WRC will not take into consideration any act or omission that 
occurred outside of the six-month period prior to the receipt of the claim. So for example, in 
Accounts Administrator v A University379 the claim was received by the WRC on 28 June 
2016, however, the complainant stated that the penalisation commenced when she was 
suspended on 12 June 2015. Therefore, the WRC held that it was prohibited to deal with the 
                                                 
376 An Employee v A Public Body ADJ-00005583. 
377 A Senior Official v A Local Authority ADJ-00001721; Mr A(1) v A Government Department ADJ-00006381; 
Enterprise Ireland v Carroll PDD 3/2018; Fingal CC v O’Brien PDD 4/2018. 
378 Thirty-three per cent of the penalisation claims were unsuccessful on procedural grounds. 
379 Accounts Administrator v A University ADJ-00004380. 
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claim, as it had no jurisdiction because the claim was submitted out of time, holding that ‘the 
date of contravention which the complaint relates to began over twelve months before the 
claim was submitted to the WRC.' 
In contrast, in the UK, where the claim must be presented before the end of the period of 
three months, beginning on the date of the act or failure to act to which the complaint 
relates,380  the UKEAT held in Tait v Redcar and Cleveland BC381 that a suspension is an act 
which extends over a period and therefore the last day of the suspension is considered to be 
the date on which the employee is informed that the suspension is at an end. The appellant 
relied on s 48(3)(a) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (‘1996 Act’) which provides that 
where there may be a series of similar acts or failures, the time period for presenting a 
complaint begins on the date of the last act or failure. Section 48(4)(a) of the 1996 Act 
provides that ‘where an act extends over a period, the ‘date of the act’ means the last day of 
that period.’ The UKEAT referred to the principal authorities on the meaning of the phrase 
‘an act extending over a period’ in the equivalent provisions in discrimination legislation 
and held that: 
With the benefit of that elucidation, it seems to us that a disciplinary suspension is 
clearly “an act extending over a period” within the meaning of the statute.  Although 
there is no doubt an initial “act” of suspension, the state of affairs thereafter in which 
the employee remains suspended pending the outcome of the disciplinary 
proceedings can quite naturally be described not simply as a consequence of that act 
but as a continuation of it.382  
Unfortunately, neither the 2014 Act nor the 2015 Act provides for a time limit where there 
are a series of similar acts or failures, and it would not be open to an Adjudication Officer to 
rely on discrimination legislation, as the language used therein is different to that in the 2015 
Act and the 2014 Act.383 Therefore, even though the complainant in Accounts Administrator 
v A University384 was still suspended at the time that the complaint was received by the WRC 
on 28 June 2016, this, unfortunately, was not capable of being subject to a penalisation 
                                                 
380 Employment Rights Act 1996, s 48(3). ibid s 48(3)(b), provides that this time period may be extended 
‘within such further period as the tribunal considers reasonable in a case where it is satisfied that it was not 
reasonably practicable for the complaint to be presented before the end of that period of three months.’ 
381 Tait v Redcar and Cleveland BC (UKEAT/0096/08/ZT, 2 April 2008). 
382 ibid [2(6)]. 
383 Employment Equality Act 1998, s 77(5)(a), as inserted by Equality Act 2004, s 32, provides that ‘a claim 
for redress in respect of discrimination or victimisation may not be referred under this section after the end of 
the period of 6 months from the date of occurrence of the discrimination or victimisation to which the case 
relates or, as the case may be, the date of its most recent occurrence.’ 
384 Accounts Administrator v A University ADJ-00004380. 
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assessment. This is clearly a limitation under the 2014 and 2015 Acts and undoubtedly led 
to an injustice being suffered by the complainant. Subsequent to this decision, the 
complainant was subject to a further six months of suspension, until it was lifted by the 
respondent in November 2017, following the publication of a report385 that vindicated some 
the complainant’s allegations.386 The complainant subsequently received payment from the 
respondent in June 2018 following a settlement agreement facilitated by a mediation 
process.387 Despite the filing of the complaint in June 2016, the time frame for the 
amelioration of the penalisation suffered by the complainant was unnecessarily protracted 
due to the limitations under the relevant legislation. The inclusion of a provision similar to 
that in s 48(3)(a) of the 1996 Act in the 2015 Act would be a much more reasonable 
approach. 
The six-month time limit was misinterpreted in the matter of AIB v Murphy388 when the 
Labour Court required that the protected disclosure was made in the cognisable period and 
refused jurisdiction on the basis that the complainant did not identify any such disclosure. 
This decision is entirely erroneous as based on s 5(1) of the 2014 Act there is no time limit 
in relation to the disclosure itself, s 41(6) of the 2015 Act only applies to the penalisation. 
Arguably, the six-month time limit is far too short for the initiation of a penalisation claim 
as the alleged act or omission constituting penalisation may be ongoing for an extended 
period and yet the complainant can only be compensated for the penalisation that occurred 
in the six-month time period before the claim is filed.  
3.5 Length of service 
3.5(a) Introduction 
Under the 2014 Act, there is no continuous service requirement in order for workers to attract 
protection. Notably, employees are protected from unfair dismissal from the first day of their 
                                                 
385 Richard Thorn, ‘Independent Review of Certain Matters and Allegations Relating to the University of 
Limerick’ Final Report (October 2017).  
386 Maria Flannery, ‘University of Limerick president lifts suspension on whistleblowers and offers widespread 
apologies’ Limerick Leader (Limerick, 23 November 2017) 
<www.limerickleader.ie/news/home/283601/breaking-university-of-limerick-president-lifts-suspension-on-
whistleblowers.html> accessed 1 October 2018.  
387 Carl O’Brien, ‘UL makes settlements of up to €150,000 with whistleblowers’ The Irish Times (Dublin, 18 
June 2018) <www.irishtimes.com/news/education/ul-makes-settlements-of-up-to-150-000-with-
whistleblowers-1.3534094> accessed 1 October 2018. 
388 AIB v Murphy PDD 1/2018. 
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employment.389 Normally, for unfair dismissal claims, employees must have one-year’s 
continuous service.390 Further, under s 13 of the 2014 Act, a person is protected from 
discrimination, disadvantage, or adverse treatment in relation to prospective employment 
and will therefore not need to demonstrate any length of service to bring their claim.391  
The findings of the case law analysis392 regarding the length of service of complainants are 
as follows:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
389 Unfair Dismissals Act 1977, s 6(2D), as inserted by Protected Disclosures Act 2014, s 11(1)(c). This reflects 
the position in the UK under Employment Rights Act 1996, s 108(3)(ff). 
390 ibid s 2(1)(a). In the UK, Employment Rights Act 1996, s 94, which protects employees from unfair 
dismissal, does not apply to employees who commenced employment on or after 6 April 2012, unless the 
employee has two years’ continuous service. ibid s 108(1) provides that a one-year’s continuous service 
requirement applies to those who commenced work prior to 6 April 2012.  
391 Protected Disclosures Act 2014, s 13(3)(b). 
392 Thirty-six cases, instead of forty-eight, were assessed for the purpose of ascertaining the length of service 
of complainants because eleven cases were appealed and therefore had the same complainant and three cases 
were the connected cases of ‘Mr A’. Further, the reason why thirty-six cases were assessed, instead of thirty-
five, was due to the fact that there were two applicants in one case (Dougan and Clarke v Lifeline Ambulances 
Ltd [2018] 29 ELR 210 (CC)).  
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Table 3.1   Case law analysis of the length of service of complainants (n=36) 
Length of service of complainant Percentage  
Less than 1 year 25%  
1 yr-5 yrs   22%  
6 yrs-10 yrs   14%  
11 yrs-15 yrs  5.5%  
16 yrs-20 yrs  5.5%  
More than 21 yrs  17%  
No details  11%  
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3.5(b) Claims by workers with less than one-year’s continuous service 
As can be seen from the results, the majority of the claims were brought by those who had 
less than one-year’s continuous service. Eighty-nine per cent (eight) of the claims brought 
by those with less than one-year’s continuous service were interim relief/unfair dismissal 
claims, whilst 11% (one) of these claims were penalisation claims. There is a risk that the 
2014 Act could be abused by employees who do not have the requisite period of continuous 
employment to bring an ordinary unfair dismissal claim. However, of those interim 
relief/unfair dismissal claims that were brought by employees who had less than one-year’s 
continuous service, 50% were successful, which represents 40% (four) of the overall 
successful cases under the 2014 Act, and 50% were unsuccessful. These findings 
demonstrate that not all claims were brought in order to abuse the legislation.  
Of those unsuccessful claims, the reason why the claims failed was that in all cases no 
protected disclosure was made. As discussed in the ‘Type of claim’ section above, in Philpott 
v Marymount Hospital and Hospice Ltd393 His Honour Judge O’Donohoe accepted the 
applicant’s sincerity but held that he did not satisfy the requirement that his beliefs were 
objectively reasonable. However, the other three unsuccessful unfair dismissal claims 
brought by employees who had less than one-year’s continuous service related to personal 
grievances.394 This indicates that there may be instances where a complainant may attempt 
to exploit the 2014 Act to allege they were dismissed unfairly for having made a protected 
disclosure because they do not qualify for an ordinary unfair dismissal claim. For example, 
in A Senior Account Manager v A print Management and Logistics Company395 the 
complainant alleged that he was dismissed by the respondent for making a protected 
disclosure on 21 July 2016 by disclosing that the respondent had breached a service 
agreement between it and a publicly funded organisation by ordering items of print from a 
supplier at an excessive price and that this was effectively a misuse of public funds. The 
respondent refuted this claim and argued that the complainant was dismissed on 5 October 
2016 for poor performance during the probationary period and on that date, he made an 
alleged protected disclosure, which was subsequently submitted in writing on 10 October 
2016. The respondent argued that the alleged disclosure on 21 July 2016 was not a protected 
disclosure and that it was ‘contrary to the spirit of the legislation to attempt to manufacture 
                                                 
393 Philpott v Marymount Hospital and Hospice Ltd (2015) IECC 1. 
394 A Senior Account Manager v A print Management and Logistics Company ADJ-00005984; An Employee v 
An Agency ADJ-00008429; A Service Engineer v A Provider of Plant Machinery ADJ-00007236. 
395 A Senior Account Manager v A print Management and Logistics Company ADJ-00005984. 
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such a disclosure and then claim to have been penalised in the form of a dismissal as a result.’ 
The Adjudication Officer found that on the balance of probabilities, the respondent would 
have had no reason to instruct the complainant to order items from a preferred supplier at an 
excessive cost, especially taking into consideration the approved list of suppliers and price 
matrix in place. Further, the Adjudication Officer stated that: 
I find that the conversation the complainant submits took place on the 21st July 2016 
was more likely as a result of what had been notified to him at the performance 
meeting held on the 19th July rather than a legitimate disclosing of a wrongdoing or 
a failure on the Respondent’s part to comply with a legal obligation as is being 
claimed by the complainant. 
Consequently, the Adjudication Officer held that the complainant did not make a protected 
disclosure on 21 July 2016. 
Further, in An Employee v An Agency396 the complainant, who had commenced employment 
with the respondent on 18 April 2016 under a fixed term contract, which expired on 31 
January 2017, alleged that he was unfairly dismissed when the respondent failed to renew 
his contract on its expiration. He alleged that the decision not to renew his contract was taken 
because he made a protected disclosure to his employer and a client company. The 
complainant alleged this his protected disclosure was that he had complained about his health 
and safety to the extent that his mental health was affected and that he wanted a transfer as 
a result of inappropriate behaviour from his manager following an intimate encounter with 
her. The respondent submitted that the complainant did not make a protected disclosure and 
argued that it had not been made aware of this encounter until after the expiry of the 
complainant’s fixed-term contract. The respondent argued further that the complainant 
presented no evidence that his health and safety was endangered and that he had never raised 
any issue or grievance with the respondent during his employment. The respondent 
contended that the complainant’s employment terminated on 31 January 2017 on expiry of 
his fixed-term contract.  
The Adjudication Officer noted that in evidence at the hearing there was no mention of any 
protected disclosure nor was there any evidence of any complaint that the complainant’s 
health and safety were at risk. The Adjudication Officer did refer to evidence of a meeting 
on 16 December 2017 where the complainant gave an account of the incident and subsequent 
inappropriate behaviour from the store manager. In finding that the complainant had not 
                                                 
396 An Employee v An Agency ADJ-00008429. 
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made a protected disclosure, the Adjudication Officer referred to the WRC Code of Practice 
on the 2014 Act397 and set out its position on the difference between a grievance and a 
protected disclosure, quoting as follows: 
What is the difference between a grievance and a Protected Disclosure? 
30. A grievance is a matter specific to the worker i.e. that worker’s employment 
position around his/her duties, terms and conditions of employment, working 
procedures or working conditions. A grievance should be processed under the 
organisation’s Grievance Procedure. 
The Adjudication Officer proceeded to find that a ‘protected disclosure is where a worker 
has information about a relevant wrongdoing. I am unable to find that the complainant made 
a protected disclosure within the meaning of this Act as claimed.’  
Although there have been a low number of claims brought under the 2014 Act to defeat the 
one-year service requirement for ordinary unfair dismissal claims, this may be an area to 
monitor as the case law in this area increases in order to uncover any pattern of misuse of 
the legislation. 
3.6 Nature of disclosure: relevant wrongdoings 
3.6(a) Introduction 
The 2014 Act provides protection to workers who make a disclosure of relevant information 
(whether before or after the date of the passing of the 2014 Act) in the manner specified in 
ss 6, 7, 8, 9, or 10 of the 2014 Act. The definition of ‘disclosure’ under the 2014 Act covers 
circumstances where the information disclosed is information of which the person receiving 
the information is already aware and provides that it means in those circumstances ‘bringing 
to the person’s attention’.398 ‘Relevant information’ is information that in the reasonable 
belief of the worker, tends to show one or more relevant wrongdoings.399 This relevant 
information must come to the worker’s attention in connection with his employment.400   
The 2014 Act sets out what types of wrongdoing qualify as a relevant wrongdoing, and this 
covers an extensive range of acts: 
(a) that an offence has been, is being or is likely to be committed, 
                                                 
397 Industrial Relations Act 1990 (Code of Practice on Protected Disclosures Act 2014) (Declaration) Order 
2015, SI 2015/464. 
398 Protected Disclosures Act 2014, s 3(1). 
399 ibid s 5(2)(a).  
400 ibid s 5(2)(b).  
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(b) that a person has failed, is failing or is likely to fail to comply with any legal 
obligation, other than one arising under the worker’s contract of employment or other 
contract whereby the worker undertakes to do or perform personally any work or 
services, 
 
(c) that a miscarriage of justice has occurred, is occurring or is likely to occur, 
 
(d) that the health or safety of any individual has been, is being or is likely to be 
endangered, 
 
(e) that the environment has been, is being or is likely to be damaged, 
 
(f) that an unlawful or otherwise improper use of funds or resources of a public body, 
or of other public money, has occurred, is occurring or is likely to occur, 
 
(g) that an act or omission by or on behalf of a public body is oppressive, 
discriminatory or grossly negligent or constitutes gross mismanagement, or 
 
(h) that information tending to show any matter falling within any of the preceding 
paragraphs has been, is being or is likely to be concealed or destroyed.401  
A breach of the worker’s contract of employment is explicitly excluded from the scope of 
the 2014 Act to prevent the 2014 Act from being used as an alternative to existing grievance 
procedures for disputes on employment contracts. Such an exclusion was necessary in order 
to avoid a situation occurring in Ireland that occurred in the UK after the decision of the 
UKEAT in Parkins v Sodexho.402 The UKEAT held, in this case, that information disclosed 
by a person in relation to a breach of their employment contract by their employer fell within 
the requirements of a protected disclosure under s 43B(1)(b) of the 1996 Act.403 Section 
43B(1)(b) of the 1996 Act provides that a ‘qualifying disclosure’ includes any disclosure of 
information which, in the reasonable belief of the worker making the disclosure, tends to 
show ‘that a person has failed, is failing or is likely to fail to comply with any legal obligation 
to which he is subject.’404 This decision was not wrong when one looked at a literal 
interpretation of the legislation. Why should the phrase ‘any legal obligation to which he is 
subject’ apply only to statutory obligations but not to employment contract obligations? 
Nonetheless, it was contrary to the spirit of the legislation, as it was never envisaged that the 
1996 Act would apply to a breach of a worker’s own employment contract that does not 
                                                 
401 ibid s 5(3)(a)-(h). 
402 Parkins v Sodexho [2002] IRLR 109 (EAT). 
403 ibid [15]-[16]. 
404 Employment Rights Act 1996, s 43B(1)(b), as inserted by Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998, s 1. 
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engage the public interest.405 The decision in Parkins was followed by the UKEAT in 
Finchman v H M Prison Service406 and Kraus v Penna plc.407 In order to curtail the impact 
of these rulings s 43B(1) of the 1996 Act was amended by s 17 of the Enterprise and 
Regulatory Reform Act 2013 in June 2013. This section introduced the requirement that the 
disclosure made by the worker must be in the public interest.408  This amendment is intended 
to close the loophole that allowed workers to make a protected disclosure in relation to 
matters that were purely of a private nature rather than being in the public interest. 
It is arguable that the approach adopted in the UK, where a public interest test was 
introduced, is a better one than that adopted in Ireland, which excludes a breach of the 
worker’s contract of employment. The approach adopted in Ireland was mooted in the UK, 
but this was rejected by the responsible Minister, Mr Norman Lamb, at committee stage of 
the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Bill 2012, where he stated:  
[A]lthough our aim is to prevent the opportunistic use of breaches of an individual’s 
contract that are of a personal nature, there are also likely to be instances where a 
worker should be able to rely on breaches of his own contract where those engage 
wider public interest issues. In other words, in a worker’s complaint about a breach 
of their contract, the breach in itself might have wider public interest implications.409  
This reservation expressed by former Minister Lamb is a valid one. There is a very real 
chance that in a disclosure there may be an intermingling of issues that may constitute both 
                                                 
405 The explanatory memorandum to the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 provides that ‘The 
Employment Appeal Tribunal decision in Parkins v Sodexho Ltd [2002] IRLR 109 (EAT) raised the possibility 
that any complaint about any aspect of an individual’s employment contract could lay the foundation for a 
protected disclosure. This has led to claims being lodged at employment tribunals that would not otherwise 
have been brought and is contrary to the intention of the legislation.’ Explanatory Memorandum to the 
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013, para 103. 
406 Finchman v H M Prison Service (UKEAT/0925/01/RN, 19 December 2001). 
407 Kraus v Penna plc [2004] IRLR 260 (EAT). 
408 Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013, s 17 amends Employment Rights Act 1996, s 43B(1)(b) and 
provides that ‘For this Part, a “qualifying disclosure” means any disclosure of information which, in the 
reasonable belief of the worker making the disclosure, is made in the public interest and tends to show one or 
more of the following…’ Chesterton Global Ltd v Nurmohamed [2017] EWCA Civ 314 laid down the test for 
‘in the public interest’ and stated in para 37 that the question of whether the disclosure was made ‘in the public 
interest’ depends on the circumstances of the particular case but that the fourfold classification of relevant 
factors as set out by Mr. Laddie QC, counsel for the claimant, are a useful tool. Those factors are as follows 
‘(a) the numbers in the group whose interests the disclosure served…; (b) the nature of the interests affected 
and the extent to which they are affected by the wrongdoing disclosed – a disclosure of wrongdoing directly 
affecting a very important interest is more likely to be in the public interest than a disclosure of trivial 
wrongdoing affecting the same number of people, and all the more so if the effect is marginal or indirect; (c) 
the nature of the wrongdoing disclosed – disclosure of deliberate wrongdoing is more likely to be in the public 
interest than the disclosure of inadvertent wrongdoing affecting the same number of people; (d) the identity of 
the alleged wrongdoer…"the larger or more prominent the wrongdoer (in terms of the size of its relevant 
community, i.e. staff, suppliers and clients), the more obviously should a disclosure about its activities engage 
the public interest"’. ibid [34].  
409 Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Bill Deb 3 July 2012, col 388. 
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a personal grievance and a protected disclosure. For example, a worker may raise a concern 
that they are not being paid the minimum wage as agreed under the contract of employment. 
This is clearly a personal grievance; however, it is also a breach of s 35 National Minimum 
Wage Act 2000, which deems it a criminal offence not to pay the national minimum wage.410 
Also, under s 4 Payment of Wages Act 1991, it is an offence for an employer to fail to give 
to an employee a statement in writing specifying clearly the gross amount of the wages 
payable to the employee and the nature and amount of any deduction therefrom.411 
Disclosures of this nature, despite having a personal grievance dimension would still fall 
within the ambit of the 2014 Act due to the public interest element, the commission of a 
criminal offence.  
The word ‘likely’ appears in all but one of the relevant wrongdoings. The meaning of the 
word ‘likely’ in the equivalent UK provision was determined in Kraus v Penna PLC.412 The 
UKEAT held that the word ‘likely’ denotes a requirement of more than a possibility or risk 
that an employer might fail to comply with a relevant legal obligation. Cox J stated that: 
The information disclosed should, in the reasonable belief of the worker at the time 
it is disclosed, tend to show that it is probable or more probable than not that the 
employer will fail to comply with the relevant legal obligation.413  
3.6(b) Case law analysis 
For the purposes of the analysis of the case law in this section, thirty-five cases could be 
assessed. This is because of the total forty-eight cases, eleven were appealed to the Labour 
Court, and three cases are related414 and therefore concern the same disclosure of alleged 
wrongdoing. It was accepted in fifteen of those cases that the disclosure made by the 
complainant constituted a protected disclosure, and therefore it was accepted that the 
wrongdoing disclosed constituted a relevant wrongdoing under the 2014 Act (however, see 
comment below on multiple disclosure cases). In that regard, for the purpose of the 
assessment of the nature of the disclosure, this assessment was limited to those fifteen cases 
as in the other twenty cases it was either not determined by the Circuit Court, WRC, or 
                                                 
410 National Minimum Wage Act 2000, s 35. 
411 Payment of Wages Act 1991, s 4. 
412 Kraus v Penna PLC [2004] IRLR 260 (EAT). 
413 ibid [24]. 
414 Mr A v A Public Body ADJ-00006360; Mr A(1) v A Government Department ADJ-00006381; Mr A(2) v A 
Government Department ADJ-00009800. 
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Labour Court that the disclosures made constituted a relevant wrongdoing, or it was rejected 
that the disclosure constituted a relevant wrongdoing. 
Forty per cent (fourteen) of the cases concerned one relevant wrongdoing, whilst 60% 
(twenty-one) of the cases concerned multiple wrongdoings. Of the cases concerning multiple 
wrongdoings, 33% (seven) of the cases concerned four wrongdoings, 22% (five) concerned 
three wrongdoings, whilst 44% (nine) of the cases concerned two wrongdoings. It is not clear 
in all of the cases concerning multiple wrongdoings whether all the wrongdoings were 
accepted to be relevant wrongdoings. However, the assessment of the case law herein 
proceeded on the presumption that all wrongdoings were considered to be relevant 
wrongdoings as it was accepted by the WRC that a protected disclosure had been made, 
without always indicating which wrongdoing constituted the protected disclosure. 
In relation to the single relevant wrongdoing cases, 50% (seven) of the cases concerned 
health and safety, 17% related to abuse in care, 17% related to a criminal offence and 17% 
related to a breach of a legal obligation. 
In contrast, in the UK, the most common disclosure assessed in the case law was 
discrimination and harassment (17% in 2009-10 and 18% in 2011-13).415 With respect to 
health and safety, the case law data in the UK was divided into ‘Public safety’, which stood 
at 5% in both 2009-10 and 2011-13, and ‘Work safety’ which accounted for 12% of the 
disclosures in both 2009-10 and 2011-13. Abuse in care accounted for 2% of health and 
safety disclosures in the case law in both 2009-10 and 2011-13. These findings can be 
compared to the number of the calls received by Protect’s advice line in 2011-13 in relation 
to abuse of care, which is somewhat higher at 8%.416 TII has reported that in Ireland in 2015-
16, 2.4% of the calls to its helpline concerned ‘Abuse and Neglect’.417 Cases in the UK 
concerning multiple wrongdoings stood at 11% in 2009-10 and at 23% in 2011-13,418 which 
is significantly lower than the case law in Ireland concerning multiple disclosures, which is 
at 60%. 
3.6(b)(i) Personal grievances 
                                                 
415 Protect, ‘Whistleblowing: Time for Change, A 5 year review by Public Concern at Work’ (Protect July 
2016) 29. This is the most recent data available on this issue. 
416 ibid. This is the most recent data available on this issue. 
417 Transparency International Ireland, ‘Speak Up Report 2017’ (TII 2017) 26. 
418 Protect, ‘Whistleblowing: Time for Change, A 5 year review by Public Concern at Work’ (Protect July 
2016) 29. This is the most recent data available on this issue. 
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As discussed above, the 2014 Act is intended to exclude purely personal grievances. In 17% 
(six) of the thirty-five cases included in this assessment, the WRC held that the disclosure 
was a personal grievance and not a protected disclosure. In 83% (five) of the cases where 
the disclosure was deemed to be a personal grievance, there was a reference to the WRC 
Code of Practice on the 2014 Act. The WRC Code of Practice on the 2014 Act outlines the 
difference between a grievance and a protected disclosure and defines a grievance as ‘a 
matter that is specific to the worker i.e. that worker’s employment position around his/her 
duties, terms and conditions of employment, working procedures or working conditions. A 
grievance should be processed under the organisation’s Grievance Procedure. A protected 
disclosure is where a worker has information about a relevant wrongdoing.’419 It also 
includes examples in order to highlight the difference between a grievance and a 
disclosure.420 
A good example of the weight placed on this WRC Code of Practice on the 2014 Act is in 
the decision of A Commercialisation Specialist v A Government Agency421 where the 
Adjudication Officer specifically stated ‘Finally I would like to stress the relevance of 
SI464/2015 the Statutory code on Whistleblowing /Protected Disclosure. This gives very 
clear guidance on assisting a workplace to appreciate the differences in Grievances and 
Protected Disclosure.’ Further, in Training Co-ordinator v A Social Support Service422 the 
Adjudication Officer highlighted that ‘I have taken some guidance from S.I 464,2015 on the 
Statutory Code of Practice on Protected Disclosures’ and proceeded to set out the example 
given in the WRC Code of Practice on the 2014 Act of the difference between a grievance 
and a protected disclosure.  
It is questionable, however, whether all disclosures in the relevant case law could be 
classified as personal grievances. In some cases, this was obvious, ie a disclosure concerning 
changes to the complainant’s terms and conditions of employment, which had taken place 
without discussion or agreement,423 but in others, there was arguably an intermingling of 
issues. For example, in A Service Engineer v A Provider of Plant Machinery424 the 
Adjudication Officer placed weight on the fact that the complainant did not classify the 
                                                 
419  Industrial Relations Act 1990 (Code of Practice on Protected Disclosures Act 2014) (Declaration) Order 
2015, SI 2015/464 [30]. 
420 ibid [31]. 
421 A Commercialisation Specialist v A Government Agency ADJ-00007228. 
422 Training Co-ordinator v A Social Support Service ADJ-00002320. 
423 A Worker v An Agricultural Estate ADJ-00000860. 
424 A Service Engineer v A Provider of Plant Machinery ADJ-00007236. 
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content of his disclosure as being an ‘offence’ until after he was dismissed. The complainant 
alleged that he had raised the issue of the payment of overtime and the recording of same at 
a meeting on 27 May 2016. It was accepted by the Adjudication Officer that the issue of 
overtime payment had been made on that date and also in an appeal letter sent to the Appeal 
Manager in or around 16 June 2016. The Adjudication Officer held that the matter of 
overtime payment was one that ‘squarely falls within the scope of his contract of 
employment’ and that ‘While the overtime issue was raised in May 2016 and during the 
appeal, the first mention of there being “an offence” was the letter of the 19th July 2016, after 
the dismissal was confirmed on appeal. It follows that the issues raised by the complainant 
while in employment cannot amount to a protected disclosure pursuant to section 5(3)(a).’ 
In his decision, the Adjudication Officer referenced the offence that would be encompassed 
by the complainant’s assertion that one had been committed as being an offence under s 25 
of the Organisation of Working Time Act 1997 in relation the preservation of working time 
records. However, in order for the complainant to make a protected disclosure, it is not 
necessary for the complainant to identify the relevant wrongdoing to which their disclosure 
relates.425 All that is required is that the complainant makes a disclosure of information that 
they reasonably believe tends to show a relevant wrongdoing. Therefore, the focus of the 
Adjudication Officer should not have been on the respondent’s argument that the 
complainant had only mentioned an ‘offence’ in his letter post-dismissal but whether the 
information disclosed at the meeting of 27 May 2016 or in his appeal letter prior to his 
dismissal tended to show a relevant wrongdoing. The evidence of the complainant was that 
at the meeting of 27 May 2016 he raised concerns that overtime was not being recorded. The 
Branch Manager of the respondent gave evidence that he had met with the complainant on 
27 May 2016 and was ‘then aware of the overtime issue’ but submitted that the complainant 
had not mentioned records or an offence being committed. In cross-examination, the Branch 
Manager of the respondent accepted that there was a legal obligation to maintain working 
time records, but when asked for the time sheets for October 2015 to February 2016, he 
replied that there were no records. This evidence puts some weight behind the complainant’s 
contention that he made a disclosure where he reasonably believed that the respondent was 
not maintaining working time records.  
                                                 
425Darnton v University of Surrey [2003] ICR 615 (EAT); Babula v Waltham Forest College [2007] ICR 1026 
(CA). What is required is that the adjudication body identifies the legal obligation that has been breached. Eiger 
Securities LLP v Korshunova [2017] ICR 561 (EAT). 
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It is arguable that in proceedings under the 2014 Act much time is being taken up with 
assessing the difference between a personal grievance and a protected disclosure and with 
focussing on whether the disclosure arises under the worker’s contract of employment. This 
is resulting in disclosures that may have an intermingling of issues falling foul of the 
exclusion in s 5(3)(b) of the 2014 Act and arguably a public interest test, as adopted in the 
UK, would be a better approach so as to ensure that such disclosures attract the protections 
under the 2014 Act. 
3.7 Channel of disclosure 
3.7(a) Introduction 
The 2014 Act provides for a stepped disclosure regime whereby the worker must comply 
with certain requirements when making their disclosure to specific recipients in order for 
their disclosure to attract the protections contained in the 2014 Act. The stepped disclosure 
regime contains three distinct levels of disclosure requirements: (i) the first step covers 
disclosures to the worker’s employer, a Minister, and to a legal advisor in the course of 
obtaining legal advice; (ii) the second step is a disclosure to a prescribed person; and (iii) the 
third step is a disclosure in other cases other than to those recipients in the first and second 
steps. It is not necessary for a worker to make their disclosure via the first or second step 
before making their disclosure through the third step but the higher a worker goes up the 
stepped disclosure regime when making their disclosure, the more requirements that they 
have to satisfy in order for their disclosure to be considered a protected disclosure. The 
purpose of such provisions is to incentivise workers to raise concerns, in the first instance, 
with their employer.426 Internal reporting allows the employer to react swiftly when 
allegations or concerns arise and gives them the opportunity to deal with them effectively to 
prevent or limit the ensuing damage.  However, if having made a disclosure to their 
employer, the employer fails to act on the information disclosed, or the worker does not wish 
to avail of the internal disclosure channel, alternative channels are provided for under the 
2014 Act. Nonetheless, there is evidence that if a worker makes their disclosure externally, 
the risk of retaliation against them is increased, irrespective of whether the external 
disclosure occurs subsequent to an internal disclosure or it is made external in the first 
                                                 
426 Protected Disclosures Act 2014, s 6. 
88 
 
instance.427 One study identified that the risk of maltreatment by managers was more than 
four and a half times greater when the investigation of the wrongdoing did not remain 
internal to the organisation but progressed externally.428 It also appears that the nature of the 
retaliation differs depending on whether the worker made their disclosure internally or 
externally, where the former attracts a quick dismissal, and the latter suffers ‘a longer process 
of discrediting’ prior to dismissal.429 
3.7(b) Case law analysis  
The incentivised nature of the 2014 Act for the making of internal disclosures by workers is 
reflected in the analysis of the case law decided under the legislation between 15 July 2014 
and 16 July 2018.430 In 89% (thirty-one) of the cases, the worker made their disclosure 
internally in the first instance to their employer. In the remaining 11% (four) of the cases, 
there is no information to whom the disclosure was made. Therefore, of the information that 
is available, none of the cases indicated that a disclosure was made externally in the first 
instance.  
This practice of making disclosures internally in the first instance can be seen in other studies 
carried out in Ireland and elsewhere. The Irish IAW survey asked 878 employees in the 
private and non-profit sectors to whom they would share a concern that wrongdoing was 
taking place in the workplace, and 90% responded that they would report their concern to 
their line manager, senior manager, or board member within their organisation.431  
                                                 
427 Janet P Near and Marcia P Miceli, ‘Retaliation against Whistle Blowers: Predictors and Effects’ (1986) 
71(1) Journal of Applied Psychology 137, 141-2; Jessica R Mesmer-Magnus and Chockalingam Viswesvaran, 
‘Whistleblowing in Organizations: An Examination of Correlates of Whistleblowing Intentions, Actions, and 
Retaliation’ (2005) 62(3) Journal of Business Ethics 277, 288; Joyce Rothschild and Terence D Miethe, 
‘Whistle-Blower Disclosures and Management Retaliation: The Battle to Control Information about 
Organization Corruption’ (February 1999) 26(1) Work and Occupations 107, 120, 122-3; Terry Morehead 
Dworkin and Melissa S Baucas, ‘Internal vs. External Whistleblowers: A Comparison of Whistleblowing 
Processes’ (September 1998) 17(2) Journal of Business Ethics 1281, 1295. 
428 AJ Brown and Jane Olsen, ‘Whistleblower mistreatment: identifying the risks’ in AJ Brown (ed), 
Whistleblowing in the Australian Public Sector Enhancing the theory and practice of internal witness 
management in public sector organisations (ANU E Press 2008) 149. 
429 Rodney Smith, ‘Whistleblowers and suffering’ in AJ Brown and others (eds), International Handbook on 
Whistleblowing Research (Edward Elgar 2014) 242; Terry Morehead Dworkin and Melissa S Baucas, ‘Internal 
vs. External Whistleblowers: A Comparison of Whistleblowing Processes’ (September 1998) 17(2) Journal of 
Business Ethics 1281, 1295. 
430 Thirty-five cases were assessed for the purpose of determining the channel within which the complainant 
made their disclosure as eleven cases were appealed and three cases were the connected cases of ‘Mr A’ and 
therefore had the same disclosure channel. 
431 Transparency International Ireland, ‘Speak Up Report 2017’ (TII 2017) 38. Only 5% of the employees 
surveyed stated that they would raise their concern with a TD, Government Minister, or a journalist. 
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In the UK, Protect has carried out a number of studies that have similar findings to those of 
the IAW survey and the researcher’s analysis of the case law decided under the 2014 Act. In 
their 2015 report, which presented the findings of its review of ET decisions involving a 
whistleblowing claim between 2011 and 2013, Protect found that in 90% of the cases, the 
concern was initially raised internally in the organisation by the whistleblower.432 These 
findings are supported by the results of the biennial survey carried out by YouGov and 
commissioned by Protect that examines public attitudes to whistleblowing. The results from 
the 2011 survey indicate that 85% of respondents said that they would raise a concern about 
wrongdoing or malpractice with their employer. In 2013, this decreased slightly to 83%.  
The data establish that the vast majority of disclosures are being made by workers in the first 
instance internally. This underscores the success of the incentivised nature of the legislation 
to promote internal reporting by reflecting the reality that this is the easiest and most 
common way for concerns to be raised and remedied.  
However, there is evidence to suggest that disclosures that are made internally in the first 
instance are often subsequently made external to the organisation. The researcher assessed 
that of the 89% (thirty-one) of cases where the disclosure was made internally in the first 
instance, the worker subsequently made their disclosure externally in 39% (twelve) of those 
cases. Two of those cases involved multiple external disclosures. In one of those cases, the 
disclosure was made to the Health and Safety Authority (‘HSA’), to the Garda Síochána, 
and a customer. Whilst in the other case, the disclosure was made to the Child and Family 
Agency (‘Tusla’), the National Youth Council of Ireland, and Dublin/Dun Laoghaire ETB. 
Therefore, of the external disclosures made, five were made to prescribed persons under s 7 
of the 2014 Act;433 three were made to Ministers under s 8; three were made under s 9, two 
to a solicitor and one to a trade union representative; and six were made under s 10 to the 
Garda Síochána, a customer, a family of a service user of a nursing home, Tusla, National 
Youth Council of Ireland and Dublin/Dun Laoghaire ETB. 
                                                 
432 Protect, ‘Is the law protecting whistleblowers? A review of PIDA claims’ (Protect 2015) 13. In 2% of the 
cases, the concern was initially raised with a prescribed person, whilst 2% of the cases involved multiple 
disclosure recipients, and 6% of the cases concerned disclosures to an ‘other’. 
433 In Monaghan v McGrath Partnership r-151162-pd-1415R the complainant made her disclosure to HIQA; 
In Carroll v Congregation of the Holy Spirit T/A Registered Charity Chy 076 UD 981/2015 the claimant made 
his disclosure to HIQA; In An Employee v A Nursing Home ADJ-00000456 the complainant made her 
disclosure to HIQA; In An Employee v An Employer ADJ-00000258 the complainant made his disclosure to 
the HSA; In Dougan and Clarke v Lifeline Ambulances Ltd [2018] 29 ELR 210 (CC) the applicants made their 
disclosure to Revenue. 
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Similarly, in the 2013 collaborative research project carried out by the University of 
Greenwich and Protect, after each attempt to raise a concern, the incidence of internal 
reporting reduced, and the rate of external disclosures increased. The research took 1,000 
sample calls to Protect’s advice line and found that in 849 cases, the concern was raised on 
the first attempt internally in 91% of the cases, in 7% of the cases the concerns were raised 
externally, whilst in 2% of the cases, the concern was raised with the Union. In 477 cases, 
there was a second attempt to raise the concern, and this was raised internally in 73% of 
these cases, it was raised externally in 23% of the cases, and in 4% of the cases, the concern 
was raised with the union representative. In 140 cases, the concern was raised a third time, 
and of those cases, 60% were internal, 36% were external, and again 4% were raised with 
the Union. In only twenty-one of the cases, the concern was raised a fourth time, and of those 
cases, 47.6% were internal, matched by 47.6% being raised externally, and 4.8% were raised 
with the Union.434 
The employees in the private and non-profit sectors in Ireland surveyed in the 2016 IAW 
survey were asked whether a person would be justified in disclosing information about 
serious wrongdoing to the media or online. In response to this question, only 7% of 
employees agreed that this disclosure channel was justified as a first option, whilst almost 
half of the employees surveyed said that this disclosure channel should only be considered 
as a last resort.435 From the information gathered from the analysis of the case law, this 
attitude towards disclosures to the media/online is reflected in the fact that no such 
disclosures were made. 
Of those cases where the disclosure was made internally in the first instance, and 
subsequently made externally, 33% (four) of the cases were successful, which equates to 
40% (four) of the overall cases that were successful. Therefore, although the requirements 
for protection of an external disclosure are much greater than for an internal disclosure, there 
is evidence that even if made externally from an employer, a disclosure may still be 
protected.                                                
3.7(c) Why do some workers who have made an internal disclosure, subsequently make 
an external one? 
                                                 
434 University of Greenwich and Protect, ‘Whistleblowing: The Inside Story A study of the experiences of 
1,000 whistleblowers’ (Protect May 2013) 12. 
435 Transparency International Ireland, ‘Speak Up Report 2017’ (TII 2017) 38. 
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There are a number of potential reasons why a worker, having raised their concern internally, 
subsequently raises it outside of the organisation. One reason may be that the worker has 
raised their concern with their employer, but their employer has failed to respond or take 
action in relation to the disclosure. This occurred in the case An Employee v A Nursing 
Home.436 The complainant herein was a staff nurse employed by the respondent nursing 
home since 14 March 2015. Within a few weeks of working with the respondent, she became 
concerned with certain practices that she observed in the workplace. On 2 June 2015, the 
complainant found a resident ‘tied with a walking belt into an ordinary chair in her room 
with the door closed and in a very distressed state.’ Immediately, the complainant reported 
this incident to the Assistant Director of Nursing, completed an incident report in the incident 
book, and recorded it in the patient file and the Communication Book. Three days later the 
complainant noticed that her entry in the Communication Book had been removed. She 
immediately wrote to the Director of Nursing outlining her concerns. The Director of 
Nursing responded verbally to this letter and informed the complainant that they were aware 
who was responsible for the incident and that it would be dealt with. 
Nonetheless, the complainant received no feedback or details of changes made, nor was her 
entry in the Communication Book reinstated, causing the complainant serious concerns 
regarding on-going practice. The complainant continued to raise her concerns regarding 
certain practices, and in a letter dated 21 September 2015 to the Director of Nursing, she 
highlighted concerns relating to medication/dangerous drug procedures, training and 
qualification of certain staff, and the lack of supervision and appraisal of staff. The Director 
of Nursing replied to this letter but did not address any of the complainant’s concerns. Due 
to this lack of response and her ongoing concerns, the complainant contacted HIQA, who 
followed up to these concerns with an unannounced inspection on 30 October 2015. By 
failing to address the wrongdoing when it was brought to its attention, the respondent left 
itself open to an external inspection of its facilities thus taking the opportunity to address the 
wrongdoing out of its own hands. 
In some cases, even if an investigation is being pursued, the worker may not believe that 
their disclosure is being taken seriously or if anything is being done to address their concern 
due to a lack of feedback. This type of situation is demonstrated in the EAT decision Carroll 
                                                 
436 An Employee v A Nursing Home ADJ-00000456. 
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v Congregation of the Holy Spirit T/A Registered Charity Chy 076.437 The claimant herein 
initially reported an alleged incident of elder abuse by a co-worker to the Matron and Health 
Care Manager but became concerned that a month or two after having made his disclosure 
he had not heard anything further in respect of any potential investigation. The claimant gave 
evidence that when he raised this with the Matron and the Health Care Manager, they 
suggested to him that it was being dealt with and that he should not concern himself any 
further. He was also told to ‘mind your own business.’438 The claimant subsequently made 
his disclosure to HIQA as ‘he felt his original complaint of elder abuse had not been correctly 
investigated’.439 The Property and Finance Manager of the respondent nursing home gave 
evidence that an investigation into the allegation of abuse was opened by the respondent.440 
The EAT stated in its judgment that it ‘fully accepts that the claimant was not given any 
reason to believe that his original complaint of elder abuse had been taken seriously and was 
being investigated. There are competing interests at stake here. On the one hand 
confidentiality and on the other hand a quite reasonable need to know that a complaint has 
been taken seriously.’441 This case underscores the importance of providing periodic 
feedback to a discloser in line with natural justice and fair procedures for the alleged 
wrongdoer442 to reassure the worker that their disclosure is being taken seriously and being 
investigated. 
Another reason why a worker may decide to raise their concern externally from the 
organisation is if the worker is dissatisfied with the investigation and how it has been 
conducted. This reason is demonstrated in the decision of Fingal CC v O’Brien.443 This case 
concerned a claim of penalisation by the complainant, a senior official of a local authority, 
the respondent herein. The complainant raised concerns of disguised payments, accounting 
irregularities relating to the expenditure of Council monies, and the veracity of statements 
made by or on behalf of the respondent to members of the Oireachtas in relation to the 
operation of a high profile sporting project in the area of the respondent. The complainant 
                                                 
437 Carroll v Congregation of the Holy Spirit T/A Registered Charity Chy 076 UD981/2015. 
438 Ciarán D’Arcy, ‘Nursing Home Worker ‘victimised’ after whistleblowing’ The Irish Times (Dublin, 20 
December 2018) <www.irishtimes.com/news/social-affairs/nursing-home-worker-victimised-after-
whistleblowing-1.2913069> accessed 17 September 2018. 
439 Carroll v Congregation of the Holy Spirit T/A Registered Charity Chy 076 UD981/2015. 
440 Ciarán D'Arcy ‘Nursing home worker ‘upset priests and patients’ with abuse claims’ The Irish Times 
(Dublin, 23 February 2017) <www.irishtimes.com/news/ireland/irish-news/nursing-home-worker-upset-
priests-and-patients-with-abuse-claims-1.2986379> accessed 17 September 2018. 
441 Carroll v Congregation of the Holy Spirit T/A Registered Charity Chy 076 UD981/2015. 
442 See: Chapter 5 for a discussion of natural justice and fair procedures in the context of protected disclosures. 
443 Fingal CC v O’Brien PDD 4/2018.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
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stated that he made his protected disclosures initially by way of letter to the CEO of the 
respondent on 14 April 2014 and then by way of a detailed report to the CEO on 30 May 
2014. The CEO carried out a review of the file and materials furnished to him by the 
complainant and also commissioned a separate and independent review of the matters raised 
by the complainant by a retired CEO of a different local authority, Mr John Fitzgerald. In 
January 2015, the complainant was informed that the matters raised by him had been dealt 
with in accordance with the relevant proper procedures and that there was nothing further to 
investigate. Following this, the complainant made a second disclosure in respect of the same 
issues to the then Minister for the Environment, Community and Local Government, Mr 
Alan Kelly TD. The evidence at the Labour Court hearing was that this second disclosure 
was made to the Minister on 23 March 2015 as the complainant ‘was not satisfied with the 
conclusions arrived at by the respondent’s Chief Executive (or indeed by Mr Fitzgerald) in 
relation to the issues the complainant had raised in his first protected disclosure.’444  At the 
WRC hearing, the complainant explained that the investigator had never spoken to him and 
that the respondent had not adequately addressed the contents of the protected disclosures 
but had instead focussed on a previous disciplinary issue that had been completed some years 
before and did not relate to the protected disclosures.445 It is clear from the evidence 
proffered by the complainant that the reason why he made a second, external, disclosure was 
because of his dissatisfaction with the investigation. Both disclosures were accepted by the 
WRC and the Labour Court to be protected disclosures, but his claim failed, as he did not 
demonstrate that he had suffered penalisation because of or in retaliation for having made 
his protected disclosures. This case highlights the necessity to ensure that the investigation 
is conducted in a proper manner in order to reduce the risk of disclosures of wrongdoing or 
alleged wrongdoing being made externally from the organisation. 
The occurrence of subsequent disclosures being made externally underpins the necessity for 
organisations to implement Procedures to address disclosures of wrongdoing and to ensure 
that periodic feedback is given to the worker so that they know that their disclosure is 
receiving attention. 
3.8 Reference to protected disclosures procedures 
3.8(a) Introduction 
                                                 
444 ibid. 
445 A Senior Official v A Local Authority ADJ-00001721. 
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As discussed in detail in Chapter 4, every public body is required to establish and maintain 
internal Procedures for dealing with protected disclosures made by workers who are, or were, 
employed by the public body.446 Written information in relation to these Procedures must be 
given by the public body to all workers employed by it.447 DPER published guidance (‘DPER 
Guidance’) for the purpose of assisting public bodies in their establishment and maintenance 
of the Procedures in March 2016,448 and public bodies are required to have regard to this 
DPER Guidance.449  
3.8(b) Case law analysis 
All forty-eight cases were assessed in order to determine the rate at which Procedures are 
referenced in case law under the 2014 Act. Twenty-three per cent (eleven) of the cases 
mentioned Procedures in some manner. All of those cases were WRC cases. Forty-five per 
cent (five) of these cases were from the public sector, 36% (four) were from the private 
sector, 10% (one) were from the non-profit sector, and in 10% (one), there was no 
information as to the relevant sector. Sixty per cent of the cases (seven) concerned internal 
disclosures, whilst 40% (four) concerned disclosures that were made internally in the first 
instance and were subsequently made externally. Section 10(3)(e) of the 2014 Act provides 
that in determining whether it was reasonable for a worker to make a subsequent disclosure 
of substantially the same information outside of their employer under s 10, regard will be 
had to whether or not the worker complied with any Procedures authorised by the employer. 
Thus, it would be expected that a worker would be more likely to be protected in making 
their wider, public disclosure, if the employer did not have any Procedures, or if the worker 
had not been made aware of the Procedures, or if it was not reasonable to expect the worker 
to have used it. Only one of the cases under consideration concerned a s 10 external 
disclosure, which related to a disclosure to a family member of the service user (discussed 
below).450  
                                                 
446 Protected Disclosures Act 2014, s 21(1). 
447 ibid s 21(2). 
448 ibid s 21(3). Government Reform Unit, Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, ‘Guidance under 
section 21(1) of the Protected Disclosures Act 2014 for the purpose of assisting public bodies in the 
performance of their functions under the Act’ (DPER 2016). 
449 Protected Disclosures Act 2014, s 21(4). 
450 A Worker v A Nursing Home ADJ-00000267. 
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In five of the cases, the complainant argued that the respondent had no Procedures.451 In one 
of those cases, A Commercialisation Specialist v A Government Agency,452 the respondent 
replied that it did have a protected disclosures policy that was dated 2011 and that the 
complainant was in possession of it as it had been presented to him on 5 May 2017. The 
WRC did not make reference to the protected disclosures policy issue in its decision but 
arguably a policy dated 2011 could not be in line with the 2014 Act as it was drafted some 
three years prior to the enactment of the legislation. Further, as this case concerned a public 
body, it is troubling that the WRC did not make reference to this issue in its decision due to 
the obligation under s 21 of the 2014 Act for the public body to establish and maintain 
Procedures.  
In Training Co-ordinator v A Social Support Service453 the respondent replied to the claim 
that it did not have a protected disclosures policy by stating that it did have one and that it 
was part of their greater Safeguarding policy. The WRC stated in its decision that it was 
satisfied that the respondent had a clearly defined policy on protected disclosures that made 
the distinction between a personal grievance and a protected disclosure clear and that in the 
circumstances the complainant had raised an expression of concern, rather than a relevant 
wrongdoing.454 The WRC put emphasis on the fact that Procedures should make the 
distinction between a personal grievance and a protected disclosure clear and the fact that 
the respondent had done so, in this case, seemed to carry weight in the WRC’s determination 
against the complainant. 
In A Senior Official v A Local Authority455 the complainant argued that the respondent did 
not take its responsibilities under the 2014 Act seriously and that ‘it was not irrelevant that 
the respondent’s policy was defective.’ In substantiating this claim, he submitted that the 
person who was named as the recipient of protected disclosures was no longer working for 
the respondent and that ‘This blasé attitude was reflected in the respondent’s approach to 
penalisation.’ The WRC noted this defect in its decision stating that ‘It is obvious that the 
respondent should update its policy and procedure regarding protected disclosures; this does 
not, however, mean that such a complaint should automatically succeed.’ Again, as this case 
                                                 
451 Training Co-ordinator v A Social Support Service ADJ-00002320; A Worker v A Service Station ADJ-
00006640; A Commercialisation Specialist v A Government Agency ADJ-00007228; the connected cases of 
Mr A v A Public Body ADJ-00006360 and Mr A(1) v A Government Department ADJ-00006381. 
452 A Commercialisation Specialist v A Government Agency ADJ-00007228. 
453 Training Co-ordinator v A Social Support Service ADJ-00002320. 
454 ibid. 
455 A Senior Official v A Local Authority ADJ-00001721. 
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concerned a public body, it is troubling that the WRC did not put more weight on the failure 
of the respondent to comply with its obligations under s 21 of the 2014 Act. This decision 
reflects the pattern emanating from the WRC that seems to favour the respondent when it 
comes to the impact of the existence or non-existence of Procedures. In this case, having a 
defective policy did not work to the complainant’s advantage, but in two other decisions of 
the WRC, a failure by the complainant to use the respondent’s Procedures worked against 
them. For example, in Employee v Employer456 the Adjudication Officer declared that the 
complaint was not well founded in circumstances where she failed to present evidence that 
she had been penalised by the respondent following the issuing of a solicitor’s letter dated 7 
April 2016. In making this determination, the Adjudication Officer took into consideration 
that the respondent had a protected disclosures policy that had been furnished to the 
complainant and that the complainant had not used this policy when making her alleged 
protected disclosures. The Adjudication Officer stated in this regard that: 
I note that the Respondent has a Whistleblowing Policy in the Employee Handbook 
which was circulated to all employees in March 2016. This is a comprehensive Policy 
Document and provides that complaints should be addressed in writing to the 
Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Respondent Company. The Complainant 
did not utilise this Policy and she did not make a complaint until her Solicitor wrote 
to the Respondent Company on the 7th April 2016. 
What is striking about this decision is that the Adjudication Officer focussed on the fact that 
the disclosure was not made ‘in writing’, as per the respondent’s Whistleblowing Policy, 
even though this is not a legislative requirement.  
Further, in A Worker v A Nursing Home,457 the respondent had argued that the complainant’s 
disclosure was not a protected disclosure because it was ‘not made in accordance with the 
hospital policy and not made to the correct person. His contract requires him to report the 
matter to the nurse in charge formally and he failed to do so. The Director of Nursing denied 
that he had ever reported the matter to her.’ In finding that the complainant had no 
justification to ground his claim of constructive dismissal the Adjudication Officer stated ‘I 
note also that he failed to use the company grievance procedures at any stage which is also 
damaging to his complaint.’ The WRC appears to have applied s 10(3)(e) of the 2014 Act to 
this decision but may not have consciously done so as there was no reference to this provision 
in the decision. Also, the Adjudication Officer refers to the ‘grievance procedures’, but it is 
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assumed this is in reference to the ‘hospital policy’ referred to by the respondent in its 
submission.  
However, in A Worker v A Communications Provider458 the respondent had argued that the 
company handbook sets out a procedure for whistleblowing and that the complainant had 
failed to observe same by drawing his concerns to the attention of the Managing Director. 
Nonetheless, the WRC did not consider this or reference it at all in its decision when it found 
in favour of the complainant that the decision to dismiss him was mainly related to him 
having made a protected disclosure regarding the respondent’s failure to observe best 
practice on health and safety matters. 
The issue of Procedures was mentioned in a small number of cases. Arguably, only two cases 
turned on this issue, in that the fact that a disclosure was not made in line with Procedures 
was taken into consideration in determining that a protected disclosure was not made. It is 
of concern that in two of the cases where there was evidence of non-compliance by a public 
body with its obligations under s 21 of the 2014 Act, the WRC did not put any weight on 
this. This raises questions as to the value of s 21 from a litigation perspective.  
3.9 Win/lose  
3.9(a) Introduction 
An assessment was undertaken of the number of cases under the 2014 Act that were 
successful and unsuccessful. It was ascertained, that taking all forty-eight decisions together, 
79% (thirty-eight) of the cases were unsuccessful and only 21% (ten) of the cases were 
successful. This finding can be contrasted with the position in the UK where 12% of the 
judgments handed down in 2011-13 were successful on PIDA grounds, whilst 62% of the 
cases were lost or struck out.459 Although this is arguably a low success rate for claimants in 
Ireland, and even lower again in the UK, a study carried out in the US of Department of 
Labor Sarbanes-Oxley determinations between 2002-05 found that at Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration (‘OSHA’) level only 3.6% of employees were successful, and 
only 6.5% were successful on appeal before administrative law judges (‘ALJs’).460 
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459 Protect, ‘Whistleblowing: Time for Change, A 5 year review by Public Concern at Work’ (Protect July 
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Of the unsuccessful cases under the 2014 Act, 66% (twenty-five) of the cases were lost on 
the merits/facts of the case, whilst 34% (thirteen) of the unsuccessful cases were lost due to 
procedural issues. 
Fifty-six per cent (ten) of the penalisation cases were unsuccessful on the merits, whilst 33% 
(six) of the penalisation cases were unsuccessful on procedural grounds. Eleven per cent 
(two) of the penalisation cases were successful. 
Fifty-six per cent (eight) of the unfair dismissal cases were unsuccessful on the merits, whilst 
13% (two) were unsuccessful on procedural grounds. Thirty-one per cent (five) of the unfair 
dismissal claims were successful. 
Ninety-two per cent (eleven) of the cases before the Labour Court were unsuccessful, whilst 
77% (twenty-four) of the cases before the WRC were unsuccessful. Of the unsuccessful 
cases before the Labour Court, 45% (five) were unsuccessful on the merits, whilst 55% (six) 
were unsuccessful on procedural grounds. Of the unsuccessful cases before the WRC, 75% 
(eighteen) were unsuccessful on the merits, whilst 25% (six) were unsuccessful on 
procedural grounds. 
Of the interim relief applications before the Circuit Court, two out of three interim relief 
applications were successful. This finding is in contrast to the position in the UK where only 
7% of interim relief applications were successful.461 
The ‘Statutory Review of the Protected Disclosures Act 2014’ (‘DPER Statutory Review’) 
commenced by DPER under s 2 of the 2014 Act in August 2017 and published 11 July 2018, 
stated in relation to its analysis of WRC cases that: 
The findings from the WRC show that in some cases whistleblowers were successful 
and in others they were not, which indicates that the Act is working as it should. The 
Courts are only beginning to interpret the Act and some landmark cases have been 
noted above. Notwithstanding these first broadly positive results, it is clear that 
further work needs to be done to increase awareness levels of the Act both amongst 
employees and employers.462 
The researcher’s findings cast doubt over the position adopted in the DPER Statutory 
Review. Firstly, the statement ‘The findings from the WRC show that in some cases 
                                                 
rationales for the high rate of unsuccessful employee claims: (i) procedural; (ii) boundary; and (iii) causation. 
ibid 100-06. 
461 Protect, ‘Is the law protecting whistleblowers? A review of PIDA claims’ (Protect 2015) 4. 
462 Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, ‘Statutory Review of the Protected Disclosures Act 2014’ 
(DPER July 2018) 22-23. 
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whistleblowers were successful and in others they were not’ is not reflected in the findings 
of the thirty-one decisions of the WRC between 15 July 2014 and 16 July 2018 where only 
23% (seven) of the claims were successful. Secondly, the statement ‘Notwithstanding these 
first broadly positive results’ is misleading as the DPER Statutory Review only referenced 
four successful cases463 and two unsuccessful cases.464 The first successful case was not until 
July 2016,465 some two years after the enactment of the 2014 Act, and taking into 
consideration that 79% (thirty-eight) of all of the cases under the 2014 Act have been 
unsuccessful it is very difficult to accept that the results of the case law have been ‘broadly 
positive’. Even if this had not been the case and the analysis of the case law by DPER was 
correct, it is too simplistic a conclusion that the 2014 Act is, therefore ‘working as it should’. 
Clearly, the high rate of unsuccessful cases under the 2014 Act raises concerns as to the 
efficacy of the 2014 Act in protecting workers who raise concerns about wrongdoing in the 
workplace. 
3.9(b) Why is there a high rate of unsuccessful claims under the 2014 Act? 
There are a number of potential reasons why so many workers are unsuccessful in their 
claims. It could be because: (i) the claims have been brought frivolously/maliciously by the 
complainants;466 (ii) the legal advisors of the complainants do not understand the 
application/scope of the provisions of the 2014 Act, or the complainants who do not have 
representation misunderstand the application/scope of the 2014 Act; or (iii) the 2014 Act has 
been misapplied by the Adjudication Officers/members of the Labour Court. 
Looking at the third hypothesis, the question arises whether the Adjudication Officers in the 
WRC or the members of the Labour Court are applying the 2014 Act correctly. Arguably 
this should not be the case as when the WRC was established, the researcher provided 
training on the 2014 Act to the newly appointed Adjudication Officers in February 2015 and 
again in March 2017 to the second intake of Adjudication Officers as part of their training 
course. Nonetheless, the training was only one and a half hours long, which is arguably not 
                                                 
463 Dougan and Clarke v Lifeline Ambulances Ltd [2018] 29 ELR 210 (CC); Monaghan v McGrath Partnership 
[2017] 28 ELR 8 (LC); An Employee v A Public Body ADJ-00005583; An Employee v A Nursing Home ADJ-
00000456. 
464 Donegal CC v Carr [2017] 28 ELR 259 (LC); Employee v Employer ADJ-00003371. 
465 Donegal CC v Carr [2017] 28 ELR 259 (LC). 
466 The Irish Small and Medium Enterprise Association (Isme) claimed that some employment lawyers might 
be coaching clients to exploit the 2014 Act. Mark Paul and Peter Hamilton, ‘Lawyers ‘coaching’ clients to 
exploit whistleblower laws – Isme’ The Irish Times (Dublin, 10  August 2018) 
<www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/lawyers-coaching-clients-to-exploit-whistleblower-laws-isme-
1.3182965> accessed 9 October 2018. 
100 
 
substantial enough to understand the application of the 2014 Act in a comprehensive manner. 
Further, it only applied to the new intake of Adjudication Officers and not to those who were 
previously appointed as such. There is no similar pre-appointment training programme for 
members of the Labour Court. There is a structured CPD programme for current members 
of the Labour Court. However, the Labour Court does not have a budget to pay for external 
contributors, and therefore the training is usually delivered by the Registrar or the Deputy 
Chairman of the Labour Court. 
The Whistleblowing Commission in the UK recommended in 2013 that tribunal members 
hearing PIDA cases should have specialist training.467 This recommendation was based on 
the fact that judges who have received training in discrimination and equal pay cases are 
‘ticketed’ to deal with the more complex discrimination cases.468 In Serbia, the Law on the 
Protection of Whistleblowers Act, no 128/2014 requires that judges hearing whistleblowing 
cases must have specialist knowledge in the protection of whistleblowers, which is to be 
conducted by the Judicial Academy in cooperation with the Ministry competent for judicial 
affairs.469 According to the Supreme Court of Cassation, in the three years, post-adoption of 
the Serbian whistleblowing law on 25 November 2014, 1,100 judges, and about 200 office 
technical advisers had so far received specific training.470 However, despite this training, in 
the first in-depth review of Serbia’s whistleblowing law, undertaken by the Center for 
Investigative Journalism of Serbia (‘CINS’), it was discovered that there had been an 
inconsistent approach adopted by different judges in cases with similar facts.471 CINS stated 
in that regard that: 
The judges dealing with these cases have gone through special training, but the 
practice of decision-making has been inconsistent. Among other things, some courts 
have refused to provide a temporary measure for protection, citing for example that 
the connection between the dismissal and reporting of irregularities was not proven. 
                                                 
467 Protect, ‘The Whistleblowing Commission, The report of the Whistleblowing Commission on the 
effectiveness of existing arrangements for workplace whistleblowing in the UK’ (Protect November 2013) 
Recommendation 21. 
468 ibid 24. 
469 Law on the Protection of Whistleblowers Act, no 2014/128, art 25. 
470 Osservatorio Balcani e Caucaso Transeuropa, ‘Whistleblowers in Serbia: a model law’ (Osservatorio 
Balcani e Caucaso Transeuropa, 21 December 2017) 
<www.balcanicaucaso.org/eng/Areas/Serbia/Whistleblowers-in-Serbia-a-model-law-184197> accessed 1 
October 2018. 
471 Center for Investigative Journalism of Serbia, ‘Safe and Sound? Jury still out on Serbia’s whistleblower 
protection law’ (Center for Investigative Journalism of Serbia, 23 January 2018) 
<www.cins.rs/english/research_stories/article/safe-and-sound-jury-still-out-on-serbias-whistleblower-
protection-law> accessed 1 October 2018; see also: Blueprint for Free Speech, ‘Safe or Sorry: Whistleblower 
Protection Laws in Europe Deliver Mixed Results’ (Blueprint for Free Speech 2018) 15. 
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Appellate courts often change decisions of the first instance, when appeal is 
submitted.  
Thus, although training is a welcome tool in the implementation of whistleblowing law, it is 
only with time and experience of applying the law that proper application is assured. 
In Ireland, there have to date been a number of decisions that have arguably been made 
erroneously. For example, in Monaghan v McGrath Partnership472 the Rights 
Commissioner473 held that there was no credible evidence that the respondent was 
responsible for any alleged alienation, but strikingly, the Rights Commissioner stated that 
‘In addition I note that alienation is not on the list of penalisation as contained in the Act.’ 
As discussed above in the ‘Type of claim’ section, the definition of penalisation under s 3(1) 
of the 2014 Act is a non-exhaustive list, and the Rights Commissioner was not limited to the 
acts or omissions specifically included in the definition of ‘penalisation’ under the 2014 Act. 
Also, in Carr v Donegal CC474 the Rights Commissioner/Adjudication Officer interpreted s 
5(3)(b) of the 2014 Act incorrectly in refusing to uphold the complainant’s complaint on the 
basis that the matters raised by him were ‘inextricably linked to the contracts of employment 
of the individuals against whom the complaints of penalisation have been made and 
accordingly find that they do not fall within the definition of a relevant wrongdoing.’ Section 
5(3)(b) excludes a legal obligation that arises under ‘the worker’s contract of employment 
or other contract whereby the worker undertakes to do or perform personally any work or 
services’475 and does not exclude a matter relating to another worker’s contract of 
employment.  
Further, despite the inclusion of s 23 in the 2014 Act that any provision in an agreement that 
intends to prohibit or restrict the making of a protected disclosure or exclude or limit the 
operation of any provision of the 2014 Act is void,476 the EAT in Carroll v Congregation of 
the Holy Spirit T/A Registered Charity Chy 076477 referred to a non-disclosure clause in its 
decision. The EAT stated that ‘On balance the Tribunal would have to accept that even in 
the clear absence of a non-disclosure clause in an acknowledged contract of employment, 
the claimant, along with any co-employee knew or ought to have known that matters as 
sensitive as care of the elderly and vulnerable should not be discussed other than in an 
                                                 
472 Monaghan v McGrath Partnership r-151162-pd-1415R. 
473 Note that Rights Commissioners did not receive training on Protected Disclosures Act 2014. 
474 Carr v Donegal CC r-153749-pd-14. 
475 Protected Disclosures Act 2014, s 5(3)(b) (emphasis added). 
476 ibid s 23(a)-(b). 
477 Carroll v Congregation of the Holy Spirit T/A Registered Charity Chy 076 UD 981/2015. 
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appropriate and confidential way.’ Also, in A Fire Station Officer (retired) v A Local 
Authority478 the Adjudication Officer incorrectly interpreted the time limits for considering 
the contravention to which the complaint relates and held that the ‘workplace practices’ that 
were the subject of the disclosure and the alleged penalisation were not made in time and 
therefore he did not have jurisdiction to hear the complaint. However, as discussed in the 
‘Type of claim’ section, the time limits do not apply to the disclosure and the 2014 Act can 
retrospectively apply to the disclosure based on s 5(1) of the 2014 Act. Moreover, in A 
Commercialisation Specialist v A Government Agency 479 the Adjudication Officer stated 
that the disclosure to a Minister was a disclosure under s 10 of the 2014 Act (even though it 
is a s 8 disclosure) and then stated that ‘I cannot establish that this document constituted a 
Protected Disclosure either as it is interwoven with a request for a job evaluation to be 
undertaken and the purpose of protected disclosure out laws a pursuance for personal gain.’ 
This finding is incorrect. Section 5(7) of the 2014 Act provides that the motivation is 
irrelevant to whether a disclosure is a protected disclosure. The issue of ‘personal gain’ is 
one of a number of factors that is taken into consideration in a s 10 disclosure and not a s 8 
disclosure under the 2014 Act. 
With respect to the Labour Court, in AIB v Murphy,480 discussed in the ‘Type of claim’ 
section, the Labour Court interpreted the six-month time limit for the initiation of claims 
under the 2014 Act incorrectly where it was held that the alleged protected disclosure was 
relevant to the cognisable period, instead of the alleged penalisation, and therefore refused 
jurisdiction. Also, the decision of the Labour Court in Donegal CC v Carr,481 which was 
decided by the Chairman of the Labour Court, Mr Kevin Foley, is arguably erroneous. This 
case was an appeal before the Labour Court against a decision by the Rights Commissioner 
that a worker, the complainant, had not made a protected disclosure as the information 
disclosed did not constitute a ‘relevant wrongdoing’. 
The complainant herein had been employed by the respondent since March 1985 and was 
still employed by the respondent at the time of the appeal hearing. At all material times, the 
complainant was employed by the respondent as a Station Officer in the Retained Fire 
Service. The complainant alleged that he had made six separate protected disclosures to his 
line managers in the Retained Fire Service. He submitted that four of the six disclosures 
                                                 
478 A Fire Station Officer (retired) v A Local Authority ADJ-00004684. 
479 A Commercialisation Specialist v A Government Agency ADJ-00007228. 
480 AIB v Murphy PDD 1/2018. 
481 Donegal CC v Carr [2017] 28 ELR 259 (LC). 
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consisted of complaints made to service management in relation to alleged behaviour of 
firefighters in the station in which he was the Station Officer, the fifth disclosure was in the 
form of a reply by him to a question from a manager in relation to a work payment claim, 
and the sixth disclosure was a complaint made by him regarding the fitness of two 
firefighters to carry out their duties by reason of physical capacity issues. 
The Labour Court was tasked with determining first whether the complainant had made a 
protected disclosure and second, if a protected disclosure had been made by him, whether 
he had been subjected to penalisation for having made that protected disclosure.482 The 
Labour Court proceeded to consider the capacity within which the complainant made his 
disclosures. The Labour Court noted that the complainant had asserted that he had made his 
disclosures ‘by way of complaints to his managers in the service in the discharge of his role 
as a Manager/Supervisor of firefighters.’483 The Labour Court put an emphasis on the fact 
that one of the disclosures had been made using a standard form drawn up for the purpose 
of reporting issues within the Fire Service. Taking those factors into consideration, the 
Labour Court held that there could be no doubt that the disclosures made by the complainant 
to his managers were made by him pursuant to the discharge of his duties as a Station 
Officer.484 In light of the above, the Labour Court proceeded to consider s 5(5) of the 2014 
Act which provides that ‘A matter is not a relevant wrongdoing if it is a matter which it is 
the function of the worker or the worker’s employer to detect, investigate or prosecute and 
does not consist of or involve an act or omission on the part of the employer.’485 Having 
considered this section, the Labour Court found that the disclosures made by the complainant 
were not protected disclosures within the meaning of the 2014 Act and held that: 
The complaints which are alleged to be protected disclosures in the within case (a) 
could not reasonably be argued to be outside of the function of a Station Officer in 
the Fire Service to detect, and (b) relate to matters other than an alleged omission of 
the Employer. On a plain reading of the Act therefore the Court finds that the 
complaint made by the Appellant in this case is misconceived. The complaints made 
by the Appellant in pursuance of his duties as Station Officer were not Protected 
Disclosures within the meaning of the Act.486 
Once the Labour Court determined that the disclosures were not protected disclosures, the 
Labour Court concluded that there was no requirement to consider whether the acts as 
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485 Protected Disclosures Act 2014, s 5(5). 
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alleged constituted penalisation for the purposes of the 2014 Act. The Labour Court affirmed 
the decision of the Rights Commissioner on the basis that no protected disclosure had been 
made by the complainant.487 
This case is important as that it addressed the scope of s 5(5) of the 2014 Act. The Labour 
Court applied a plain reading of that section and found that it was the function of the worker 
to make the disclosures that he made. In that regard, the Labour Court found that it was the 
function of the complainant as Station Officer to detect the alleged wrongdoings and that 
these wrongdoings did not consist or involve an omission on the part of the employer. The 
application of s 5(5) in this manner is worrisome as it means that the scope of the protection 
under the 2014 Act excludes a wide range of workers who are employed in managerial 
positions. Applying the rationale of the Labour Court in this case generally, it would mean 
that workers who are in positions where they are responsible for the running of the 
organisation would fail to attract the protections of the 2014 Act in circumstances where 
their roles are deemed to consist of an obligation to detect wrongdoing in the workplace, 
unless the wrongdoing consisted of or involved an act or omission on the part of their 
employer.  
It is arguable that the Labour Court should have taken a purposive approach in interpreting 
s 5(5) of the 2014 Act. Section 5 of the Interpretation Act 2005 provides that if in construing 
a provision of any Act that on a literal interpretation would be absurd or would fail to reflect 
the plain intention of the Oireachtas the provision must be given a construction that reflects 
the plain intention of the Oireachtas where that intention can be ascertained from the 2014 
Act as a whole.488 Therefore, in ascertaining the intention of the Oireachtas, the preamble of 
the 2014 Act provides that the 2014 Act is ‘An Act to make provision for and in connection 
with the protection of persons from the taking of action against them in respect of the making 
of certain disclosures in the public interest and for connected purposes.’489 Thus, the purpose 
of the 2014 Act is to protect workers who make protected disclosures and the Labour Court 
should not have taken the approach that it did in limiting the range of workers to whom 
protection can be afforded as this would mean that a wide range of workers are not protected 
from action being taken against them as a result of having made a protected disclosure. 
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This decision was cited in the Adjudication Officers’ decisions of Training Co-ordinator v 
A Social Support Service490 and A Public Servant v A Government Department.491  
These erroneous decisions, outlined above, shed light on the confusion experienced by some 
Adjudication Officers and Labour Court members in applying the 2014 Act to the cases 
before them. They underscore the necessity of training, especially for members of the Labour 
Court, as this has sole appellate jurisdiction in all disputes under employment rights 
legislation and it is, therefore, paramount that it is interpreting and applying the law 
correctly. 
3.10 Remedy and quantum 
3.10(a) Introduction 
The nature of the remedy ordered in a claim under the 2014 Act depends on the type of the 
claim that is initiated by the complainant.  
3.10(a)(i) Unfair dismissal 
In s 11 unfair dismissal claims, the employee, if successful, is entitled to redress that is 
considered appropriate in all the circumstances by the WRC, the Labour Court, or the Circuit 
Court.492 The redress ordered can consist of re-instatement,493 re-engagement,494 or 
compensation.495 Normally, for an unfair dismissal claim, an employee is entitled to be 
awarded up to 104 weeks’ remuneration (ie two years’ remuneration),496 however, an 
employee who was dismissed wholly or mainly for having made a protected disclosure is 
entitled to be awarded up to 260 weeks’ remuneration (ie five years’ remuneration). 
Remuneration includes allowances in the nature of pay and benefits in lieu of or in addition 
to pay.497 At the second stage of the Protected Disclosures Bill 2013, former Minister 
Brendan Howlin (‘Howlin’) explained in relation to this increase that: 
This legislation provides for compensation of up to five times one’s annual salary in 
such cases. Some of the employers’ bodies have suggested that this could be too 
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severe for small organisations and that we should instead go along with just twice 
the salary as contained in the unfair dismissal provisions. I do not go along with that 
because twice a salary is nothing to a large bank or financial institution. In fact, it 
would pay five times the whistleblower’s salary to get rid of the nuisance.498 
Compensation consists of any financial loss incurred that is attributable to the dismissal and 
includes any actual loss and any estimated prospective loss of income and the value of any 
loss or diminution, attributable to the dismissal, of the rights of the employee under the 
Redundancy Payments Acts, 1967 to 1973, or in relation to superannuation.499 If the 
employee does not incur any financial loss, then the employer may have to pay compensation 
up to four weeks’ remuneration as is just and equitable having regard to all the 
circumstances.500 The compensation awarded can be reduced by up to 25% if the 
investigation of the relevant wrongdoing was not the sole or main motivation for making the 
disclosure.501 
The Joint Committee on Finance, Public Expenditure and Reform noted that given the 
potential loss of career and livelihood, setting the maximum at two years’ remuneration 
could serve as a deterrent to prospective disclosures.502 Although there was some resistance 
from employers to the increase of compensation for unfair dismissal for making a protected 
disclosure, as expressed by Howlin above, the fact that the compensation is limited is 
disquieting.503 By contrast, in the UK, there is no cap on the amount of compensation that 
can be awarded to employees who are dismissed where the reason or principal reason is that 
he or she made a protected disclosure.504 It is arguable that the position in the UK is much 
more robust than the Irish position and is more in line with international best practice 
principles. Transparency International recommends that a full range of remedies should be 
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available for persons who suffer repercussions for having made a protected disclosure, 
stating that a ‘full range of remedies must cover all direct, indirect and future consequences 
of any reprisals, with the aim to make the whistleblower whole’ and includes compensation 
for lost past, present and future earnings, and status.505 Further, the Mahon Tribunal 
recommended in its Final Report that limits on the amount of compensation that may be 
awarded to a whistleblower be removed.506 The 2014 Act should have adopted such 
recommendations and provided for uncapped compensation just as the UK legislation did. 
There is evidence in Ireland of persons who have made disclosures of wrongdoing being 
unable to secure employment in the same area of employment ever again.507 As a result, such 
persons need to be compensated appropriately and a limitation on the amount of 
compensation that can be awarded will mean that this is not achieved.   
3.10(a)(ii) Interim relief 
In an interim relief application, the Circuit Court must announce its findings and explain to 
both parties, if present, what powers the court may exercise on the application and in what 
circumstances it will exercise them.508 If the employer and the employee are willing to agree, 
the court may order that, pending the determination or the settlement, the employee is 
reinstated509 in the position that he or she was dismissed from or order that the employee is 
                                                 
505 Transparency International, ‘International Principles for Whistleblower Legislation, Best Practices for Laws 
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re-engaged in another position on terms and conditions not less favourable510 than those 
which would have been applicable to the employee if he or she had not been dismissed.511 If 
the employer specifies terms and conditions for re-engagement and the employee rejects 
these on reasonable grounds, the court must do one of two things: (i) make an order for the 
continuation of the employee’s contract of employment from the date of its termination512 
until the determination or the settlement of the claim, for the purposes of pay or any other 
benefit derived from the employment, seniority, pension rights and other similar matters, 
and also for the purposes of determining the period of reckonable employment;513 or (ii) 
make no order.514 If on hearing the application for interim relief the employer fails to attend 
before the court or states an unwillingness either to reinstate or re-engage the employee the 
court must make an order for the continuation of the employee’s contract of employment515 
until the determination or the settlement of the claim, for the purposes of pay or any other 
benefit derived from the employment, seniority, pension rights and other similar matters, 
and also for the purposes of determining the period of reckonable employment.516 
3.10(a)(iii) Penalisation exclusive of unfair dismissal 
For a s 12 penalisation claim, a decision of the Adjudication Officer will do one or more of 
the following: (i) declare that the complaint was or was not well founded;517 (ii) require the 
employer to take a specified course of action;518 and/or (iii) require the employer to pay 
compensation as is just and equitable having regard to all the circumstances up to a 
maximum of five years’ remuneration.519 The compensation awarded can be reduced by up 
to 25% if the investigation of the relevant wrongdoing was not the sole or main motivation 
for making the disclosure.520 On appeal, the Labour Court shall ‘make a determination in 
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writing in relation to the appeal affirming, varying, or setting aside the decision’ of the 
Adjudication Officer.521  
3.10(a)(iv) Tort claim under s 13 of the 2014 Act 
As referred to in the ‘Forum’ section, in a s 13 tort claim, a successful plaintiff can be 
awarded damages that are limited by the monetary jurisdiction of the particular court wherein 
the claim is brought. A court may order a range of different types of damages, ie nominal, 
contemptuous, special and general, compensatory, restitutionary, exemplary damages, 
and/or aggravated. Damages are paid as a lump sum award. In comparison to an unfair 
dismissal claim where only financial loss can be awarded, or a penalisation claim that, like 
an unfair dismissal claim, is capped at five years’ remuneration, a claim under s 13 could 
mean that a worker might be awarded compensation for both pecuniary and non-pecuniary 
loss that is not capped (except for the monetary jurisdiction of the particular court, thus a 
claim before the High Court would not be capped). So for example, a claim before the High 
Court may result in a very high award of compensation if there has been a particularly 
egregious infringement of a plaintiff’s rights.522 Further, there is no requirement under s 13 
for compensation to be reduced by 25% if the investigation of the relevant wrongdoing 
concerned was not the sole or main motivation for making the disclosure by the worker, as 
is required in a claim for redress for unfair dismissal under s 11 or for penalisation under s 
12. Nonetheless, a court could exercise its discretion in this regard when making an award 
of compensation.  
3.10(b) Case law analysis 
As mentioned earlier, there have been ten successful claims under the 2014 Act. Three 
concerned penalisation claims, five concerned unfair dismissal claims, whilst two were 
                                                 
521 ibid sch 2, s 2(1)(b). 
522 In Shortt v Commissioner of An Garda Síochána [2005] IEHC 311, the High Court made an award of 
€50,000 in exemplary damages to the plaintiff who had been framed by members of the Garda Síochána for 
drug offences in relation to a night club that he was the owner and which had resulted in the imposition of a 
three-year sentence of imprisonment. In Shortt v Commissioner of An Garda Síochána [2007] 4 IR 587 (SC), 
the Supreme Court increased the High Court award to €1 million. It is worth noting that in relation to exemplary 
damages, several judges in Ireland have expressed the view that the Rookes v Barnard [1964] AC 1129 (HL) 
limitations do not apply to Irish law, ie Keane CJ in O’Brien v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd [2001] 1 IR 1 
(SC) 22; Murray CJ in Shortt v Commissioner of An Garda Síochána [2007] 4 IR 587 (SC) 620; Finlay CJ in 
Conway v Irish National Teachers Organisation [1991] 2 IR 305 (SC). The Rookes limitations require that 
exemplary damages can only be awarded in three categories of cases: (i) The oppressive, arbitrary or 
unconstitutional action by the servants of government; (ii) where the defendant’s conduct has been calculated 
by him to make a profit for himself which may well exceed the compensation payable to the plaintiff; and (iii) 
where exemplary damages were expressly authorised by statute. Rookes v Barnard [1964] AC 1129 (HL) 1226-
1227. 
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interim relief applications. Only one of the successful claims, a penalisation claim, was 
successful before the Labour Court. 
Excluding the interim relief applications, which will be dealt with below, the remedies 
ordered all consisted of orders of compensation, whilst one case, in addition to an order for 
compensation, included an order for the respondent to remove the complainant’s disciplinary 
sanction from his file.523  
3.10(b)(i) Unfair dismissal case law remedies 
In the successful unfair dismissal claims, the WRC ordered a range of monetary awards to 
be made. The largest award made occurred in the case of An Employee v A Nursing Home524 
where the WRC ordered compensation to be paid to the complainant in the amount of 
€52,416, which equated to two years’ salary. In making its determination, the WRC found 
that the rules of natural justice were not followed by the respondent in dismissing the 
complainant. The WRC noted that the complainant was invited to a disciplinary investigation 
meeting on two occasions. On the first occasion, the complainant was on annual leave and 
could not source representation in time to attend and on the second occasion, she was on 
certified sick leave. The disciplinary investigation proceeded in her absence, and the 
complainant was found guilty of gross misconduct. The WRC stated that ‘It is normal 
procedure to ensure that an employee is certified fit and able to participate in an investigation 
whilst out on certified sick leave. This did not occur and I find that the complainant was 
dismissed without having the right to respond to the allegations against her.’ The 
Adjudication Officer was of the opinion that the respondent had commenced the disciplinary 
procedure in an attempt to dismiss the complainant in advance of her reaching her twelve 
months’ service and that this was done because she had made a protected disclosure to 
HIQA.  
The second highest award made was €22,500 in the case of A Worker v A Communications 
Provider.525 Again, the WRC held that the rules of natural justice were not followed by the 
respondent in this case. Evidence was proffered by the complainant that within an hour of 
having raised health and safety concerns in relation to unsafe climbing equipment and 
ladders that had not been certified since 3 March 2013 he was dismissed with immediate 
                                                 
523 A Complainant v A Respondent ADJ-00004519. 
524 An Employee v A Nursing Home ADJ-00000456. 
525 A Worker v A Communications Provider ADJ-00001380. 
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effect.  The WRC held that ‘The claimant was summarily dismissed without any regard to 
due process or the provisions of SI146/2000 or indeed the claimant’s rights under natural 
justice.’ 526 
In A Worker v A Service Station527 the WRC ordered the respondent to pay compensation to 
the complainant in the amount of €7,020 where it determined on the balance of probabilities 
that the complainant was dismissed for having made a protected disclosure and not, as the 
respondent had argued, because of an unfavourable performance review and because of 
friction between the complainant and other staff. The WRC found that there was no 
compelling evidence to explain the contradictions between the evidence of the respondent 
that the complainant had poor performance and her positive appraisal completed four days 
before her dismissal. Further, in evidence at the hearing, the respondent had confirmed that 
no member of staff had expressed a grievance in relation to the complainant.  
In Carroll v Congregation of the Holy Spirit T/A Registered Charity Chy 076528 the EAT 
ordered for €4,100 to be paid to the complainant. The EAT held that although there was a 
constructive dismissal, the claimant had not exhausted the internal Procedures made 
available to him stating that the claimant’s ‘own actions brought him to that point as much 
as any action on the part of the respondent’. The complainant had sought compensation in 
the amount of €26,000, but in the circumstances, the EAT made an award of only €4,100. 
The lowest award made by the WRC in a s 11 unfair dismissal claim was €2,000 in 
Researcher v Employment Agency,529 which was described by the WRC in its decision as 
being token compensation of four weeks’ pay as the complainant had gained subsequent 
employment immediately following her dismissal, so there was no actual financial loss. 
Thus, the two largest awards that were made was for an unfair dismissal was €52,416, which 
equated to two years’ salary, followed by €22,500. The other three awards of compensation 
€7,020, €4,100 and €2,000 were quite low when one considers that the WRC has the 
discretion to order up to five years’ remuneration. The two largest awards were made in 
circumstances where not only did the respondent dismiss the complainant for having made 
a protected disclosure but also where they failed to follow the rules of natural justice and fair 
                                                 
526 ‘SI146/2000’ refers to the Industrial Relations Act 1990 (Code of Practice on Grievance and Disciplinary 
Procedures) (Declaration) Order 2000 (SI 2000/146). 
527 A Worker v A Service Station ADJ-00006640. 
528 Carroll v Congregation of the Holy Spirit T/A Registered Charity Chy 076 UD 981/2015. 
529 Researcher v Employment Agency ADJ-00010550. 
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procedures. In both of those cases, the complainant had less than one-year’s service. The 
level of awards being made is relatively low when compared to those in the UK where there 
have been quite substantial awards made. For example, in Best v Medical Marketing 
International Group Plc (in voluntary liq)530 the claimant was awarded £2,259,088 which 
equated to two years’ and two months’ pay, which is similar to the highest unfair dismissal 
award under the 2014 Act in Ireland where compensation equating to two years’ salary was 
awarded in An Employee v A Nursing Home.531 In both cases, there was also a finding of a 
failure to comply with disciplinary and dismissal procedures; however, in Best the award 
was increased by a further 50% to £3,402,245 to reflect this finding. This award is the highest 
award made under PIDA. In Fernandes v Netcom Consultants UK Ltd532 the claimant was 
awarded £293,441 on the basis that as a fifty-eight-year-old chief financial officer he would 
not secure similar work in the future. This award represented just over four times his salary. 
In Watkinson v Royal Cornwall NHS Trust533 the UKEAT awarded £1,201,453 to the 
claimant, a chief executive of the respondent, which amount included £569,158 for 
future loss of earnings for the damage to his career as a result of the dismissal and the 
various detriments he suffered, including suspension, failure to implement a salary increase, 
and libellous publicity by the respondent. This award represented just over eight times his 
salary. This award was reduced to around £880,000 on review.  
3.10(b)(ii) Personal liability in unfair dismissal claims 
It is important to note that in Ireland and the UK there is a divergence in the statutory regimes 
in respect of personal liability for protected disclosures’ unfair dismissal claims. In the UK 
in International Petroleum Ltd v Osipov,534 the UKEAT held two non-executive directors of 
the respondent jointly and severally liable for the unfair dismissal of the claimant for having 
made a number of protected disclosures. The imposition of personal liability by the UKEAT 
was grounded on s 47B(1A) of the 1996 Act, which introduced vicarious liability for 
                                                 
530 Best v Medical Marketing International Group Plc (in voluntary liq) (ET Case No 1501248/2008, 2 July 
2013). 
531 An Employee v A Nursing Home ADJ-00000456. 
532 Fernandes v Netcom Consultants UK Ltd (ET Case No 22000060/00, 24 January 2000). 
533 Watkinson v Royal Cornwall NHS Trust (UKEAT/0378/10/DM, 17 August 2011). 
534 International Petroleum Ltd v Osipov (UKEAT/0058/17/DA, UKEAT/0229/16/DA, 19 July 2017). 
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detriments in 2013535 and s 48(5)(b) of the 1996 Act, which provides that a claim under s 
47B(1A) can be brought by a worker against another worker or agent.536 
Normally for a claim of detriment in the form of an unfair dismissal, the claim can only be 
brought by an employee against the employer under s 103A of Part X of the 1996 Act due 
to the limitation in s 47B(2) of the 1996 Act, which provides that s 47B(1) of the 1996 Act 
does not apply where ‘(a) the worker is an employee, and (b) the detriment in question 
amounts to dismissal (within the meaning of Part X).’ Workers other than employees must 
bring a claim for detriment amounting to unfair dismissal under s 47B(1) of Part V of the 
1996 Act. 
With respect to a claim of detriment against a worker or agent personally, the UKEAT held 
in Osipov that the restriction in s 47B(2) of the 1996 Act does not apply to a claim under s 
47B(1A) of the 1996 Act.537 The UKEAT, therefore, held that employees and workers could 
bring claims for unfair dismissal against agents and workers personally. The UKEAT stated 
that:  
This construction does not strain the meaning of the legislation, and to my mind 
creates a coherent approach.  It puts employees in the same position as workers who 
never lose their right to make claims against individuals for detriments amounting to 
dismissal and ensures that employees are given the same protection as workers who 
are subjected to the most serious detriments and not put in a worse position than those 
workers.538   
The UKEAT acknowledged that claims against fellow workers would be unusual.539 
However, for workers and employees who may be deprived of a remedy for unfair dismissal 
because their employer is unable to pay compensation, for example, in cases where the 
employer is insolvent, means that they will have another avenue open to them. In addition, 
a detriment claim requires a lower threshold to be met, ie ‘on the ground that’, instead of in 
a dismissal claim, which requires the employee to show that the protected disclosure was 
‘the reason or principal reason’ for the dismissal, and therefore, a claim against a fellow 
worker for unfair dismissal might be easier to satisfy. 
                                                 
535 Employment Rights Act 1996, s 47B(1A), as inserted by Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013, s 
19(1). 
536 ibid s 48(5)(b), as inserted by Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013, s 19(2)(b). 
537 International Petroleum Ltd v Osipov (UKEAT/0058/17/DA, UKEAT/0229/16/DA, 19 July 2017) [155]. 
538 ibid [156]. 
539 ibid. 
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In Ireland, there is no scope for personal liability for unfair dismissal or penalisation claims 
under s 11 or s 12 of the 2014 Act. Section 12(2) of the 2014 Act specifically states that the 
vicarious liability provision for penalisation does not apply to unfair dismissal claims, whilst 
unfair dismissal claims under s 11 of the 2014 Act is limited to claims by employees only. 
However, workers, including employees, can bring a claim against a person personally for 
detriment, which could cover a claim of unfair dismissal, under s 13 of the 2014 Act (or for 
any loss suffered for a breach of confidentiality under s 16 of the 2014 Act). Therefore, 
although the approach adopted in the legislation in Ireland is different to that adopted in the 
UK, both workers and employees can avail of the option of pursuing a person personally for 
redress for unfair dismissal if the employer is not a suitable respondent. This issue, however, 
has not arisen in case law in Ireland as of yet but it will be important to assess the extent of 
its application when it does. 
3.10(b)(iii) Penalisation case law remedies 
The largest award of compensation ordered in a penalisation claim by the WRC was €30,000 
in An Employee v A Public Body.540 In this case, the WRC held that the complainant, a prison 
officer who had worked for the respondent for twenty-two years and four months, had been 
subjected to unfair treatment because he had made a protected disclosure in respect of an 
inefficient use of taxpayers’ funds. This unfair treatment was found to be a failure on the 
part of the respondent to inform the complainant that an extremely serious potential security 
threat to the complainant and his family did not exist, despite knowing for fifteen months 
that this was the case.  
In the other successful penalisation claim before the WRC, A Complainant v A Respondent541 
it ordered for €10,000 to be paid to the complainant. This case also included an order that 
the respondent removes a disciplinary sanction from the complainant’s file. The 
complainant, in this case, had been suspended and issued a verbal warning in respect of a 
complaint made against him by a colleague (on his own behalf and that of five other 
colleagues) and by his manager. The WRC held that the process of investigation and the 
ensuing discipline were a ‘sham’ and that there was ‘no justification whatsoever in imposing 
a disciplinary sanction against the complainant other than to penalise him for having made 
a protected disclosure under the Act.’ 
                                                 
540 An Employee v A Public Body ADJ-00005583. 
541 A Complainant v A Respondent ADJ-00004519. 
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Finally, the Labour Court ordered compensation to be paid to the complainant in Monaghan 
v McGrath Partnership in the amount of €17,500.542 The court held that the complainant 
was penalised for having made a protected disclosure when she was placed on suspension 
from 20 June 2014 to 7 November 2014.543 
Compensation orders for penalisation claims can be difficult to quantify. In the penalisation 
cases to date, there is no indication as to what factors were included when calculating the 
amount of compensation awarded. Unlike the position in the UK, there is no guidance under 
the 2014 Act as to what should be taken into consideration when calculating the amount of 
compensation to be awarded. In the UK, s 49(2) of the 1996 Act provides that compensation 
awarded must be such as the tribunal considers to be just and equitable in all the 
circumstances having regard to ‘(a) the infringement to which the complaint relates, and (b) 
any loss which is attributable to the act, or failure to act, which infringed the complainant’s 
right.’544 Section 49(3) of the 1996 Act provides further that the loss referred to in s 49(2)(b) 
must be taken to include ‘(a) any expenses reasonably incurred by the complainant in 
consequence of the act, or failure to act, to which the complaint relates, and (b) loss of any 
benefit which he might reasonably be expected to have had but for that act or failure to 
act.’545  
Thus, compensation for detriment claims include both pecuniary and non-pecuniary loss. 
The scope of non-pecuniary loss has been addressed in a number of cases, particularly in 
Virgo Fidelis Senior School v Boyle546 where the UKEAT awarded compensation for injury 
to feelings on the basis that protected disclosures claims should be treated the same as 
discrimination claims. The UKEAT stated in this regard that ‘We see no reason for detriment 
under section 47B to be treated differently; it is another form of discrimination’547 and held 
that compensation should have been awarded in line with the Vento guidelines.548 In coming 
to this conclusion, the UKEAT gave particular attention to the requirement in s 49(2)(a) of 
the 1996 Act for a tribunal to have regard to the ‘infringement’ to which the complaint relates 
                                                 
542 Monaghan v McGrath Partnership [2017] 28 ELR 8 (LC) 18. 
543 ibid. 
544 Employment Rights Act 1996, s 49(2)(a) and (b). 
545 ibid s 49(3)(a) and (b). 
546 Virgo Fidelis Senior School v Boyle [2004] IRLR 268 (EAT). 
547 ibid [44(b)]. 
548 In Vento v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police [2003] ICR 318 (CA) [65]-[68], Lord Justice Mummery 
sitting in the Court of Appeal suggested that there should be three bands of injury to feelings in discrimination 
cases. In Miles v Gilbank [2006] ICR 1297 (CA) [41], the Court of Appeal held that Vento merely provided 
guidance as to level of awards for injury to feelings in discrimination cases and is not a rule of law.  
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when making an award of compensation.549 There is no similar requirement in relation to a 
penalisation claim under the 2014 Act. However, if the position adopted in Virgo Fidelis is 
followed in Ireland and a penalisation claim is treated in the same manner as a discrimination 
claim, then compensation for injury to feelings could be awarded based on the requirement 
in s 82(1)(c) of the Employment Equality Acts 1998-2015, which provides that redress in a 
discrimination claim can include ‘an order for compensation for the effects of acts of 
discrimination or victimisation’.550  
The level of compensation that is considered appropriate in a protected disclosures detriment 
claim in the UK is considered to be in the top band of injury to feelings as set out in Vento.  
The UKEAT in Virgo Fidelis stated that ‘we are firmly of the view that the Tribunal were in 
error in not having regard to the Vento guidelines, albeit that detriment suffered by 'whistle-
blowers' should normally be regarded by Tribunals as a very serious breach of discrimination 
legislation.’551 The UKEAT varied the ET award for injury to feelings from £42,540 to 
£25,000, albeit noting that this was a very serious case meriting a very high award.552 
In addition to injury to feelings, there are other types of damages that can be awarded in 
detriment claims under PIDA in the UK. Aggravated damages were awarded in Virgo 
Fidelis553 based on the fact that aggravated damages are available in discrimination cases.554 
Damages can be awarded for personal injury (ie psychiatric damage),555 again based on the 
fact that such damages are available in discrimination claims.556 In Virgo Fidelis, the 
UKEAT could see no reason why exemplary damages could not be awarded as long as the 
Rookes v Barnard557 limitations do not apply, which was not the case in Virgo Fidelis.558  
                                                 
549 Virgo Fidelis Senior School v Boyle [2004] IRLR 268 (EAT) [44(a)]. 
550 Employment Equality Acts 1998-2015, s 82(1)(c) (emphasis added). 
551 Virgo Fidelis Senior School v Boyle [2004] IRLR 268 (EAT) [45]. 
552 ibid [56]. No separate award was made in relation to the psychiatric damage suffered by the respondent, as 
there was no separate head of claim for this. 
553 ibid [65]. 
554 HM Prison Service v Johnson [1997] ICR 275 (EAT) [40]; Virgo Fidelis Senior School v Boyle [2004] 
IRLR 268 (EAT) [59]-[65]. The principles underpinning an award of aggravated damages in the context of 
protected disclosures derive from the UKEAT decision of Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis v Shaw 
[2012] ICR 464 (EAT) [16(2)] which provides that ‘The features that may attract an award of aggravated 
damages can be classified under three heads - (a) the manner in which the defendant has committed the tort; 
(b) the motive for it; and (c) the defendant's conduct subsequent to the tort but in relation to it.’ 
555 Virgo Fidelis Senior School v Boyle [2004] IRLR 268 (EAT) [54(c)]. 
556 Sheriff v Klyne Tugs (Lowestoft) Ltd [1999] ICR 1170 (CA). 
557 Rookes v Barnard [1964] AC 1129 (HL). See footnote 522 in relation to the non-applicability of the Rookes 
limitation in Ireland. 
558 Virgo Fidelis Senior School v Boyle [2004] IRLR 268 (EAT) [81] where the UKEAT held that the school 
was not acting as servants or agents of the executive in exercising their disciplinary powers nor were their 
actions oppressive, arbitrary, or unconstitutional.  
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Ultimately, if damages for injury to feelings, aggravated damages, damages for personal 
injury, and exemplary damages are to be awarded in penalisation claims under the 2014 Act 
it will be necessary for the treatment of a whistleblower to be considered a discriminatory 
act, as determined by the UKEAT in Virgo Fidelis in the UK, and an argument made that 
such compensation should be made taking into consideration s 82(1)(c) of the Employment 
Equality Acts 1998-2015. 
In Ireland, some guidance in relation to what compensation can be awarded in a penalisation 
claim can be gleaned from the case law under s 27 of the Safety, Health and Welfare at Work 
Act 2005, which contains a similar ‘penalisation’ provision as that contained in the 2014 
Act. Significantly, in the case, Allied Foods Ltd v Sterio,559 the Labour Court relied on the 
decision of the European Court of Justice, Von Colson and Kamann v Land Nordrhein-
Westfalen,560 when varying the compensation ordered by the Rights Commissioner from 
€5,000 to €6,000 and stated that ‘where an individual right is infringed, the judicial redress 
provided should not only compensate for the claimant's economic loss but must provide a 
real deterrent against future infractions.’ Therefore, any compensation awarded must be 
effective in deterring acts of penalisation and must be adequate to the damage claimed.561  
3.10(b)(iv) Motivation in successful penalisation and unfair dismissal claims 
Even though the WRC has the discretion to reduce the level of award being made by up to 
25% if the sole or main reason for the worker making the protected disclosure was not the 
investigation of the relevant wrongdoing, this has not been applied in any case before it. In 
An Employee v A Nursing Home 562 the respondent had argued that if the Adjudication 
Officer was to find that the complainant proved her case, then the investigation of the 
relevant wrongdoing was not the sole or main motivation for making her disclosure. The 
respondent based its submission on its position that there were inconsistencies between the 
                                                 
559 Allied Foods Ltd v Sterio HSD 97/2009. 
560 Von Colson and Kamann v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen C 14/83, [1984] ECR 1891.  
561 ibid. The Court stated at para 28 of that decision that ‘It should, however, be pointed out to the national 
court that although Directive No 75/207/EEC, for the purpose of imposing a sanction for the breach of the 
prohibition of discrimination, leaves the Member States free to choose between the different solutions suitable 
for achieving its objective, it nevertheless requires that if a Member States chooses to penalize breaches of that 
prohibition by the award of compensation, then in order to ensure that it is effective and that it has a deterrent 
effect, that compensation must in any event be adequate in relation to the damage sustained and must therefore 
amount to more than purely nominal compensation such as, for example, the reimbursement only of the 
expenses incurred in connection with the application. It is for the national court to interpret and apply the 
legislation adopted for the implementation of the directive in conformity with the requirements of Community 
law, in so far as it is given discretion to do so under national law.’ 
562 An Employee v A Nursing Home ADJ-00000456. 
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various versions given by the complainant regarding the event that allegedly constituted the 
protected disclosure and because the complainant made a complaint regarding the 
respondent to the Garda Síochána that was subsequently deemed to be unfounded. However, 
the WRC did not address this submission in the decision and in finding that the complainant 
did make a protected disclosure and was dismissed because of that protected disclosure, two 
years’ salary in compensation was awarded, which equated to €52,416, without any 
reduction being applied. 
3.10(b)(v) Interim relief case law remedies 
In the first successful interim relief application, Dougan and Clarke v Lifeline Ambulances 
Ltd,563 the respondent refused to reinstate the two applicants in the positions from which they 
had been dismissed but offered re-engagement to both. Mr Clarke, who had been a director 
of ambulance operations with the respondent, was offered re-engagement working as a 
paramedic on the respondent’s ambulances, which he refused on the grounds that he had not 
worked as a full-time paramedic for fourteen years, he would have to be retrained, and that 
he would be supervised  by persons that he had previously managed.564 Mr Dougan, who 
had been an assistant manager with the respondent, was offered re-engagement on 
‘gardening leave’,565 which was described by the respondent as being a ‘zero hours contract 
with 40 hours pay’.566 His Honour Judge Comerford held that the rejection of the offer of re-
engagement by Mr Clarke was reasonable and that although the offer to Mr Dougan did not 
require a response, if it did require one, a refusal would also be reasonable.567 It is clear that 
the rationale behind His Honour Judge Comerford’s acceptance of the applicants’ rejection 
for re-engagement was based on the view that the offers made by the respondent were in 
contravention of sch 1, s 2(3)(b) of the 2014 Act which provides that the terms and conditions 
of the position offered in re-engagement must not be less favourable than those which would 
have been applicable to the employee if he or she had not been dismissed. His Honour Judge 
Comerford made an order for the continuation of the applicants’ contracts of employment 
from the date of termination until the determination or settlement of the dispute for the 
purposes of pay or any other benefit derived from the employment, seniority, pension rights 
                                                 
563 Dougan and Clarke v Lifeline Ambulances Ltd [2018] 29 ELR 210 (CC). The facts of this case are discussed 
in the ‘Type of claim’ section. 
564 ibid 219. 
565 ibid. 
566 ‘Hall’s ambulance company ordered to continue paying whistleblowers’ The Irish Times (Dublin, 30 July 
2016) 4. 
567 Dougan and Clarke v Lifeline Ambulances Ltd [2018] 29 ELR 210 (CC) 219. 
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and other similar matters, and also for the purposes of determining the period of reckonable 
employment.  
Concern has been raised that continuation orders, like those made in the Dougan and Clarke 
case, could lead to ‘double recovery’ if an employee is also successful in their unfair 
dismissal claim before the WRC. In that regard, it has been suggested that payments made 
to employees under continuation orders should be offset against any award made in the 
substantive unfair dismissal case.568 
3.11 Subject to appeal 
3.11(a) Introduction 
As mentioned earlier, eleven of the unsuccessful WRC decisions under the 2014 Act were 
appealed to the Labour Court. Appeals from a decision of an Adjudication Officer must be 
made to the Labour Court by giving a notice in writing569 within forty-two days from the 
date of the decision concerned.570 The Labour Court may direct that such a notice may be 
given to it after the expiration of the forty-two day period specified if it is satisfied that the 
notice was not so given before such expiration due to the existence of exceptional 
circumstances.571 When such an appeal is made, the Labour Court must do the following: (i) 
give the parties to the appeal an opportunity to be heard by it and to present to it any evidence 
relevant to the appeal;572 (ii) make a decision in relation to the appeal in accordance with the 
‘relevant redress provision’;573 and (iii) give the parties to the appeal a copy of that decision 
in writing.574 The ‘relevant redress provision’ in this regard is sch 2, s 2(1)(b) of the 2014 
Act which provides that on appeal, the Labour Court shall ‘make a determination in writing 
in relation to the appeal affirming, varying, or setting aside the decision’ of the Adjudication 
Officer.575 A party to the proceedings before the Labour Court may appeal a determination 
of the Labour Court to the High Court on a point of law not later than forty-two days from 
                                                 
568 Donall O’Riordan, ‘The Protected Disclosures Act 2014-Practicalities and Recent Developments’ (2017) 
14(1) Irish Employment Law Journal 10, 17. 
569 Workplace Relations Act 2015, s 44(2). 
570 ibid s 44(3). 
571 ibid s 44(4). 
572 ibid s 44(1)(a)(i). 
573 ibid s 44(1)(a)(ii). 
574 ibid s 44(1)(a)(iii). 
575 Protected Disclosures Act 2014, sch 2, s 2(1)(b). 
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the service on that party of notice of the decision of the Labour Court, and this determination 
of the High Court will be final and conclusive.576 
3.11(b) Case law analysis 
All eleven Labour Court cases under the 2014 Act were appeals brought by the worker. Only 
one of those cases was successful.577 Of the ten unsuccessful cases, only three of the cases 
were unsuccessful for the same reasons as decided by the WRC. In the WRC decision, A 
Senior Official v A Local Authority,578 and in its appeal before the Labour Court, Fingal CC 
v O’Brien,579 it was determined that the worker had made protected disclosures but that he 
was not penalised because of or in retaliation for having made those protected disclosures. 
In the WRC decision Bank Official v Banking Sector,580 and its appeal before the Labour 
Court, AIB v Murphy,581 it was determined that the application was out of time. Finally, in 
the WRC decision, Claimant v Respondent,582 and in its appeal before the Labour Court, 
QFF Distribution Ltd v O’Reilly,583 it was also determined that the application was out of 
time.  
Of those cases where the claims were unsuccessful, seven of the cases were determined to 
be unsuccessful by the Labour Court for different reasons than those given by the WRC. The 
disclosures in Training Co-ordinator v A Social Support Service584 and A Service Engineer 
v A Provider of Plant Machinery585 were determined by the WRC not to be protected 
disclosures, whilst the Labour Court decided in their corresponding appeals, Kerry Parents 
& Friends Association v O’Connor Flemming586 and Loxam Ltd v Brunkard587 that the 
claims were filed out of time. In A Fire Station Officer (retired) v A Local Authority588 the 
WRC found that the claim was out of time, whilst the Labour Court in the appeal, Galway 
CC v Connolly,589 held that there was no penalisation.  
                                                 
576 Workplace Relations Act 2015, s 46. 
577Monaghan v McGrath Partnership [2017] 28 ELR 8 (LC) 15. 
578 A Senior Official v A Local Authority ADJ-00001721. 
579 Fingal CC v O’Brien PDD 4/2018. 
580 Bank Official v Banking Sector ADJ-00005011. 
581 AIB v Murphy PDD 1/2018. 
582 Claimant v Respondent ADJ-00002571. 
583 QFF Distribution Ltd v O’Reilly PDD 1/2017. 
584 Training Co-ordinator v A Social Support Service ADJ-00002320. 
585 A Service Engineer v A Provider of Plant Machinery ADJ-00007236. 
586 Kerry Parents & Friends Association v O’Connor Flemming PDD 2/2017. 
587 Loxam Ltd v Brunkard UD 1755. 
588 A Fire Station Officer (retired) v A Local Authority ADJ-00004684. 
589 Galway CC v Connolly PDD 2/2018. 
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In A Commercialisation Specialist v A Government Agency590 the WRC held that the 
complainant had not made a protected disclosure but had raised a personal grievance, whilst 
the Labour Court in its appeal, Enterprise Ireland v Carroll591 found that there was no 
evidence of penalisation. The test for penalisation requires that the Labour Court first 
determine that a protected disclosure is made before it proceeds to assess whether there has 
been penalisation.592 However, in this case, the Labour Court did not determine whether a 
protected disclosure was made on the basis of the presumption in s 5(8) of the 2014 Act and 
the fact that the respondent did not make a substantive submission to the Labour Court on 
the incidents claimed to constitute protected disclosures. The Labour Court stated in this 
regard that ‘the Court is of the view that it is neither necessary nor appropriate for it to offer 
its opinion as to whether those incidents constitute protected disclosures within the meaning 
of the 2014 Act.’ Therefore, even though the decisions of the WRC and the Labour Court 
differ, this appears to be because of the different evidence proffered by the parties in both 
hearings.  
In the decision, Accounts Administrator v A University,593 the WRC failed to grant the 
complainant’s request for an adjournment due to a number of prior adjournments being 
granted, the serious nature of the claim, a lack of serious justified reason for the adjournment, 
and to ensure fair procedures. In Accounts Administrator v A University594 the claim failed 
because it was deemed to be out of time. Both appeals, the former being University of 
Limerick v Roche595 and the latter being University of Limerick v Copley596 were 
subsequently struck out for want of prosecution because neither of the complainants 
appeared on the hearing date. 
The identification of cases as being unsuccessful before the WRC and the Labour Court for 
different reasons demonstrates a high level of inconsistency in the interpretation and 
application of the law between the WRC and the Labour Court. This inconsistency, however, 
may be due to the fact that the hearing before the Labour Court is de novo and therefore 
different evidence may be presented before the WRC and the Labour Court. It must be noted, 
                                                 
590 A Commercialisation Specialist v A Government Agency ADJ-00007228. 
591 Enterprise Ireland v Carroll PDD 3/2018. 
592 The test for penalisation was established in Monaghan v McGrath Partnership [2017] 28 ELR 8 (LC) 15, 
discussed in the ‘Type of claim’ section. 
593 Accounts Administrator v A University ADJ-00004380. 
594 Accounts Administrator v A University ADJ-00000305.  
595 University of Limerick v Roche PDD 3/2017. 
596 University of Limerick v Copley PDD 4/2017. 
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though, that 55% (six) of the unsuccessful Labour Court cases failed due to procedural 
reasons, ie four of those cases were deemed to be out of time, and two of the cases failed 
because the complainants did not attend before the Court on the hearing date. Nonetheless, 
there may be a higher risk of an erroneous application of the 2014 Act due to a lack of 
adequate training provided to members of the Labour Court compared to Adjudication 
Officers of the WRC.597  
3.12 Conclusion 
There has been criticism of the value of case law statistics in the UK, where it has been 
described as having a somewhat limited impact on the assessment of the effectiveness of 
PIDA in promoting transparency in the workplace.598 However, the purpose of the case law 
analysis herein was not to assess the effectiveness of the 2014 Act in promoting transparency 
in the workplace but to measure the impact of the interpretation and application of the 2014 
Act on the purpose of the 2014 Act, to identify any issues associated with same, and to 
suggest reform where problems are identified. 
The DPER Statutory Review published in July 2018 claimed ‘There is still a limited amount 
of case law from which to draw conclusions on any weaknesses in the legal framework 
established by the Act that may need to be addressed.’599 The researcher disputes this 
statement and argues that the findings from the case law analysis undertaken in this thesis 
highlights the weaknesses of the 2014 Act and identifies issues that need to be addressed. 
From the case law analysis, it appears that the attraction for complainants is to file their claim 
under the 2014 Act before the WRC. The intention underpinning the establishment of the 
WRC was for disputes to be resolved in an informal manner that was both speedy and 
inexpensive. As one of the forums designated to resolve disputes under the 2014 Act, the 
WRC is arguably an appropriate one. Its non-imposition of costs orders and fees is extremely 
attractive for complainants, especially in light of the difficulties with these in the UK. 
Further, unlike a claim before the civil courts, which attracts both fees and costs orders, the 
short processing times and the hearing of claims in private before the WRC are also 
beneficial for a complainant under the 2014 Act. Nonetheless, the short time frame for the 
                                                 
597 The issue of training for WRC Adjudication Officers and members of the Labour Court is discussed in the 
‘Win/lose’ section. 
598 Jeanette Ashton, ‘15 Years of Whistleblowing Protection under the Public Interest Disclosures Act 1998: 
Are We Still Shooting the Messenger?’ (2015) 44(1) Industrial Law Journal 39. 
599 Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, ‘Statutory Review of the Protected Disclosures Act 2014’ 
(DPER July 2018) 22. 
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filing of a complaint and the cap on an award of compensation are disadvantages to filing a 
claim before the WRC. However, these advantages and disadvantages only apply to 
employees who file claims before the WRC as workers other than employees can only avail 
of a claim before the civil courts. 
With respect to the time frame for filing complaints, the six-month time limit is far too short 
for claims of penalisation under the 2014 Act. It is recommended that the 2014 Act is 
amended to reflect the position in the UK where s 48(3)(a) of the 1996 Act provides that 
where there may be a series of similar acts or failures, the time period for presenting a 
complaint begins on the date of the last act or failure. Section 48(4)(a) of the 1996 Act goes 
on to clarify that ‘where an act extends over a period, the ‘date of the act’ means the last day 
of that period.’ By adopting such a provision in Ireland, this would mean that if a worker is 
suspended for having made a protected disclosure under the 2014 Act and this occurs outside 
of the six-month time limit but is still suspended at the time of the filing of the complaint or 
within six months before the complaint is filed, the worker can still avail of redress. As the 
law currently stands in Ireland, this absence in the 2014 Act of a provision such as s 48(3)(a) 
of the 1996 Act, means that a worker could be subjected to a series of acts or omissions that 
affect the worker to the worker’s detriment, but they may not be able to successfully claim 
for all or part of that penalisation because it occurred outside of the six-month period before 
the claim is filed. This limitation clearly can result in an injustice to the worker by depriving 
them of the protections under the 2014 Act and allows for the employer to evade liability.  
In relation to the issue of the cap on compensation for a penalisation claim, this is arguably 
an unnecessary limitation of the 2014 Act. If a person suffers a loss, then they should be 
compensated for that loss, irrespective of how much it is. The amount of compensation 
awarded should place the worker in the position they were in before the penalisation 
occurred. It is recommended that the approach adopted in the UK not to impose a cap on the 
amount of compensation awarded should be implemented in Ireland. The level of awards in 
Ireland to date is significantly lower than those that have been awarded in the UK. In 
explaining the rationale of the uncapped compensation in the UK, the then Secretary of State 
for Trade and Industry, Stephen Byers, stated that ‘There are many cases in which public 
interest was important, and the House must send out a clear message underlining how 
seriously we regard that issue. To say that compensation will be unlimited is the best possible 
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demonstration of the importance we attach to that matter.’600 This rationale in relation to the 
public interest, as well as the purpose of the 2014 Act to protect disclosers, should underscore 
the adoption of uncapped compensation in Ireland. In addition, the implementation of 
uncapped compensation would underscore the fact that many whistleblowers are blacklisted 
and cannot secure the same or similar employment after they blow the whistle and thus suffer 
a greater loss than five years’ gross remuneration. Uncapped compensation would also take 
account of the fact that some acts of penalisation are egregious and therefore employers 
should be sufficiently punished for such acts, whilst other employers should be deterred from 
taking such action against whistleblowers. Further, uncapped compensation would reflect 
the fact that many whistleblowers suffer severe personal injury, most notably in the form of 
psychiatric injury, as well as injury to feelings.  
This issue in relation to compensation also concerns the different types of damages that can 
be awarded under the 2014 Act and this issue needs to be addressed in Ireland. In the UK, 
awards for detriment are treated in the same manner as discrimination claims. A provision 
such as s 49(2) of the 1996 Act in the UK should be included in the 2014 Act to provide 
guidance as to what should be taken into consideration when an award in a penalisation claim 
is being made. Currently, there is no such guidance, and this is resulting in an inconsistent 
approach to the award of damages, where awards are being made in an ad hoc manner. In 
the case law analysed, there were no cases that concerned an argument that claims of 
penalisation should be treated in the same manner as a discrimination claim and that 
compensation for injury to feelings should be awarded on the basis of s 82(1)(c) of the 
Employment Equality Acts 1998-2015. Thus, it remains to be seen whether such an approach 
will be adopted in Ireland, although arguably it should be in order to ensure a worker is 
properly compensated for any penalisation suffered. 
Further, in respect of the issue of compensation, there appears to be an unnecessary 
limitation in the 2014 Act where a worker cannot be compensated for both unfair dismissal 
and any other penalisation. Again, the 2014 Act should be amended to remove the limitation 
under s 12(2) and (4) in order to ensure that a worker who is unfairly dismissed is properly 
compensated for any other wrongs suffered by them. This amendment would again mean 
that, as well as fulfilling the purpose of the 2014 Act, an employer who both dismisses a 
worker for having made a protected disclosure and penalises that worker in other forms in 
                                                 
600 HC Deb 30 March 1999, vol 328, col 877. 
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retaliation for having made a protected disclosure is punished accordingly and other 
employers are deterred from similar future infractions.  
Of course, compensation can only be awarded in successful cases. There is, however, a high 
rate of unsuccessful cases under the 2014 Act. There is a similarity in the rate of successful 
cases under the 2014 Act and those under PIDA in the UK, albeit the rate of successful cases 
in Ireland is slightly higher. Not surprisingly, the number of PIDA cases in the UK is far 
greater than cases in Ireland under the 2014 Act and undoubtedly, the rates of successful and 
unsuccessful cases under the 2014 Act will fluctuate as time goes on. It will be important to 
examine whether the rates of unsuccessful cases under the 2014 Act continue to outweigh 
the successful ones. By assessing the reasons for the high rate of unsuccessful cases at this 
stage, this may mean that certain issues with the 2014 Act are identified, and concerns 
regarding the interpretation and application of the 2014 Act can be addressed so that the 
disparity between the rates of successful and unsuccessful cases can be reduced as soon as 
possible.  
Looking at the position in Ireland, there were a number of reasons identified for the low 
success rates of cases under the 2014 Act. One of those potential reasons is that the 2014 
Act is being abused by workers who do not qualify for ordinary dismissal claims because 
they have less than one-year’s continuous service that would entitle them to bring such a 
claim. When assessing the length of service of complainants under the 2014 Act, it was 
identified that the largest group of complainants were workers who had less than one-year’s 
continuous service and that the vast majority of those workers brought an unfair 
dismissal/interim relief claim. It was noted, however, that 50% (four) of those cases were 
successful and therefore not all of those workers were using the 2014 Act to circumvent the 
qualifying period for ordinary unfair dismissal. Nonetheless, there is scope for the 2014 Act 
to be subject to abuse in this regard and it is recognised that this is an issue that needs to be 
monitored going forward in order to establish whether the non-qualifying period for an unfair 
dismissal claim under the 2014 Act is resulting in frivolous or malicious claims being 
brought. If a pattern of unsuccessful unfair dismissal claims by workers with less than one-
year’s continuous service does emanate then, it may be necessary for the Oireachtas to 
address the requirement of a qualifying period for ordinary unfair dismissal claims. 
The second potential issue identified for the high rate of unsuccessful cases is the erroneous 
interpretation and application of the 2014 Act by Adjudication Officers and Labour Court 
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members. One notable issue in this regard was the different approaches adopted in relation 
to unfair dismissal claims. In order to ensure fairness, and that all workers who are entitled 
to protection are afforded it, there needs to be consistency in the approaches adopted in such 
cases. Further, although the test for penalisation was set down in Monaghan v McGrath 
Partnership,601 this test was not referred to in a number of subsequent penalisation claims. 
Also, the fact that only three of the eleven WRC cases appealed to the Labour Court were 
ultimately decided for the same reason as the WRC may indicate a level of inconsistency in 
the interpretation and application of the 2014 Act, bearing in mind that the appeal to the 
Labour Court is de novo. There was also evidence of a number of decisions where the 2014 
Act was blatantly applied incorrectly.602  
Further, the fact that there is no public interest test in the 2014 Act,603 but an exclusion of 
legal obligations that arise under a worker’s contract of employment, means that some issues 
that may be in the public interest and constitute a relevant wrongdoing are being excluded 
because they also fall within the worker’s contract of employment. An argument could be 
made for the inclusion of a public interest test, as adopted in the UK, instead of the approach 
employed in Ireland to ensure that protected disclosures that are intermingled with personal 
grievances are not excluded from protection. The 2014 Act is still in its infancy, therefore as 
the number of cases under the 2014 Act increase, it is hoped that those who are interpreting 
and applying it will develop a deeper familiarity with its provisions. Nonetheless, there is a 
strong case to be made for the delivery of intensive training to Adjudication Officers and 
Labour Court members in order to ensure that there is a proper understanding of the 2014 
Act and that it is interpreted and applied correctly. 
When looking at the sectors from which claims under the 2014 Act derive, the data indicates 
that the majority of the claims emanate from the private sector, followed by the public sector 
and then the non-profit sector. This hierarchy reflects the number of workers in these sectors, 
and this may explain the rates of claims from each sector. There may also be an argument 
                                                 
601 Monaghan v McGrath Partnership [2017] 28 ELR 8 (LC). 
602 For example, Monaghan v McGrath Partnership r-151162-pd-1415R; Carr v Donegal CC r-153749-pd-14; 
Carroll v Congregation of the Holy Spirit T/A Registered Charity Chy 076 UD 981/2015; A Fire Station Officer 
(retired) v A Local Authority ADJ-00007228; AIB v Murphy PDD 1/2018; Donegal CC v Carr [2017] 28 ELR 
259 (LC). 
603 For the purposes of a ‘relevant wrongdoing’, no public interest test applies. The exception to this is if the 
disclosure concerned the unlawful acquisition, use, or disclosure of a trade secret within the meaning of the 
European Union (Protection of Trade Secrets) Regulations 2018, SI 2018/188 then then disclosure will only 
be a protected disclosure provided that the worker has acted for the purposes of protecting the general public 
interest. Protected Disclosures Act 2014, s 5(7A).   
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for the implementation of Procedures. As can be seen from the IAW survey, a very low rate 
of employers in the private and non-profit sectors indicated that they had a whistleblowing 
policy or guidance,604 which is in stark contrast to the estimated 94% of public bodies that 
have Procedures in place.605 However, as will be seen in Chapter 4, only 29% (twenty-nine) 
of prescribed persons had Procedures available on their websites. Therefore, the impact of 
having Procedures on the data derived from the case law under the 2014 Act is something 
that should be assessed in the future, especially if the obligation on private organisations to 
establish Procedures for internal reporting and following-up of reports under the draft EU 
Commission Directive on whistleblowing is adopted. The necessity to establish and maintain 
Procedures is underscored by the finding in the case law analysis that in 89% (thirty-one) of 
the cases under the 2014 Act, the disclosure was made internally to the employer in the first 
instance. This finding demonstrates that employers in the majority of cases are given the 
opportunity to address the wrongdoing and to provide protection to the worker. If the 
employer does not avail of the opportunity to deal with the disclosure and the worker 
appropriately, there is evidence from the case law analysis that the worker will then proceed 
to make their disclosure externally from the organisation. Therefore, if proper Procedures 
are implemented so that disclosures are addressed appropriately and workers are afforded 
protection, then a worker should not need to bring a claim under the 2014 Act. It must be 
recognised, however, that from the case law analysis, the non-existence of Procedures, or 
the existence of defective Procedures, does not appear to have any impact on the liability of 
an employer under the 2014 Act, even when that employer is a public body. There needs to 
be more of an incentive for an organisation to establish and maintain Procedures, such as the 
imposition of a sanction for failing to do so. If this incentive is not included in legislation, 
then the Adjudication Officers and Labour Court members need to put more weight on this 
issue, especially as the case law analysis demonstrates that great weight is being placed on 
whether a worker complied with Procedures when determining if a worker made a protected 
disclosure.  
The case law analysis conducted for this thesis highlights the deficiencies of the 2014 Act 
and finds that it is not achieving its purpose of protecting workers. However, an analysis of 
the case law under the 2014 Act in isolation cannot provide a complete assessment of 
                                                 
604 Transparency International Ireland, ‘Speak Up Report 2017’ (TII 2017) 42. 
605 ibid 33. 
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whether the 2014 Act is fulfilling its purpose. Therefore, the research presented in the 
subsequent chapters assists in providing a comprehensive evaluation of this issue.   
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Chapter 4: The prescribed persons’ system under the Protected Disclosures Act 2014 
4.1 Introduction  
The Protected Disclosures Act 2014 (‘2014 Act’) provides for a number of channels through 
which a worker can make their disclosure. The legislation incentivises internal reporting to 
the worker’s employer by requiring the least onerous conditions to be satisfied by the worker 
in order to attract the statutory protections of the 2014 Act. However, it is not always 
appropriate for the worker to make their disclosure to their employer, for example, if the 
employer is involved in the wrongdoing, and therefore the 2014 Act provides for alternative 
channels, such as disclosure to a prescribed person. This disclosure channel regime is 
discussed in Chapter 3 and is referred to colloquially as a ‘stepped disclosure regime’. A 
disclosure to a prescribed person is considered to be a second step disclosure and requires 
the worker to satisfy additional conditions than if the disclosure had been made to their 
employer.  
This chapter looks at the following questions: 
1. What is the role of prescribed persons under the 2014 Act? 
2. Are protected disclosures being made to prescribed persons? Are prescribed persons 
complying with their obligation under s 22 of the 2014 Act to publish annual reports on 
protected disclosures? 
3. Do prescribed persons understand their role under the 2014 Act? 
4. Are prescribed persons complying with their obligations under s 21(1) of the 2014 Act to 
establish and maintain protected disclosures procedures (‘Procedures’) and under s 21(4) of 
the 2014 Act to have regard to the Guidance issued by the Department of Public Expenditure 
and Reform (‘DPER’) for the purpose of assisting public bodies in their establishment and 
maintenance of the Procedures606 (‘DPER Guidance’)? 
4.1(a) Objectives 
                                                 
606 Government Reform Unit, Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, ‘Guidance under section 21(1) 
of the Protected Disclosures Act 2014 for the purpose of assisting public bodies in the performance of their 
functions under the Act’ (DPER 2016). 
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The research conducted for this chapter is intended to identify weaknesses in the prescribed 
persons’ system under the 2014 Act and to make recommendations in order to improve the 
system. It is also designed to identify the compliance rate of prescribed persons with their 
obligations under s 21 and s 22 of the 2014 Act, to highlight any deficiencies with these 
obligations, and to make suggestions to enhance their impact. The objective of the 
combination of the approaches outlined is to ascertain whether the purpose of the 2014 Act 
is being achieved. 
4.1(b) Methodology 
In conducting the research for this chapter, there were five approaches used:  
(i) On 15 January 2018, the three and a half year anniversary of the 2014 Act, the websites 
of all the persons prescribed under SI 2014/339, SI 2015/448, and SI 2016/490 (‘prescribed 
persons’ SIs’) were accessed in order to: (a) establish their existence; (b) to locate their 
annual reports; and (c) to find their Procedures. The prescribed persons under the 2014 Act 
consist of both local authorities and organisations other than local authorities. In order to 
ensure consistency and fairness, the websites of seventy-one organisations other than local 
authorities who are designated as prescribed persons were accessed on 15 January 2018. On 
16 January 2018, the websites of the thirty-one local authorities were then accessed. 
Although not all websites were accessed on the same day, the segregation of the prescribed 
persons into two types of prescribed persons, local authorities and organisations other than 
local authorities, and the accessing of the websites of each group on the same day ensured 
fairness in the research carried out. A follow-up search was conducted on the 17 and 18 
February 2018 when all organisations whose Procedures were not located during the search 
undertaken on 15 and 16 January were subject to a further Google search where the name of 
the organisation and the term ‘protected disclosure’ were used in the Google search engine. 
(ii) An analysis of both the statutory annual protected disclosure reports published by 
prescribed persons and the case law under the 2014 Act was undertaken to ascertain whether 
disclosures are being made to prescribed persons.  
(iii) In order to assess the prescribed persons’ Procedures in light of the DPER Guidance, a 
checklist was drafted of the issues outlined in the DPER Guidance that should be included 
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in Procedures.607 The checklist contained twenty-two of the twenty-six issues in the DPER 
Guidance,608 which were then subdivided into 112 issues. One of the twenty-two issues 
contained information relating to law enforcement matters and consisted of two sub-issues. 
As none of the prescribed persons whose Procedures were analysed dealt with matters 
relating to law enforcement matters,609 this issue was omitted in the calculation of 
compliance with the DPER Guidance, and thus only 110 sub-issues were used.  
The twenty-two of the twenty-six issues from the DPER Guidance were compiled into 
nineteen issues for the purposes of the checklist. These issues were as follows:  
1. Policy statement 
2. Application 
3. What is a protected disclosure? This included the issues in the DPER Guidance of 
‘Relevant wrongdoings’, ‘Disclosure of information’, ‘Reasonable belief’, and ‘In 
connection with their employment’ 
4. Making a protected disclosure  
5. Disclosure in the area of law enforcement, security, defence, international relations and 
intelligence 
6. Protection against penalisation (including dismissal and detriment) 
7. Confidentiality/protection of identity 
8. Anonymous disclosures 
9. Personal complaint vs protected disclosures 
10. Motivation 
11. Assessment and Investigation 
12. Protection of the rights of Respondents 
13. Disciplinary record of discloser and other related matters 
14. Feedback 
15. Support and Advice 
16. Review 
17. Non-restriction of rights to make protected disclosures 
                                                 
607 See: Appendix 3(a), ‘DPER Checklist for Prescribed Persons’ Protected Disclosures Procedures’. 
608 The issues of ‘Responsibility’; ‘Consultation and provision of information and training’; ‘Adaptation of 
Procedures’; and ‘Central over-sight/co-ordination of information’ were omitted from the analysis as these 
issues could not be readily assessed from the Procedures. 
609 The Garda Síochána Ombudsman Commission (‘GSOC’) has been designated as the prescribed person 
under Protected Disclosures Act 2014 (s 7(2)) Order 2014, SI 2014/339 to receive disclosures under Protected 
Disclosures Act 2014, s 7. However, GSOC’s Procedures were not available publicly for analysis. 
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18. Mandatory reporting 
19. The information that should be provided in a disclosure  
(iv) On 17 January 2018, a Research Ethics Application was made via Middlesex Online 
Research Ethics (‘MORE’) for approval for the administering of a survey to prescribed 
persons under the 2014 Act. This application was approved on 18 February 2018. The survey 
was administered via Qualtrics Survey Software.610 An email was sent to ninety-six 
prescribed persons on 5 April 2018, which included a cover letter. The cover letter detailed 
the purpose of the survey; who should complete the survey; consent; confidentiality; use and 
storage of data collected; the timeframe for completion of the survey; and an email address 
where queries can be sent.611 Reminder emails were sent on 13 April 2018, 18 April 2018, 
23 April 2018, 27 April 2018, 30 April 2018, and 1 May 2018. The deadline was extended 
from 19 April 2018 to 1 May 2018 due to an initial low response rate. 
The response rates to the survey were assessed and analysed. Further, the survey answers 
were also subject to scrutiny. The survey answers shed light on how the prescribed persons’ 
system is operating, highlighting any weaknesses of the system and any areas requiring 
reform. The purpose of the survey was also to substantiate the findings of the website, annual 
reports, and Procedures assessments. The responses to the survey have been anonymised in 
line with the commitment to confidentiality in the survey cover letter.612  
(v) The research undertaken for this chapter also used a doctrinal method of research and 
referenced international and national reports, articles, books, statutory rules, case law, and 
parliamentary debates. 
4.2 What is the role of prescribed persons under the 2014 Act? 
4.2(a) Introduction 
In order to assess the role of prescribed persons under the 2014 Act the following issues 
were examined: (i) Why are disclosures made to a prescribed person? (ii) What are the legal 
requirements for making a disclosure to a prescribed person? and (iii) What persons are 
prescribed and who should be prescribed under s 7 of the 2014 Act? 
                                                 
610 See: Appendix 2(b), ‘Protected Disclosures Prescribed Person Survey’. 
611 See: Appendix 2(a), ‘Prescribed Persons’ Survey Cover Letter’. 
612 See: Appendix 2(c), ‘Default Report Protected Disclosures Prescribed Person Survey’. 
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4.2(b) Why are disclosures made to a prescribed person?  
The prescribed persons’ system has been described as a ‘halfway house’ between disclosures 
to an employer and disclosures in the public domain.613 The 2014 Act is designed to promote 
internal disclosures, but this is not always appropriate, especially if the worker’s employer 
is involved in the wrongdoing or has failed to respond adequately or at all to a disclosure of 
wrongdoing. The UK National Audit Office (‘UK NAO’) in their 2015 report on prescribed 
persons recognised that the making of a disclosure externally from the employer to a 
prescribed person means that the system for disclosures is not working properly, stating: 
A concern is usually raised first with the employer. In such cases, where 
appropriately handled, no further stages of reporting would be necessary. The 
number of concerns raised externally, and how they vary over time, is an indicator 
of how effectively the system is working. The need for prescribed persons will 
always exist. But in a well-performing system reporting to them should be the 
exception, not the rule.614 
A prescribed person is independent of the worker’s employer and usually has the authority 
to both investigate disclosures and to hold their regulated entities to account.615 In general, 
prescribed persons have regulatory functions in the area that is the subject of the 
disclosure.616 
Savage and Hyde emphasise that ‘Regulators need whistleblowers; whistleblowers need 
regulators.’617 They argue that disclosures from workers can have a positive influence on 
regulatory practice.618 Workers in regulated bodies are well placed to access information on 
a day-to-day basis that the regulator may not be able to access. In the corollary, the role 
played by regulators in the whistleblowing process can also be a positive one as regulators 
have the potential to vindicate and address the concerns raised by the worker.619 There is a 
public interest in disclosures of wrongdoings being made to the appropriate prescribed 
                                                 
613 Ashley Savage and Richard Hyde, ‘The response to whistleblowing by regulators: a practical perspective’ 
(2015) 35 Legal Studies 408, 415. 
614 National Audit Office, ‘The role of prescribed persons’ (NAO 27 February 2015) 29. 
615 Arron Phillips and David Lewis, ‘Whistleblowing to Regulators: Are Prescribed Persons Fit for Purpose?’ 
(October 2013) 5 Middlesex University Erepository. 
616 Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, ‘Statutory Review of the Protected Disclosures Act 2014’ 
(DPER July 2018) 7. 
617 Ashley Savage and Richard Hyde, ‘The response to whistleblowing by regulators: a practical perspective’ 
(2015) 35 Legal Studies 408, 408. 
618 ibid 409. 
619 ibid 410; Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, ‘Whistleblowing, Prescribed Persons 
Guidance’ (BEIS March 2015) 4. 
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person.620 Indeed, by disclosing to a regulator not only is it expected that it can address the 
particular wrongdoing disclosed, but it is also expected that it can have an overall influence 
on the behaviour of the regulated bodies as the regulator should have the requisite legal 
authority and resources to achieve this. As Savage and Hyde explain ‘Through a 
whistleblowing disclosure by a worker and a response by a regulator, the regulatory capacity 
of both is enhanced, as the whistleblower would not have had the organisational capacity to 
affect changes within the regulated entity and the regulator would not have been positioned 
to detect the regulatory non-compliance.’621 
It has been recognised that disclosers ultimately view prescribed persons as being the 
solution to addressing their concern.622 Nonetheless, it was identified in the UK by the 
Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (‘UK BEIS’) in its whistleblowing 
framework call for evidence that this expectation is not always met and can lead to a lack of 
confidence in the system.623 It was recognised that this lack of confidence centres around the 
paucity of communication from prescribed persons and that one of the roots of this issue is 
that prescribed persons often operate within particular constraints, including overriding legal 
obligations, and this can result in prescribed persons being restricted from providing 
feedback in relation to the progress or outcome of investigations.  
In the survey carried out by the UK NAO for their 2015 report on prescribed persons, ten of 
the seventeen whistleblowers surveyed stated that their expectations were not met by the 
prescribed person because it did not investigate their disclosure.624 The UK NAO also 
identified a range of factors that can result in this expectation gap, namely: (i) different 
prescribed persons have different prescribed powers meaning that some regulators can act 
on the disclosure by taking enforcement actions, whilst others cannot; (ii) prescribed persons 
are not legally required to investigate all concerns that are received by them, and each 
prescribed person decides which disclosure merits investigation; (iii) prescribed persons 
sometimes receive a number of similar disclosures which are responded to in a broader 
manner, such as adding a new area to their routine inspection programme, leaving a worker 
feeling that their specific disclosure has not been addressed; and (iv)  prescribed persons 
                                                 
620 Jeremy Lewis and others, Whistleblowing Law and Practice (3rd edn, OUP 2017) para 5.65. 
621 Ashley Savage and Richard Hyde, ‘The response to whistleblowing by regulators: a practical perspective’ 
(2015) 35 Legal Studies 408, 413. 
622 Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, ‘Whistleblowing Framework Call for Evidence, 
Government Response’ (BEIS June 2014) 6. 
623 ibid 6 and 15. 
624 National Audit Office, ‘The role of prescribed persons’ (NAO 27 February 2015) 17. 
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cannot protect workers against penalisation or dismissal, nor can they provide legal 
advice.625 To fill this gap, the UK NAO recommended that prescribed persons ‘clearly state 
powers and responsibilities to manage whistleblower’s expectations … Whistleblowers also 
need to know that there are proper procedures in place to deal with their concerns and what 
will happen if they raise a concern.’626  
In order to remedy this deficiency in the prescribed persons’ system, the UK government 
introduced an obligation on prescribed persons to report annually on the disclosures received 
by them.627 This reporting obligation was intended to result in greater transparency, thus 
instilling confidence in the actions of prescribed persons, driving up standards across all 
prescribed persons, and ‘striking a balance between the desire of individuals to know action 
has been taken in respect of their disclosure, with the constraints that prescribed persons 
operate within, such as their responsibilities to maintain confidentiality.’628 However, the 
introduction of this reporting obligation alone is not sufficient to fill the expectation gap.  
In Ireland, unlike in the UK, prescribed persons are legally obliged to comply with both the 
annual reporting requirement629 and the requirement to establish Procedures.630 It would be 
expected that based on the research in the UK that identified expectation gaps in the 
prescribed persons’ system, that these legal obligations would promote the making of 
disclosures to such persons when the need arises.  As the UK BEIS guidance for prescribed 
persons explains ‘There is an implied role for prescribed persons to play in the 
whistleblowing process.’631 The making of disclosures to a prescribed person can be an 
attractive one for workers in circumstances where the worker is unable or unwilling to make 
their disclosure to their employer and where the prescribed person has the necessary 
investigative and enforcement powers to address the wrongdoing. The essential requirement 
for promoting the making of disclosures to prescribed persons is that the worker has 
confidence in the role of the prescribed person, which can be achieved through transparency 
                                                 
625 ibid 18. 
626 ibid 17. 
627 The Prescribed Persons (Reports on Disclosures of Information) Regulations 2017, SI 2017/507. These 
Regulations were made by the Secretary of State in the exercise of powers conferred by Employment Rights 
Act 1996, s 43FA, as inserted by Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015, s 148(1) and (2). 
628 Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, ‘Whistleblowing Framework Call for Evidence, 
Government Response’ (BEIS June 2014) 15.  
629 Protected Disclosures Act 2014, s 22. 
630 ibid s 21. 
631 Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, ‘Whistleblowing, Prescribed Persons Guidance’ 
(BEIS March 2015) 4. 
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and communication of actions taken in respect of other disclosures and actions that can be 
taken in respect of their particular disclosure, be it as a specific action on foot of that 
disclosure or as a broader action in relation to the organisation as a whole over which the 
prescribed person has authority.  
4.2(c) What are the legal requirements for making a disclosure to a prescribed person? 
Under s 7 of the 2014 Act, a worker can make a protected disclosure to a prescribed person. 
A person can be prescribed by the Minister for Public Expenditure and Reform (‘Minister’) 
by reason of the nature of their responsibilities or functions to be the recipients of certain 
disclosures.632 In order to make a protected disclosure under s 7, there is a higher evidential 
burden than a disclosure under s 6 of the 2014 Act to an employer or other responsible 
person, under s 8 to a Minister, and under s 9 to a legal adviser, in that the worker must 
reasonably believe that the information disclosed, and any allegation contained in it, are 
substantially true. Further, in making the disclosure to a prescribed person under s 7 of the 
2014 Act, the worker must reasonably believe that the relevant wrongdoing falls within the 
description of matters in respect of which the person is prescribed. In order to assist a worker 
in this regard, there is a corresponding list in the prescribed persons’ SIs to the list of 
prescribed persons setting out matters in respect of which the person is prescribed.  
The person to whom the disclosure is made must be prescribed by the date of the dismissal 
or penalisation in order for the disclosure to the prescribed person to be protected.633 The 
reasonable belief test does not qualify the requirement in s 7(1)(a) that the person to whom 
the disclosure is made is prescribed.634 Hence, in order for the worker’s disclosure to be 
protected the worker must make their disclosure to the correct prescribed person. It is 
therefore essential that the list of prescribed persons in the prescribed persons’ SIs is up-to-
date and comprehensive in order to ensure that the worker can make their disclosure to the 
correct prescribed person. 
In relation to the requirement that the worker must reasonably believe that the information 
disclosed, and any allegation contained in it, are substantially true, the information disclosed 
and any allegation contained in it does not have to be substantially true, all that is required 
is that the worker reasonably believes that they are substantially true. In Korashi v Abertawe 
                                                 
632 Protected Disclosures Act 2014, s 7(2). 
633 See: UK Court of Session decision: Miklaszewicz v Stolt [2001] IRLR 656 (CS) [19]. 
634 Jeremy Lewis and others, Whistleblowing Law and Practice (3rd edn, OUP 2017) para 5.58. 
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Bro Morgannwg University Local Health Board635 the UKEAT held that since the test is the 
worker’s ‘reasonable’ belief, that belief must be subject to what a person in their position 
would reasonably believe to be a wrongdoing.636 Further, the UKEAT held that both the 
information and the allegation must be substantially true. It was deemed to be insufficient to 
show that the gist of the matter complained of was believed to be substantially true when a 
number of other allegations were not so believed. Judge Mc Mullen stated that: 
[O]nce one goes outside the immediate confines of the employment relationship and 
to an outsider ... additional layers of responsibility are required upon the 
discloser.  The information must in the reasonable belief of the discloser be 
substantially true.  There is no obligation to make allegations but if they are made 
they too must in the reasonable belief of the discloser be substantially true.  Both 
information and allegations must fit that criterion.  Here on the facts found by the 
Tribunal they did not.  If we were required to decide this matter it would not be 
sufficient to show that a matter was believed to be substantially true when a number 
of the allegations were not so believed.637  
The UK Court of Appeal has emphasised that there is no rigid dichotomy between 
‘information’ and ‘allegation’.638 Information is capable of covering statements that might 
also be characterised as allegations, but not every statement involving an allegation will 
constitute information.639 What is required for the disclosure to constitute a protected 
disclosure is that it has ‘a sufficient factual content and specificity such as is capable of 
tending to show’ a relevant wrongdoing640 and this should be assessed in light of the 
particular context in which it is made.641 Lewis and Bowers suggest that it is not necessary 
for there to be a narrow approach to what constitutes information and that ‘information’ may 
encompass an implicit statement of belief or opinion and that the ‘evaluation of whether that, 
either by itself or together with other matters disclosed, is sufficient to sustain the requisite 
reasonable belief will need to be made having regard to all the circumstances.’642 They argue 
further that the subjective belief of a relevant wrongdoing may be shown to be reasonable 
                                                 
635 Korashi v Abertawe Bro Morgannwg University Local Health Board [2012] IRLR 4 (EAT). 
636 ibid [62]. 
637 ibid [66]. 
638 Kilraine v London Borough of Wandsworth [2018] IRLR 846 (CA) [30], clarifying the confusion arising 
from the UKEAT decision in Cavendish Munro Professional Risk Management Ltd v Geduld [2010] ICR 325 
(EAT). 
639 ibid [30]-[31]. 
640 ibid [35]. 
641 ibid [41]. 
642 Jeremy Lewis and John Bowers, ‘Whistleblowing to No Avail: Protected Disclosures Post Kilraine v 
Wandsworth LBC’ (2018) 47(4) Industrial Law Journal 567, 581. 
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by reference to a different wrongdoing or on different grounds to those that the worker had 
in mind at the time that they made their disclosure, ie an ex post facto justification.643 
4.2(d) What persons are prescribed and who should be prescribed under s 7 of the 2014 
Act? 
Under the prescribed persons’ SIs, there are purportedly 102 persons prescribed for the 
purpose of receiving disclosures under s 7 of the 2014 Act. These prescribed persons consist 
of seventy-one regulatory and supervisory bodies and thirty-one local authorities. The 
research uncovered that of the 102 prescribed persons, ten of the prescribed persons have 
either been dissolved, had a change of name, have merged, or had their functions transferred 
to another organisation.644  
These anomalies in the list of prescribed persons need to be rectified. Otherwise a worker 
who makes a disclosure to an organisation that has not been prescribed will not be protected 
under s 7 of the 2014 Act, but may be considered a s 10 disclosure, which attracts onerous 
conditions. 
Also, there are some notable omissions from the list of prescribed persons, which means that 
there may not be an appropriate recipient designated in relation to a particular type of 
wrongdoing.645 For example, the Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission (‘IHREC’) 
                                                 
643 ibid 581-582. This argument is premised on the approach taken in Chesterton Global Ltd v Nurmohamed 
[2018] ICR 731 (CA) [29] where the Court of Appeal held that the reasonableness of a worker’s belief that 
their disclosure was made in the public interest can be established by reference to factors that the worker did 
not have in mind at the time when they made their disclosure. 
644These ten prescribed persons are as follows: (i) Two prescribed persons, the Opticians Board and the Health 
and Social Care Professional Council have been replaced by CORU in October 2015; (ii) The functions of the 
Commissioners of Charitable Donations and Bequests for Ireland, a prescribed person, have been taken on by 
the Charities Regulatory Authority in 2014; (iii) The prescribed person, the Dublin Docklands Authority, was 
dissolved on 1 March 2016; (iv) The prescribed person, the Commission for Energy Regulation (‘CER’) 
changed its name in 2017 to the Commission for Regulation Utilities (‘CRU’); (v) The Competition and 
Consumer Protection Commission (‘CPCC’) was established on 31 October 2014 when the two prescribed 
persons, the Competition Authority and the National Consumer Agency, were amalgamated; (vi) The 
prescribed person, the National Employment Rights Authority (‘NERA’) was subsumed into the Workplace 
Relations Commission in October 2015; and (vii) Transport Infrastructure Ireland was established as a result 
of the merger of the two prescribed persons, the National Roads Authority (‘NRA’) and the Railway 
Procurement Agency (‘RPA’) under the Roads Act 2015, effective from 1 August 2015.  
645 Similar research undertaken in the UK also identified a number of national regulators who were not 
prescribed without any justification, as well as anomalies in the online list of prescribed persons maintained by 
the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy: Ashley Savage and Richard Hyde, ‘The response 
to whistleblowing by regulators: a practical perspective’ (2015) 35 Legal Studies 408, 416; Arron Phillips and 
David Lewis, ‘Whistleblowing to Regulators: Are Prescribed Persons Fit for Purpose?’ (October 2013) 6-7 
Middlesex University Erepository; David Lewis and Arron Laverty, ‘A Survey of Information about 
Whistleblowing provided on the Websites of Persons Prescribed under Part IVA Employment Rights Act 1996’ 
(May 2011) 3 Middlesex University Erepository; David Lewis, ‘A survey of whistleblowing/confidential 
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was established in 2014 and is Ireland’s national human rights and equality institution. It is 
an independent public body that accounts directly to the Oireachtas and whose functions 
include protecting and promoting human rights and equality; encouraging the development 
of a culture of respect for human rights, equality, and intercultural understanding in the State; 
and promoting understanding and awareness of the importance of human rights and equality 
in the State.646 The IHREC has the power to carry out an inquiry into ‘a serious violation of 
human rights or equality of treatment obligations in respect of a person or a class of persons, 
or a systemic failure to comply with human rights or equality of treatment obligation’647 and 
where certain other conditions are satisfied and would, therefore, be an appropriate recipient 
of disclosures under s 5(1)(a),(b) and (g) of the 2014 Act.  
Another example of an omission from the list of prescribed persons is the Charities 
Regulatory Authority (‘CRA’). The CRA was established under the Charities Act 2009 
(‘2009 Act’) to both register and regulate charities operating in Ireland, as well as to carry 
out investigations in accordance with the 2009 Act.648 The CRA is already tasked with 
receiving information of offences under the 2009 Act;649 offences under the Criminal Justice 
(Theft and Fraud Offences) Act 2001;650 and of non-compliance with the provision of the 
2009 Act.651 Additionally, as the functions of the Commissioners of Charitable Donations 
and Bequests for Ireland, a prescribed person, have been taken on by the CRA, this 
underscores their suitability as a prescribed person. A further omission is the Legal Services 
Regulatory Authority (‘LSRA’), established in October 2016, and tasked with regulating the 
provision of legal services by legal practitioners.652  Complaints against the legal profession 
are currently dealt with by the Law Society, the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal, and the 
Barristers' Professional Conduct Tribunal, but the LSRA will replace these and will deal 
with all complaints653 when it is fully operational.654  
                                                 
reporting procedures used by persons prescribed under the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998’ (2007) 
Communications Law 125, 126.  
646 Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission Act 2014, s 10(1)(a), (b) and (c). 
647 ibid s 35(1)(a)(1) and (ii). 
648 Charities Act 2009, s 14. 
649 ibid ss 27, 59, and 61(a).  
650 ibid s 61(c). 
651 ibid s 61(b). 
652 Legal Services Regulation Act 2015, s 13.  
653 ibid pt 6. 
654 Shane Phelan, ‘New legal regulator to probe complaints by summer 2019’ Irish Independent (Dublin, 2 
May 2018) <www.independent.ie/irish-news/courts/new-legal-regulator-to-probe-complaints-by-summer-
2019-36864827.html> accessed 6 November 2018. 
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The Health Service Executive (‘HSE’) should also be prescribed under the 2014 Act in 
relation to disclosures from s 38 and s 39 funded agencies.655 Currently, the HSE can receive 
complaints656 from a service user in relation to any action of the HSE or a service provider 
that does not accord with fair and sound administrative practice, and adversely affects or 
affected that person.657 Further, the HSE can receive protected disclosures, not only under 
the 2014 Act from workers, but also under the Health Act 2004658 from employees of a 
relevant body,659 employees of a person carrying on the business of a designated centre other 
than a centre operated by a relevant body,660 or an employee of a person providing mental 
health services other than a relevant body.661 Therefore, the HSE is receiving protected 
disclosures from workers under both the 2014 regime and from employees in s 38 and s 39 
funded agencies under the Health Acts. It is recommended that the HSE be prescribed in 
relation to disclosures from s 38 and s 39 funded agencies in order to align the two statutory 
protected disclosures regimes under the Health Acts and the 2014 Act. Arguably, the Garda 
Síochána should also be a prescribed person. Currently, disclosures to the Garda Síochána 
are s 10 disclosures, which contains onerous conditions in order to attract the protections 
under the 2014 Act. It is recommended that disclosures to the Garda Síochána should attract 
a lower threshold for protection as the Garda Síochána are appropriate recipients of 
disclosures under s 5(3)(a) in respect of a criminal offence, and it is in the public interest that 
disclosures of that nature would be made to the Garda Síochána.662 Another suggested 
prescribed person would be members of Dáil Éireann or Seanad Éireann. In March 2014, 
Members of Parliament (‘MPs’) in the UK were added to the list of prescribed persons. It 
has been recognised that prescribing MPs in this manner has two benefits: (i) it assists 
workers who do not know to whom to make their disclosure to qualify for legal protection; 
                                                 
655 A s 38 agency is an agency that is funded to provide a defined level of service on behalf of the HSE. A s 39 
agency is an agency that receives grant aid from the HSE. Employees of s 38 agencies are public servants and 
are subject to the standard salary scales for health sector employees. Employees of s 39 agencies are not public 
servants.  For more information on s 38 and s 39 agencies, see: Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, 
‘Distinction between Section 38 and Section 39 agencies’ (DPER).  
656 Health Act 2004, pt 9. 
657 ibid s 46. 
658 ibid pt 14, as amended by Health Act 2007. 
659 ibid s 55B, as inserted by Health Act 2007, s 103. 
660 ibid s 55C, as inserted by Health Act 2007, s 103. 
661 ibid s 55C, as inserted by Health Act 2007, s 103. 
662 Protect’s Whistleblowing Commission in the UK suggested that s 43F of the Employment Rights Act 1996 
is amended to include all statutory bodies, which would result in ‘organisations such as the police being listed’ 
as a prescribed person. Protect, ‘The Whistleblowing Commission, The report of the Whistleblowing 
Commission on the effectiveness of existing arrangements for workplace whistleblowing in the UK’ (Protect 
November 2013) para 99. 
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and (ii) it helps ensure that the alleged wrongdoing is looked into by the relevant regulator.663 
The explanatory memorandum to The Public Interest Disclosure (Prescribed Persons) 
(Amendment) Order 2014664 in the UK provides that ‘MPs are often well placed to make 
representations on behalf of whistleblowers, including to regulatory agencies of the kind that 
already feature in the 1999 Order.’665 Currently in Ireland, a disclosure to members of Dáil 
Éireann (other than Ministers) or Seanad Éireann is considered to be a s 10 disclosure under 
the 2014 Act and therefore attracts the cumbersome conditions associated with such 
disclosures. Prescribing such persons under s 7 of the 2014 Act would be following best 
practice as established in the UK where it was recognised that whistleblowers should be able 
to ‘talk freely to their Member of Parliament’ without having to satisfy cumbersome 
conditions.666 
In a similar vein, there are persons prescribed whose description of matters in respect of 
which they are prescribed is deficient. For example, members of the Garda Síochána 
Ombudsman Commission (‘GSOC’) are prescribed in relation to ‘All matters relating to the 
functions performable by the Commission under Part 3 of the Garda Síochána Act 2005’.667 
This provision, however, does not cover disclosures relating to security, defence, 
international relations, and intelligence. This omission is because s 18(3)(a) and (b) of the 
2014 Act provides that disclosures of information relating to security, defence, international 
relations, and intelligence are not protected unless they are made in the manner specified in 
ss 6(1)(a), 8, 9 or, to the Disclosures Recipient and the requirements of s 10 of the 2014 Act 
are met.  In response to the invitation in the ‘Statutory Review of the Protected Disclosures 
Act 2014’ (‘DPER Statutory Review’)668 to make submissions on the 2014 Act, GSOC 
                                                 
663 Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, ‘Whistleblowing Framework Call for Evidence, 
Government Response’ (BEIS June 2014) 12. 
664 The Public Interest Disclosure (Prescribed Persons) (Amendment) Order 2014, SI 2014/596.   
665 Explanatory Memorandum to The Public Interest Disclosure (Prescribed Persons) (Amendment) Order 
2014, SI 2014/596, para 7.2.   
666 Public Interest Disclosure (Amendment) Bill Deb 19 November 2013, cols 1117-1119. It has been 
recognised that this Ten Minute Rule Bill, sponsored by the Rt Hon David Davis MP, inspired the inclusion of 
prescribed persons as MPs. Commons Briefing Paper, ‘Whistleblowing to MPs, Briefing Paper’ (House of 
Commons Library 17 April 2014) 4. 
667 Protected Disclosures Act 2014 (s 7(2)) Order 2014, SI 2014/339. 
668 As discussed in Chapter 3, the ‘Statutory Review of the Protected Disclosures Act 2014’ was commenced 
by DPER under s 2 of the 2014 Act in August 2017 and was published 11 July 2018. Department of Public 
Expenditure and Reform, ‘Statutory Review of the Protected Disclosures Act 2014’ (DPER July 2018). 
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submitted that there should be an amendment made to the 2014 Act to enable it to investigate 
such disclosures.669  
4.3 Are protected disclosures being made to prescribed persons? 
4.3(a) Introduction 
An assessment was undertaken of the number of disclosures being made to prescribed 
persons between 2014-17. In order to determine whether disclosures are being made to 
prescribed persons, data were assessed from: (i) the case law analysis undertaken in Chapter 
3; (ii) from the prescribed persons’ annual reports that have been published; and (iii) from 
the prescribed persons’ survey responses.  
4.3(b) Data from case law research 
According to the findings of the case law analysis undertaken in Chapter 3, none of the cases 
concerned a disclosure to a prescribed person in the first instance. In twelve (39%) of the 
cases where the disclosure was made internally in the first instance, the disclosure was 
subsequently made externally. Of those cases, the disclosure was made to a prescribed 
person under s 7 of the 2014 Act in five cases (which equates to 42% of the cases where the 
disclosure was made externally). In three of the cases, the disclosure was made to Health 
Information Quality Authority (‘HIQA’),670 one case concerned a disclosure to the Health 
and Safety Authority (‘HSA’),671 and in one case, the disclosure was made to Revenue.672  
4.3(c) Data from annual reports 
Under s 22 of the 2014 Act, every public body is obliged to prepare and publish a report by 
30 June each year detailing the number of protected disclosures made to it in the immediately 
preceding year and any action taken in response to those protected disclosures. The annual 
report must be in such a form that it does not enable the identification of the person involved 
in the matters included in the report.673 A similar obligation was introduced in the UK in 
                                                 
669 Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, ‘Public Consultation on the Review of the Protected 
Disclosures Act 2014’ (DPER) <www.per.gov.ie/en/public-consultation-on-the-review-of-the-protected-
disclosures-act-2014/> accessed 6 November 2018. 
670 Monaghan v McGrath Partnership r-151162-pd-1415R; Carroll v Congregation of the Holy Spirit T/A 
Registered Charity Chy 076 UD 981/2015; An Employee v A Nursing Home ADJ-00000456. 
671 An Employee v An Employer ADJ-00000258. 
672 Dougan and Clarke v Lifeline Ambulances Ltd [2018] 29 ELR 210 (CC). 
673 Protected Disclosures Act 2014, s 22. 
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2017.674 Certain prescribed persons in the UK675 are required to report in writing on 
disclosures that it has received from workers in the designated reporting period, which is 
twelve months beginning on 1 April of each year.676 Within six months of the end of the 
reporting period, the prescribed person’s annual report must be placed on its website or 
published in a manner that the prescribed person considers appropriate for bringing the report 
to the public’s attention.677  
The purpose and impact of annual reporting are manifold. As the UK BEIS guidance for 
prescribed persons states: 
The aim is to increase transparency in the way that whistleblowing disclosures are 
dealt with and to raise confidence among whistleblowers that their disclosures are 
taken seriously. Producing reports highlighting the number of disclosures received 
and how they were taken forward will go some way to assure individuals who blow 
the whistle that action is taken in respect of their disclosures.678 
Thus, the reports are an opportunity for prescribed persons to clarify the expectations that 
workers have when making their disclosures to prescribed persons.679 Also, annual reporting 
obligations ensure that there are systematic processes in respect of how prescribed persons 
handle disclosures. Therefore, this reporting obligation should result in a consistent standard 
of best practice for prescribed persons in how they should handle disclosures.680 According 
to the responses to the UK prescribed bodies’ annual reporting requirements on 
whistleblowing consultation undertaken in 2014, 55% of respondents believed that a duty to 
report annually would both encourage consistency across prescribed persons and improve 
transparency, whilst 65% believed that it would increase confidence in prescribed persons 
and the way in which they handled disclosures.681  
                                                 
674 The Prescribed Persons (Reports on Disclosures of Information) Regulations 2017, SI 2017/507.  
675 ibid reg 2, provides that the obligation to publish annual reports on disclosures of information applies to 
prescribed persons, other than: a member of the House of Commons; a Minister of the Crown; a Welsh 
Minister; A Scottish Minister; the European Securities and Markets Authority; and an auditor appointed to 
audit smaller authorities.  
676 ibid reg 3(1)-(2).  
677 ibid reg 4.  
678 Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, ‘Whistleblowing, Prescribed Persons Guidance’ 
(BEIS March 2015) 7.  
679 Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, ‘Prescribed Bodies: Annual Reporting 
Requirements on Whistleblowing, Government Response’ (BEIS March 2015) 20. 
680 Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, ‘Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Bill, 
Prescribed persons: annual reporting requirements on whistleblowing’ (BEIS August 2014) 4. 
681 Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, ‘Prescribed Bodies: Annual Reporting 
Requirements on Whistleblowing, Government Response’ (BEIS March 2015) 18. 
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The first issue assessed in this research in relation to the issue of prescribed persons’ annual 
reports was whether prescribed persons are complying with their statutory obligation to 
publish annual reports and the second issue assessed was whether protected disclosures are 
being made to prescribed persons, and if so, how many have been made? 
4.3(c)(i) Are prescribed persons complying with their statutory obligation to publish annual 
reports? 
With respect to the first issue, the compliance rate of ninety-two prescribed persons was 
assessed. Ninety-two prescribed persons were assessed because ten of the prescribed persons 
were either dissolved, merged, or had their functions transferred to another organisation. 
However, one of those ten prescribed persons, CORU,682 was included in the assessment as 
it is holding itself out as a prescribed person as it has published Procedures to receive 
disclosures as a prescribed person. Further, although CER changed its name to CRU, this 
body was included in the assessment as it stated on its website that it is a prescribed person 
and therefore it was deemed appropriate to include its annual report in the assessment. The 
annual report of the prescribed person, the National Standards Authority of Ireland, included 
information on the Legal Metrology Service, also a prescribed person, and therefore the 
annual report for both prescribed persons was treated as a single report. Also, the annual 
report of the prescribed person, the Registry of Companies, also concerned the prescribed 
person, the Registry of Friendly Societies, and therefore the annual report for both were 
treated as a single report.  
Of the ninety-two prescribed persons included in this assessment, 28% (twenty-six) did not 
publish an annual report, 51% (forty-seven) demonstrated partial reporting compliance, and 
21% (nineteen) had full compliance (ie published three annual reports).683 With regard to the 
rates of partial compliance, 34% (thirty-one) of prescribed persons had one annual report, 
whilst 17% (sixteen) of prescribed persons published two annual reports.  
 
                                                 
682 CORU replaced the Opticians Board and the Health and Social Care Professional Council. 
683 See: Appendix 4(a), ‘Prescribed Persons’ Annual Reports’ Data’ for the compliance rate of each prescribed 
person. The assessment of the annual reports covered the reporting period from 2014 until 2017 as the research 
to locate the annual reports was undertaken on 15 and 16 January 2018 and the deadline for responding to the 
prescribed persons’ survey was 1 May 2018. As the deadline for publishing the 2018 report was 30 June 2018, 
not all prescribed persons would have published its report by the survey deadline, and as the survey responses 
and the annual reports were to be assessed in tandem, it was considered appropriate to limit the assessment to 
the 2014-17 annual reports.  
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From the assessment, it is clear that prescribed persons have some difficulty in complying 
with their statutory obligation under s 22 of the 2014 Act to publish annual reports. Firstly, 
the low rate of full compliance with s 22 indicates either a lack of awareness of the obligation 
to publish annual reports or an indifference to that obligation on the basis that there is no 
accountability provision included in s 22 in the event of non-compliance. Secondly, there 
appears to be a miscomprehension of the timeframe that the annual report is meant to cover. 
Section 22 of the 2014 Act requires that the annual report details the number of protected 
disclosures made to it in the ‘immediately preceding year’. Nonetheless, there appeared to 
be only four prescribed persons that understood this requirement and complied fully with 
it.684 Thirdly, in the vast majority of cases, prescribed persons are publishing their reports in 
such a manner that it is unclear whether the disclosure is being made to it in its capacity as 
a prescribed person or as an employer. Only eleven prescribed persons made this distinction 
clear. Eight prescribed persons categorised the disclosures into disclosures received either 
as an employer, as a prescribed person, or under s 10 of the 2014 Act,685 whilst two 
prescribed persons specifically stated that the disclosures were solely received in their role 
as prescribed persons,686 and one indicated that the disclosures were received solely in its 
capacity as the employer.687 The HIQA report was in excess of its reporting requirements 
under the 2014 Act and stated in its 2016 annual report that 1,334 disclosures were received 
from staff, people who use services, and the general public. Therefore, it is impossible to 
discern in what capacity disclosures were received by HIQA under the 2014 Act.  
According to the survey responses, three prescribed persons indicated that they did not know 
if their annual report under s 22 of the 2014 Act includes disclosures received as a prescribed 
person, whilst two of those prescribed persons also did not know if their annual report under 
s 22 of the 2014 Act includes disclosures received as an employer. Further, five prescribed 
persons indicated in the survey that their annual reports under s 22 of the 2014 Act did not 
include disclosures received as a prescribed person or as an employer. These responses 
                                                 
684 Central Bank; Data Protection Commission; Communications Regulation; Limerick City and CC. The 
requirement to publish an annual report that details the number of protected disclosures made to it in the 
‘immediately preceding year’ requires that the 2015 report covers disclosures from 15 July 2014 to 29 June 
2015; the 2016 report covers disclosures from 30 June 2015 to 29 June 2016; and the 2017 report covers 
disclosures from 30 June 2016 to 29 June 2017. 
685 Comptroller and Auditor General; Data Protection Commission; Higher Education Authority; Irish Aviation 
Authority; Pharmaceutical Society of Ireland; Revenue; Teaching Council; Veterinary Council of Ireland. 
686 Health and Safety Authority; ODCE. 
687 Private Residential Tenancies Board. 
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highlight a clear concern that prescribed persons do not understand their reporting 
obligations or the content of their reports.  
4.3(c)(ii)  Are disclosures being made to prescribed persons? If so, how many have been 
made? 
With regard to the second issue of whether disclosures are being made to prescribed persons 
and if so how many have been made, this could only be assessed in relation to the annual 
reports that have been published. Of those prescribed persons who published annual reports, 
and considering the totality of disclosures, the following results were identified: 
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Table 4.1   Number and rate of disclosures received by prescribed persons: annual 
reports (n=66) 
Number of disclosures received Number of prescribed persons  Percentage688 
0 43  65% 
1 8  12% 
2 6  9% 
3 1 1.5% 
5 1 1.5% 
7 1 1.5% 
8 1 1.5% 
14 1 1.5% 
16 1 1.5% 
24 1 1.5% 
124 1 1.5% 
2509 1 1.5% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
688 This is the percentage of disclosures received by the prescribed persons who had published annual reports. 
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Thus, of the sixty-six prescribed persons who have published annual reports, twenty-three 
prescribed persons (35%) reported receiving protected disclosures. This finding can be 
contrasted with the data obtained by Savage and Hyde in their study of disclosures received 
by twenty-five prescribed persons in the UK between 2005 and 2010 where sixteen 
regulators (64%) reported receiving disclosures and nine (36%) reported receiving no 
disclosures.689 The Savage and Hyde study, however, concerned a lower number of 
prescribed persons and covered a longer period than this study and therefore cannot be 
entirely comparable. The largest number of disclosures received by a prescribed person in 
Ireland was by HIQA who reported that it had received 2509 disclosures. However, its 
annual reports included disclosures from a range of persons outside of the scope of the 2014 
Act and therefore the disclosures reported could not all constitute a protected disclosure 
under the 2014 Act. Therefore, the highest number of disclosures reported was 124 
disclosures in the financial services sector to the Central Bank. There has been a year-on-
year increase in the number of disclosures received by the Central Bank, with only 1 in 2015, 
44 in 2016, and 79 in 2017.  
One factor to be taken into consideration when assessing this high rate of disclosures 
received by the Central Bank is that the Central Bank was only one of nineteen prescribed 
persons that had published three annual reports, and therefore, the more annual reports that 
are published, it is expected that this would reveal a higher number of disclosures than those 
prescribed persons who have either partial compliance or no compliance. Another factor to 
be taken into consideration is that the Central Bank can receive disclosures under a number 
of pieces of legislation in addition to the 2014 Act, eg Central Bank (Supervision and 
Enforcement) Act 2013690 and European Union (Single Supervisory Mechanism) 
Regulations 2014.691 Further, a significant factor to be considered is that under European 
                                                 
689 Ashley Savage and Richard Hyde, ‘The response to whistleblowing by regulators: a practical perspective’ 
(2015) 35 Legal Studies 408, 420. Further, in a 2007 study of prescribed persons’ internal procedures in the 
UK, out of twenty-one respondents, seven (33%) indicated that their procedures had been invoked and six 
(29%) stated that it had been used on twenty or more occasions. David Lewis, ‘A survey of 
whistleblowing/confidential reporting procedures used by persons prescribed under the Public Interest 
Disclosure Act 1998’ (2007) Communications Law 125, 128. 
690 Central Bank (Supervision and Enforcement) Act 2013, pt 5 and s 38. 
691 European Union (Single Supervisory Mechanism) Regulations 2014, SI 2014/495, giving full effect to 
Council Regulation (EC) 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central 
Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions [2013], art 23; and 
European Central Bank Regulation (EC) 468/2014 of 16 April 2014 establishing the framework for cooperation 
within the Single Supervisory Mechanism between the European Central Bank and national competent 
authorities and with national designated authorities (SSM Framework Regulation) [2014] OJ L141/1, arts 36-
38. 
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Parliament and Council Regulation 596/2014 on market abuse692 the Central Bank is obliged 
to establish effective mechanisms to enable reporting of actual or potential market abuse.693 
These effective mechanisms include having specific procedures for: (i) the receipt and 
follow-up of infringement reports, including establishing secure communication channels 
for such reports;694 (ii) providing appropriate protections to persons working under a contract 
of employment who make the report and to persons accused of the infringement;695 and (iii) 
protecting the personal data of both the discloser and the alleged infringer.696 The rules for 
these procedures are laid down in Commission Implementing Directive 2015/2392/EC697 
and are given effect nationally in the European Union (Market Abuse) Regulations 2016 
(‘2016 Regulations’).698 Amongst other obligations, the 2016 Regulations require the 
Central Bank to establish independent and autonomous communication channels, which are 
both secure and ensure confidentiality, for receiving and following up on infringements.699 
The Central Bank is required to publish information on these communication channels in a 
separate, easily identifiable, and accessible section of its website.700 This requirement 
includes information for contacting the dedicated staff members who are trained to handle 
infringement reports.701 Further, a clear outline of the infringement reporting procedures 
                                                 
692 European Parliament and Council Regulation 596/2014 of 16 April 2014 on market abuse (market abuse 
regulation) and repealing Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission 
Directives 2003/124/EC, 2003/125/EC and 2004/72/EC. 
693 ibid art 32(1). 
694 ibid art 32(2)(a). 
695 ibid art 32(2)(b). 
696 ibid art 32(2)(c). 
697 Commission Implementing Directive 2015/2392/EC of 17 December 2015 on Regulation (EC) 596/2014 
of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards reporting to competent authorities of actual or 
potential infringements of that Regulation OJ L332/126. The Commission Implementing Directive 
2015/2392/EC highlights the importance of publishing information regarding communication channels and 
states ‘Persons intending to report actual or potential infringements of Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 should 
be able to make an informed decision on whether, how and when to report. Competent authorities should 
therefore publicly disclose and make easily accessible information about the available communication channels 
with competent authorities, about the applicable procedures and about the dedicated staff members within the 
authority dealing with reports of infringements. All information regarding reports of infringements should be 
transparent, easily understandable and reliable in order to promote and not deter reporting of infringements.’ 
ibid Recital 4. 
698 European Union (Market Abuse) Regulations 2016, SI 2016/349, giving full effect to European Parliament 
and Council Regulation 596/2014 of 16 April 2014 on market abuse (market abuse regulation) and repealing 
Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Directives 2003/124/EC, 
2003/125/EC and 2004/72/EC, art 32; and giving effect to Commission Implementing Directive 2015/2392/EC 
of 17 December 2015 on Regulation (EC) 596/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards 
reporting to competent authorities of actual or potential infringements of that Regulation OJ L332/126. 
699 ibid reg 18. 
700 ibid reg 16(a). This information includes ‘(i) the phone numbers, indicating whether conversations are 
recorded or unrecorded when using those phone lines, and (ii) dedicated electronic and postal addresses, which 
are secure and ensure confidentiality, to contact the dedicated staff members’. 
701 ibid. Regulation 15 of SI 2016/349 provides that dedicated staff members perform the following functions: 
‘(a) providing any interested person with information on the procedures for reporting infringements; (b) 
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must be published,702 as well as the applicable confidentiality regime,703 the protection 
procedures,704 and the appropriate immunity statement.705 
It is also worth noting that the Commission Implementing Directive 2015/2392/EC 
recommends that anonymous reporting should be allowed by competent authorities.706 The 
2016 Regulations has adopted this and provides that the procedures applicable to the reports 
of infringement should clearly indicate that reports of infringements may be submitted 
anonymously.707 
Therefore, taking all of the factors outlined into consideration, this goes some way to 
explaining the significant number of disclosures reported by the Central Bank as having been 
received by it. Other prescribed persons may not have the range of legislative disclosure 
provisions applicable to them other than under the 2014 Act. In addition, under the 2014 
Act, prescribed persons are only required to provide workers employed by it with written 
information in relation to its Procedures, they are not required to provide information to 
workers in relation to their role as a prescribed person under the 2014 Act.708 The obligation 
on the Central Bank to provide information publicly may explain the higher rate of 
disclosures received by it than by other prescribed persons as it has made the process 
transparent and accessible. Further, the active promotion of anonymous disclosures by the 
Central Bank under their market abuse reporting scheme may also explain the high rate of 
disclosures received by it as this is an attractive option for workers seeking to make a 
disclosure.709  
4.3(d) Data from survey responses 
                                                 
receiving and following up on reports of infringements; (c) maintaining contact with the reporting person where 
that person has identified himself or herself.’ 
702 ibid reg 16(b). 
703 ibid reg 16(c). 
704 ibid reg 16(d). 
705 ibid reg 16(e). 
706 Commission Implementing Directive 2015/2392/EC of 17 December 2015 on Regulation (EC) 596/2014 
of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards reporting to competent authorities of actual or 
potential infringements of that Regulation OJ L332/126 Recital 4 and art 5(1)(a). 
707 European Union (Market Abuse) Regulations 2016, SI 2016/349, reg 17. 
708 There is an obligation on prescribed persons in the UK to include in their annual report that is placed on its 
website, an explanation of the functions and objectives of the relevant prescribed person. The Prescribed 
Persons (Reports on Disclosures of Information) Regulations 2017, SI 2017/507, reg 5(d). 
709 The issue of anonymous disclosures is discussed in detail in Chapter 5. 
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Ninety-six prescribed persons were invited to participate in a survey710 from 5 April 2018 
until 1 May 2018. The survey was sent to ninety-six prescribed persons instead of the 
designated 102 prescribed persons because five prescribed persons have either been 
dissolved or merged into another prescribed person and one organisation used the same 
website and contact details as another prescribed person. However, included in the ninety-
six prescribed persons were: (i) CRU, despite having changed its name from CER in 2017; 
(ii) CORU, which replaced both the Opticians Board and the Health & Social Care 
Professional Council; (iii) the CRA which had taken over the functions of the 
Commissioners of Charitable Donations in 2014; (iv) the CPCC, which was established on 
31 October 2014 when the Competition Authority and the National Consumer Agency, were 
amalgamated; and (v) Transport Infrastructure Ireland, which was established as a result of 
the merger of the two prescribed persons, the National Roads Authority and the Railway 
Procurement Agency under the Roads Act 2015. It was considered appropriate to include 
these organisations in the survey in order to determine whether they are acting as prescribed 
persons under the 2014 Act irrespective of the anomalies regarding their prescription under 
the prescribed persons’ SIs. Despite the inclusion of CRU, CORU, CRA, CPCC, and 
Transport Infrastructure Ireland, none of these organisations responded to the survey. This 
failure to respond may indicate that they are not acting as prescribed persons or they simply 
decided not to respond to the survey. It is not possible to determine the reason for the non-
response. However, it must be noted that both CORU and CRU have Procedures available 
for receiving disclosures in their capacity as a prescribed person.  
Twenty prescribed persons completed the survey, which equates to a 21% response rate.711 
Of those who completed the survey, ten of the respondents were local authorities, and ten 
were regulatory bodies. The low response rate means that the findings can only be illustrative 
                                                 
710 See: Appendix 2(b), ‘Protected Disclosures Prescribed Person Survey’. The purpose of the survey was set 
out in the cover letter and explained that ‘The purpose of this survey is to determine whether the Protected 
Disclosures Prescribed Person system is working properly. In order for the system to be effective, prescribed 
persons need to know and understand what is required of them to carry out their role. It is hoped that an analysis 
of the data from the survey will assist me in making recommendations for improvements of the Protected 
Disclosures Prescribed Person system.’ See: Appendix 2(a), ‘Prescribed Persons’ Survey Cover Letter’. 
711 See: Appendix 2(c), ‘Default Report Protected Disclosures Prescribed Person Survey’. Thirty-two surveys 
were commenced, which equates to 33% of the prescribed persons invited to participate in the survey. There 
were twenty-six recorded responses, which is an 81% completion rate of those who started the survey and 28% 
of the overall number of prescribed persons invited to participate in the survey. Of the twenty-six recorded 
responses, five were deemed a ‘false’ finish, although two of those surveys were included in the default report 
generated by Qualtrics as some of the questions were answered by the respondents therein. Three of the twenty-
six recorded responses were designated as a ‘true’ finish but none of the survey questions were answered in 
those three surveys. 
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as opposed to representative. The response rate to the survey can be compared to similar 
research conducted in the UK where there was a response rate of 58% (twenty-six replies) 
to a survey sent to forty-five prescribed persons in November 2005.712 In a 2013 UK study, 
there was a response rate of 78% (forty-two replies) to a survey sent to fifty-four prescribed 
persons. 
In contrast to the 2005 and 2013 surveys in the UK, the survey for the purpose of this 
research was administered to a larger number of prescribed persons who were given a shorter 
period within which to complete the survey. In the 2005 study, the participants were given 
from November 2005 to end of February 2006 to complete the survey, and in the 2013 study, 
the participants had from 23 February 2013 to 12 May 2013 to complete the survey. For 
completion of the survey herein, the participants were initially required to complete the 
survey from 5 April 2018 to 19 April 2018. The deadline for completion of the survey was 
extended from 19 April 2018 to 1 May 2018 as only thirteen responses had been received by 
that date. This larger sample size and shorter time from for responding to the survey in this 
study could explain the lower rates of response than those received in the UK studies. 
In respect of the issue of whether disclosures are being made to prescribed persons, nineteen 
prescribed persons answered question 12 ‘Has your organisation received any alleged 
protected disclosures?’ In response to this question, seven (37%) of the prescribed persons 
answered ‘Yes’; ten (53%) answered ‘No’; and two (11%) answered ‘Don’t know’.  
These rates are similar to the findings of the annual reports:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
712 David Lewis, ‘A survey of whistleblowing/confidential reporting procedures used by persons prescribed 
under the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998’ (2007) Communications Law 125, 126.  
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Bar Chart 4.1   Rates of disclosures to prescribed persons: survey results and annual 
report data 
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It is surprising that two of the prescribed persons stated that they did not know if they had 
received a protected disclosure as the cover letter to the survey requested that ‘the most 
appropriate person in your organisation in relation to protected disclosures completes the 
survey.’713 Therefore, it is either the case that two of those persons were not the ‘most 
appropriate person’ to complete the survey or that person is the most appropriate person, but 
they are not carrying out their function appropriately.  
With respect to the number of protected disclosures received by the prescribed persons, 
question 13 asked ‘If you answered ‘yes’ to Q12, approximately how many alleged protected 
disclosures has your organisation received?’ Five (71%) prescribed persons responded that 
they had received between ‘1-4’ protected disclosures; two (29%) indicated that they had 
received between ‘5-9’ protected disclosures; and none answered ‘10+’. These findings can 
be contrasted with the findings from the annual reports analysis: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
713See: Appendix 2(a), ‘Prescribed Persons’ Survey Cover Letter’. 
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Bar Chart 4.2   Number of disclosures received by prescribed persons: survey results 
and annual report data 
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Therefore, despite the low response rate to the survey by prescribed persons, the findings in 
relation to whether disclosures are being made to prescribed persons are similar to those of 
the annual reports assessment. Thus, as can be seen from both datasets, the majority of 
prescribed persons have not received protected disclosures, be it in their role as a prescribed 
person or their role as an employer. Further, of those disclosures that are being made, they 
tend to fall into the lower bracket (between ‘1-4’) of disclosures, thus indicating that of those 
organisations that are receiving disclosures, they are not receiving them regularly. 
4.4 Do prescribed persons understand their role under the 2014 Act? 
4.4(a) Introduction 
In order for the prescribed persons’ system to operate effectively, the core requirement is 
that the prescribed person understands their role under the 2014 Act. In order to assess 
whether prescribed persons understand their role, the responses to the prescribed persons’ 
survey were assessed. 
4.4(b) Data from survey responses 
First of all, with respect to the issue of whether the prescribed person is aware that it is 
prescribed under the 2014 Act, twenty (100%) prescribed persons answered ‘Yes’ to 
question 3 of the survey that asked ‘Does your organisation perform the function of 
prescribed person under either Protected Disclosures Act 2014 (s 7(2)) Order 2014, SI 
339/2014, Protected Disclosures Act 2014 (Disclosure to Prescribed Persons) Order 2015, 
SI 448/2015, or Protected Disclosures Act 2014 (Disclosure to Prescribed Persons) Order 
2016, SI 490/2016?’ This finding indicates a high level of recognition by prescribed persons 
of their designation under the 2014 Act. This can be contrasted with the UK prescribed 
persons’ study carried out in 2013 where thirty (71%) respondents confirmed that they were 
prescribed persons, whilst two (5%) said they were not, and ten (24%) failed to specify either 
way.714 However, in Ireland, CORU, despite not being prescribed under the prescribed 
persons’ SIs, has published Procedures for receiving disclosures as a prescribed person. 
Therefore, although the survey indicates a high level of recognition of the being prescribed 
under the 2014 Act, there is still evidence of some confusion in relation to this.   
                                                 
714 Arron Phillips and David Lewis, ‘Whistleblowing to Regulators: Are Prescribed Persons Fit for Purpose?’ 
(October 2013) 13 Middlesex University Erepository. 
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Of course, in order to be able to carry out their role, the prescribed person must have a high 
level of understanding of: (i) the 2014 Act; (ii) the scope of matters in respect of which they 
are prescribed; and (iii) both their protected disclosures procedures and investigation 
procedures. In order to assist the researcher in determining prescribed persons’ level of 
understanding of these matters, specific questions were included in the survey in this regard, 
and prescribed persons were asked to mark their answers as either ‘High’, ‘Medium’, or 
‘Low’.715  
Question 8 of the survey asked ‘What is your level of understanding of your protected 
disclosures procedures?’ Question 9 asked ‘What is your level of understanding of the 
provisions of the Protected Disclosures Act 2014?’ Question 10 of the survey asked ‘What 
is your level of understanding of the scope of matters in respect of which you are prescribed?’ 
Question 11 asked ‘What is your level of understanding of investigation procedures for 
protected disclosures?’ The following responses were recorded for questions 8, 9, 10, and 
11: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
715 The use of the terms ‘High’, ‘Medium’, and ‘Low’ means that the responses from prescribed persons are 
entirely subjective. There was no method of assessing these particular issues in an objective manner. The 
alternative was to omit the questions that required a ‘High’, ‘Medium’, or ‘Low’ response but this option was 
rejected on the grounds that it was better to have a subjective response rather than none at all. 
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Bar Chart 4.3   Prescribed persons’ levels of understanding regarding protected 
disclosures Procedures, the provisions of the 2014 Act, the scope of matters in respect 
of which they are prescribed, and investigation procedures for protected disclosures 
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The findings from these four questions indicate that with regard to all four issues, the 
majority of prescribed person had either a ‘High’ or a ‘Medium’ level of understanding. This 
is somewhat reassuring and demonstrates that prescribed persons are in the main subjectively 
comfortable with their role under the 2014 Act. This finding is underscored by the responses 
to question 28, which asked ‘How confident are you in carrying out your role as a prescribed 
person?’ The majority of prescribed persons, eleven (61%), indicated that they are 
‘Somewhat confident’ in carrying out their role; followed by six (33%) indicating that they 
were ‘Very confident’; and one (6%) stating that they are ‘Not confident’.716 Nonetheless, 
some respondents to the survey also indicated that due to either not receiving disclosures or 
receiving a low number of disclosures that this meant that they could not share what they 
considered to be good practice as a prescribed person. Question 29 asked ‘As a prescribed 
person, do you have anything to share that could be considered good practice?’ One 
respondent stated that ‘Haven't received any protected disclosures to date so limited 
experience in dealing with same.’ Another respondent stated that ‘It is difficult to become 
an expert when no disclosures have been received to learn from and gain experience from’. 
Such statements demonstrate that despite having a high or medium level of understanding 
of the issues relating to their role as a prescribed person, or in the majority, feeling 
‘Somewhat confident’ with the role, unless prescribed persons are receiving disclosures and 
responding to them, they cannot really assess their own understanding of the issues 
underpinning their role. 
In order to assist prescribed persons with their understanding of these issues, it is essential 
that they receive protected disclosures’ training. The issue of training was the subject of 
question 7 of the survey, which asked ‘Did you receive any specific training on protected 
disclosures?’ Ten (53%) prescribed persons indicated that they had received training, whilst 
nine (47%) said that they had not received training. In the UK, in the study conducted by 
Lewis on the whistleblowing/confidential reporting procedures used by prescribed persons 
under the Public Interest Disclosures Act 1998 (‘PIDA’), it was identified that nine of the 
twenty-one respondents (43%) provided training to their managers in how to handle 
                                                 
716 Again, the use of the terms ‘Very confident’, ‘Somewhat confident’, and ‘Not confident’ means that the 
responses from prescribed persons are entirely subjective. There was no method of assessing these particular 
issues in an objective manner. The alternative was to omit the questions that required a ‘Very confident’, 
‘Somewhat confident’, or ‘Not confident’ response but this option was rejected on the grounds that it was better 
to have a subjective response rather than none at all. 
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concerns.717 Further, in the UK study carried out by Phillips and Lewis in 2013 on prescribed 
persons, of the twenty-eight prescribed persons who completed the full questionnaire, 50% 
had received training in how to perform their role, whilst 50% had not. Of the 50% of 
organisations who had not received training, nine (64%) indicated that they felt that training 
would have been beneficial.718  
Lack of training appears to be a key concern of prescribed persons in Ireland. Question 30 
in the survey for this study asked ‘Is there anything else you would like to add about your 
role as a prescribed person?’ Five prescribed persons took this opportunity to comment on 
their role as a prescribed person, and three of those prescribed persons commented about 
training. One commented that ‘There should be annual revision training as the disclosures 
are so infrequent that one forgets the policy and procedure where it only forms a title but is 
not the substantive duties.’ Another commented that ‘I have recently been appointed to the 
role of Acting Senior Executive Officer Corporate Services and have been designated as the 
Protected Disclosures Recipient. I have reviewed the legislation and have a general 
understanding of the requirements but would need to complete some training and seek 
specialist advice in the event of receipt of a protected disclosure’.  Another prescribed person 
stated that ‘There should be government-wide standardised training that is offered to all 
prescribed persons.’ 
Thus, the findings of the UK and Irish studies are closely aligned. There appears to be a 
deficit in training for prescribed persons, yet prescribed persons have identified it as being 
necessary for them to carry out their role. As discussed in Chapter 3, Transparency 
International Ireland’s (‘TII’) Integrity at Work (‘IAW’) initiative has provided training to a 
host of public sector organisations,719 totalling 480 participants. Further, DPER published a 
‘Request for Tenders to Establish a Multi-Supplier Framework for the Provision of Training 
Services under Protected Disclosures Act 2014’ in May 2017. The successful framework 
                                                 
717 David Lewis, ‘A survey of whistleblowing/confidential reporting procedures used by persons prescribed 
under the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998’ (2007) Communications Law 125, 128.  
718 Arron Phillips and David Lewis, ‘Whistleblowing to Regulators: Are Prescribed Persons Fit for Purpose?’ 
(October 2013) 13 Middlesex University Erepository. 
719 Department of Justice; National Disability Authority; Policing Authority; Irish Congress of Trade Unions; 
Action Aid; Valuation Office; Legal Aid Board; Charities Regulator; Courts Service; Probation Service; Garda 
Síochána; Higher Education Authority; Insolvency Service of Ireland; International Protection Office; Irish 
Film Classifications Office; Irish Prison Service; Road Safety Authority; Property Registration Authority of 
Ireland.   
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members were RSM Ireland and Byrne Wallace Solicitors.720 Also, there is a Professional 
Certificate in ‘Whistleblowing Law and Practice,’721 which commences in January 2019 in 
University College Dublin,722 and it would be anticipated that those who are tasked with 
dealing with protected disclosures would avail of this opportunity to maximise their 
understanding of this area. Thus, there are opportunities for prescribed persons to receive 
training in protected disclosures, but it needs to be promoted and encouraged.   
4.5 Are prescribed persons complying with their obligations under s 21(1) to establish 
and maintain protected disclosures procedures and under s 21(4) to have regard to the 
DPER Guidance? 
4.5(a) Introduction 
Transparency International defines a ‘whistleblowing – or internal reporting – mechanism’ 
as ‘a set of policies or procedures within an organisation which establish not just effective 
channels but comprehensive protection and support for reporting persons.’723 Workplace 
Procedures are fundamental in order to encourage workers to make disclosures to their 
employer rather than externally to recipients outside of the organisation. Internal reporting 
allows employers to respond swiftly to wrongdoing and thus limit any potential damage and 
it reduces the risk of confidential information being leaked to external recipients.724 Further, 
                                                 
720 ETenders, ‘Contract award notice’ <https://irl.eu-
supply.com/ctm/Supplier/PublicTenders/ViewNotice/195643> (Etenders, 7 September 2017) accessed 30 July 
2018. 
721 University College Dublin, ‘Whistleblowing Law and Practice’ (UCD) 
<www.ucd.ie/law/events/whistleblowinglawandpractice/> accessed 11 December 2018. 
722 University College Dublin was ranked 47th globally in the 2019 Times Higher Education World University 
Rankings table for law subjects. THE World University Rankings, ‘World University Rankings 2019 by 
subject: law’ (Times Higher Education) <www.timeshighereducation.com/world-university-
rankings/2019/subject-ranking/law#!/page/0/length/25/sort_by/rank/sort_order/asc/cols/stats> accessed 11 
December 2018. 
723 Transparency International, ‘Internal Whistleblowing Mechanisms Topic Guide’ (TI 28 June 2017) 5. 
724 Note that under s 15 of the 2014 Act, making a protected disclosure does not constitute a criminal offence. 
Further, European Parliament and Council Directive 2016/943/EC of 8 June 2016 on the protection of 
undisclosed know-how and business information (trade secrets) against their unlawful acquisition, use and 
disclosure [2016] OJ L157/1 provides in recital 20 that ‘The measures, procedures and remedies provided for 
in this Directive should not restrict whistleblowing activity. Therefore, the protection of trade secrets should 
not extend to cases in which disclosure of a trade secret serves the public interest, insofar as directly relevant 
misconduct, wrongdoing or illegal activity is revealed. This should not be seen as preventing the competent 
judicial authorities from allowing an exception to the application of measures, procedures and remedies in a 
case where the respondent had every reason to believe in good faith that his or her conduct satisfied the 
appropriate criteria set out in this Directive.’ This position is enshrined in art 1(2)(b) where it provides that the 
Directive does not affect ‘the application of Union or national rules requiring trade secret holders to disclose, 
for reasons of public interest, information, including trade secrets, to the public or to administrative or judicial 
authorities for the performance of the duties of those authorities.’ In addition, art 5(b) of the Directive provides 
that Member States must ‘ensure that an application for the measures, procedures and remedies provided for 
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implementing protected disclosure Procedures promotes a workplace culture where workers 
are encouraged to disclose information about wrongdoing in the anticipation that they will 
not be penalised for having done so. It also encourages workers to come forward with such 
information in the expectation that action will be taken in response to their disclosure. This 
should improve the trust, confidence, and morale of workers. It is estimated that 94% of 
public bodies in Ireland have Procedures in place.725 Unfortunately, however, according to 
a survey of 353 employers in the private sector in Ireland, only 10% said that they had a 
whistleblowing policy or guidance.726  
The benefits of implementing Procedures are manifold. The DPER Guidance issued under s 
21(3) of the 2014 Act provides that establishing Procedures will facilitate the public body to 
achieve the following: 
(i) Deter wrongdoing in the public service. 
(ii) Ensure early detection and remediation of potential wrongdoing. 
(iii) Reduce the risk of confidential information being leaked. 
(iv) Demonstrate to interested stakeholders, regulators, and the courts that the public body is 
accountable and managed effectively. 
(v) Improve trust, confidence, and morale of workers in the public body. 
(vi) Build a responsible and ethical organisational culture.  
                                                 
in this Directive is dismissed where the alleged acquisition, use or disclosure of the trade secret was carried out 
in any of the following cases: (a) for exercising the right to freedom of expression and information as set out 
in the Charter, including respect for the freedom and pluralism of the media; (b) for revealing misconduct, 
wrongdoing or illegal activity, provided that the respondent acted for the purpose of protecting the general 
public interest; (c) disclosure by workers to their representatives as part of the legitimate exercise by those 
representatives of their functions in accordance with Union or national law, provided that such disclosure was 
necessary for that exercise; (d) for the purpose of protecting a legitimate interest recognised by Union or 
national law.’ The European Union (Protection of Trade Secrets) Regulations 2018, SI 2018/188 transposes 
Directive 2016/943/EC into Irish law and inserts s 5(7A) into the 2014 Act, which provides that ‘Where a 
worker, referred to in subsection (1), makes a disclosure of relevant information in the manner specified by 
that subsection, and in respect of that disclosure of relevant information it is alleged that the disclosure 
concerned the unlawful acquisition, use, or disclosure of a trade secret (within the meaning of the European 
Union (Protection of Trade Secrets) Regulations 2018 (S.I. No. 188 of 2018)), disclosure is a protected 
disclosure provided that the worker has acted for the purposes of protecting the general public interest.’ 
Protected Disclosures Act 2014, s 5(7A).   
725 Transparency International Ireland, ‘Speak Up Report 2017’ (TII 2017) 33. 
726 ibid 42. 
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(vii) Limit the risk of reputation and financial damage.727 
In ‘Whistling While They Work A good-practice guide for managing internal reporting of 
wrongdoing in public sector organisations’, a guide resulting from four years of research 
into the management of whistleblowing in the Australian public sector, four reasons were 
identified as to why it is essential that public sector managers manage whistleblowing 
properly in the workplace. These reasons are as follows: 
• it is increasingly accepted that employee reporting is often the most effective and 
fastest way for senior management of organisations to become aware of problems in 
their organisation  
 
• if organisations do not manage whistleblowing effectively, it is now well known 
that complaints are more likely to be taken outside the organisation, including into 
the public domain, leading to greater conflict, embarrassment and cost  
 
• organisations that support employees in fulfilling their duty to report concerns are 
more likely to become known as good workplaces and employers of choice, while 
organisations who do not are more likely to become liable for failing to provide 
employees with a safe, healthy and professional working environment  
 
• public sector agencies are increasingly subject to specific statutory obligations to 
manage whistleblowing to a high standard, as part of their jurisdiction’s public 
integrity systems.728 
The benefits outlined above apply to prescribed persons’ internal disclosures. Prescribed 
persons should also establish Procedures with information for workers in order to assist them 
in making their disclosure to the organisation in its capacity as a prescribed person. Many of 
the benefits outlined would also apply to prescribed persons’ Procedures. Bowers et al 
identified nine benefits of implementing adequate Procedures to address concerns of 
workers. There is an overlap of some of those benefits for both internal and prescribed 
persons’ Procedures, and these can be summarised as follows: 
(i) It creates a more healthy and accountable workplace where issues are addressed quickly. 
(ii) It may act as an early warning system. 
                                                 
727 Government Reform Unit, Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, ‘Guidance under section 21(1) 
of the Protected Disclosures Act 2014 for the purpose of assisting public bodies in the performance of their 
functions under the Act’ (DPER 2016) para D(2). 
728 Peter Roberts, AJ Brown and Jane Olsen, Whistling While They Work A good-practice guide for managing 
internal reporting of wrongdoing in public sector organisations (ANU E Press 2011) 9.  
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(iii) It ensures that critical information comes to the attention of persons who can affect 
action. 
(iv) It may deter workers from participating in malpractice in the knowledge that a colleague 
may raise concerns of same under the Procedures. 
(vi) It reduces the risk of litigation if concerns are addressed and handled appropriately.729 
Thus, implementing Procedures assists an organisation in managing whistleblowing 
properly in the workplace by establishing formal processes that are known and understood 
by both management and workers alike. Further, prescribed persons’ Procedures will 
encourage and promote the making of disclosures to the prescribed person, and it will assist 
recipients in their response to the disclosure. 
4.5(a)(i) The impact of the existence/non-existence of Procedures in legal proceedings 
The importance of establishing robust Procedures cannot be understated. The UK Committee 
on Standards in Public Life730 stated in its Tenth Report in relation to PIDA that: 
4.35 Firstly, it is important to reiterate that the Act is a statutory ‘backstop’ to ensure 
that employees who follow prescribed procedures for raising concerns are not 
victimised or suffer detriment as a result. Where an individual case reaches the point 
of invoking the Act then this represents a failure of the internal systems in some 
respect. Either the employee has failed to follow the procedure (for whatever reason) 
or the procedures themselves have failed. In our view, therefore, any case where the 
Act is invoked should initiate a review of the whistleblowing procedures in that 
organisation.731 
This statement underpins the necessity for prescribed persons to implement effective 
Procedures. If an organisation has established Procedures and a worker fails to comply with 
their employer’s Procedures, this will be taken into consideration during protected disclosure 
proceedings. As can be seen from the case law analysis in the ‘Reference to protected 
disclosures procedures’ section of Chapter 3, the legal principles that can be drawn from the 
Irish case law under the 2014 Act are that firstly, a complainant’s case is less likely to 
                                                 
729 Jeremy Lewis and others, Whistleblowing Law and Practice (3rd edn, OUP 2017) para 19.02. 
730 The Committee on Standards in Public Life advises the Prime Minister on ethical standards across the whole 
of public life in the UK. It monitors and reports on issues relating to the standards of conduct of all public 
office holders. For more information, see: <www.gov.uk/government/organisations/the-committee-on-
standards-in-public-life> accessed 29 June 2016. 
731 Committee on Standards in Public Life, Getting the Balance Right: Implementing Standards of Conduct in 
Public Life, Tenth Report (Committee on Standards in Public Life 2005) 89.  
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succeed if they do not utilise their employer’s Procedures;732 and secondly, if the 
complainant’s employer does not have Procedures or if they are outdated or defective, this 
does not mean that that the claim automatically succeeds.733 On the face of it, these decisions 
seem to lean in favour of the employer. It appears that a worker does not benefit from the 
employer’s omission to implement Procedures or to update its Procedures. This position 
adopted by the Workplace Relations Commission (‘WRC’) could act as a disincentive for 
an employer to establish Procedures, as there is no real sanction for failing to implement 
such Procedures. This is a deficit in respect of the obligations on public bodies under s 21 of 
the 2014 Act.  Nonetheless, taking into consideration the statement by the Adjudication 
Officer in A Senior Official v A Local Authority734 where he stated that ‘It is obvious that the 
respondent should update its policy and procedure regarding protected disclosures; this does 
not, however, mean that such a complaint should automatically succeed’, tends to indicate 
that not having Procedures, or having outdated or defective Procedures, would be one of a 
number of factors that an adjudication officer would take into consideration in their 
deliberations. Nevertheless, the benefit for the employer in having Procedures is that the 
disclosure would be less likely to be considered a protected disclosure if the worker does not 
make their disclosure in line with those Procedures.735 There does not seem to be any 
consequential benefit to the worker in either scenario.  
4.5(a)(ii) The DPER Guidance  
All public bodies are obliged to establish and maintain Procedures under s 21(1) of the 2014 
Act. Section 21(3) of the 2014 Act provides that ‘The Minister may issue guidance for the 
purpose of assisting public bodies in the performance of their functions under subsection 
(1) and may from time to time revise or re-issue it.’ Section 21(4) goes on to provide that 
‘Public bodies shall have regard to any guidance issued under subsection (3) in the 
performance of their functions under subsection (1).’736 A draft DPER Guidance was issued 
by the Minister for Public Expenditure and Reform in September 2015. Following this, a 
                                                 
732 Employee v Employer ADJ-00003371; A Worker v A Nursing Home ADJ-00000267. 
733 A Senior Official v A Local Authority ADJ-00001721; A Commercialisation Specialist v A Government 
Agency ADJ-00007228; Training Co-ordinator v A Social Support Service ADJ-00002320. 
734 A Senior Official v A Local Authority ADJ-00001721. 
735 Note that Protected Disclosures Act, s10, provides that if a disclosure is made to a recipient other than the 
worker’s employer or responsible person, prescribed person, Minister, or legal advisor, in proceedings under 
the 2014 Act, the reasonableness of the worker’s disclosure must be considered. One of the factors that regard 
must be had to in determining the reasonableness of the disclosure, is where a disclosure of substantially the 
same information was made to the worker's employer or responsible person, whether the worker complied with 
any procedure the use of which by the worker was authorised by the employer. ibid s 10(3)(e). 
736 ibid s 21(4). 
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public consultation was undertaken on the draft DPER Guidance in April 2015.  On 10 
March 2016, the government published the DPER Guidance to assist public bodies with their 
obligation under s 21(1) of the 2014 Act to establish and maintain Procedures in the 
workplace by providing advice and information on how they should design and operate their 
Procedures.737 The DPER Guidance is one of a suite of measures designed to support the 
implementation of the 2014 Act.  
The DEPR Guidance is based primarily on international best practice for whistleblowing 
arrangements and sets out how Procedures are to be introduced, operated, and reviewed. It 
is devised on the premise that a one-size-fits-all approach is not appropriate given the 
different nature and scope of public sector bodies. Therefore, the content of the Procedures 
of an individual public body will be a matter for that particular body to consider having 
regard to its own unique and individual circumstances. It is the government’s intention, 
however, that a degree of consistency in relation to the content of Procedures is achieved. 
The DPER Guidance thus provides the fundamentals of a good set of Procedures. The DPER 
Guidance has been hailed as being effective in demonstrating how statutory guidance is a 
valuable method of explaining how the law is intended to operate as well as encouraging 
best practice, which goes beyond the minimum statutory floor of rights.738 
The key principles informing the DPER Guidance are: 
1.1 All disclosures of wrongdoing in the workplace should, as a matter of routine, be 
the subject of an appropriate assessment and / or investigation and the identity of the 
discloser should be adequately protected; and 
 
1.2 Providing that the worker discloses information relating to wrongdoing, in an 
appropriate manner, and based on a reasonable belief, no question of penalisation 
should arise. 
2. If those two principles are respected, there should be no need for disclosers to 
access the protections and redress contained in the 2014 Act.739 
                                                 
737 Government Reform Unit, Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, ‘Guidance under section 21(1) 
of the Protected Disclosures Act 2014 for the purpose of assisting public bodies in the performance of their 
functions under the Act’ (DPER 2016). 
738 Lauren Kierans and David Lewis, ‘Using statutory guidance and codes of practice to build on 
whistleblowing legislation: the Irish experience’ (2016) 10 La Revue des droits de l’homme 
<https://journals.openedition.org/revdh/2716> accessed 24 November 2018. 
739 Government Reform Unit, Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, ‘Guidance under section 21(1) 
of the Protected Disclosures Act 2014 for the purpose of assisting public bodies in the performance of their 
functions under the Act’ (DPER 2016) para C. 
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The requirement to have regard to this DPER Guidance applies only to public bodies. In 
their presentation to the Oireachtas Joint Committee on Finance, Public Expenditure and 
Reform, TII argued that Head 26 of the Draft Heads of the Protected Disclosure in the Public 
Interest Bill 2012 which required public bodies to establish and publish internal Procedures 
be extended to all organisations in the public, private, and non-profit sector.740 This 
recommendation was not adopted, but instead, the WRC drafted a Statutory Code of Practice 
on Procedures,741 which applies to both private and non-profit organisations.742 The draft EU 
Commission Directive on whistleblowing proposes that Member States must ensure that 
certain public and private sector legal entities establish internal channels and procedures both 
for reporting and for following up on reports.743 The explanatory memorandum explains that 
‘This obligation is meant to ensure that information on actual or potential breaches of Union 
law reaches swiftly those closest to the source of the problem, most able to investigate and 
with powers to remedy it, where possible.’744 It would be expected that this obligation is also 
meant to ensure that those who report such breaches are protected from any retaliation. It 
remains to be seen to what extent this obligation will apply to the private sector and if the 
2014 Act will go even further and apply it to the non-profit sector. If these obligations are 
adopted, then DPER Guidance for these sectors should be developed. With respect to 
prescribed persons, as public bodies, they are obliged to establish and maintain Procedures 
under s 21(1) of the 2014 Act and to have regard to the DPER Guidance under s 21(4) of the 
2014 Act when developing their Procedures. The focus of this research in this section is to 
determine whether prescribed persons are complying with their statutory obligations under 
ss 21(1) and 21(4) of the 2014 Act. 
4.5(b) Are prescribed persons complying with their obligations under s 21(1) of the 2014 
Act to establish and maintain protected disclosures procedures? 
                                                 
740 Joint Committee on Finance, Public Expenditure and Reform Deb 13 June 2012. 
741 Industrial Relations Act 1990 (Code of Practice on Protected Disclosures Act 2014) (Declaration) Order 
2015, SI 2015/464. 
742 It is important to note that Industrial Relations Act 1990, s 42(4), provides that a Code of Practice is 
admissible in evidence in proceedings and any provision of the code which appears to be relevant to any 
question arising in the proceedings will be taken into account in determining that question. 
743 Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of 
persons reporting on breaches of Union law, 2018/0106 (COD) art 4(1). 
744 Explanatory Memorandum to the Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on the protection of persons reporting on breaches of Union law, 2018/0106 (COD) 11. 
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As a result of the prescribed persons’ website search on 15 and 16 January 2018, twenty-six 
Procedures were located.745 The follow-up search on 17 and 18 February 2018 located three 
further Procedures.746 Thus, of the 102 prescribed persons, only twenty-seven had 
Procedures available on their website.747 A further two organisations had prescribed persons’ 
Procedures available on their websites even though they have not been statutorily prescribed 
as recipients of protected disclosures under section 7 of the 2014 Act.748 
Of those organisations who did have Procedures, seventeen were local authorities749 , and 
twelve were organisations other than local authorities750 In identifying the number of 
prescribed persons with Procedures, this was broken down further into whether prescribed 
persons had Procedures for internal disclosures only, for disclosures received in their 
capacity as a prescribed person only, or Procedures for disclosures that were received both 
internally and in their capacity as a prescribed person. The results were as follows: 
(i) Of the seventeen local authorities, twelve had a single Procedures document for 
both internal disclosures and disclosures received in their capacity as a prescribed 
person.751 Five local authorities had Procedures that concerned internal disclosures 
only, which were interim Procedures.752 
(ii) Of the twelve organisations other than local authorities, five had Procedures that 
were solely for disclosures in their role as a prescribed person;753 four had a single 
                                                 
745 Commission for Regulation Utilities (CRU); Comptroller and Auditor General (C&AG); Coras Iompar 
Éireann (CIÉ); CORU, Health Insurance Authority (HIA); Higher Education Authority (HEA); Carlow CC; 
Cavan CC; Clare CC; Fingal CC; Galway CC; Galway City Council; Kildare CC; Kilkenny CC; Limerick City 
Council and CC; Longford CC; Monaghan CC; Sligo CC; South Dublin CC; Wexford City Council and CC; 
Westmeath CC; Wicklow CC; Marine Institute; Office of the Revenue Commissioners (Revenue); 
Pharmaceutical Society of Ireland (PSI); State Examinations Commission (SEC). 
746 Irish Auditing and Accounting Supervisory Authority (IAASA); Kerry CC; Sea Fisheries Protection 
Authority (SFPA). 
747 C&AG; CIÉ; HIA; HEA; IAASA; Carlow CC; Cavan CC; Clare CC; Fingal CC; Galway CC; Galway City 
Council; Kerry CC; Kildare CC; Kilkenny CC; Limerick City Council and CC; Longford CC; Monaghan CC; 
Sligo CC; South Dublin CC; Wexford City Council and CC; Westmeath CC; Wicklow CC; Marine Institute; 
Revenue; PSI; SFPA; SEC. 
748 The Opticians Board is prescribed under SI 2014/339 to receive protected disclosures under s 7 of the 2014 
Act. However, its registration transferred automatically to the Optical Registration Board at CORU. The 
Commission for Energy Regulation (‘CER’) is also prescribed under SI 2014/339 to receive protected 
disclosures under s 7 of the 2014 Act, however, it changed its name to CRU in 2017.  
749 Carlow CC; Cavan CC; Clare CC; Fingal CC; Galway CC; Galway City Council; Kerry CC; Kildare CC; 
Kilkenny CC; Limerick City Council and CC; Longford CC; Monaghan CC; Sligo CC; South Dublin CC; 
Wexford City Council and CC; Westmeath CC; Wicklow CC. 
750 C&AG; CIÉ; HIA; HEA; IAASA; Marine Institute; Revenue; PSI; SFPA; SEC. 
751 Carlow CC; Cavan CC; Fingal CC; Galway City Council Kerry CC; Kilkenny CC; Limerick City Council 
and CC; Longford CC; Monaghan CC; Sligo CC; Westmeath CC; Wicklow CC. 
752 Clare CC; Galway CC; Kildare CC; South Dublin CC; Wexford City Council and CC. 
753 IAASA; PSI; SFPA; CORU; CRU. 
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Procedures document for both internal disclosures and disclosures received in their 
capacity as a prescribed person;754 two had Procedures for internal disclosures 
only;755 and one had two separate Procedures, one internal and one prescribed 
persons.756 
Thus, of the twenty-seven prescribed persons who had Procedures publicly available, twenty 
had Procedures available for workers who wished to make a disclosure to the organisation 
in its capacity as a prescribed person. This is only 20% of the persons prescribed. The other 
two organisations, CORU and CRU, also had prescribed persons’ Procedures available but 
as they are not statutorily prescribed as a person to receive protected disclosures, then a 
worker using their Procedures to make a disclosure would not be protected under s 7 of the 
2014 Act. These findings can be contrasted with the prescribed persons’ survey responses to 
question 4, which asked ‘Does your organisation have specific procedures for receiving 
protected disclosures as a prescribed person (separate to any you may have for internal 
staff)?’ Sixteen (84%) prescribed persons confirmed that they did, whilst three (16%) stated 
that they did not.757 Although the response rate to the survey is quite low, there is a clear 
conflict between the numbers of prescribed persons who stated that they did have separate 
Procedures for receiving disclosures as a prescribed person and the number of such 
Procedures that were located during the research conducted of the prescribed persons’ 
websites. Of the prescribed persons who confirmed in the survey that they did have specific 
procedures for receiving protected disclosures as a prescribed person (separate to any they 
have for internal staff), only one of those Procedures could be located during the research 
conducted for this chapter. Therefore, as there is a higher rate of prescribed persons 
indicating that they have prescribed persons’ Procedures than what was located during the 
research, there is an issue as regards their accessibility and availability, thus requiring action 
to be taken in this regard. 
                                                 
754 C&AG; HIA; Marine Institute; Revenue. 
755 CIÉ; SEC. 
756 HEA. 
757 In the Phillips and Lewis prescribed persons’ study carried out in the UK in 2013, of the twenty-eight 
organisations who completed the full questionnaire, nineteen (68%) specified that they had a separate 
policy/procedures for external disclosures, whilst nine (22%) indicated that they did not, Arron Phillips and 
David Lewis, ‘Whistleblowing to Regulators: Are Prescribed Persons Fit for Purpose?’ (October 2013) 15 
Middlesex University Erepository. In the 2011 UK study on internal whistleblowing/confidential reporting 
procedures, of the twenty-six responses, twenty-two organisations indicated that they had such a procedure, 
David Lewis, ‘A survey of whistleblowing/confidential reporting procedures used by persons prescribed under 
the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998’ (2007) Communications Law 125, 126. 
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Besides the twenty-seven prescribed persons whose Procedures were located on their 
websites, nine additional prescribed persons had information on their websites about the 
making of a protected disclosure to the organisation in its capacity as a prescribed person.758 
Taking this into consideration, in addition to the twenty prescribed persons who had 
Procedures for disclosures to the organisation in its capacity as a prescribed person, this 
means that only 29% (twenty-nine) of persons prescribed had information publicly available 
in relation to disclosures to it as a prescribed person. This finding can be contrasted with the 
responses to question 16 in the survey, which asked ‘Is there information on your 
organisation’s website which tells external persons how to make a protected disclosure to 
your organisation?’ Eleven (58%) prescribed persons confirmed that there was information 
on their website, whilst five (26%) stated that it did not, and three (16%) said that they did 
not know. Ten prescribed persons answered the follow-on question to this, question 17, 
which asked ‘If yes, please indicate the type of information, i.e. procedures, webpage, online 
form etc.’ Three (30%) prescribed persons indicated that there was a webpage, one of which 
stated that there was a ‘webpage and guidance note’ and another stated that it had a 
‘Webpage with indication of how to submit a disclosure’. The remaining seven (70%) 
prescribed persons indicated that the type of information was in the form of either policies 
and/or Procedures.  
4.5(c) Analysis of whether prescribed persons are complying with their statutory 
obligations under s 21(4) of the 2014 Act 
For the purposes of the analysis of whether prescribed persons are complying with their 
statutory obligations under s 21(4) of the 2014 Act, which obliges public bodies to have 
regard to the DPER Guidance issued by the Minister when establishing and maintaining 
Procedures, all twenty-nine Procedures that were located during the search for prescribed 
persons’ Procedures were assessed. 
Of the 110 issues identified in the DPER Guidance to be included in the Procedures, the 
following compliance results were found:759 
                                                 
758 Central Bank; Environmental Protection Agency; Garda Síochána Ombudsman Commission; Health 
Products Regulatory Authority; Pensions Authority; Quality and Qualifications Ireland; Standards in Public 
Office Commission; Teaching Council; Veterinary Council of Ireland. 
759 See: Appendix 3(b): ‘Coding of DPER Checklist for Prescribed Persons’ Protected Disclosures Procedures’ 
and Appendices 3(c), (d), and (e), ‘Findings of Prescribed Persons’ Protected Disclosures Procedures using the 
DPER Checklist for Prescribed Persons’. 
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Table 4.2   Compliance rate of prescribed persons with their obligations under s 21(4) 
of the 2014 Act 
No Name Percentage Prescribed 
Persons’ 
Procedures 
Only 
Internal 
Procedures 
Only 
Internal & 
Prescribed 
Persons’ 
Procedures 
1 CORU (formally the 
Opticians Registration 
Board) 
12     
2 Comptroller and Auditor 
General (C&AG) 
12     
3 Commission for 
Regulation of Utilities 
(CRU) (originally CER) 
10     
4 Coras Iompar Éireann 
(CIÉ) 
14     
5 Health Insurance Authority 
(HIA) 
39     
6 Higher Education 
Authority (HEA) (Internal 
(x1) & PP (x1) ) 
Internal (84)  
PP(20) 
     
7 Irish Auditing and 
Accounting Supervisory 
Authority (IAASA) 
7     
8 Carlow CC 73     
9 Cavan CC 73     
10 Clare CC  33     
11 Fingal CC 73     
12 Galway CC 33     
13 Galway City Co 73     
14 Kerry CC 73     
15 Kildare CC 33     
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16 Kilkenny CC 73     
17 Limerick City Co & CC 73     
18 Longford CC 73     
19 Monaghan CC 73     
20 Sligo CC 73     
21 South Dublin CC 33     
22 Wexford City Co & CC 33     
23 Westmeath CC 73     
24 Wicklow CC 73     
25 Marine Institute 92     
26 Office of the Revenue 
Commissioners (Revenue) 
24     
27 Pharmaceutical Society of 
Ireland (PSI) 
15     
28 Sea Fisheries Protection 
Authority (SFPA) 
35     
29 State Examinations 
Commission (SEC) 
83     
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Thus, as can be seen from the above table, the percentage of issues identified in the DPER 
Guidance that are included in the prescribed persons’ Procedures, the overall average score 
obtained by organisations that had Procedures is 46%. When the Procedures are categorised 
into: (i) internal and prescribed persons’ Procedures; (ii) prescribed persons’ Procedures 
only; and (iii) internal Procedures only; the most comprehensive Procedures, on average, 
were Procedures that provided for both internal disclosures and prescribed persons’ 
disclosures, which included 65% of the issues identified in the DPER Guidance to be 
included in Procedures. Internal Procedures only had on average 43%, whilst prescribed 
persons’ Procedures only, contained 17% of the DPER Guidance issues. A clear concern is 
not only the fact that 20% (twenty) of prescribed persons have Procedures publicly available, 
but that of the prescribed persons’ Procedures (including the two organisations purporting 
to be prescribed persons) there is a meager rate of compliance with the legal requirement 
under s 21(4) of the 2014 Act to have regard to the DPER Guidance issued under s 21(3) of 
the 2014 Act.  
4.5(c)(i) Breakdown of the compliance rate of prescribed persons’ Procedures with the 
issues in the DPER Guidance 
Further analysis of the compliance rate of the prescribed persons’ Procedures with the DPER 
Guidance checklist was undertaken in respect of the eighteen separate issues. This analysis 
was designed to identify patterns of inclusion or exclusion of particular issues in prescribed 
persons’ Procedures. By identifying these patterns, it was hoped that weaknesses in the 
DPER Guidance could be detected and that specific issues that are causing confusion or 
concern for prescribed persons could be explored. The following issues were assessed: 
A. Policy statement 
B. Application 
C. What is a protected disclosure? This section included the issues of ‘Relevant 
wrongdoings’, ‘Disclosure of information’, ‘Reasonable belief’, and ‘In connection with 
their employment’ 
D. Making a protected disclosure  
E. Protection against penalisation (including dismissal and detriment) 
F. Confidentiality/ protection of identity 
G. Anonymous disclosures 
H. Personal complaint vs protected disclosures 
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I. Motivation 
J. Assessment and Investigation 
K. Protection of the rights of Respondents 
L. Disciplinary record of discloser and other related matters 
M. Feedback 
N. Support and Advice 
O. Review 
P. Non-restriction of rights to make protected disclosures 
Q. Mandatory reporting 
R. The information that should be provided in a disclosure.  
The results of the breakdown of the compliance rate with the eighteen issues in the DPER 
Guidance that are meant to be included in the Procedures are as follows:760 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
760 The results of the assessment of the eighteen issues listed in relation to the prescribed persons’ Procedures 
are set out in detail in Appendices 3(c), (d), and (e), ‘Findings of Prescribed Persons’ Protected Disclosures 
Procedures using the DPER Checklist for Prescribed Persons’. 
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Table 4.3   Breakdown of the compliance rate of prescribed persons’ Procedures with 
the issues in the DPER Guidance 
Issue Prescribed 
Persons’ 
Procedures 
Only 
Internal 
Procedures 
Only 
Internal & 
Prescribed 
Persons’ 
Procedures 
Total761 
A. Policy 
statement 
6% 46% 40% 34% 
B. Application 0% 29% 29% 23% 
C. What is a 
protected 
disclosure? 
32% 58% 65% 57% 
D. Making a 
protected 
disclosure  
31% 56% 82% 65% 
E. Protection 
against 
penalisation 
(including 
dismissal and 
detriment) 
3% 35% 70% 47% 
F. 
Confidentiality/ 
protection of 
identity 
28% 53% 83% 64% 
G. Anonymous 
disclosures 
13% 41% 45% 38% 
H. Personal 
complaint vs 
0% 50% 86% 59% 
                                                 
761 The ‘Total’ percentage outlined is the percentage of the total number of sub-issues contained in each issue 
in the DPER Guidance, multiplied by the total number of Procedures available for analysis, ie thirty 
Procedures. 
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protected 
disclosures 
I. Motivation 8% 59% 64% 52% 
J. Assessment 
and 
Investigation 
6% 39% 70% 49% 
K. Protection of 
the rights of 
Respondents 
11% 33% 33% 29% 
L. Disciplinary 
record of 
discloser and 
other related 
matters 
0% 25% 13% 13% 
M. Feedback 8% 14% 57% 36% 
N. Support and 
Advice 
0% 25% 6% 10% 
O. Review 0% 25% 81% 50% 
P. Non-
restriction of 
rights to make 
protected 
disclosures 
0% 13% 6% 7% 
Q. Mandatory 
reporting 
0% 21% 4% 8% 
R. The 
information that 
should be 
provided in a 
disclosure  
25% 3% 86% 61% 
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The results of the assessment of the individual issues in the DPER Guidance that should be 
included in Procedures, when taking all three types of Procedures together, illustrate that the 
issue that has been complied with the most is ‘D. Making a protected disclosure’. The issue 
that has been complied with the least when taking all Procedures together is ‘P. Non-
restriction of rights to make protected disclosures’.  
Looking at the three types of Procedures separately, the ‘Prescribed Persons’ Procedures 
only’ omitted seven issues entirely.762 Of the issues that were included, the issue that was 
complied with the most was ‘C. What is a protected disclosure?’ Whilst, the issue that was 
complied with the least was ‘E. Protection against penalisation (including dismissal and 
detriment)’.  
Procedures that concerned internal disclosures only, complied with the issue of ‘I. 
Motivation’ the most, whilst the issue that was complied with the least was ‘R. The 
information that should be provided in a disclosure’.  
Procedures that concerned both internal disclosures and disclosures in their capacity as a 
prescribed person, complied with the issue of ‘H. Personal complaint vs protected 
disclosures’ the most, whilst it complied with the issue of ‘Q. Mandatory reporting’ the least.  
Therefore, in addition to the overall compliance rate of ‘Prescribed Persons’ Procedures 
Only’ being the lowest of all the types of Procedures, when looking at each issue separately, 
the ‘Prescribed Persons’ Procedures Only’ have the lowest rate of compliance consistently, 
with the exception of one issue ‘R. The information that should be provided in a 
disclosure’.763 These low compliance rates emphasise the necessity for prescribed persons 
to have specific guidance formulated to assist them in their role under s 7 of the 2014 Act 
and in complying with their statutory obligations under s 21 of the 2014 Act. 
On assessment of each issue in the DPER Guidance,764 specific difficulties were identified 
in the context of the overall analysis of the Procedures.  Two notable difficulties were evident 
                                                 
762 ‘B. Application’; ‘H. Personal complaint vs protected disclosures’; ‘L. Disciplinary record of discloser and 
other related matters’; ‘N. Support and Advice’; ‘O. Review’; ‘P. Non-restriction of rights to make protected 
disclosures’; ‘Q. Mandatory reporting’. 
763 In comparison to the local authorities who had finalised their Procedures, the local authorities who had 
interim internal Procedures did not have an appendix with a form/sample form for reporting a protected 
disclosure.  
764 The compliance rate in respect of the constituent parts of each particular issue can be seen in Appendices 
3(c), (d), and (e), ‘Findings of Prescribed Persons’ Protected Disclosures Procedures using the DPER Checklist 
for Prescribed Persons’. 
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in relation to ‘Application’ and ‘What is a protected disclosure?’765 These two issues are 
discussed below. 
4.5(c)(ii) Application 
Unsurprisingly, the DPER Guidance addresses issues that reflect the provisions of the 2014 
Act. It provides that Procedures should set out to whom they will apply and recommends 
that their coverage should reflect the definition of ‘worker’ in s 3 of the 2014 Act.766 The 
2014 Act contains quite a broad definition of ‘worker’ and includes, employees, contractors, 
consultants, agency staff, former employees, temporary employees, interns, trainees, and 
members of the Defence Forces.767 At Report Stage of the Protected Disclosures Bill 2013 
(‘2013 Bill’), an amendment was made to extend the definition of ‘employee’ to cover 
members of the Garda Síochána, and civil servants768 who do not work under formal 
contracts of employment.769 
Despite the comprehensive definition of ‘worker’ under the 2014 Act, volunteers were left 
out of the definition due to the lack of a contractual relationship between persons providing 
voluntary services and employers, the non-remuneration status of volunteers, and because 
an employment tribunal was deemed not to be an appropriate forum under which a volunteer 
could seek redress. Former Minister for Public Expenditure and Reform, Brendan Howlin 
(‘Howlin’) stated that:  
I do not see a compelling case for their inclusion in these provisions. Moreover, it 
would be very difficult for a volunteer to find a mechanism that would fit him or her 
within the architecture of this protection system. Seeking a restitution of position, 
pay or anything like this from the Labour Court would not apply.770  
It is arguable that, although a volunteer who has made a disclosure does not face reprisal in 
terms of remuneration or promotion prospects, as would arise for a worker, the volunteer 
                                                 
765 The following three issues are dealt with in Chapter 5: ‘F. Confidentiality/ protection of identity’; ‘G. 
Anonymous disclosures’; and ‘K. Protection of the rights of Respondents’. The reason why these three issues 
are not addressed in this chapter is because it was deemed that the findings in relation to those issues were 
more suitable to an assessment in light of the analysis undertaken in Chapter 5 in relation to the balancing of 
rights of the discloser and the rights of the alleged wrongdoer. 
766 Government Reform Unit, Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, ‘Guidance under section 21(1) 
of the Protected Disclosures Act 2014 for the purpose of assisting public bodies in the performance of their 
functions under the Act’ (DPER 2016) para E(3.1). 
767 Protected Disclosures Act 2014, s 3(1). 
768 Within the meaning of the Civil Service Regulation Act 1956. 
769 Dáil Deb 12 June 2014, vol 843. 
770 Select Sub-Committee on Public Expenditure and Reform Deb 14 May 2014, 4. 
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may suffer other forms of retribution because of having made a disclosure of wrongdoing. 
Many volunteers in charitable organisations are volunteering their time, skill, and energy 
because they have a personal vested interest in the work being carried out by that 
organisation or because they want to change things for the better771 or to help people.772 The 
work being carried out by the volunteer would, therefore, be an important part of the person's 
life and an important commitment that he or she has made to the organisation. If a volunteer 
uncovers wrongdoing in the course of carrying out his or her voluntary efforts and makes a 
disclosure in this respect, the volunteer may be subjected to, for example, coercion, 
intimidation, harassment, injury, damage, or loss. If this does occur, then the volunteer 
should have access to the whistleblowing mechanisms under the legislation and associated 
protections contained therein.773 This sentiment is reflected in the explanatory memorandum 
to the draft EU Commission Directive on whistleblowing, which states:  
Effective whistleblower protection implies protecting also further categories of 
persons who, whilst not relying on their work-related activities economically, may 
nevertheless suffer retaliation for exposing breaches. Retaliation against volunteers 
and unpaid trainees may take the form of no longer making use of their services, or 
of giving a negative reference for future employment or otherwise damaging their 
reputation.774 
At EU level, Member States are being urged to take the requisite steps to institutionalise 
volunteering in a manner consistent with their national labour laws.775 Further, at EU level, 
with respect to whistleblowing law, in particular, Member States are consistently being 
pressed to include coverage of volunteers in their national framework. For example, the 
Council of Europe Recommendation (2014)7 on the Protection of Whistleblowers states that 
                                                 
771Volunteer Ireland, ‘National Survey of Volunteers 2013’ (Volunteer Ireland 2013) 24. The report examines 
whether formal volunteering had positive effects on teenagers and young adults (aged 16-35) who registered 
to volunteer during 2012. An online survey was emailed to a sample group of registered volunteers in this age 
group. In response to the question ‘Why did you become a volunteer?’ Thirty per cent of the two hundred 
volunteers surveyed said it was because they wanted to make a difference/ change things for the better. This 
was the primary reason why persons chose to become a volunteer. 
772 ibid. In response to the question ‘Why did you become a volunteer?’ Twenty-two per cent of volunteers 
surveyed said it was because they wanted to help people. This was the joint-second most popular reason given 
by the volunteers surveyed as to why they became a volunteer. 
773 Lauren Kierans, ‘Whistle While You Work: Protected Disclosures Act 2014’ (2015) 2(2) Irish Business 
Law Review 31, 39. 
774 Explanatory Memorandum to the Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on the protection of persons reporting on breaches of Union law, 2018/0106 (COD) para 28. See 
also: Explanatory Memorandum to the Council of Europe, Recommendation CM/REC (2014)7 of the 
Committee of Ministers to Member States on the Protection of Whistleblowers, adopted by the Committee of 
Ministers on the 30 April 2014 at the 1198 meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies (SPDP Council of Europe 2014)  
para 79; Transparency International, ‘A Best Practice Guide for Whistleblowing Legislation’ (TI 1 March 
2018) 11. 
775 European Parliament, Resolution 2013/2064(INI) Volunteering and voluntary activity in Europe, para 27. 
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‘The personal scope of the national framework should cover all individuals working in either 
the public or private sectors, irrespective of the nature of their working relationship and 
whether they are paid or not.’776 Also, the draft EU Commission Directive on whistleblowing 
provides that the Directive applies to volunteers.777  
International best practice principles recommend that volunteers should be included in 
whistleblower legislation. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(‘OECD’) recommends that legislation should contain a clear definition of the persons 
afforded protection under the law and states that examples of best practice in support of this 
principle could include inter alia the affording of protection to volunteers.778 It further 
provides that a ‘no loophole’ approach to the scope of coverage of protected persons would 
ensure that coverage also includes volunteers.779 Transparency International advocates that 
a broad definition of whistleblower should include volunteers.780 Blueprint for Free Speech 
also recommends that a broad definition of whistleblower should cover volunteers.781 The 
US Government Accountability Project (‘GAP’)782 proposes that whistleblower policies 
should cover all applicants or personnel who carry out activities relevant to the 
organisation’s mission and that this should include volunteers.783 GAP identifies that what 
is important in determining who should be protected when making disclosures is the 
                                                 
776 Council of Europe, Recommendation CM/REC (2014)7 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States 
on the Protection of Whistleblowers, adopted by the Committee of Ministers on the 30 April 2014 at the 1198 
meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies (SPDP Council of Europe 2014) app, principle 3. 
777 Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of 
persons reporting on breaches of Union law, 2018/0106 (COD) art 2(1)(c). 
778 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, ‘G20 Anti-Corruption Action Plan Protection 
of Whistleblowers, Study on Whistleblower Protection Framework, G20 Compendium of Best Practices and 
Guiding Principles for Legislation on the Protection of Whistleblowers’ (OECD 2011) 30-31.  
779 ibid 9. 
780 Transparency International, ‘International Principles for Whistleblower Legislation, Best Practices for Laws 
to Support Whistleblowers and Support Whistleblowing in the Public Interest’ (TI 2013) 4-5. These 
international principles are intended to serve as guidance for formulating new and improving existing 
whistleblower legislation. They take into account lessons learned from existing laws and their implementation 
in practice, and have been shaped by input from whistleblower experts, government officials, academia, 
research institutes and NGOs from all regions. It is recommended that the principles are adapted to an 
individual country’s political, social and cultural contexts, and to its existing legal frameworks. 
781 Blueprint for Free Speech, ‘Whistleblower Protection Rules in G20 Countries: The Next Action Plan’ 
(Blueprint for Free Speech 2014) 4. 
782 The Government Accountability Project is the leading whistleblower protection and advocacy organisation 
in the United States. It is a non-partisan public-interest group that litigates whistleblower cases, helps expose 
wrongdoing to the public, and actively promotes government and corporate accountability. Since its founding 
in 1977, GAP has helped over 6,000 whistleblowers. For more information, see: <www.whistleblower.org> 
accessed 14 December 2018. 
783 Government Accountability Project, International Best Practices for Whistleblower Policies (GAP 2013) 4. 
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contribution that the applicant or personnel can make by bearing witness, not their formal 
status.784  
There is evidence of volunteers being included in a number of whistleblowing law statutes 
globally. For example, the New Zealand Protected Disclosures Act 2000 (‘2000 Act’) 
provides that an employee of an organisation may disclose information in accordance with 
the 2000 Act and defines an employee, in relation to an organisation, as including ‘a person 
who works for the organisation as a volunteer without reward or expectation of reward for 
that work.’785 Also, the Kosovan draft Law on Protection of Whistleblowers provides for 
protection of volunteers. Article 3(1.1) defines a whistleblower as ‘any person who reports 
or discloses information on threat or damage to the public interest in the context of own 
employment relationship in the public or private sector.’ It stipulates that a person in the 
context of an employment relationship is a natural person who is or has been in an 
employment relationship with a public institution or private entity, regardless of the nature 
of the relationship, its duration or payment and this includes a volunteer786 or a candidate for 
volunteering activities.787 In addition, the Serbian Law on the Protection of Whistleblowers 
Act, no 128/2014 provides that ‘“Whistleblower” shall mean any natural person who 
performs whistleblowing in connection with his employment; hiring procedure’788 and goes 
on to define ‘employment’ as including volunteering.789 
Therefore, in order to be in line with international best practice principles for whistleblower 
protection legislation, volunteers should have been included in the 2014 Act. The inclusion 
of volunteers was an opportunity for innovation in the 2014 Act, but unfortunately, this 
opportunity was missed, thus leaving nearly 15,000 registered volunteers in Ireland790 
without comprehensive protection when raising concerns of wrongdoing.791 As argued by 
                                                 
784 ibid. 
785 Protected Disclosures Act 2000, s 3(g). 
786 Draft Law on Protection of Whistleblowers, art 3(1.5.2). 
787 ibid art 3(1.5.3).  
788 Law on the Protection of Whistleblowers Act, no 2014/128, art 2(2). 
789 ibid art 2(5). 
790 In 2016, there were 14,830 volunteers registered with I-Vol (Volunteer Ireland database) and local 
Volunteer Centres. Volunteer Ireland, ‘Volunteering Statistics’ (Volunteer Ireland) 
<www.volunteer.ie/resources/volunteering-statistics/> accessed 12 November 2018. 
791 Lauren Kierans, ‘Whistle While You Work: Protected Disclosures Act 2014’ (2015) 2(2) Irish Business 
Law Review 31, 57-58. ‘Persons’ are protected under the Charities Act 2009, s 61, to the extent that they have 
protection from civil liability in respect of certain disclosures, but this protection is far from comprehensive 
when compared to the protections available under the 2014 Act. 
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Lewis, as a matter of principle, granting employment protection rights to as wide a range of 
people as possible is desirable.792  
Despite their exclusion from the statute, it was intended that specific provision for volunteers 
would be included in the DPER Guidance.793 This commitment has been preserved, and the 
DPER Guidance suggests that Procedures can go further than the definition of ‘worker’ in 
the 2014 Act and apply to volunteers. The DPER Guidance provides that: 
While the 2014 Act applies to workers and does not include volunteers within that 
definition, volunteers may disclose wrongdoing and the public body should consider 
how any such disclosures will be dealt with, any protections that may be appropriate 
for volunteers in such circumstances and how they will be made aware of any risks 
that may arise for them in making a disclosure. Public bodies should confirm in their 
Procedures that any disclosures from volunteers will be appropriately assessed and / 
or investigated.794 
It has been recognised that it is entirely appropriate to use guidance and codes of practice to 
invite employers to consider extending the scope of their whistleblowing arrangements 
beyond the statutory minimum.795 However, this approach does not bring volunteers within 
the remit of the legislation. Howlin intended that by including provision for volunteers in 
the DPER Guidance this would ensure that the 2014 Act provides a framework for public 
bodies within which appropriate arrangements can be made to receive reports made by 
volunteers that do not fall within the ambit of the legislation.  
The DPER Guidance provides that six issues regarding the issue of ‘Application’ should be 
included in Procedures.796 With respect to these issues, the compliance rate of the Procedures 
was identified as follows: 
(i) Of the organisations that had prescribed persons’ Procedures only,797 none 
addressed the issue of ‘Application’ at all.798  
                                                 
792 David Balaban Lewis, ‘Nineteen years of whistleblowing legislation in the UK: is it time for a more 
comprehensive approach?’ (2017) 59(6) International Journal of Law and Management 1126, 1129. 
793 Dáil Deb 12 June 2014, vol 843. 
794 Government Reform Unit, Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, ‘Guidance under section 21(1) 
of the Protected Disclosures Act 2014 for the purpose of assisting public bodies in the performance of their 
functions under the Act’ (DPER 2016) para E(3.2). 
795 Lauren Kierans and David Lewis, ‘Using statutory guidance and codes of practice to build on 
whistleblowing legislation: the Irish experience’ (2016) 10 La Revue des droits de l’homme 
<https://journals.openedition.org/revdh/2716> accessed 24 November 2018. 
796 See: Appendix 3(b): ‘Coding of DPER Checklist for Prescribed Persons’ Protected Disclosures Procedures’. 
797 CORU; CRU; HEA; IAASA; PSI; and SFPA. 
798 See: Appendix 3(c), ‘Findings of Prescribed Persons’ Protected Disclosures Procedures using the DPER 
Checklist for Prescribed Persons.’ 
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(ii) Of those Procedures that were internal only,799 the HEA addressed three issues,800 
the five local authorities addressed two issues,801 the SEC contained one issue,802 
whilst CIÉ did not address the issue of ‘Application’ at all.  
(iii) Of those organisations that had both internal and prescribed persons’ 
Procedures,803 the local authorities included two issues,804 whilst the C&AG, the 
HIA, the Marine Institute, and Revenue included one issue only.805  
Thus, as can be seen from the results in relation to the six issues identified in the DPER 
Guidance regarding ‘Application’, there was evidence of only 23% compliance when taking 
all the Procedures together. Those organisations that had internal Procedures only and 
organisations that had both internal and prescribed persons’ Procedures attained 29% 
compliance. Of concern is the fact that those organisations with only prescribed persons’ 
Procedures had 0% compliance.  
Despite the intentions of Howlin for volunteers to be included in the DPER Guidance, it is 
clear that this approach to providing protection for volunteers is not succeeding. From the 
analysis of the Procedures, only one prescribed person (the HEA internal Procedures) 
included an attempt at considering how disclosures from volunteers would be dealt with. 
The HEA internal Procedures provide that:  
These Procedures apply to all workers as defined in section 3 of the 2014 Act, which 
includes current and former employees, independent contractors, trainees and agency 
staff in the HEA and the IRC. While the Act only applies to workers; volunteers and 
members of the public may disclose wrongdoing and any such disclosures will be 
appropriately assessed and investigated.806 
This provision merely states that the disclosures from volunteers will be ‘appropriately 
assessed and investigated’, but it does not address the protection considered appropriate for 
volunteers who make disclosures or how volunteers will be made aware of any risks that 
                                                 
799 CIÉ; SEC; HEA; Clare CC; Galway CC; Kildare CC; South Dublin CC; and Wexford City Council and CC. 
800 See: Appendix 3(d), ‘Findings of Prescribed Persons’ Protected Disclosures Procedures using the DPER 
Checklist for Prescribed Persons,’ B1, B2, and B3.  
801 ibid B1 and B2.  
802 ibid B1. 
803 C&AG; HIA; Marine Institute; Revenue; Carlow CC; Cavan CC; Fingal CC; Galway City Council; Kerry 
CC; Kilkenny CC; Limerick City Council and CC; Longford CC; Monaghan CC; Sligo CC; Westmeath CC; 
and Wicklow CC. 
804 See: Appendix 3(e), ‘Findings of Prescribed Persons’ Protected Disclosures Procedures using the DPER 
Checklist for Prescribed Persons,’ B1 and B2.  
805 ibid B1. 
806 Higher Education Authority, ‘Protected Disclosures Procedures’ (Higher Education Authority) 4.1. 
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may arise for them in making a disclosure. The intention underpinning the DPER Guidance 
regarding volunteers was that disclosures from volunteers would receive at most internal 
organisational protections, but this intention has not been achieved if the HEA internal 
Procedures are the only Procedures that address this issue and yet it is done in a particularly 
weak manner. What is interesting to note about the internal Procedures of the HEA is that 
they are also intended to apply to members of the public. Members of the public do not fall 
within the ambit of the 2014 Act. In practice, it remains to be seen what protections the HEA 
could give to members of the public who make disclosures, although, as the Procedures are 
silent in respect of the issue of protection of such persons, this may indicate an intention not 
to extend any protection to such persons. 
The issue of volunteers was highlighted by the HEA in response to question 4 of the DPER 
Statutory Review, which asked ‘Are there any of the definitions contained in the 
interpretation section (section 3) that it would be useful to reconsider, amend, replace, clarify 
etc.? For example, is the definition of "worker" too broad or too narrow or does it strike the 
right balance?’807 The HEA submitted that ‘Many organisations e.g. charities have raised the 
issue of volunteers who, although not workers or employees, carry out the same work as 
employees. The Act may need to be amended to reflect this.’808 
For prescribed persons who have volunteers under their remit, their inclusion in the DPER 
Guidance and not in the 2014 Act may lead to confusion for both the volunteer in relation to 
what protections they can receive and for the prescribed person in relation to what 
protections it can afford. The submission by the HEA in relation to question 4 of the DPER 
Statutory Review in respect of volunteers highlights this confusion. In response to the 
submissions on volunteers, the DPER Statutory Review stated:  
The Act contains a very broad definition of ‘worker’ including employees, workers 
under contract, those who are provided with work experience pursuant to training 
courses etc. Much consideration was given to the inclusion of volunteers when the 
Bill was being drafted, but the advice was that it was not possible in view of the fact 
that they do not have an employment relationship, and their inclusion would open up 
to the provisions of the Act to the general public, which would dilute its purpose and 
focus. As such, employment law remedies cannot be applied. The situation is similar 
with students on placement. 
                                                 
807 Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, ‘Statutory Review of the Protected Disclosures Act 2014’ 
(DPER July 2018) 51. 
808 Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, ‘Public Consultation on the Review of the Protected 
Disclosures Act 2014’ (DPER) <www.per.gov.ie/en/public-consultation-on-the-review-of-the-protected-
disclosures-act-2014/> accessed 6 November 2018. 
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The prevailing view among experts internationally is that whistleblower legislation 
should not extend beyond the basis of a workplace relationship, because of the access 
to information available to workers which is not available outside the workplace, and 
as the risk of sanctions against workers because of their employment status requires 
that specific legal protections be made available. The guidance issued by the Minister 
sets out, however, that every effort should be made to apply protections to volunteers 
etc. in so far as possible.809 
The position adopted in the DPER Statutory Review is clearly in conflict with the 
international best practice principles outlined above which recommend that volunteers fall 
within the ambit of whistleblowing protection legislation. 
A glaring concern arising from the results in relation to the issue of ‘Application’ is that only 
the seventeen local authorities and the HEA cover all workers as defined in s 3 of the 2014 
Act.810 Therefore, only 60% of the Procedures assessed apply to workers as defined under 
the 2014 Act. If, however, the local authorities are taken out of this analysis this percentage 
drops significantly to only 8%.  Further, the fact that prescribed persons have entirely 
omitted the issue of ‘Application’ from their Procedures for disclosures received solely in 
their capacity as a prescribed person indicates a possible apprehension on the part of 
prescribed persons in specifying from whom they can receive disclosures in their role as a 
prescribed person.  These deficits could be explained by a miscomprehension of the coverage 
of the 2014 Act. For example, in response to question 4 of the DPER Statutory Review,811 
the HEA submitted that ‘There should perhaps be clarity provided in respect of former or 
retired employees of an organisation and whether they can make a protected disclosure.’812 
Despite this confusion, for a person who is familiar with the provisions of the 2014 Act, it is 
arguably quite clear that former employees can make protected disclosures as the 2014 Act 
provides that an employee has the meaning given by s 1 of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977813 
(‘1977 Act’) which defines ‘employee’ as: 
[A]n individual who has entered into or works under (or, where the employment has 
ceased, worked under) a contract of employment and, in relation to redress for a 
                                                 
809 Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, ‘Statutory Review of the Protected Disclosures Act 2014’ 
(DPER July 2018) 35. 
810 See: Appendix 3(b): ‘Coding of DPER Checklist for Prescribed Persons’ Protected Disclosures Procedures’ 
811 Question 4 asked ‘Are there any of the definitions contained in the interpretation section (section 3) that it 
would be useful to reconsider, amend, replace, clarify etc.? Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, 
‘Statutory Review of the Protected Disclosures Act 2014’ (DPER July 2018) 51.  
812 Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, ‘Public Consultation on the Review of the Protected 
Disclosures Act 2014’ (DPER) <www.per.gov.ie/en/public-consultation-on-the-review-of-the-protected-
disclosures-act-2014/> accessed 6 November 2018. 
813 Protected Disclosures Act 2014, s 3(1). 
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dismissal under this Act, includes, in the case of the death of the employee concerned 
at any time following the dismissal, his personal representative.814 
Further miscomprehension can be demonstrated by the submission made by GSOC, a 
prescribed person, to the DPER Statutory Review, which stated:  
The Garda Síochána Protected Disclosure Policy (February 2017) confirms that 
reports of wrongdoing by members of the Garda Reserve will be treated as protected 
disclosures.  
 
It appears that there is a concern that the definition of “worker” as set out in section 
3 of the Protected Disclosures Act, 2014 does not cover reserve members of the 
Garda Síochána. 
 
Proposed solution 
 
A statutory amendment to specifically include reserve members of the Garda 
Síochána as “workers” under the Protected Disclosure Act, 2014.815 
In response to this submission, the DPER Statutory review stated ‘The advice of the Office 
of the Attorney General is that Reserve Members of the Gardaí are covered by the protections 
of the Act to the same extent as other members.’816 This response conflicts with the decision 
of Commissioner of An Garda Síochána v Oberoi,817 where Feeney J concluded that a 
volunteer in the Garda Reserve was not employed under a contract of employment. 
These submissions from prescribed persons and the low compliance rate with the issues that 
should be included in Procedures in relation to ‘Application’ as outlined in the DPER 
Guidance demonstrate the necessity for the provision of training in order to improve the 
comprehension of the 2014 Act. Further, the fact that none of the Procedures concerning 
disclosures to organisations in their capacity as a prescribed person addressed the issue of 
‘Application’ at all underscores the necessity for the publication of guidance specifically for 
prescribed persons, which details the type of workers that disclosures can be received from 
and the inclusion of appropriate examples.  
                                                 
814 Unfair Dismissals Act 1977, s 1. 
815 Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, ‘Public Consultation on the Review of the Protected 
Disclosures Act 2014’ (DPER) <www.per.gov.ie/en/public-consultation-on-the-review-of-the-protected-
disclosures-act-2014/> accessed 6 November 2018. 
816 Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, ‘Statutory Review of the Protected Disclosures Act 2014’ 
(DPER July 2018) 35. 
817 Commissioner of An Garda Síochána v Oberoi [2013] IEHC 267, [2014] ELR 17. Further, 
Garda Síochána Act 2005, s 15(6) (as inserted by Criminal Justice Act 2007, s 43), provides that ‘A reserve 
member is a volunteer and does not perform his or her functions as such a member under a contract of 
employment.’ 
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Further, the failure to extend protections in the 2014 Act to volunteers is a missed 
opportunity. The provision for workers and third parties to seek redress for detriment in tort 
law818 would have been a sufficient mechanism for a volunteer to seek redress for detriment 
suffered as a result of having made a protected disclosure. It is illogical that a family member 
who suffers a detriment because of another family member who is a worker made a protected 
disclosure can have access to redress, but a person who makes a disclosure in the workplace 
is excluded because they are deemed to be a volunteer. The inclusion of specific provisions 
for volunteers in the DPER Guidance is not appropriate because: (i) it provides, at most, 
internal organisational protections, which are far from copper fastened; (ii) it is limited to 
volunteers in the public sector; and (iii) it may lead to confusion as to the types of protection 
that can be afforded to such persons.  
4.5(c)(iii) What is a protected disclosure?  
The second notable issue causing difficulty in the context of the overall analysis of the 
Procedures is the issue of ‘C. What is a protected disclosure?’ The DPER Guidance sets out 
what a protected disclosure is, as defined under the 2014 Act, and provides that the 
procedures should explain the meaning of terms included in this definition, eg ‘information’; 
‘relevant wrongdoing’; ‘reasonable belief’; ‘in connection with their employment’; etc.819 In 
total, the DPER Guidance provides that eleven issues regarding the issue of ‘What is a 
Protected Disclosure?’ should be included in Procedures.820 With respect to these issues, the 
compliance rate of the Procedures was identified as follows: 
(i) Of the organisations that had prescribed persons’ Procedures,821 the HEA 
addressed ten issues,822 the SFPA addressed six issues,823 CORU addressed three,824 
the PSI addressed two issues,825 whilst the CRU and the IAASA failed to address any 
of the issues. 
                                                 
818 Protected Disclosures Act 2014, s 13. 
819 Government Reform Unit, Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, ‘Guidance under section 21(1) 
of the Protected Disclosures Act 2014 for the purpose of assisting public bodies in the performance of their 
functions under the Act’ (DPER 2016) para E(4-8). 
820 See: Appendix 3(b): ‘Coding of DPER Checklist for Prescribed Persons’ Protected Disclosures Procedures’. 
821 CORU, CRU, HEA, IAASA, PSI, and SFPA.  
822 See: Appendix 3(c), ‘Findings of Prescribed Persons’ Protected Disclosures Procedures using the DPER 
Checklist for Prescribed Persons,’ C1, C2, C3, C5, C6, C7, C8, C9, C10, and C11.  
823 ibid C1, C2, C5, C6, C8, and C10. 
824 ibid C1, C2, and C10.  
825 ibid C2 and C5. 
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(ii) Of those Procedures that were internal only,826 the SEC addressed ten issues,827 
whilst the HEA addressed nine issues,828 the local authorities addressed six issues,829 
and CIÉ addressed two issues.830 
(iii) Of those organisations that had both internal and prescribed persons’ 
Procedures,831 the Marine Institute addressed nine issues,832 the local authorities 
addressed eight issues,833 the HIA addressed six issues,834 Revenue addressed three 
issues,835 whilst the C&AG addressed only one issue.836 
Thus, taking all the Procedures together there was a compliance rate of 57%. Those 
organisations with both internal and prescribed persons’ Procedures obtained 65% 
compliance, whilst organisations that had internal Procedures only, achieved 58% 
compliance. Organisations with prescribed persons’ Procedures only, obtained a compliance 
rate of 32%, which is the highest compliance rate by these Procedures of the eighteen issues 
in the DPER Guidance.  
However, with respect to all three types of Procedures, an issue that appears to be causing 
particular difficulty for prescribed persons is the issue in ‘C4’ which requires public bodies 
to refer to other relevant employment specific/profession specific obligations that do not fall 
under the definition of ‘relevant wrongdoing’ in the 2014 Act. This issue was only included 
in the Procedures of one prescribed person, Revenue, which has a single Procedures 
document for both internal disclosures and disclosures in its capacity as a prescribed person.  
International best practice recommends that there should be a broad coverage of information 
that can attract protection, ie ‘protectable information’. Transparency International 
emphasises that whistleblowing legislation should have both a broad and clear definition of 
                                                 
826 CIÉ; SEC; HEA; Clare CC; Galway CC; Kildare CC; South Dublin CC; and Wexford City Council and CC. 
827 See: Appendix 3(d), ‘Findings of Prescribed Persons’ Protected Disclosures Procedures using the DPER 
Checklist for Prescribed Persons,’ C1, C2, C3,  C5, C6, C7, C8, C9, C10, and C11. 
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830  ibid C2 and C5. 
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833 ibid C1, C2, C5, C7, C8, C9, C10, and C11.  
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835 ibid C 2, C4, and C5.  
836 ibid C10.  
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whistleblowing that ensures that as wide a range of wrongdoing as possible is covered.837 It 
stresses that limiting the scope of protectable information hinders whistleblowing.838 The 
Council of Europe recommends that Member States should take a broad approach to the 
scope of protectable information and highlights that by ‘Restricting legal protection to those 
who disclose only certain types of information, such as corruption offences for example, and 
only to certain bodies will risk confusing “whistleblowing in the public interest” with 
“informing” or “denouncing” and may increase opposition to the law and distrust in its 
purpose.’839 Further, in its Recommendation (2014)7 on the Protection of Whistleblowers, 
the Council of Europe emphasises that a comprehensive and coherent approach in national 
law and legislation to the protection of whistleblowers includes providing a coverage of 
persons and situations that are as wide as possible and that this approach ‘implies that the 
relevant norms may be legislative or contained in legal documents (such as collective 
bargaining agreements) and professional and employer codes.’840  
The Norwegian legislation, the Working Environment Act 2005, contains an extensive 
definition of protectable information and provides that all employees in public and private 
sectors have the right to ‘notify censurable conditions at the employer’s undertaking. 
Workers hired from temporary-work agencies also have a right to notify censurable 
conditions at the hirer’s undertaking.’841 The notification does not have to amount to a breach 
of the law but includes ‘any censurable activity’ (otherwise translated as ‘conditions worthy 
of criticism’).842 Canada’s Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act 2005 (‘2005 Act’) 
defines a wrongdoing as including a serious breach of the Treasury Board’s or the 
organisation’s code of conduct established under the 2005 Act.843 The French 
whistleblowing law, Sapin II, includes both a list of categories of wrongdoing and a public 
interest category.844 This has the potential to extend protection to information outside of the 
                                                 
837 Transparency International, ‘A Best Practice Guide for Whistleblowing Legislation’ (TI 1 March 2018) 7.  
838 ibid. 
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841 Working Environment Act 2005 (as amended in 2017), s 2A-1(1). 
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specific categories listed.845 The approach adopted in Sapin II reflects the recommendation 
made by Protect’s Whistleblowing Commission to amend PIDA to the extent that it contains 
a non-exhaustive list of wrongdoing, which would include helpful examples of what 
constitutes wrongdoing.846 This mixed approach to coverage of wrongdoing is also 
considered best practice by Transparency International.847 
Thus, international best practice principles demonstrate that as wide a range of wrongdoings 
as possible are covered in national whistleblowing legislation, thus suggesting that breaches 
of employment specific/profession specific obligations could be included in whistleblowing 
legislation. Further, international best practice principles demonstrate that in defining the 
nature of the wrongdoings there should be a mixed approach adopted that includes a list of 
specific categories of wrongdoing but that this list is non-exhaustive.  
At Report Stage of the 2013 Bill, Deputy Mary Lou McDonald (‘Deputy McDonald’) 
proposed an amendment that the following be inserted into the 2013 Bill ‘"(c) that a person 
has failed, is failing or is likely to fail to comply with a nonstatutory obligation, such as that 
arising from a professional code or workplace code of practice or recognised international 
standard, where such obligation is intended to uphold human rights, or other rights of 
citizens,".’848 Deputy McDonald explained that the objective of her amendment was to 
ensure that breaches of soft law or professional codes of conduct that do not have statutory 
footing are covered by the legislation. Howlin rejected this amendment on the basis of advice 
from the Office of the Attorney General that the inclusion of such codes would be 
inconsistent with the purposes of the 2013 Bill. He admitted that he understood the basis of 
the proposed amendment but argued that ‘the legal analysis that I am bound to accept is that, 
where professional bodies or representative organisations apply particular codes or standards 
to their members that do not have the force of law, it is not possible to apply sanctions under 
legislation on a person who is alleged to have been penalised for reporting a breach in such 
codes or standards.’ He also argued that the ‘imposition of high levels of compensation’, ie 
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846 Protect, ‘The Whistleblowing Commission, The report of the Whistleblowing Commission on the 
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the five years’ gross remuneration compensation, could not be sustained in respect of a 
breach of ‘soft law’. 
Howlin explained that in order to recognise the intention of the proposed amendment within 
the overall framework of whistleblower protection that he was examining how the 
Procedures established and maintained by public bodies could address this issue. Howlin 
stated that the aim of his approach to the legislation was in respect of the overall framework 
of protecting whistleblowers and in that regard, it appears that the Procedures are intended 
to address any lacuna where issues that are deemed to be relevant to whistleblower protection 
but cannot have statutory force, are dealt with. Unfortunately, as with the issue of volunteers, 
there appears to be a difficulty for prescribed persons with respecting the obligations under 
the DPER Guidance that do not fall within the ambit of the 2014 Act in the Procedures.  
As mentioned, Revenue was the only prescribed person that included the issue of breaches 
of employment specific/profession specific obligations in its Procedures and provided that 
‘A worker should make a disclosure if in their reasonable belief any of the wrongdoings 
outlined in section 5 has occurred, is occurring or is likely to occur or there has been a breach 
of Revenue or Civil Service policy such that harm may be arising to others or to the 
Organisation.’849 The Procedures provide protection from reprisal to workers who disclose 
wrongdoing covered by the policy.850 However, as with the issue of volunteers, it should be 
made clear that protection from reprisal for having made a disclosure relating to the Revenue 
or Civil Service policy can only be internal organisational protection and that the worker 
cannot avail of the protections under the 2014 Act for such disclosures. Revenue failed to do 
this in its Procedures. 
The attempt to ensure that disclosures from workers in relation to employment 
specific/profession specific obligations are encouraged and accepted by public bodies and 
that such workers are protected, by including this issue in the DPER Guidance, is not 
achieving its aim. The notable omission of this issue by prescribed persons in their 
Procedures underscores the contention that either: (i) more detailed information regarding 
this issue be included in updated DPER Guidance; or (ii) the 2014 Act be amended to include 
such disclosures in the list of relevant wrongdoings. The suggestion to amend the 2014 Act 
echoes the statement by Deputy McDonald at Report Stage of the 2013 Bill where she stated 
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that ‘If the Minister is not minded to amend the legislation in the way I am suggesting we 
have at least noted it on the record of the Oireachtas and if at any stage it becomes apparent 
that this is a difficulty, we have the option of amending the legislation. I withdraw the 
amendment.’ Despite the clear difficulty in relation to this issue, as identified in this research, 
no amendment was adopted following the recent DPER Statutory Review. 
The DPER Statutory Review responded to submissions from TII and the Department of 
Employment Affairs and Social Protection on this issue851 and stated that:  
It is a matter of policy that breaches of codes and guidelines are not specifically listed 
as wrongdoings, in that the legislation is intended to protect workers’ rights. Private 
law bodies determine their own codes and rules which apply to members and it is up 
to those bodies to revise their codes if necessary to align with the Act. If there are 
breaches of such codes they are likely to be covered under the categories of 
wrongdoings; if not, they are unlikely to be serious matters that would cause a 
detriment to the public interest. They would also be likely to be subject to a 
disciplinary process.852  
As pointed out in the DPER Statutory Review, there is a possibility for overlap where a 
breach of a code may also constitute a breach of a legal obligation under the 2014 Act. This 
possibility would also extend to a circumstance where there is no breach of a legal obligation 
but where a worker reasonably believes that a breach of employment specific/profession 
specific obligations is a breach of a legal obligation.853 However, this would not include a 
situation where the worker merely believes that the breach is wrong.854 If a regulatory 
obligation is imposed on foot of a statutory power, there may be scope for arguing that a 
disclosure of a breach of a regulatory obligation could constitute a breach of a legal 
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obligation.855 This is particularly so where there is a lack of a clear distinction between a 
legal and a regulatory obligation. This would reinforce the reasonableness of a subjective 
belief that a regulatory obligation entails a legal obligation.856 However, these issues are 
ones that would arise in a penalisation or detriment claim before the WRC or courts. It is 
necessary to provide clarity for disclosers and recipients of disclosures in advance of this 
stage as to the scope and nature of the obligations and protections associated with disclosures 
relating to employment specific/profession specific wrongdoings and the suggestions 
regarding the provision of more detail on these in an updated DPER Guidance or an 
amendment to the 2014 Act should be considered. 
4.6 Conclusion 
The intention underpinning the prescribed persons’ system under the 2014 Act is that it 
provides a mechanism for the wrongdoing disclosed by a worker to be addressed and for 
disclosers to be protected by providing alternative safe disclosure channels if required. The 
system operates when a worker chooses to make their disclosure to a prescribed person in 
circumstances where they are unable or unwilling to make their disclosure to their employer. 
In that regard, the worker expects that the prescribed person will be the solution to their 
concern by investigating it and holding the employer to account, thus vindicating the 
disclosure made by the worker. In order for a disclosures system to be effective, not only 
must disclosers be protected, but also recipients of disclosures must act on the information 
disclosed to them in order to remedy the wrongdoing. The explanatory memorandum to the 
draft EU Commission Directive on whistleblowing highlights that ‘Lack of confidence in 
the usefulness of reporting is one of the main factors discouraging potential 
whistleblowers.’857  
However, various studies in the UK have identified that there is an expectation gap in relation 
to the worker’s expectations of prescribed persons’ powers. This expectation gap is echoed 
in Ireland. For example, in its submission to the DPER Statutory Review by the prescribed 
person, the Pensions Authority, it stated that: 
The Authority’s experience has been that those making disclosures often believe that 
the Authority is compelled to investigate the matter by virtue of the fact that it has 
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been made pursuant to the PD Act, notwithstanding the fact that following a thorough 
assessment of the issues highlighted, no reasonable grounds to suspect wrongdoing 
exists … the PD Act does not alter the remit or functions of any statutory body nor 
does it negate the body’s legal obligations in respect of exercising fair procedures 
and due process when deciding whether to initiate an investigation. Explaining this 
to disclosers can be difficult and therefore clarity should be provided in the 
legislation in order to avoid any ambiguity and to manage expectations.858 
Further, the submission made by the prescribed person, the Teaching Council, to the DPER 
Statutory Review also highlights the expectation gap, where it stated ‘In the case of an 
external disclosure received by the Director of the Council as a Prescribed Person, the 
capacity to investigate may be limited or non-existent.’859 In addition, in response to the 
survey in this study, one prescribed person stated ‘The big weakness in the Act are the lack 
of formal investigative processes. There are limited powers under our establishing legislation 
to investigate the type of complaint I am prescribed to receive. It is hard to envisage a type 
of protected disclosure that I could actually investigate as envisaged under the 2014 Act.’860 
In order to remedy this expectation gap in the UK, a statutory obligation was introduced for 
prescribed persons to report annually on the disclosures received by them. As discussed, 
there is a similar obligation on prescribed persons in Ireland, in addition to a requirement to 
establish and maintain Procedures. The purpose of the annual reports is to improve the 
confidence of workers with the prescribed persons’ system by making it more transparent. 
It is also intended to drive up standards across the prescribed persons’ system. However, 
from the data obtained in this study, a number of concerns were identified with the 
obligations to publish annual reports and Procedures. 
Firstly, only 21% (nineteen) of the ninety-two prescribed persons included in the assessment 
had complied fully with their obligation to prepare and publish their annual reports. 
Secondly, only 20% (twenty) of all persons prescribed had Procedures publicly available for 
disclosures in their capacity as a prescribed person, whilst 9% (nine) had information, other 
than Procedures, on their website. This means that only 29% (twenty-nine) prescribed 
persons had information publicly available for disclosers who wished to make a disclosure 
to a prescribed person. This data can be contrasted with the survey responses, where 84% 
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(sixteen) of the prescribed persons who responded stated that they had specific Procedures 
for receiving disclosures as a prescribed persons and 58% (eleven) confirmed that there was 
information on their website which tells external persons how to make a disclosure to it. 
When contrasting the findings from the website search and the survey responses, there is a 
higher rate of prescribed persons indicating in the survey that they have prescribed persons’ 
Procedures than what was located during the research. Also, from the survey responses, there 
is evidence that there are more prescribed persons indicating that they have Procedures than 
those indicating that they have information on their websites. This means that there is an 
issue as regards the accessibility and availability of information/Procedures.  
Difficulties for prescribed persons in complying with the obligation to establish Procedures 
were emphasised by the Teaching Council in the DPER Statutory Review where it stated 
that ‘The implementation of the Act both in terms of developing internal and external 
Protected Disclosure policies has been challenging and costly.’861 The responses to the 
survey indicated that prescribed persons were not given additional funding to assist them 
with the additional costs that the role of a prescribed person may incur. In that regard, 83% 
(fifteen) prescribed persons stated that they had not been given additional funding, whilst 
17% (three) did not know if they had been given additional funding. 
If there is no information made publicly available to workers regarding disclosures to 
prescribed persons then the result of this is that the prescribed person is unlikely to receive 
disclosures. According to the data from the case law analysis undertaken in Chapter 3, a 
protected disclosure has never been made to a prescribed person in the first instance, and of 
those cases where a disclosure was subsequently made externally, it was made to a 
prescribed person in five cases. From this case law analysis, there are a number of hypotheses 
as to why there are a low number of cases concerning disclosures to a prescribed person. The 
first hypothesis is that disclosures are not being made to prescribed persons because: (i) the 
worker is unaware that disclosures can be made to prescribed persons; (ii) the worker 
suffered penalisation for having made a disclosure to their employer and as a result does not 
attempt to raise it again with a prescribed person; and/or (iii) the wrongdoing does not come 
within the remit of the prescribed person. The second hypothesis is that disclosures are being 
made to prescribed persons but prescribed persons are complying with their obligation of 
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confidentiality, and therefore the worker does not suffer penalisation for having made their 
disclosure to the prescribed person and as a result does not need to take a claim for 
penalisation. 
However, there was also evidence from the data from the annual reports and the survey 
results of a low rate of disclosures being made to prescribed persons. Thirty-five per cent 
(twenty-three) of prescribed persons who had published annual reports had received 
protected disclosures, whilst 37% (seven) of survey respondents indicated that they had 
received protected disclosures. Of those who had received protected discloses, the majority 
of prescribed persons, (71% (five) of survey respondents and 65% (fifteen) of the annual 
reports) received disclosures in the lower bracket of disclosures, ie between ‘1-4’ 
disclosures.  
Nonetheless, the data from the annual reports are not entirely reliable as firstly, only sixty-
six prescribed persons published annual reports. Secondly, only four prescribed persons had 
reported within the correct timeframe. Thirdly, only eleven prescribed persons had made the 
distinction clear as to whether the annual report concerned disclosures received in their 
capacity as a prescribed person, as an employer, or as a s 10 disclosure. Fourthly, from the 
survey results, ten prescribed persons did not know in what capacity their annual reports 
were published, ie as an employer, as a prescribed person, or as both. Of clear concern is 
that five of those prescribed persons indicated that their annual report was neither as an 
employer nor as a prescribed person. The aforementioned findings underscore the 
miscomprehension regarding the annual reporting obligations under the 2014 Act. 
A difficulty with the reporting obligations, although not manifestly obvious from the 
assessment of the annual reports, is the obligations on prescribed persons to designate a 
disclosure as a protected disclosure.  This difficulty is voiced, however, in the responses to 
the prescribed persons’ survey. The prescribed persons were asked ‘How does your 
organisation decide whether or not a disclosure is a protected disclosure for the purposes of 
the section 22 annual report?’ Sixteen prescribed persons answered this question. Three 
indicated that this issue had not arisen, as they had not received any protected disclosures. 
Of the remaining responses, there was a range of approaches indicated.862 The lack of 
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consistency in the approaches adopted by prescribed persons in their assessment of whether 
a disclosure constitutes a protected disclosure means that the usefulness of the annual reports 
is questionable. The manner in which s 22(2) of the 2014 Act is drafted is potentially the 
source of this difficulty. Section 22(2) of the 2014 Act prescribes that the report should 
contain information relating to the ‘number of protected disclosures made to the public 
body’. A disclosure can only be determined to be a protected disclosure if it is subject to 
adjudication before a court or WRC. There is no guidance for prescribed persons to assist 
them in their determination of a disclosure as a protected disclosure for the purposes of the 
annual report. In the UK, prescribed persons’ annual reports must contain  ‘the number of 
workers’ disclosures received during the reporting period that the relevant prescribed person 
reasonably believes are- (i) qualifying disclosures within the meaning of section 43B of the 
Employment Rights Act 1996; and (ii) which fall within the matters in respect of which that 
person is so prescribed’.863 Further, the prescribed person is ‘not required to report on 
disclosures that it reasonably believes do not fall within the description of matters in respect 
of which that person is so prescribed.’864 The inclusion of a ‘reasonable belief’ requirement 
ensures that the prescribed persons in the UK are not expected to determine whether a 
disclosure is a public interest disclosure.865 The approach adopted in the UK would be of 
assistance to prescribed persons in Ireland, in addition to the publication of guidance as to 
what is meant by ‘reasonable belief’ that a disclosure is a protected disclosure.    
As with the assessment of the case law data, the findings of the annual reports and survey in 
relation to the low number of disclosures being made to prescribed persons lead to a number 
of hypotheses. Firstly, there is no necessity for workers to make a disclosure to a prescribed 
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person, as wrongdoing is not taking place. However, according to TII’s IAW survey, of 878 
employees surveyed, 17% indicated that they had had good reason to believe that 
wrongdoing was taking place where they worked, at any time in their working life. This 
equates to a population estimate of 257,000.866  Secondly, workers are making their 
disclosures internally to their employer who is remedying that wrongdoing and therefore 
there is no necessity to make the disclosure externally from the employer to the prescribed 
person in order for the wrongdoing to be rectified. Thirdly, workers are not aware that 
disclosures can be made to prescribed persons. This third hypothesis can be substantiated by 
the low rate of prescribed persons making their Procedures/information on their role publicly 
available. This necessitates the introduction of a statutory obligation on prescribed persons 
to make information publicly available. The statutory obligations on the Central Bank, 
discussed above, to publish information on reporting mechanisms in a separate, easily 
identifiable, and accessible section of its website867 could be replicated in the 2014 Act and 
imposed on prescribed persons. This recommendation for amendment to the 2014 Act is 
further substantiated in light of the proposal under art 10 of the draft EU Commission 
Directive on whistleblowing for Member States to ensure that competent authorities publish 
information regarding the receipt of reports and their follow-up in a separate, easily 
identifiable, and accessible section of their website.868 Further, it may be appropriate to 
impose a sanction on prescribed persons who do not comply with their obligations to publish 
Procedures. In its submission to the DPER Statutory Review, Fianna Fáil suggested that the 
Procedures established and maintained by public bodies are subject to an audit and review 
by DPER and that DPER should provide recommendations as to how the Procedures can be 
improved. Further, Fianna Fáil suggested that there should be some sort of penalty imposed 
on public bodies that have not set up clear procedures.869 
However, in requiring prescribed persons to publish information/Procedures on their 
websites, there needs to be appropriate guidance as to what must be published. As identified 
in this research, the prescribed persons who had Procedures publicly available had included 
only 17% of the issues in the DPER Guidance that should be included in their Procedures. 
                                                 
866 Transparency International Ireland, ‘Speak Up Report 2017’ (TII 2017) 36. 
867 European Union (Market Abuse) Regulations 2016, SI 2016/349, reg 16(a). 
868 Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of 
persons reporting on breaches of Union law, 2018/0106 (COD) art 10. 
869 Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, ‘Public Consultation on the Review of the Protected 
Disclosures Act 2014’ (DPER) <www.per.gov.ie/en/public-consultation-on-the-review-of-the-protected-
disclosures-act-2014/> accessed 6 November 2018. 
199 
 
Of the eighteen issues assessed, prescribed persons did not include seven of the issues at all 
in their Procedures for disclosures received in their capacity as a prescribed person only.870 
Further, in respect of each issue, prescribed persons consistently had the lowest rates of 
compliance, excluding the issue of ‘R. The information that should be provided in a 
disclosure’. This low compliance rate is not only detrimental to the making of disclosures 
by workers to it as a prescribed person, but it also means that prescribed persons are not 
leading by example to the organisations over which they have authority.871 The difficulty 
experienced by prescribed persons in developing Procedures was highlighted by the 
Teaching Council in the DPER Statutory Review, where it submitted that: 
[T]he role and powers of the Director of the Teaching Council as a Prescribed Person 
have been difficult to define. This creates difficulty when trying to provide published 
guidance for persons who may be contemplating making a disclosure. The issues that 
arose were: a. Who or what cohorts of workers are meant to be comprehended for 
the Director’s role as a Prescribed Person? b. What powers of investigation does the 
Director have, apart from the procedures under Part 5 (Fitness to Teach) of the 
Teaching Council Act which apply only to registered teachers, if a disclosure is 
received?’872  
It is recommended that prescribed persons be issued with their own specific guidance for 
dealing with disclosures as prescribed persons. This guidance would cover the scope, role, 
and powers of prescribed persons; what should be included in their prescribed persons’ 
Procedures; how the Procedures should be made publicly available; and how to comply with 
their annual reporting obligations, including advice in relation to reporting on disclosures in 
their capacity as an employer, a prescribed person, and s 10 disclosures. Also, prescribed 
persons’ guidance needs to be supplemented with specific prescribed persons’ training. 
According to the survey responses, 53% (ten) of the prescribed persons indicated that they 
had received training on protected disclosures. Nevertheless, of the five prescribed persons 
who made comments on what they would like to add about their role as a prescribed person, 
three stated that there should be training for prescribed persons, thus underscoring the 
concern of prescribed persons in relation to this issue. 
                                                 
870 B. Application; H. Personal complaint vs protected disclosure; L. Disciplinary record of discloser and other 
related matters; N. Support and advice; O. Review; P. Non-restriction of rights to make protected disclosures; 
Q. Mandatory reporting. 
871 Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, ‘Whistleblowing, Prescribed Persons Guidance’ 
(BEIS March 2015) 7, provides that ‘prescribed persons can encourage organisations they oversee to have 
whistleblowing policies in place and assist in ensuring the arrangements are effective. One way to do this is to 
lead by example to ensure they have whistleblowing arrangements for their own staff that meet best practice.’ 
872 Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, ‘Public Consultation on the Review of the Protected 
Disclosures Act 2014’ (DPER) <www.per.gov.ie/en/public-consultation-on-the-review-of-the-protected-
disclosures-act-2014/> accessed 6 November 2018. 
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Further, the inclusion of non-statutory provisions in the DPER Guidance has caused 
difficulty for prescribed persons. Thus, as demonstrated by this research, the commitment 
by the government to include the issue of volunteers and employment specific/profession 
specific obligations that do not fall under the definition of ‘relevant wrongdoing’ in the 2014 
Act in the DPER Guidance has created much confusion for prescribed persons. Only one 
prescribed person, the HEA included the issue of volunteers in its Procedures and only 
Revenue included the issue of employment specific/profession specific obligations. In both 
cases, neither prescribed person addressed the issue satisfactorily as they did not make it 
clear that such disclosures only attract internal organisational protections, which is 
understandable, as the nature of such protections is unclear. This issue of requiring 
prescribed persons to deal with non-statutory issues in their Procedures may be addressed 
by providing clarity in an updated DPER Guidance. However, it is recommended that these 
issues be given statutory footing in order to be in line with international best practice, to 
reduce the risk of confusion for both recipients of disclosures and disclosers, and to ensure 
that the purpose of the 2014 Act is fulfilled. 
Despite the recommendations made above in relation to the obligations on prescribed 
persons regarding annual reporting and publishing Procedures, as well as the 
recommendations for providing specific guidance and training for prescribed persons, if the 
list of prescribed persons is not kept up to date, the prescribed persons’ system will not be 
effective. In order to attract the protections under the 2014 Act, a worker must make their 
disclosures to the correct prescribed persons under s 7. As identified in this research, ten 
prescribed persons have either been dissolved, had a change of name, have merged, or had 
their functions transferred to another organisation. In addition, the research identified a 
number of omissions from the list of prescribed persons. The omissions of certain 
appropriate organisations as prescribed persons has a number of ramifications. Firstly, a 
disclosure to a non-prescribed regulator is considered to be a s 10 disclosure under the 2014 
Act, thus requiring the worker to satisfy a number of additional conditions in order to attract 
the protections under the 2014 Act. Secondly, the rate of disclosures to regulators who are 
not prescribed reduces if they are not provided with the formal status of a prescribed person, 
which attracts the protections under the 2014 Act.873 Thirdly, as recognised by Savage and 
Hyde, by prescribing some regulators and not others, this creates a hierarchy of both 
                                                 
873 Ashley Savage and Richard Hyde, ‘The response to whistleblowing by regulators: a practical perspective’ 
(2015) 35 Legal Studies 408, 427. 
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regulators and public interest concerns.874 As Savage and Hyde explain ‘Those regulators 
who are prescribed may be considered to be more important than those who are not. The 
concerns that prescribed regulators may receive may be deemed more important than those 
received by regulators who do not have prescribed status.’875  
The necessity to identify the deficiencies in the list of prescribed persons is an issue that 
DPER appears to be conscious of and this can be seen in the DPER Statutory Review where 
it was confirmed that the prescribed persons’ SIs had been reviewed, and a commitment was 
made to update it, as appropriate.876 It referred specifically to the issue of s 38 and s 39 
agencies in the health sector and stated that it is proposed to make the HSE a prescribed 
person, subject to the agreement of the Minister for Health and the HSE, to receive 
disclosures from such agencies in relation to functions in respect of which it is already a 
recipient under the Health Acts.877 Therefore, it is anticipated that the prescribed persons’ SI 
will be updated, both in respect of the list of prescribed persons and in respect of the matters 
which they are prescribed. It is also essential that in undertaking this review, that the powers 
of the prescribed persons are reviewed by the government in order to ensure that they are 
adequate to investigate and remedy the wrongdoing.  It is recommended that in conjunction 
with updating the list that the practice adopted in the UK of requiring the UK BEIS to 
maintain a list of prescribed persons online and updating it promptly following any changes 
made by statutory instruments, as well as reviewing the list on an annual basis, should be 
replicated in Ireland.878 In that vein, it is recommended that instead of designating this 
function to an already overstretched governmental department, that an authority be 
established to oversee the prescribed persons’ system.  
The functions of such an authority could include the following:  
1. Ensuring that prescribed persons are establishing and maintaining Procedures.  
                                                 
874 ibid 416. 
875 ibid. 
876 Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, ‘Statutory Review of the Protected Disclosures Act 2014’ 
(DPER July 2018) 44. 
877 ibid 33. 
878 This practice in the UK of maintaining an online database of prescribed persons arose in response to 
concerns raised in the whistleblowing framework call for evidence in the UK in 2014. Department for Business, 
Energy and Industrial Strategy, ‘Whistleblowing Framework Call for Evidence, Government Response’ (BEIS 
June 2014) 13. 
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2. Examining prescribed persons’ Procedures to ascertain that they are clear and easy to 
understand. 
3. Making sure that information on Procedures and information on the role of the prescribed 
person is made publicly available.  
4. Monitoring prescribed persons’ responses to disclosures received by them.  
5. Establishing that prescribed persons have the correct powers to carry out their functions 
in relation to disclosures made to them pursuant to s 7 of the 2014 Act. 
6. Ensuring that prescribed persons publish their protected disclosures’ annual reports, as 
well as examining the content of the annual reports.  
7. Certifying that the prescribed persons’ SI is up-to-date in terms of the prescribed person 
itself and the description of matters in respect of which it is prescribed, as well as maintaining 
this list online.  
8. Providing specific advice to prescribed persons, when requested, in respect of their role 
under the 2014 Act.  
9. Publishing guidance to assist prescribed persons’ in carrying out their functions in respect 
of protected disclosures. 
10. Providing training to prescribed persons in relation to the receipt, investigation, and 
remediation of the wrongdoing.879 
11. Receiving complaints in relation to the prescribed person in carrying out its role under 
the 2014 Act. 
12. Reviewing any decision/finding/order made by prescribed persons in respect of an 
investigation of a relevant wrongdoing under the 2014 Act, ie a decision not to investigate; 
a finding that a relevant wrongdoing/no relevant wrongdoing had occurred; or any order 
made in respect of remedial action to be taken in relation to the relevant wrongdoing. 
                                                 
879 Phillips and Lewis suggest that joint training of prescribed persons could create a forum for prescribed 
persons to share their understanding of issues affecting them, as well as their practices and experiences. Arron 
Phillips and David Lewis, ‘Whistleblowing to Regulators: Are Prescribed Persons Fit for Purpose?’ (October 
2013) 13 Middlesex University Erepository. 
203 
 
13. Promoting the role of prescribed persons as a disclosure channel for workers under the 
2014 Act. 
14. Imposing penalties on prescribed persons who are not complying with their statutory 
obligations. 
15. Ensuring that prescribed persons’ have adequate resources, both financial and in terms 
of staff.  
16. Reporting annually to DPER on the prescribed persons’ system, including making 
recommendations for improvements to the system. 
In addition to the establishment of this oversight authority, it is recommended that the UK 
Employment Tribunal (‘ET’) referral system be adopted in Ireland by the WRC. This referral 
system gives the ET the power to send copies of protected disclosures claims to regulators 
with the consent of the claimant.880 Concerns have been raised in the UK that the ET cannot 
always identify the correct prescribed person to refer the disclosure to and that by the time 
the case gets through the system the wrongdoing may have been resolved.881 The 
requirement of the ET having to identify the correct prescribed person seems to be addressed 
by the introduction of a system whereby claims are forwarded to and processed at a central 
location, and the parties to the claim are notified which regulator the alleged wrongdoing 
has been referred.882 There is, of course, the risk that a wrongdoing may no longer exist at 
the time that the claim is filed. Nonetheless, at that stage, the referral system is essentially a 
‘backstop’ for when the wrongdoing has still not been addressed, especially when the worker 
has made a claim against their employer, who may not be predisposed to remedying the 
wrongdoing alleged against them, or if the disclosure is buried in a settlement agreement.  
The research undertaken for this chapter identified numerous weaknesses in the prescribed 
persons’ system under the 2014 Act and recommendations have been made in order to 
                                                 
880 The Employment Tribunals (Constitution and Rules of Procedure) Regulations 2013, SI 2013/1237, reg 14. 
This referral system was introduced after a public consultation in 2009. The Government response to this 
consultation was published in 2010 and indicated that of the forty respondents, 61% supported the proposed 
approach to the referral system. Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, ‘Government 
Response, Employment tribunal claims and the Public Interest Disclosure Act’ (BEIS January 2010) 5. 
881 Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, ‘Whistleblowing Framework Call for Evidence, 
Government Response’ (BEIS June 2014) 6. 
882 Minh Alexander, ‘Prescribed Persons or the Pretence of PIDA. How UK whistleblowers are ignored’ 
(Alexander’s Excavations, 14 October 2018) <https://minhalexander.com/2018/10/14/prescribed-persons-or-
the-pretence-of-pida-how-uk-whistleblowers-are-ignored/> accessed 13 December 2018. 
204 
 
improve it, culminating in the recommendation for the establishment of an authority that 
oversees the prescribed persons’ system. If the recommendations contained herein are 
adopted this will go some way to improving confidence in the system, not only by the 
discloser but also by the prescribed person in conducting its role under the 2014 Act, as well 
as ensuring that the purpose of the 2014 Act is respected.  
However, even if the recommendations as outlined in this chapter are adopted, there may 
still be a risk that the purpose of the 2014 Act to protect workers who make protected 
disclosures will be undermined if on receipt of a disclosure an organisation fails to provide 
the proper protections to a worker. The research presented in the next chapter aims to assess 
the conflict for an organisation with regard to balancing the rights of the discloser and the 
alleged wrongdoer in the context of a protected disclosure and makes suggestions on how 
this conflict may be resolved in order to ensure that the purpose of the 2014 Act is achieved. 
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Chapter 5: Implementing protected disclosures procedures: practical issues for 
recipients of disclosures in relation to the discloser and the alleged wrongdoer 
5.1 Introduction 
When implementing protected disclosures procedures (‘Procedures’), an area that raises 
significant difficulties for organisations is the balancing of the rights of the discloser against 
the rights of the alleged wrongdoer. On receipt of a disclosure, an organisation must task 
itself with balancing the rights of the discloser under s 16 of the 2014 Act to have their 
identity protected, subject to certain exceptions, and the rights of the alleged wrongdoer 
under natural justice and fair procedures and under data protection rules. The ‘Whistling 
While They Work A good-practice guide for managing internal reporting of wrongdoing in 
public sector organisations’ (‘WWTW Guide’)883 highlights that the receipt of disclosures 
couched in terms of a ‘wrongdoer’ as opposed to a ‘wrongdoing’ causes considerable 
difficulties for organisations, stating that: 
Reports of wrongdoing that allege wrongdoing by another employee are not 
infrequent and create significant difficulties for organisations. Ideally, the ethical 
culture of an organisation would promote fair treatment and support for all parties 
involved in a report, and managers would be fully aware of how to protect the rights 
and interests of all parties.884 
In order to explore this difficulty, the following issues are addressed in this chapter: 
1. Confidentiality 
2. Anonymous disclosures 
3. Rights of the alleged wrongdoer 
4. Data protection 
5.1(a) Objectives 
When implementing Procedures, organisations run the risk of breaching the rights of the 
discloser, which undermines the purpose of the 2014 Act, and/or the rights of the alleged 
wrongdoer, in attempting to apply fairness to the parties and to respect their rights equally. 
                                                 
883 The introduction to the WWTW Guide explains that the guide ‘sets out the results from four years of 
research into how public sector organisations can better fulfil their missions, maintain their integrity and value 
their employees by adopting a current best practice approach to the management of whistleblowing.’ Peter 
Roberts, AJ Brown and Jane Olsen, Whistling While They Work A good-practice guide for managing internal 
reporting of wrongdoing in public sector organisations (ANU E Press 2011) 9. 
884 ibid 68. 
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The objective of this research is to: (i) provide guidance to organisations as to what rules to 
apply when attempting to protect the rights of both parties; (ii) highlight where conflict may 
arise; and (iii) when a conflict arises, provide advice as to best practice to adopt when one 
party’s rights take precedence over another party’s rights.  
5.1(b) Methodology 
In Chapter 4, an analysis of the prescribed persons’ Procedures was undertaken in light of 
the guidance published by the Department of Public Expenditure and Reform (‘DPER’) for 
the purpose of assisting public bodies in their establishment and maintenance of Procedures 
(‘DPER Guidance’).885 Of the nineteen issues contained in the checklist drafted of the issues 
outlined in the DPER Guidance that should be included in Procedures, three of the issues 
were omitted from the assessment in Chapter 4 as it was deemed that it was more appropriate 
that they would be addressed in this chapter to underpin the analysis of the balancing of 
rights of the discloser and the rights of the alleged wrongdoer. The issues in the DPER 
Guidance relating to ‘Confidentiality/protection of identity’, ‘Anonymous disclosures’, and 
‘Protection of the rights of Respondents’886 are assessed herein.   
In addition to the analysis undertaken in relation to the issues contained in the DPER 
Guidance, much of the research for this chapter utilised a doctrinal methodology to evaluate 
the national and international statutory rules, precedent established in case law, articles, 
books, and international and national reports, covering the issues. 
5.2 Confidentiality 
5.2(a) Introduction 
Confidentiality has been identified as the most effective way to encourage workers to come 
forward with information of wrongdoing.887 The prominence of protection of a discloser’s 
identity in whistleblowing schemes is emphasised by the European Commission in its draft 
                                                 
885 Protected Disclosures Act 2014, s 21(3). Government Reform Unit, Department of Public Expenditure and 
Reform, ‘Guidance under section 21(1) of the Protected Disclosures Act 2014 for the purpose of assisting 
public bodies in the performance of their functions under the Act’ (DPER 2016). 
886 The DPER Guidance refers to alleged wrongdoers as ‘respondents’, however, the use of this term for this 
purpose is erroneous as alleged wrongdoers are not respondents in the context of protected disclosures unless 
a claim is brought against them in legal proceedings on foot of the alleged wrongdoing or for a claim of personal 
liability under the 2014 Act. 
887 European Data Protection Supervisor, ‘Guidelines on processing personal information within a 
whistleblowing procedure’ (EDPS July 2016) 1. 
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Directive on whistleblowing and provides in its explanatory memorandum that ‘Article 5 
sets out the minimum standards that internal reporting channels and procedures for following 
up on reports should meet. In particular, it requires that reporting channels guarantee the 
confidentiality of the identity of the reporting person, which is a cornerstone of 
whistleblower protection.’888 The draft EU Commission Directive on whistleblowing places 
such weight on this issue that it provides that Member States must provide for penalties 
against both natural and legal persons if there is a breach of the duty of maintaining the 
confidentiality of the discloser.889 The imposition of criminal liability for revealing 
identifying information of the discloser already exists in some jurisdictions internationally. 
For example, under the Australian Public Interest Disclosure Act 2013, it is a criminal 
offence to disclose information obtained by a person in their capacity as a public official and 
that information is likely to enable the identification of the discloser as a person who has 
made a public interest disclosure,890 subject to certain exceptions.891 The offence carries a 
penalty of imprisonment for six months and/or thirty penalty units.892 Further, under the 
French whistleblowing law, Sapin II, a breach of confidentiality attracts two years’ 
imprisonment and a €30,000 fine.893 
International best practice principles emphasise that whistleblowing legislation should 
ensure that organisations commit to protecting the identity of a discloser, as can be seen in 
the principles developed by Transparency International;894 Protect;895 the Council of 
                                                 
888 Explanatory Memorandum to the Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on the protection of persons reporting on breaches of Union law, 2018/0106 (COD) 11. 
889 ibid art 17(1)(d). 
890 Public Interest Disclosure Act 2013, s 20(1). 
891 ibid s 20(3). 
892 ibid s 20(2). 
893  LOI n° 2016-1691 du 9 décembre 2016 relative à la transparence, à la lutte contre la corruption et à la 
modernisation de la vie économique (1), art 9(II). 
894 Transparency International, ‘International Principles for Whistleblower Legislation, Best Practices for Laws 
to Support Whistleblowers and Support Whistleblowing in the Public Interest’ (TI 2013) 5, provides that ‘the 
identity of the whistleblower may not be disclosed without the individual’s explicit consent.’ 
895 Protect, ‘The Whistleblowing Commission, The report of the Whistleblowing Commission on the 
effectiveness of existing arrangements for workplace whistleblowing in the UK’ (Protect November 2013) 29 
which provides that ‘The best way to raise a concern is to do so openly. Openness makes it easier for the 
employer to assess the issue, work out how to investigate the matter and obtain more information.’ 
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Europe;896 and the Organisation of Economic Co-Operation and Development (‘OECD’).897 
These principles are reflected in whistleblowing legislation across numerous jurisdictions, 
including, Australia,898 Bolivia,899 Canada,900 Ecuador,901 France,902 Italy,903 Kosovo,904 
New Zealand,905 Norway,906 Paraguay,907 Romania,908 Serbia,909 and the US.910 In the UK, 
however, the Public Interest Disclosures Act 1998 (‘PIDA’) does not oblige organisations to 
protect the identity of the discloser. Nonetheless, guidance issued by the UK government 
highlights that maintaining confidentiality is considered to be best practice911 and this has 
been interpreted as being a promotion of the protection of confidentiality as the default 
position for an organisation when it receives a disclosure.912  
5.2(b) The 2014 Act 
The inclusion of the issue of confidentiality in the 2014 Act reflects international best 
practice. Under the 2014 Act, the identity of the worker making the disclosure is protected 
to the extent that the person to whom the protected disclosure is made or the person to whom 
a protected disclosure is referred in the performance of that person’s duties, must not disclose 
                                                 
896 Council of Europe, Recommendation CM/REC (2014)7 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States 
on the Protection of Whistleblowers, adopted by the Committee of Ministers on the 30 April 2014 at the 1198 
meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies (SPDP Council of Europe 2014) app, principle 18, which provides 
‘Whistleblowers should be entitled to have the confidentiality of their identity maintained, subject to fair trial 
guarantees.’ Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution 1729 (2010) Protection of “whistle -
blowers”,  which provides that ‘6.2. Whistle-blowing legislation should focus on providing a safe alternative 
to silence. 6.2.1. It should give appropriate incentives to government and corporate decision makers to put into 
place internal whistle-blowing procedures that will ensure that…6.2.1.2. the identity of the whistle-blower is 
only disclosed with his or her consent, or in order to avert serious and imminent threats to the public interest.’ 
897 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, ‘G20 Anti-Corruption Action Plan Protection 
of Whistleblowers, Study on Whistleblower Protection Framework, G20 Compendium of Best Practices and 
Guiding Principles for Legislation on the Protection of Whistleblowers’ (OECD 2011) 31, provides that an 
example of best practice in ensuring that legislation provides robust and comprehensive protection to 
whistleblowers could include ‘Due process for both parties (the whistleblower and the respondent), including, 
inter alia, the need for protecting confidentiality’. 
898 Public Interest Disclosures Act 2013, ss 20 and 21. 
899 Law 458 for Whistleblower and Witness Protection 2013, art 2. 
900 Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act 2005, ss 11(1)(a), 22(e) and 44. 
901 Criminal Code 1971, art 495. 
902 LOI n° 2016-1691 du 9 décembre 2016 relative à la transparence, à la lutte contre la corruption et à la 
modernisation de la vie économique (1), art 9(I). 
903 Legislative Decree 2015/72, s 18; Legislative Decree 1993/285, s 52-bis.    
904 Draft Law on Protection of Whistleblowers, art 7. 
905 Protected Disclosures Act 2000, s 19. 
906 Working Environment Act 2005, s 2A-4. 
907 Instructive Order 2014/7 from the Attorney General’s Office, art 5. 
908 Law No 2004/571, art 3(b). 
909 Law on the Protection of Whistleblowers Act, no 2014/128, arts 10 and 14. 
910 Whistleblower Protection Act 1989, 5 USC § 1213(h). 
911 Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, ‘Whistleblowing, Guidance for Employers and 
Code of Practice’ (BEIS March 2015) 10. 
912 Jeremy Lewis and others, Whistleblowing Law and Practice (3rd edn, OUP 2017) para 19.57. 
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to another person, information that might identify the person who made the protected 
disclosure.913 A failure by the disclosure recipient to comply with this section is actionable 
by the person who made the protected disclosure if that person suffers any loss by reason of 
the recipient’s failure to comply.914  
This protection is not absolute, however, and disclosure of identity can occur in the following 
specific circumstances: 
(c) the person to whom the protected disclosure was made or referred reasonably 
believes that disclosing any such information is necessary for- 
   (i) the effective investigation of the relevant wrongdoing concerned,  
(ii) the prevention of serious risk to the security of the State, public health, 
public safety or the environment, or 
(iii) for the prevention of crime or prosecution of a criminal offence, or  
(d) the disclosure is otherwise necessary in the public interest, or is required by 
law.915  
Further, the disclosure recipient, and the person to whom the disclosure was referred to in 
the performance of that person’s duties, can disclose to another person any information that 
might identify the person who made the protected disclosure if that person reasonably 
believes that the person who made the protected disclosure does not object to the disclosure 
of any information that might identify them.916  
The disclosure recipient and the person to whom the disclosure was referred in the 
performance of that person’s duties will also have a defence in any action taken under this 
section if they can show that he or she took ‘all reasonable steps’ to avoid disclosing any 
information to another person that might identify the discloser.917  
A recipient of a protected disclosure, or any person to whom that disclosure is referred to in 
the performance of that person’s duties, can be held personally liable for any loss suffered 
by the worker who made the disclosure if information that might identify them is disclosed 
to another person, and one of the defences in s 16(2) of the 2014 Act do not apply. From the 
                                                 
913 Protected Disclosures Act 2014, s 16(1). 
914 ibid s 16(3). 
915 ibid s 16(2). 
916 ibid s 16(2)(b). 
917 ibid s 16(2)(a). 
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initiation of the 2014 Act until the cut-off point for analysis of the case law under the 2014 
Act in July 2018, there had been no cases decided under s 16 of the 2014 Act.  
5.2(c) The DPER Guidance 
The DPER Guidance for public bodies also addresses the important issue of ‘Confidentiality/ 
protection of identity’.918 It provides that Procedures should confirm that there is an 
obligation on recipients of disclosures under the 2014 Act to protect the identity of the 
worker but that this protection is not absolute and that certain exceptions apply, which reflect 
those contained in s 16(2) of the 2014 Act.919  The DPER Guidance advises that in respect 
of their confidentiality obligations, public bodies should address matters such as document 
security, IT, digital filing, and manual filing.920 The DPER Guidance does not elaborate on 
how these matters should be addressed. Nonetheless, the DPER Guidance flags these matters 
so that each public body is aware that such concerns must be addressed. The Article 29 Data 
Protection Working Party921 (‘Data Protection Working Party’) in Opinion 1/2006 explains 
that an essential requirement of whistleblowing schemes is that disclosures are kept 
confidential in order to comply with the security of processing operations under art 17 of 
Directive 95/46/EC922 (now art 32 of the General Data Protection Regulation923 
(‘GDPR’)).924 The Data Protection Working Party states that ‘it is essential that the person 
who reports be adequately protected, by guaranteeing the confidentiality of the report and 
                                                 
918 Government Reform Unit, Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, ‘Guidance under section 21(1) 
of the Protected Disclosures Act 2014 for the purpose of assisting public bodies in the performance of their 
functions under the Act’ (DPER 2016) para E(11). 
919 ibid paras E(11.1) and E(11.4). 
920 ibid para E(11.1). 
921 The Article 29 Working Party was established under art 29 of Council Directive (EC) 95/46/EC, which 
provides for a ‘Working Party on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the processing of Personal Data.’ 
It consists of a representative from the data protection authority of each EU Member State, the European Data 
Protection Supervisor, and the EU Commission. The Data Protection Working Party is an independent body 
that acts in an advisory capacity. The aim of the Data Protection Working Party is to harmonise the application 
of data protection rules throughout the EU. Its work involves the publication of opinions and recommendations 
on data protection issues. The European Data Protection Board (‘EDPB’) replaced the Article 29 Data 
Protection Working Party on 25 May 2018 under Council Regulation (EC) 679/2016 of 27 April 2016 on the 
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such 
data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) [2016]. For more information on 
the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, see: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/article29/news.cfm?item_type=1358&tpa_id=6936> accessed 21 April 2018. 
922 Council Directive (EC) 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the 
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data [1995] OJ L281/31. 
923 Council Regulation (EC) 679/2016 of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the 
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General 
Data Protection Regulation) [2016], art 32.  
924 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party Opinion 1/2006 of 1 February 2006 on the Application of EU 
data protection rules to internal whistleblowing schemes in the field of accounting, internal accounting controls, 
auditing matters, fight against bribery, banking and financial crime [2006] 00195/06/EN WP 117, 14.  
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preventing third parties from knowing his/her identity.’925 This reference to third parties 
would include the alleged wrongdoer. 
The DPER Guidance recommends certain processes that should be implemented to ensure 
that the protection of identity obligations are guaranteed. The DPER Guidance provides in 
para E that: 
11.2 Where action is to be taken following a protected disclosure, it is recommended 
that a process is put in place for consulting with the discloser and, where possible, 
for gaining the informed consent of the discloser, prior to any action being taken that 
could identify them. This may include when disclosures are being referred by the 
public body to an external party.  
 
11.3 Where it is decided that it is necessary to disclose information that may or will 
disclose the identity of the discloser, the discloser should be informed of this decision 
in advance of the disclosure, except in exceptional cases. The discloser should also 
be informed of the applicable review process, which may be invoked by the discloser 
in respect of this decision.926   
In complying with the recommendation in para E(11.2) to consult with the discloser and to 
attempt to gain informed consent to disclose the worker’s identity prior to any action being 
taken that could identify them, further good practice would be to document any consent or 
refusal and in the event of a refusal, explain the reasons why disclosure is necessary. The 
reference in para E(11.3) to informing the discloser of any decision to disclose information 
that may or will disclose their identity, except in exceptional circumstances, underscores the 
position in s 16(2) of the 2014 Act that it may be appropriate in some circumstances for the 
rights of the worker under s 16(1) of the 2014 Act to be curtailed.  
An essential condition in para E(11.3) is the requirement to inform the discloser of a review 
process in respect of any decision taken to disclose their identity. Paragraph E(20) of the 
DPER Guidance deals with the ‘Review’ requirements in Procedures.927 With regard to the 
issue of confidentiality, para E(20.1.i) provides that Procedures should include a system for 
review of ‘Any decision made to disclose the identity of the discloser (except in exceptional 
                                                 
925 ibid 15.  
926 Government Reform Unit, Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, ‘Guidance under section 21(1) 
of the Protected Disclosures Act 2014 for the purpose of assisting public bodies in the performance of their 
functions under the Act’ (DPER 2016) paras E(11.2-11.3). 
927 Industrial Relations Act 1990 (Code of Practice on Protected Disclosures Act 2014) (Declaration) Order 
2015, SI 2015/464, is silent on the issue of ‘Review’. 
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circumstances).’928 Paragraph E(20.2) provides further information in relation to this system 
of review and proposes that the review should not be undertaken by a person who made the 
initial decision to disclose information that may/will lead to the revelation of the discloser’s 
identity. Further, the DPER Guidance recommends that where a decision has been taken to 
disclose any information that may reveal the identity of the discloser, a review should be 
offered prior to the disclosure of that information. This is good practice but may not be 
feasible in all cases. There may be an urgency in respect of the wrongdoing disclosed, and 
any delay could jeopardise any remediation of that wrongdoing. In addition, in small 
organisations, there may be an insufficient number of staff within the organisation to 
facilitate a review by an independent person internally, and therefore an external person may 
have to be engaged at a cost. 
Paragraph E(11.4) of the DPER Guidance urges public bodies to include a request in their 
Procedures that a worker who is concerned that their identity is not being protected to notify 
their employer of this concern. It is further advised that public bodies include in their 
Procedures both a commitment to assess and investigate a notification by a discloser that 
their identity is not being protected and a commitment to take appropriate action where 
necessary when notification by a discloser that their identity is not being protected is 
received. 
The European Data Protection Supervisor (‘EDPS’)929 substantiates the position adopted in 
the DPER Guidance with respect to confidentiality and provides that a discloser’s identity 
‘should never be revealed except in certain exceptional circumstances if the whistleblower 
authorises such a disclosure, if this is required by any subsequent criminal law proceedings, 
or if the whistleblower maliciously makes a false statement.’930 The Data Protection 
Working Party also addresses the protection of the discloser's identity in the context of data 
rules. The Data Protection Working Party maintains that in exercising their right of access 
under data protection rights, under no circumstances can the alleged wrongdoer (ie the data 
                                                 
928 Government Reform Unit, Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, ‘Guidance under section 21(1) 
of the Protected Disclosures Act 2014 for the purpose of assisting public bodies in the performance of their 
functions under the Act’ (DPER 2016) para E(20.1.i). 
929 The European Data Protection Supervisor is the European Union’s independent data protection authority. 
For more information, see: <https://edps.europa.eu/> accessed 21 April 2018. 
930 European Data Protection Supervisor, ‘Guidelines on processing personal information within a 
whistleblowing procedure’ (EDPS July 2016) 4-5. These Guidelines specifically relate to EU institutions and 
bodies in order to ensure they comply with data protection obligations under Council Regulation (EC) 45/2001 
of 18 December 2000 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the 
Community institutions and bodies and on the free movement of such data [2001]. The Guidelines may be 
regarded as having a general reference to whistleblowing schemes. 
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subject) obtain information about the identity of the whistleblower.931 Nonetheless, despite 
the protection of the identity of a whistleblower under data protection rules, this protection 
may be curtailed by an alleged wrongdoer exercising their rights to natural justice and fair 
procedures. Both of these issues are addressed in more detail later in the chapter. 
5.2(d) WRC Code of Practice  
The WRC Code of Practice on the 2014 Act932 addresses the issue of protection of identity 
in each of its three parts. The first part of the WRC Code of Practice gives an overview of 
the 2014 Act and provides in respect of protection of identity that: 
All reasonable steps must be taken to protect the identity of the person making the 
disclosure and to ensure the disclosures are treated in confidence. The exceptions to 
this are (a) where the worker making the disclosure has made it clear that he/she has 
no objection to his/her identity being disclosed and (b) the identity of the person 
making the disclosure is critical to an investigation of the matter raised. An example 
of this might be where the worker making the disclosure is called as a witness in the 
context of an investigation.933 
This explanation in the WRC Code of Practice is worrisome as it does not address all the 
exceptions in s 16(2) of the 2014 Act and is therefore misleading with regard to when a 
discloser’s identity may be revealed. The second part of the WRC Code of Practice, which 
deals with the scope and content of Procedures, advises that: 
It is important that a worker making a disclosure should be assured that every effort 
will be made to maintain confidentiality. It is advisable to point out that there may 
be circumstances where confidentiality cannot be maintained, for example in the 
context of an investigation. It is important to note however that all reasonable steps 
must be taken to maintain confidentiality.934 
The DPER Guidance is much more robust than the WRC Code of Practice in outlining the 
steps that should be taken in relation to the protection of the identity of the discloser. The 
‘Model Whistleblowing Policy’, which is an appendix to the WRC Code of Practice, 
suggests the following approach to the issue of protection of identity: 
This organisation is committed to protecting the identity of the worker raising a 
concern and ensures that relevant disclosures are treated in confidence. The focus 
will be on the wrongdoing rather than the person making the disclosure. However 
                                                 
931 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party Opinion 1/2006 of 1 February 2006 on the Application of EU 
data protection rules to internal whistleblowing schemes in the field of accounting, internal accounting controls, 
auditing matters, fight against bribery, banking and financial crime [2006] 00195/06/EN WP 117, 14.  
932 Industrial Relations Act 1990 (Code of Practice on Protected Disclosures Act 2014) (Declaration) Order 
2015, SI 2015/464. 
933 ibid [32]. 
934 ibid [50]. 
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there are circumstances, as outlined in the Act, where confidentiality cannot be 
maintained particularly in a situation where the worker is participating in an 
investigation into the matter being disclosed. Should such a situation arise, we will 
make every effort to inform the worker that his/her identity may be disclosed.935 
The reference in the ‘Model Whistleblowing Policy’ to the focus being on the wrongdoing 
rather than on the discloser is a welcome addition. This position underpins the objective of 
the 2014 Act that the focus needs to be on the message and not on the messenger.936 
Nonetheless, the suggested approach in the Model Whistleblowing Policy is far from 
satisfactory, as it does not set out the extent of the obligation in s 16(1) of the 2014 Act. Nor 
does it address the entirety of the exceptions in s 16(2) of the 2014 Act. It also fails to provide 
for consultation with a discloser and an option of review of any decision made to disclose 
the worker’s identity. 
5.2(e) Prescribed persons’ Procedures analysis 
In analysing the Procedures of the prescribed persons, nine issues in the DPER Guidance 
were assessed in relation to ‘Confidentiality/ protection of identity’.937 
Of the organisations that had Prescribed Persons’ Procedures only,938 the HEA and the 
IAASA did not address any of the issues; CORU addressed one issue;939 the PSI addressed 
two issues;940 CRU addressed three issues;941 and the SFPA addressed all nine issues. 
Of those Procedures that were internal only;942 CIÉ failed to address any of the issues; the 
local authorities addressed four of the issues;943 and the SEC and the HEA addressed all nine 
issues. 
                                                 
935 ibid app. 
936 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Committing to Effective Whistleblower 
Protection (OECD Publishing 2016) 174. 
937 See: Appendix 3(b), ‘Coding of DPER Checklist for Prescribed Persons’ Protected Disclosures Procedures’. 
938 CORU; CRU; HEA; IAASA; PSI; and SFPA. 
939 See: Appendix 3(c), ‘Findings of Prescribed Persons’ Protected Disclosures Procedures using the DPER 
Checklist for Prescribed Persons,’ F5.  
940 ibid F2.  
941 ibid F2, F4, and F5.  
942 CIÉ; SEC; HEA; Clare CC; Galway CC; Kildare CC; South Dublin CC; and Wexford City Council and CC. 
943 See: Appendix 3(d), ‘Findings of Prescribed Persons’ Protected Disclosures Procedures using the DPER 
Checklist for Prescribed Persons,’ F1, F2, F5, and F6.  
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Of those organisations that had both internal and prescribed persons’ Procedures,944 the HIA 
did not address any of the issues; the C&AG and Revenue addressed one issue;945 and the 
Marine Institute and the local authorities addressed all nine issues.  
Thus, as can be seen from the results in relation to the nine issues identified in the DPER 
Guidance regarding ‘Confidentiality/ protection of identity’, there was evidence of 64% 
compliance when taking all the Procedures together. Those organisations with both internal 
and prescribed persons’ Procedures obtained 83% compliance, whilst organisations that had 
internal Procedures only, achieved 53% compliance. Organisations with prescribed persons’ 
Procedures only, obtained a compliance rate of 28%.  
It is interesting to note that the HEA’s internal Procedures and their Procedures in their 
capacity as a prescribed person only, have very different rates of compliance regarding this 
issue. Their internal Procedures were robust, attaining 100% compliance, whilst their 
prescribed persons’ Procedures had 0% compliance. When looking at their overall rate of 
compliance with the DPER Guidance, their internal Procedures had 84% compliance but had 
only 20% compliance for their prescribed persons’ Procedures. This result highlights the 
positive use of the DPER Guidance for public bodies but also underscores the necessity for 
specific guidance for prescribed persons to establish and maintain Procedures. 
Of those prescribed persons that responded to the survey undertaken for this research, 89% 
(sixteen) indicated that they had a system for protecting the identity of the worker who makes 
a disclosure to them, whilst 5.5% (one) indicated that they did not, and 5.5% (one) indicated 
that they did not know if they had such a system. Of those prescribed persons who undertook 
to answer the follow-on question requesting them to briefly explain what steps they take to 
protect the discloser’s identity, there was a range of answers provided.946  
                                                 
944 C&AG; HIA; Marine Institute; Revenue; Carlow CC; Cavan CC; Fingal CC; Galway City Council; Kerry 
CC; Kilkenny CC; Limerick City Council and CC; Longford CC; Monaghan CC; Sligo CC; Westmeath CC; 
and Wicklow CC. 
945 See: Appendix 3(e), ‘Findings of Prescribed Persons’ Protected Disclosures Procedures using the DPER 
Checklist for Prescribed Persons,’ F3. 
946 These answers included:  ‘Set out in our procedure’; ‘It’s in our policy on our website’; ‘Reporting when 
shared with others is anonymised by me’; ‘We use an external recipient’; ‘We haven’t had a disclosure yet, but 
should we have, every effort will be made to protect the identity of the worker involved’; ‘Designated Officer 
for receipt of protected Disclosures will ensure that the name of the discloser remains confidential. File is kept 
in a locked cabinet in a locked room’; ‘The identity of the discloser is not made known unless there are lawful 
reasons for doing so, e.g. if the investigation cannot be conducted without disclosing their identity’; ‘All 
concerns will be treated, as far as possible, in the strictest confidence and every effort will be made not to 
reveal the employees identity, if desired. Any disclosure can sent to the protected disclosure email, accessible 
only by the designated persons (CEO and Chairperson)’; ‘Follow the guidelines for dealing with an 
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The survey responses demonstrate an inconsistent approach being adopted by organisations 
to protect the discloser’s identity. Inconsistency in approaches is not necessarily a deficit but 
if the approaches are not effective, which arguably a number of the approaches set out in the 
survey responses would not be, or they are not being applied consistently within the 
organisation, then this can cause difficulties in relation to the application of the s 16 
protection.  
In response to the DPER Statutory Review, a number of organisations voiced the difficulty 
in relation to the scope and nature of the confidentiality obligation. The Department of 
Education and Skills submitted that ‘There appears to be a conflict between the obligations 
to keep the discloser’s identity confidential and the right to know one’s accuser. An accused 
person may have a valid basis not to engage with an investigation where the identity of the 
person making an allegation is not disclosed.’947 Further, the HEA suggested the 
development of guidelines to address the issue of ‘what steps can be taken to accurately 
convey the substance of a protected disclosure without revealing the worker’s identity.’948 
The HSE submitted that further clarity on how to implement s 16(1) of the 2014 Act would 
be welcomed and that the obligation to protect the identity of the discloser and to balance 
this with the need to follow up on a disclosure ‘presents difficulties in terms of balance and 
natural justice’.949 Resolve highlighted in its submission that ‘There are also acute 
difficulties being experienced in terms of case management of protected disclosures issues 
in the event of an investigation being conducted. It can be a significant challenge to protect 
the identity of the person making the protected disclosure, in light of the facts and assertions 
that may need to be shared with others for the effective conduct of such an investigation 
whilst respecting the principles of natural justice.’950 Transparency International Ireland 
(‘TII’) emphasised in their submission that with regard to s 16 of the 2014 Act ‘some 
employers have told TI Ireland that they are finding it difficult to understand their obligations 
                                                 
investigation’; ‘Protected disclosures are treated much the same as any complaint made to us. Where a 
complaint is received, we follow our established investigation procedures which entail contacting the 
person/persons against whom an allegation is made, and providing details of the allegation. We protect insofar 
as possible the identity of the complainant. However, anonymous complaints are not accepted, and the 
principles of natural justice must also apply’; ‘All information is held in a confidential file with restricted 
access’; ‘Meetings held off site, files kept securely locked’; ‘It is kept confidential to the prescribed person 
only’; and ‘Name of complainant withheld at all times’. 
947 Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, ‘Public Consultation on the Review of the Protected 
Disclosures Act 2014’ (DPER) <www.per.gov.ie/en/public-consultation-on-the-review-of-the-protected-
disclosures-act-2014/> accessed 6 November 2018. 
948 ibid 
949 ibid. 
950 ibid. 
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under the provision. It would, therefore, be important to provide further guidance to those 
employers struggling to interpret the law and their conflicting duties to uphold the natural 
rights of the respondent where a protected disclosure is made.’951  
Thus, a recurring theme is the difficulty arising for organisations from the interplay between 
the obligations under s 16 of the 2014 Act to protect the identity of the worker and the 
obligation under natural justice and fair procedures to respect the rights of the alleged 
wrongdoer. Therefore, it is arguable that the 2014 Act, the WRC Code of Practice, and the 
DPER Guidance are ineffective in resolving this conflict for organisations. There are rules 
deriving from case law in relation to this conflict and these, as well as the conflict with 
obligations under data protection rules, are explored in more detail below in the ‘Rights of 
the alleged wrongdoer’ and the ‘Data protection’ sections. 
5.3 Anonymous disclosures 
5.3(a) Introduction 
Closely aligned to the issue of confidentiality, is that of anonymous disclosures. Anonymous 
disclosures are disclosures where the identity of the discloser is withheld by the discloser, 
whilst confidential disclosures are disclosures where the identity is known by the recipient 
but is withheld by them. The concerns regarding anonymous disclosures are manifold for an 
organisation. How can an organisation afford an alleged wrongdoer their rights to natural 
justice and fair procedures, such as cross-examining the discloser, if it does not know who 
this person is? Can the organisation carry out a fulsome investigation without the discloser’s 
participation? How can the organisation protect a discloser from retaliation if it is not aware 
of who the discloser is? 
Anonymous disclosures are not explicitly provided for in the 2014 Act. However, in the 
original carnation of the 2014 Act, the Draft Heads of the Protected Disclosures in the Public 
Interest Bill 2012952 (‘Draft Heads’), anonymous disclosures were explicitly excluded. Head 
11 of the Draft Heads provided that ‘A disclosure made anonymously shall not be a protected 
disclosure for the purposes of this Act.’ In relation to Head 11, the explanatory note to the 
legislation explained that both Heads 15 (immunity from criminal proceedings) and 16 
(confidentiality) are important safeguards to protect the confidentiality of a worker making 
                                                 
951 ibid. 
952 The Draft Heads of the Protected Disclosures in the Public Interest Bill 2012, Head 11. 
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a protected disclosure. It stated that it was not considered appropriate or practical that a 
worker could seek to avail of the protections provided under the legislation on the basis of 
having made an anonymous disclosure.953 The Draft Heads only afforded protection to 
workers who made a confidential disclosure.954  
The issue of excluding anonymous disclosures from the ambit of the Draft Heads was 
discussed at a number of sittings of the Joint Committee on Finance, Public Expenditure and 
Reform (‘Committee’). The issue was raised by the National Union of Journalists who 
highlighted that whistleblowers might speak to journalists on an anonymous basis.955 It was 
also raised by TII who argued that ‘Most people want to report anonymously’ and 
recommended that ‘the legislation protects a worker making an anonymous disclosure where 
the worker can be identified as the source of a protected disclosure.’956 The Committee 
issued a report on foot of the submissions made to it on the Draft Heads, and it acknowledged 
therein that the ‘issue of confidentiality versus anonymity must be examined.’957 Following 
the release of the report, the Protected Disclosures Bill 2013 was published which referred 
only to the issue of confidentiality958 but made no mention of anonymous disclosures. 
5.3(b) The DPER Guidance 
Although the 2014 Act does not refer explicitly to anonymous disclosures, the DPER 
Guidance addresses this issue in para E(12). The DPER Guidance recommends that 
Procedures should distinguish between confidentiality and anonymity as these terms can 
cause confusion for both disclosers and recipients.959  The DPER Guidance emphasises that 
public bodies should give a commitment to act on information disclosed anonymously, to 
the extent that it is possible.960 This advice is clarified further by a recommendation that the 
Procedures should include a statement that investigations of such disclosures may be 
restricted and that, in the event of retaliation against the discloser, it may be difficult or 
                                                 
953 Explanatory Note to the Draft Heads of the Protected Disclosures in the Public Interest Bill 2012, Head 11. 
954 The Draft Heads of the Protected Disclosures in the Public Interest Bill 2012, Head 16. 
955 Joint Committee on Finance, Public Expenditure and Reform Deb 23 May 2012. 
956 Joint Committee on Finance, Public Expenditure and Reform Deb 13 June 2012. 
957 Joint Committee on Finance, Public Expenditure and Reform, Report on hearings in relation to the Scheme 
of the Protected Disclosures in the Public Interest Bill, 2012 (31/FPER/010, 2012) 12. 
958 Protected Disclosures Bill 2013, s 16. 
959 Government Reform Unit, Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, ‘Guidance under section 21(1) 
of the Protected Disclosures Act 2014 for the purpose of assisting public bodies in the performance of their 
functions under the Act’ (DPER 2016) para E(12.1). 
960 ibid. 
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impossible to provide protection if anonymity is maintained.961 The DPER Guidance also 
stresses that Procedures should make it clear that unless a discloser reveals their identity, 
they will not be able to avail of the protections under the 2014 Act.962  
5.3(c) WRC Code of Practice  
The first part of the WRC Code of Practice provides that disclosures can be made 
anonymously.963 Importantly the WRC Code of Practice sets out the rationale behind this 
position and explains that the focus needs to be on the alleged wrongdoing and not on the 
discloser. The WRC Code of Practice states: 
Yes, a disclosure may be made anonymously. It should be noted that a disclosure 
made anonymously may potentially, of itself, present a barrier to the effective 
internal investigation of the matter reported on. 
 
Focus should be on the reported wrongdoing and not on the person making the 
disclosure.964 
Further, in the third part of the WRC Code of Practice, the ‘Model Whistleblowing Policy’, 
it provides that anonymous disclosures can be made but encourages confidential disclosures, 
stating that: 
A concern may be raised anonymously. However on a practical level it may be 
difficult to investigate such a concern. We would encourage workers to put their 
names to allegations, with our assurance of confidentiality where possible, in order 
to facilitate appropriate follow-up. This will make it easier for us to assess the 
disclosure and take appropriate action including an investigation if necessary.965 
5.3(d) Prescribed persons’ Procedures analysis 
In analysing the Procedures of the prescribed persons in light of the DPER Guidance, four 
issues were assessed in relation to ‘Anonymous disclosures’.966 
                                                 
961 ibid para E(12.2). 
962 ibid para E(12.1). 
963 Industrial Relations Act 1990 (Code of Practice on Protected Disclosures Act 2014) (Declaration) Order 
2015, SI 2015/464, [33]-[34]. 
964 ibid. 
965 ibid app. 
966 See: Appendix 3(b), ‘Coding of DPER Checklist for Prescribed Persons’ Protected Disclosures Procedures’. 
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Of the organisations that had prescribed persons’ Procedures only,967 CRU, the HEA, the 
IAASA, and the PSI do not address the issue of anonymous disclosures at all in their 
Procedures; CORU includes one issue;968 and the SFPA includes two issues.969 
Of those Procedures that were internal only,970 CIÉ does not include any information on 
anonymous disclosures in their Procedures; the local authorities include one issue;971 and 
both the SEC and the HEA include all of the issues regarding anonymous disclosures. 
Of those organisations that had both internal and prescribed persons’ Procedures,972 neither 
the C&AG nor Revenue includes the issue of anonymous disclosures in their Procedures; 
the HIA includes one issue;973 the local authorities include two issues;974 and the Marine 
Institute includes all four issues. 
Therefore, the results in relation to the four issues identified in the DPER Guidance regarding 
‘Anonymous disclosures’ indicate 36% compliance when taking all the Procedures together. 
This is a very low compliance rate. Those organisations with both internal and prescribed 
persons’ Procedures obtained 45% compliance, whilst organisations that had internal 
Procedures only, achieved 41% compliance. Organisations with prescribed persons’ 
Procedures only, obtained a compliance rate of 13%.975  
The difficulty experienced by organisations in relation to anonymous disclosures was 
highlighted by the Department of Education and Skills in its submission to the DPER 
Statutory Review, where it stated: 
There is potential for confusion amongst some persons making disclosures between 
keeping a discloser’s identity confidential and an anonymous disclosure. It would be 
helpful if the Act drew the distinction between the protections (if any) afforded to 
                                                 
967 CORU; CRU; HEA; IAASA; PSI; and SFPA. 
968 See: Appendix 3(c), ‘Findings of Prescribed Persons’ Protected Disclosures Procedures using the DPER 
Checklist for Prescribed Persons,’ G2.  
969 ibid G2 and G4.  
970 CIÉ; SEC; HEA; Clare CC; Galway CC; Kildare CC; South Dublin CC; and Wexford City Council and CC. 
971 See: Appendix 3(d), ‘Findings of Prescribed Persons’ Protected Disclosures Procedures using the DPER 
Checklist for Prescribed Persons,’ G3.  
972 C&AG; HIA; Marine Institute; Revenue; Carlow CC; Cavan CC; Fingal CC; Galway City Council; Kerry 
CC; Kilkenny CC; Limerick City Council and CC; Longford CC; Monaghan CC; Sligo CC; Westmeath CC; 
and Wicklow CC. 
973 See: Appendix 3(e), ‘Findings of Prescribed Persons’ Protected Disclosures Procedures using the DPER 
Checklist for Prescribed Persons,’ G1.  
974 ibid G3 and G4.  
975 The CRU, HEA, IAASA, PSI, Revenue, C&AG, and CIÉ have complete non-compliance, whilst CORU, 
SFPA, HIA, and all the local authorities only have partial compliance. The SEC, HEA (internal), and the 
Marine Institute are all examples of good practice.  
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“anonymous” disclosures” and “confidential” disclosures”. A number of the 
disclosures received to date have been made anonymously, however these present a 
number of difficulties in terms of conducting an investigation and may be due to a 
misunderstanding of the purpose of the Act i.e. the protections of the worker against 
penalisation – if a disclosure is made anonymously the employer does not know the 
identity of the worker so cannot offer protections.  
 
There are challenges to assessing and investigating matters raised anonymously. 
While the Protected Disclosure Act does not place a requirement to act on any 
disclosures, anonymous or otherwise, in some instances, allegations are made 
anonymously to a Minister which are of sufficient importance to warrant 
investigation, however such disclosures may prove difficult to investigate as it is not 
always possible to fully investigate the matters highlighted or to establish supporting 
evidence.976 
In addition, the HSE emphasised in its submission to the DPER Statutory Review that there 
is difficulty in terms of ‘balance and natural justice’ in circumstances where the disclosure 
is made anonymously.977 
5.3(e) The case for and against anonymous disclosures 
The position adopted in the DPER Guidance reflects the assertion by the OECD that there 
should be protection of identity through the availability of anonymous reporting978 
Transparency International also promotes the affording of protection to anonymous 
disclosures.979 Further, the UK Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy 
provides that it is good practice for managers to have a facility for anonymous disclosures.980 
There is evidence of anonymous disclosures being explicitly provided for on statute in other 
jurisdictions, eg, Australia,981 Hungary,982 Italy,983 New Zealand,984 Serbia,985 and 
                                                 
976 Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, ‘Public Consultation on the Review of the Protected 
Disclosures Act 2014’ (DPER) <www.per.gov.ie/en/public-consultation-on-the-review-of-the-protected-
disclosures-act-2014/> accessed 6 November 2018. 
977 ibid. 
978 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, ‘G20 Anti-Corruption Action Plan Protection 
of Whistleblowers, Study on Whistleblower Protection Framework, G20 Compendium of Best Practices and 
Guiding Principles for Legislation on the Protection of Whistleblowers’ (OECD 2011) 31. 
979 Transparency International, ‘International Principles for Whistleblower Legislation, Best Practices for Laws 
to Support Whistleblowers and Support Whistleblowing in the Public Interest’ (TI 2013) 6, provides that ‘full 
protection shall be granted to whistleblowers who have disclosed information anonymously and who 
subsequently have been identified without their explicit consent.’ 
980 Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, ‘Whistleblowing Guidance for Employers and 
Code of Practice’ (BEIS March 2015) 8.  
981 Public Interest Disclosures Act 2013, s 28(2). 
982 Complaints and Announcements of Public Concern Act (the ‘Whistleblower Act’) 165 of 2013. 
983 Legislative Decree 2015/72, s 18; Legislative Decree 1993/285, s 52-bis. 
984 Protected Disclosures Act 2000, s 19(3)(a). 
985 Law on the Protection of Whistleblowers Act, no 2014/128, art 13. 
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Singapore.986 However, Vandekerckhove and Lewis explain that although the possibility of 
anonymous reporting might make it easier for individuals to raise an issue, confidential 
reporting facilitates investigations.987 This is a recurring theme in the reasoning against the 
facilitating of anonymous reporting. As a result, certain organisations do not actively 
promote the inclusion of anonymous reporting provisions. For example, the British 
Standards Institute’s ‘Whistleblowing Arrangements Code of Practice’ advises against 
anonymous whistleblowing;988 the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution 
1729 (2010) Protection of “whistle-blowers”, stresses the importance of confidential 
reporting but makes no mention of anonymous reporting;989 and the draft EU Commission 
Directive on whistleblowing does not mention the possibility of allowing for anonymous 
disclosures.990 Further, the Data Protection Working Party advises against the receipt of 
anonymous disclosure, stating ‘As a general rule, the Data Protection Working Party 
considers that only identified reports should be communicated through whistleblowing 
schemes’991 in order to ensure that personal data is collected fairly. The Data Protection 
Working Party highlights a number of reasons why anonymous disclosures are not preferred: 
-being anonymous does not stop others from successfully guessing who raised the 
concern; 
-it is harder to investigate the concern if people cannot ask follow-up questions; 
-it is easier to organise the protection of the whistleblower against retaliation, 
especially if such protection is granted by law, if the concerns are raised openly; 
-anonymous reports can lead people to focus on the whistleblower, maybe suspecting 
that he or she is raising the concern maliciously; 
-an organisation runs the risk of developing a culture of receiving malevolent reports; 
                                                 
986 Corruption, Drug Trafficking and other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) Act (Cap 65A), s 39; 
Terrorism (Suppression of Financing Act) (Cap 325), ss 8(1) and 10(1). 
987 Wim Vandekerckhove and David Lewis, ‘The Content of Whistleblowing Procedures: A Critical Review 
of Recent Official Guidelines’ (2012) 108(2) Journal of Business Ethics 253, 255. 
988 British Standards Institute, ‘Whistleblowing Arrangements Code of Practice’ (BSI 2008) 14. 
989 Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution 1729 (2010) Protection of “whistle -blowers” , 
para 6.2.1.2. 
990 Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of 
persons reporting on breaches of Union law, 2018/0106 (COD). 
991 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party Opinion 1/2006 of 1 February 2006 on the Application of EU 
data protection rules to internal whistleblowing schemes in the field of accounting, internal accounting controls, 
auditing matters, fight against bribery, banking and financial crime [2006] 00195/06/EN WP 117, 11. This 
position is reflected in the Guidelines issued by the European Data Protection Supervisor where it stated ‘In 
principle, whistleblowing should not be anonymous. Whistleblowers should be invited to identify themselves 
not only to avoid abuse of the procedure but also to allow their effective protection against any retaliation. This 
will also allow a better management of the file if further information would be necessary.’ European Data 
Protection Supervisor, ‘Guidelines on processing personal information within a whistleblowing procedure’ 
(EDPS July 2016) 6. 
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-the social climate within the organisation could deteriorate if employees are aware 
that anonymous reports concerning them may be filed through the scheme at any 
time.992 
The Data Protection Working Party does acknowledge that anonymous disclosures are a 
reality for organisations and that workers may not always be in a position to make a 
confidential disclosure or have the psychological disposition to do so.993 It recommends that 
anonymous disclosures should be an exception to the rule and that whistleblowing schemes 
should be developed in such a manner that anonymous disclosures are not encouraged as the 
‘usual way’ to make a disclosure.994 The Data Protection Working Party advises that an 
organisation should not advertise that anonymous disclosures can be made through its 
whistleblowing scheme.995 Lewis, however, points out that if a discloser wishes to make 
their disclosure without revealing their identity, then it is better that Procedures state that 
making a disclosure anonymously is preferable to remaining silent about alleged serious 
wrongdoing.996 
A significant complication with the original approach in the Draft Heads to exclude 
anonymous disclosures was s 301 of the US Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 (‘SOX’) which 
already required companies listed in the US and their subsidiaries to establish protocols for 
anonymous reporting (there are approximately 700 US owned firms operating in Ireland that 
employ about 150,000 people997).998 The proposal under the Draft Heads to exclude 
anonymous disclosures from the ambit of the legislation would have been likely to create 
confusion and deny many Irish and migrant workers the same rights as those subject to SOX 
to make a protected disclosure. However, it is important to note that a decision by the French 
data protection authority (‘CNIL’) in 2005 declined to approve the SOX helplines of two US 
                                                 
992 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party Opinion 1/2006 of 1 February 2006 on the Application of EU 
data protection rules to internal whistleblowing schemes in the field of accounting, internal accounting controls, 
auditing matters, fight against bribery, banking and financial crime [2006] 00195/06/EN WP 117, 10-11.  
993 ibid 11. 
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996 David Lewis, ‘Whistleblowing and data protection principles: Is the road to reconciliation really that rocky?’ 
(2011) 2(1) European Journal of Law and Technology 5 <http://ejlt.org/article/view/53/119> accessed 31 
March 2019. 
997 US Department of State, ‘US Relations with Ireland’ (US Department of State) 
<www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3180.htm> accessed 25 April 2018. 
998 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed by US Congress in 2002 after the Enron and WorldCom scandals in 
order to protect employees of publicly traded companies who report violations of Securities and Exchange 
Commission regulations or any provision of federal law relating to fraud against the shareholders. Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002, s 301(4)(B) provides that in relation to complaints, each audit committee shall establish 
procedures ‘for the confidential, anonymous submission by employees of the issuer of concerns regarding 
questionable accounting or auditing matters.’ 
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companies partly on the basis that they provided for anonymous reporting.999 CNIL held that 
the possibility of anonymous ‘ethics alert’ could only increase the risk of slanderous 
accusations.1000 The CNIL advocated that companies should not encourage anonymous 
reporting and that although it is not prohibited, it should be the exception.1001  
This position is at odds with the position adopted in the DPER Guidance, where it advises 
that Procedures should give a commitment to act on the information disclosed anonymously, 
to the extent that it is possible.1002 The Data Protection Working Party takes the view that a 
worker should be informed that their identity will be protected and that they will not be 
penalised for making a disclosure, but if despite these assurances a worker still wants to 
make an anonymous disclosure then it should be processed through the whistleblowing 
scheme.1003 The DPER Guidance includes assurances of confidentiality, protection from 
reprisal, and that anonymous disclosures will be assessed and investigated. This approach 
follows the view expressed in the WWTW Guide, which provides that organisations should 
accept anonymous disclosures and give a commitment that they will be acted on.1004 The 
WWTW Guide explains that flexibility in disclosure options facilitates the reporting of 
wrongdoing, especially in encouraging ‘risk-averse complainants’ to come forward.1005 The 
WWTW Guide recommends that in order to get around any limitations on investigating 
anonymous disclosures, organisations should state in their Procedures that a commitment to 
investigate anonymous disclosures will only apply to those disclosures that contain a 
                                                 
999 National Commission of Computing and Freedoms, ‘Délibération relative à une demande d'autorisation de 
McDonald's France pour la mise en oeuvre d'un dispositif d'intégrité professionnelle’ (Délibération n°2005-
110, 26 May 2005) <www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCnil.do?id=CNILTEXT000017653326> accessed 24 
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1001 National Commission of Computing and Freedoms ‘Deliberation No. 2017-191 of 22 June 2017 amending 
Resolution No 2005-305 of 8 December 2005 on the single authorization for the automatic processing of 
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1002 Government Reform Unit, Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, ‘Guidance under section 21(1) 
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functions under the Act’ (DPER 2016) para E(12). This position is echoed in the DPER Statutory Review 
Report where, in response to a request for guidance on how to deal with anonymous disclosures, it stated 
‘Internal procedures should clarify that anonymous disclosures should be dealt with similarly to any other 
disclosure, i.e. as assessment of the issue and an investigation if appropriate.’ Department of Public 
Expenditure and Reform, ‘Statutory Review of the Protected Disclosures Act 2014’ (DPER July 2018) 41. 
1003 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party Opinion 1/2006 of 1 February 2006 on the Application of EU 
data protection rules to internal whistleblowing schemes in the field of accounting, internal accounting controls, 
auditing matters, fight against bribery, banking and financial crime [2006] 00195/06/EN WP 117, 11. 
1004 Peter Roberts, AJ Brown and Jane Olsen, Whistling While They Work A good-practice guide for managing 
internal reporting of wrongdoing in public sector organisations (ANU E Press 2011) 48. 
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sufficient amount of information to facilitate such an investigation.1006 The WWTW Guide 
suggests that Procedures should explain that an appropriate level of information is necessary 
in a disclosure, as the organisation will be prohibited from consulting further with the 
discloser to gain further information or clarification if the disclosure is made 
anonymously.1007 
It is worth noting that the rate of disclosures being made anonymously can vary. For 
example, according to the findings of the WWTW survey, of the Australian agencies 
surveyed in the study (n=304), 68.1% said that they would accept anonymous disclosures, 
whilst 28% indicated they would not, with a 39% non-response rate. Of those agencies that 
accepted anonymous disclosures, the estimated proportion of anonymous disclosures was 
5.46%.1008 However, according to the Irish IAW survey, 33% of employees surveyed 
(n=878) said that a key influencing factor for reporting wrongdoing in the workplace is if 
they could report anonymously.1009 If an organisation is receiving high rates of anonymous 
disclosures, this may be a warning sign to the organisation that there is a serious issue with 
the culture in the organisation that workers do not feel safe in raising their concerns openly. 
As the Ethics Resource Centre highlights, their survey data shows that ‘employees would 
rather sacrifice anonymity and report to someone they know and trust’.1010  
Despite the advice to organisations that anonymous disclosures are to be accepted by them, 
organisations need to be cognizant of the risk of injustice to the person who is the subject of 
the disclosure under natural justice and fair procedures. As discussed below, these rights 
may entail a right to cross-examine the discloser; however, if the identity of the discloser is 
not known by the organisation, then such a right cannot be afforded to the alleged wrongdoer. 
There is also the risk that maliciously false claims could be made against an individual so an 
organisation must implement processes that reduce the risk to an alleged wrongdoer. These 
are significant difficulties for the organisation. It may not be enough for an organisation to 
state in their Procedures that maliciously false disclosures will be subject to appropriate 
sanctions, as clearly, if a person makes a disclosure anonymously, they will assume that it 
will be unlikely that they would be subject to such sanctions when they cannot be identified 
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1009 Transparency International Ireland, ‘Speak Up Report 2017’ (TII 2017) 39. 
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Business Ethics Survey (Ethics Resource Center 2012) 11. 
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as the source of the disclosure. In that regard, what would be required is that recipients of 
disclosures receive training in identifying genuine disclosures of alleged wrongdoing and 
are advised that if they have any doubt as to the validity of the concern raised, that the subject 
of the disclosure is afforded all necessary protections.  
5.4 Rights of the alleged wrongdoer 
5.4(a) Introduction 
The 2014 Act is silent on the rights of an alleged wrongdoer. The Data Protection Working 
Party notes in their Opinion 1/2006 that ‘while existing regulations and guidelines on 
whistleblowing are designed to provide specific protection to the person making use of the 
whistleblowing scheme (“the whistleblower”), they never make any particular mention of 
the protection of the alleged wrongdoer’.1011 Nonetheless, there is evidence of the rights of 
the alleged wrongdoer being included in whistleblowing legislation in other jurisdictions, eg 
Canada,1012 Hungary,1013 Italy,1014 Kosovo,1015 and Serbia.1016 In Ireland, although the 2014 
Act does not include a provision relating to the alleged wrongdoer, the DPER Guidance does 
address this issue.1017  
5.4(b) The DPER Guidance 
The DPER Guidance advises that appropriate protection is afforded to the alleged wrongdoer 
and that natural justice and fair procedures are respected.1018 It gives limited advice regarding 
how to balance these rights with that of the discloser not to have their identity disclosed, 
subject to the statutory exceptions. The DPER Guidance acknowledges that complying with 
the general principles of natural justice and fair procedures will be a particular challenge 
when the disclosure is made anonymously.1019 The DPER Guidance explains that: 
                                                 
1011 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party Opinion 1/2006 of 1 February 2006 on the Application of EU 
data protection rules to internal whistleblowing schemes in the field of accounting, internal accounting controls, 
auditing matters, fight against bribery, banking and financial crime [2006] 00195/06/EN WP 117, 6. 
1012 Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act 2005, ss 11(1)(c). 
1013 Complaints and Announcements of Public Concern Act (the ‘Whistleblower Act’) 165 of 2013. 
1014 Legislative Decree 2015/72, s 18; Legislative Decree 1993/285, s 52-bis.    
1015 Draft Law on Protection of Whistleblowers, art 20(2). 
1016 Law on the Protection of Whistleblowers Act, no 2014/128, art 19. 
1017 Government Reform Unit, Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, ‘Guidance under section 21(1) 
of the Protected Disclosures Act 2014 for the purpose of assisting public bodies in the performance of their 
functions under the Act’ (DPER 2016) para E(16). 
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16.3 Whether it is necessary to disclose the identity of the discloser, or not, will 
depend upon the facts of the case, which may include, for example, whether any 
allegation is made against an individual and the nature of that allegation. The 
disclosure recipient will need to consider such matters when determining whether a 
protected disclosure can be investigated and the nature of any investigation. Persons 
making a protected disclosure should be encouraged to frame it in terms of 
information that has come to their attention rather than seeking to draw conclusions 
about particular individuals or specific offences.  
 
16.4 While an investigation under the Procedures is different to a grievance, dignity 
at work or disciplinary investigation, there are certain key themes and common 
features and the nature of any investigation under the Procedures will be informed 
by the procedures that normally apply in the public sector body when other 
allegations are investigated. The public body will need to be mindful that, if the 
investigation comes to the conclusion that some form of wrongdoing has occurred, 
the report that issues may need to be used in a subsequent disciplinary process. As a 
result, it should be able to withstand scrutiny as part of any disciplinary process and 
there should, where possible, be strong commonality of approach between such 
procedures.1020   
The DPER Guidance highlights a number of difficulties for organisations, such as balancing 
the obligations to protect the discloser’s identity with the alleged wrongdoer’s rights to 
natural justice and fair procedures, but it does not offer solutions to these issues. Potential 
solutions are addressed later in this chapter. 
5.4(c) Irish Congress of Trade Unions, ‘Drafting a Whistleblowing Policy, Guidelines for 
Trade Union Negotiators on The Protected Disclosures Act 2014’ 
The WRC Code of Practice is silent on the issue of the rights of the alleged wrongdoer. The 
Irish Congress of Trade Unions (‘ICTU’) produced a guide (‘ICTU guide’) to provide trade 
union negotiators with pointers to key provisions in the 2014 Act and to assist them in 
negotiations with employers who are interested in having a whistleblowing policy in 
place.1021 The ICTU guide addresses the position of an alleged wrongdoer and provides as 
follows: 
The Protected Disclosures Act 2014 does not in any way change the existing rights 
of workers who are subject of an allegation. In particular, workers who are the subject 
of a protected disclosure must have their right to natural justice and fair procedures 
upheld. In this respect the LRC Code of Practice: Grievance and Disciplinary 
Procedures S.I. NO. 146 OF 2000 is central. Fair procedure principles require that 
the allegations or complaints be set out in writing, that the source of the allegations 
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1021 Irish Congress of Trade Unions, ‘Drafting a Whistleblowing Policy, Guidelines for Trade Union 
Negotiators on The Protected Disclosures Act 2014’ (ICTU August 2014). 
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or complaint be given or that the employee concerned be allowed to confront or 
question witnesses. The worker must be given the opportunity to be represented.1022 
This information is incorrect. As will be seen later in this chapter, the rights to natural justice 
and fair procedures are not necessarily the same in the context of a protected disclosure as 
in other grievance procedures, for example, in the context of a protected disclosure, the 
source of the allegation does not always have to be given to the alleged wrongdoer.  
5.4(d) Prescribed persons’ Procedures analysis 
In analysing the Procedures of the prescribed persons, three issues in the DPER Guidance 
were assessed in relation to ‘Protection of the rights of Respondents’.1023 
 
Of the organisations that had prescribed persons’ Procedures only,1024 the SFPA was the 
only organisation to include information on this issue in their Procedures and addressed the 
first two issues from the DPER Guidance.1025  
Of those Procedures that were internal only,1026 the HEA addressed one issue;1027 the local 
authorities also addressed one issue;1028 and the SEC addressed two issues.1029  
Of those organisations that had both internal and prescribed persons’ Procedures,1030 the HIA 
and Revenue contained none of the issues in their Procedures; the C&AG and the local 
authorities included one issue;1031 and the Marine Institute included all three issues in their 
Procedures. 
Thus, as can be seen from the results in relation to the three issues identified in the DPER 
Guidance regarding ‘Protection of the rights of Respondents’, there was evidence of only 
                                                 
1022 ibid 8. 
1023 See: Appendix 3(b), ‘Coding of DPER Checklist for Prescribed Persons’ Protected Disclosures 
Procedures’. 
1024 CORU; CRU; HEA; IAASA; PSI; and SFPA. 
1025 See: Appendix 3(c), ‘Findings of Prescribed Persons’ Protected Disclosures Procedures using the DPER 
Checklist for Prescribed Persons,’ K1 and K2.  
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1027 See: Appendix 3(d), ‘Findings of Prescribed Persons’ Protected Disclosures Procedures using the DPER 
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1028 ibid K1.  
1029 ibid K2 and K3. 
1030 C&AG; HIA; Marine Institute; Revenue; Carlow CC; Cavan CC; Fingal CC; Galway City Council; Kerry 
CC; Kilkenny CC; Limerick City Council and CC; Longford CC; Monaghan CC; Sligo CC; Westmeath CC; 
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1031 See: Appendix 3(e), ‘Findings of Prescribed Persons’ Protected Disclosures Procedures using the DPER 
Checklist for Prescribed Persons,’ K2. 
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29% compliance when taking all the Procedures together. Those organisations with both 
internal and prescribed persons’ Procedures obtained 33% compliance, whilst organisations 
that had internal Procedures only, also obtained 33% compliance. Organisations with 
prescribed persons’ Procedures only, obtained a compliance rate of 11%. Eight prescribed 
persons failed to include any information on this issue in their Procedures.1032 All the local 
authorities, the HEA (internal), and the C&AG included one issue each. The SFPA and the 
SEC included two of the issues, but again the Marine Institute was best in class for their 
compliance with the requirements of the DPER Guidance.  
However, it must be emphasised, that although the Marine Institute’s Procedures reflect the 
conditions of the DPER Guidance, the DPER Guidance is silent on some matters, such as 
the rights of the alleged wrongdoer under data protection rules. Therefore, whilst the 
Procedures of an organisation may comply with the DPER Guidance, organisations will still 
have to weigh up the rights of each alleged wrongdoer on a case-by-case situation and should 
ensure that their Procedures address the issues relating to the rights of an alleged wrongdoer, 
that are outlined below.  
5.4(e) Natural justice and fair procedures 
In order to balance the rights of the discloser and the rights of an alleged wrongdoer, the 
organisation will need to have an understanding of what constitutes natural justice and fair 
procedures and when such rights apply to an alleged wrongdoer. The WWTW Guide 
highlights that the issue of natural justice can create considerable difficulties for 
organisations stating that: 
Misunderstandings around the requirements of natural justice are a source of 
confusion and practical difficulty in the area of maintaining confidentiality. When an 
allegation is made against a person, natural justice principles require that the person 
be made aware of the allegations against them if an adverse decision is to be made. 
Many managers, however, incorrectly assume that natural justice obligations require 
the identity of the person making the report to be revealed. In small work groups, 
making someone aware of the allegations against them can also inevitably mean 
signalling the identity of the reporter.1033 
However, this statement is not entirely accurate. It is correct to say that at the receipt stage, 
it may not be necessary to inform the subject of the disclosure of the source of the disclosure; 
                                                 
1032 CIÉ; CORU; CRU; HEA; IAASA; PSI; Revenue; and HIA. 
1033 Peter Roberts, AJ Brown and Jane Olsen, Whistling While They Work A good-practice guide for managing 
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230 
 
however, it may be required at the investigation and disciplinary stages of the disclosure, as 
discussed below. 
5.4(e)(i) What are natural justice and fair procedures? 
The right to fair procedures is derived from an implied right in Bunreacht na hÉireann 1937 
(‘Irish Constitution’) which provides in Article 40.3.1 that ‘The State guarantees in its laws 
to respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate the personal rights 
of the citizen.’1034 In addition to the constitutional right to fair procedures, there are three 
further sources of fair procedures:1035 (i) an implied term of a contract of employment;1036 
(ii) the Unfair Dismissals Acts 1977-2001;1037 and (iii) some particular statutory form of 
procedural protection from dismissal for those public servants excluded from the Unfair 
Dismissal Acts 1977-2001.1038 
Historically, principles of natural justice were only afforded to office-holders or officers who 
could be removable for cause but not to office-holders or officers dismissable at pleasure or 
to employees.1039 However, the Supreme Court in Garvey v Ireland1040 held that this 
distinction between office-holders/officers holding office at pleasure and those that could be 
dismissed for cause was no longer applicable and that principles of natural justice applied to 
any decision to dismiss. Further, in Gunn v Bord an Choláiste Náisiúnta Ealaíne is 
Deartha,1041 Mr Justice Walsh held that the principles of natural justice apply without regard 
to the status of the person entitled to benefit from them.1042  
Traditionally, what constituted fair procedures could be found in the maxims nemo iudex in 
causa sua, ie the decision maker should not be biased, and audi alteram partem, ie the 
                                                 
1034 Art 40.3.1. 
1035 Frances Meenan, Employment Law (Round Hall 2014) 699. 
1036 Glover v BLN Ltd [1973] IR 388 (SC). 
1037 The Unfair Dismissals Acts 1977-2001 do not apply to all categories of employees, ie members of the 
defence forces, local authority managers, or persons employed by or under the State who are still dismissable 
by the government. 
1038 For example, Local Government Act 1941 and Universities Act 1997. 
1039 Frances Meenan, Employment Law (Round Hall 2014) 884. 
1040 Garvey v Ireland [1981] IR 75 (HC). 
1041Gunn v Bord an Choláiste Náisiúnta Ealaíne is Deartha [1990] 2 IR 168 (SC). 
1042 ibid 181. Mr Justice Walsh stated in this regard ‘There is one other matter I wish to refer to, to clear up 
what appears to be misapprehension concerning the application of the rules of natural justice or of constitutional 
justice. The application of these rules does not depend upon whether the person concerned is an office-holder 
as distinct from being an employee of some other kind.’  
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alleged wrongdoer ought to know the case he has to meet and have a reasonable opportunity 
to put their side of the case.1043 
In the decision of Re Haughey,1044 Ó Dáilaigh CJ, although addressing the rights of the 
applicant when appearing before the Dáil’s Public Accounts Committee, held that the 
following fair procedural safeguards should be afforded to an alleged wrongdoer during an 
oral hearing: 
(a) that he should be furnished with a copy of the evidence which reflected on his 
good name; (b) that he should be allowed to cross-examine, by counsel, his accuser 
or accusers; (c) that he should be allowed to give rebutting evidence; and (d) that he 
should be permitted to address, again by counsel, the Committee in his own 
defence.1045  
Further guidance as to what constitutes fair procedures can be drawn from the Code of 
Practice on Grievance and Disciplinary Procedures,1046 which provides that the procedures 
for dealing with disciplinary and grievance issues, whilst reflecting the varying 
circumstances of enterprises/organisations, must comply with the general principles of 
natural justice and fair procedures.1047 Paragraph 4(7) of the Code of Practice on Grievance 
and Disciplinary Procedures provides that these principles of natural justice and fair 
procedures may require that the allegations or complaints be set out in writing, that the source 
of the allegations or complaint be given, or that the employee concerned be allowed to 
confront or question witnesses. 
The elements of natural justice and fair procedures in the context of whistleblowing schemes 
are addressed below. 
                                                 
1043 Michael Forde, Constitutional Law (2nd edn, First Law Limited 2004) 521. 
1044 Re Haughey [1971] IR 217 (SC). 
1045 ibid 263; Mr Justice McMahon in Khan v HSE  [2008] IEHC 234 described what is meant by fair procedures 
and stated ‘What does fair procedures mean? At the very minimum it means that the person at whom a charge 
is levelled has proper notice of the charge; that he has proper opportunity to take legal advice and to prepare 
for hearing; that no one is to be a judge in their own cause; (nemo judex in causa sua) that both parties are 
given a full opportunity to be heard (audi alteram partem) and that the judge is free from bias. Moreover, it 
is clichéd law that not only must these principles be adhered to, but they must be seen to be adhered to. Justice 
must be seen to be done.’ 
1046 Industrial Relations Act 1990 (Code of Practice on Grievance and Disciplinary Procedures) (Declaration) 
Order 2000, SI 2000/146.  
1047 ibid [4(6)], provides that the general principles of natural justice and fair procedures include: (i) That 
employee grievances are fairly examined and processed; (ii) that details of any allegations or complaints are 
put to the employee concerned; (iii) that the employee concerned is given the opportunity to respond fully to 
any such allegations or complaints; (iv) that the employee concerned is given the opportunity to avail of the 
right to be represented during the procedure; and (v) that the employee concerned has the right to a fair and 
impartial determination of the issues concerned, taking into account any representations made by, or on behalf 
of, the employee and any other relevant or appropriate evidence, factors, circumstances.  
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5.4(e)(ii) At what stage of the disclosures process do natural justice and fair procedures 
apply? 
Organisations must not only be satisfied that they know what rights the alleged wrongdoer 
is entitled to but also at what stage of the process the alleged wrongdoer is afforded those 
rights. In the seminal decision of Re Haughey,1048 Ó Dáilaigh CJ sitting in the Supreme 
Court, outlined when the principles of natural justice apply, stating that: 
[I]n proceedings before any tribunal where a party to the proceedings is on risk of 
having his good name, or his person or property, or any of his personal rights 
jeopardised, the proceedings may be correctly classed as proceedings which may 
affect his rights, and in compliance with the Constitution the State, either by its 
enactments or through the Courts, must outlaw any procedures which will restrict or 
prevent the party concerned from vindicating these rights.1049 
The law in Ireland is currently in a state of flux due to the decision of Mr Justice Eagar sitting 
in the High Court in 2017 in the case of Lyons v Longford Westmeath Education and 
Training Board.1050 The High Court in Lyons held that an alleged wrongdoer is entitled to 
both legal representation and the right to cross-examine the complainant, through counsel, 
if an investigation extends further than simply investigating the allegations and deciding 
whether there is a case to answer or not. The High Court held that an alleged wrongdoer is 
entitled to such fair procedures where a complaint is made which could impinge on an 
individual’s good name, as protected under Article 40.3.2 of the Irish Constitution,1051 and 
where it could result in a dismissal.1052 
                                                 
1048 Re Haughey [1971] IR 217 (SC). 
1049 ibid 264. 
1050 Lyons v Longford Westmeath Education and Training Board [2017] IEHC 272. In January 2018, because 
of the evolving case law in this area, Mr Pat Breen (‘Breen’), TD, Minister of State for Trade, Employment, 
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concerned.’ Merrion Street, ‘Minister Breen announces review of Codes of Practice on Bullying in the 
Workplace’ (Merrion Street, 17 January 2018) 
<https://merrionstreet.ie/en/NewsRoom/Releases/Minister_Breen_announces_review_of_Codes_of_Practice
_on_Bullying_in_the_Workplace.html> accessed 4 April 2018. 
1051 Art 40.3.2 provides that ‘The State shall, in particular, by its laws protect as best it may from unjust attack 
and, in the case of injustice done, vindicate the life, person, good name, and property rights of every citizen.’ 
1052 Lyons v Longford Westmeath Education and Training Board [2017] IEHC 272 [95]. 
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In relation to the finding of a right to cross-examine at the investigatory stage, Mr Justice 
Eagar relied on the Supreme Court decision of Borges v Fitness to Practice Committee,1053 
where Keane CJ stated:  
It is beyond argument that, where a tribunal such as the first respondent is inquiring 
into an allegation of conduct which reflects on a person's good name or reputation, 
basic fairness of procedure requires that he or she should be allowed to cross-
examine, by counsel, his accuser or accusers. That has been the law since the decision 
of this court in In re Haughey [1971] I.R. 217 and the importance of observing that 
requirement is manifestly all the greater where, as here, the consequence of the 
tribunal's finding may not simply reflect on his reputation but may also prevent him 
from practising as a doctor, either for a specified period or indefinitely.1054 
Mr Justice Eagar emphasised in his decision that cross-examination is a ‘vital safeguard to 
ensure fair procedure’ where an investigation can lead to dismissal1055 and noted further that 
Keane CJ in Borges stated that: 
It is sufficient to say that the applicant cannot be deprived of his right to fair 
procedures, which necessitate the giving of evidence by his accusers and their being 
cross-examined, by the extension of the exceptions to the rule against hearsay to a 
case in which they are unwilling to testify in person.1056 
The High Court in Lyons ultimately held that it is ‘the actual investigation that requires the 
rights to cross-examination and representation, that takes prior to the initiation of the 
disciplinary procedure…’1057 Mr Justice Eagar found that a refusal to allow legal 
representation to appear on behalf of the applicant and to allow the applicant to cross-
examine the complainant through legal representation was in breach of Articles 40.3.1 and 
40.3.2 of the Irish Constitution. Mr Justice Eagar stated that ‘The Court is clear that in the 
circumstances where a complaint is made which could result in an individual’s dismissal, or 
where it impinges on the individual’s right to a good name, the individual is entitled to fair 
procedures, as outlined by the Supreme Court’.1058 Prior to the Lyons decision, a right to 
legal representation at the disciplinary stage depended on the circumstances of each case.1059 
                                                 
1053 Borges v Fitness to Practice Committee [2004] 1 IR 103 (SC). 
1054 ibid 113. 
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1056 Borges v Fitness to Practice Committee [2004] 1 IR 103 (SC) 119. 
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1058 ibid [101].  
1059 The Code of Practice on Grievance and Disciplinary Procedures provides that an employee is entitled to 
be represented during the grievance and disciplinary procedure but does not require that this is legal 
representation and it does not exclude such representation. Industrial Relations Act 1990 (Code of Practice on 
Grievance and Disciplinary Procedures) (Declaration) Order 2000, SI 2000/146 [4(6)]. The Supreme Court in 
Burns v Governor of Castlerea Prison [2009] 3 IR 682 (SC) had held that a right to legal representation at a 
disciplinary hearing may be appropriate in certain circumstances. At paras 14 and 15 of that judgment, Mr 
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Now it appears, however, that there is a blanket right to legal representation at the 
investigation stage if the investigation is not just an evidence gathering exercise.1060  
Despite the right of an alleged wrongdoer to natural justice and fair procedures as outlined, 
these rights can be curtailed when balancing them against the rights of a discloser to have 
their identity protected. As demonstrated below in relation to data protection rights and 
obligations, the identity of the discloser does not have to be disclosed to the alleged 
wrongdoer in order for the alleged wrongdoer to be able to respond to the accusation. 
However, this issue becomes less clear when fair procedures and natural justice are 
considered. Meenan explains that the rights enunciated by Ó Dálaigh CJ in Re Haughey are 
normally applied as a package but that in some circumstances it may be appropriate that only 
some of the rights are applied.1061  
                                                 
Justice Geoghan approved the criteria set out by Mr Justice Webster in R  v Home Sec Ex p Tarrant [1985] 1 
QB 251 (HL), namely: (i) the seriousness of the charge and of the potential penalty; (ii) whether any 
points of law are likely to arise; (iii) the capacity of a particular prisoner to present his own case; (iv) procedural 
difficulty; (v) the need for reasonable speed in making the adjudication, that being an important consideration; 
and (vi) the need for fairness as between prisoners and as between prisoners and prison officers. Mr Justice 
Geoghan emphasised that the criteria suggested are starting off points to be considered and are merely factors 
which might be relevant in the consideration of whether legal representation is desirable in the interests of a 
fair hearing but that an employer would still be entitled to consider whether a fair hearing would require a 
lawyer in the particular circumstances of the case. Mr Justice Geoghan reiterated that legal representation 
should be the exception rather than the rule. 
1060 The Supreme Court in Re National Irish Bank Ltd (under investigation) and Re Companies Act, 1990 (No. 
1) [1999] 3 IR 145 (SC) dealt with an investigation by inspectors which was a two stage one. The first stage of 
the investigation was an information gathering exercise by way of informal interviews, whilst the second stage 
of the investigation consisted of a hearing at which certain individuals could have legal representation, could 
cross-examine witnesses, and could give evidence themselves. The second stage of the investigation would 
only arise when the first stage indicated a possibility that adverse conclusions could be drawn in relation to 
those certain individuals. In distinguishing Re Haughey [1971] IR 217 (SC), Mr Justice Shanley at 168 held 
that at the first stage of the investigation, the inspectors cannot be compelled to produce any documents to the 
respondent and that the respondent is not entitled to any documents or to the facility of cross-examining any 
person at this initial stage in the process. Mr Justice Shanley stated that ‘I am satisfied that there is no 
entitlement to invoke the panoply of rights identified by the Supreme Court at the information gathering stage 
of the Inspectors' work. The procedures identified by the inspectors following the outcome of the first stage 
accord in my view with the requirements of fairness and justice and guarantee, where appropriate, the exercise 
of the rights identified in In re Haughey  [1971] I.R. 217.’ 
1061 Frances Meenan, Employment Law (Round Hall 2014) 655-656. For example, if the alleged wrongdoer 
does not raise any issue of fact before their dismissal which needs to be referred to a tribunal then the audi 
alteram partem rule may not be applied. This position is demonstrated in the Supreme Court decision of 
Mooney v An Post [1998] 4 IR 288 (SC) where one of the arguments put forward by the plaintiff was that his 
dismissal breached fair procedures in circumstances where he was not afforded an investigation of the 
complaint against him at an oral hearing before an independent chairman. In dismissing the plaintiff’s appeal, 
the Supreme Court noted that the plaintiff had been entitled to remain silent when the complaint against him 
had been the subject of criminal proceedings but that from the date of his acquittal until the date of his dismissal 
he had made no further statement in relation to the complaint made against him, although he had been afforded 
every opportunity to do so. In that regard, the Supreme Court held that as the plaintiff had raised no issue of 
fact there was no necessity to refer it to a civil tribunal. Barrington J stated that ‘Certainly the employee is 
entitled to the benefit of fair procedures but what these demand will depend upon the terms of his employment 
the circumstances surrounding his proposed dismissal. Certainly the minimum he is entitled to is to be informed 
of the charge against him and to be given an opportunity to answer it and to make submissions.’ ibid 297.  
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5.4(e)(iii) The balancing of rights of the discloser and the alleged wrongdoer 
Paragraph E(16) of the DPER Guidance provides that Procedures must comply with the 
general principles of natural justice and fair procedures, as appropriate.1062 The DPER 
Guidance acknowledges that this right to fair procedures may include the right of an alleged 
wrongdoer to challenge the evidence against them and in that regard, such a right will have 
to be balanced against the discloser’s rights under the 2014 Act, in particular, the discloser’s 
right to have their identity protected.1063 For organisations, this must be a carefully calculated 
balancing exercise. Guidance as to how an organisation should proceed in such 
circumstances can be gleaned from the decision of the UK Employment Appeal Tribunal 
(‘UKEAT’) in Linfood Cash & Carry Ltd v Thomson.1064 The UKEAT in this decision 
acknowledged that there must be a careful balance between ‘the desirability to protect 
informants who are genuinely in fear, and providing a fair hearing of issues for employees 
who are accused of misconduct.’1065 The UKEAT proceeded to lay down guidance as to the 
appropriate procedures to be deployed when the discloser wishes for their identity to remain 
protected and stated: 
Every case must depend upon its own facts, and circumstances may vary widely — 
indeed with further experience other aspects may demonstrate themselves — but we 
hope that the following comments may prove to be of assistance: 
1. The information given by the informant should be reduced into writing in one or 
more statements.1066 Initially these statements should be taken without regard to the 
fact that in those cases where anonymity is to be preserved, it may subsequently 
prove to be necessary to omit or erase certain parts of the statements before 
submission to others in order to prevent identification. 
2. In taking statements the following seem important: (a) Date, time and place of 
each or any observation or incident. (b) The opportunity and ability to observe clearly 
and with accuracy. (c) The circumstantial evidence such as knowledge of a system 
or arrangement, or the reason for the presence of the informer and why certain small 
details are memorable. (d) Whether the informant has suffered at the hands of the 
accused or has any other reason to fabricate, whether from personal grudge or any 
other reason or principle. 
                                                 
1062 Government Reform Unit, Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, ‘Guidance under section 21(1) 
of the Protected Disclosures Act 2014 for the purpose of assisting public bodies in the performance of their 
functions under the Act’ (DPER 2016) para E(16.1). 
1063 ibid para E(16.2). 
1064 Linfood Cash & Carry Ltd v Thomson [1989] ICR 518 (EAT) 522-523. 
1065 ibid 522. 
1066 When recording disclosures in writing this engages data protection law, which is discussed in the ‘Data 
Protection’ section below. 
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3. Further investigation can then take place either to confirm or undermine the 
information given. Corroboration is clearly desirable. 
4. Tactful inquiries may well be thought suitable and advisable into the character and 
background of the informant or any other information which may tend to add to or 
detract from the value of the information. 
5. If the informant is prepared to attend a disciplinary hearing, no problem will arise, 
but if, as in the present case, the employer is satisfied that the fear is genuine, then a 
decision will need to be made whether or not to continue with the disciplinary 
process. 
6. If it is to continue, then it seems to us desirable that at each stage of those 
procedures the member of management responsible for that hearing should himself 
interview the informant and satisfy himself what weight is to be given to the 
information. 
7. The written statement of the informant — if necessary with omissions to avoid 
identification — should be made available to the employee and his representatives. 
8. If the employee or his representative raises any particular and relevant issue which 
should be put to the informant, then it may be desirable to adjourn for the chairman 
to make further inquiries of that informant. 
9. Although it is always desirable for notes to be taken during disciplinary 
procedures, it seems to us to be particularly important that full and careful notes 
should be taken in these cases. 
10. Although not peculiar to cases where informants have been the cause for the 
initiation of an investigation, it seems to us important that if evidence from an 
investigating officer is to be taken at a hearing it should, where possible, be prepared 
in a written form.1067 
Thus, in order to balance the rights of both the alleged wrongdoer and the discloser, the 
Linfood guidelines provide that the written recording of the disclosure should be furnished 
to the alleged wrongdoer but with the necessary omissions to avoid identification of the 
discloser.1068 It further provides that management responsible for the hearing should 
interview the discloser and satisfy themselves as to the weight to be given to the information 
                                                 
1067 Linfood Cash & Carry Ltd v Thomson [1989] ICR 518 (EAT) 522-523. 
1068 In the Irish EAT decision of Kieran v Our Lady’s Hospital for Sick Children UDD 1129/1992 allegations 
regarding the disappearance of food from the hospital were made in confidence by members of staff to the 
Director of Nursing (‘DON’). The DON did not reveal the identity of those staff members to the alleged 
wrongdoer, the claimant, on the grounds of fear of threats of intimidation. The claimant argued that he was 
dismissed unfairly for the alleged misconduct on the basis that the allegations about misappropriation of goods 
were not substantiated and no witnesses were called to give evidence and therefore the investigation was 
flawed. The EAT stated that it understood the position adopted by the DON that she could not divulge the name 
of the witnesses because they had approached her in confidence. The EAT held that the DON was not obliged 
to make such a disclosure as long as she outlined the allegations made by them to the claimant. The EAT further 
noted that the DON had five meetings with the claimant and therefore had every opportunity of responding to 
the allegations against him. On that basis, the EAT did not accept the claimant’s submission that the dismissal 
was procedurally unfair.   
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and that any questioning of the discloser at a disciplinary hearing should be done through 
the chairperson of the disciplinary hearing.  
Although welcome, the Linfood guidelines have limitations when the 2014 Act and other 
statutory obligations are taken into consideration. Firstly, the reference to the making of 
inquiries into the character and background of the informant is arguably inapplicable 
considering the explicit requirement under the 2014 Act that the motivation for making a 
disclosure is irrelevant to whether or not it is a protected disclosure.1069 Secondly, the 
Linfood guidelines provide that if the discloser is not prepared to attend a disciplinary 
hearing, and the employer is satisfied that the discloser has a genuine fear in attending, the 
employer must decide whether to continue with the disciplinary process. This approach may 
result in the discloser pursuing their disclosure outside of the organisation if they believe 
that the employer is not taking steps to address the alleged wrongdoing, which may result in 
reputational damage to the organisation. Also, the employer may have obligations under 
other statutory provisions to address wrongdoing in the workplace that must be complied 
with, ie s 8 of the Safety, Health and Welfare at Work Act 2005 obliges employers to ensure 
the safety, health, and welfare at work of their employees. Thus, if an employer fails to fully 
address a disclosure that the health and safety of an employee are being or is likely to be 
endangered, the employer could be found guilty of failing to discharge their duty to protect 
their employees. Further, an employer may have obligations under the common law or other 
statutory provisions. For example, in respect of health and safety concerns, under the 
common law negligence principles, an employer owes a duty of care to its employees ‘to 
take reasonable care for the servant’s safety in all the circumstances of the case.’1070 It is also 
an implied term in an employee’s contract of employment that the employer will provide a 
safe and healthy working environment.1071 
                                                 
1069 Protected Disclosures Act 2014, s 5(7). However, note that the motivation of a worker is a factor in relation 
to a disclosure of a trade secret as a result of the transposition of European Parliament and Council Directive 
2016/943/EC of 8 June 2016 on the protection of undisclosed know-how and business information (trade 
secrets) against their unlawful acquisition, use and disclosure [2016] OJ L157/1 into Irish law in June 2018 by 
the European Union (Protection of Trade Secrets) Regulations 2018, SI 2018/188, which inserts s 5(7A) into 
the 2014 Act and provides that ‘Where a worker, referred to in subsection (1), makes a disclosure of relevant 
information in the manner specified by that subsection, and in respect of that disclosure of relevant information 
it is alleged that the disclosure concerned the unlawful acquisition, use, or disclosure of a trade secret (within 
the meaning of the European Union (Protection of Trade Secrets) Regulations 2018 (S.I. No. 188 of 2018)), 
disclosure is a protected disclosure provided that the worker has acted for the purposes of protecting the general 
public interest.’ Protected Disclosures Act 2014, s 5(7A). 
1070 Dalton v Frendo (SC, 15 December 1977) 4. 
1071 Wilson and Clyde Coal Co Ltd v English [1938] AC 57 (HL). 
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In the Irish courts, there is precedent for arguing that the alleged wrongdoer may not always 
have the right to cross-examination at the disciplinary hearing. In the High Court decision 
of Vogel v Cheeverstown House Ltd,1072 Mr Justice Shanley held that the requirements of 
natural justice did not require a complainant to be produced and cross-examined by a 
disciplinary tribunal. This case concerned an application by the plaintiff for an interlocutory 
injunction restraining the defendant from commencing and determining a disciplinary charge 
against him in relation to an allegation of sexual abuse unless he was allowed to cross-
examine the complainant. The complainant had a moderate level of mental handicap and 
was regarded as being ‘extremely sensitive, vulnerable, fragile mentally’1073 and there was 
evidence following a validation exercise that being subjected to examination and cross-
examination during the proposed tribunal would seriously damage her mental health. The 
defendant proposed to permit the plaintiff to use legal representation and to have copies of 
all correspondence, medical reports, and witness statements. The defendant intended that all 
witnesses would be produced, except for the complainant. However, all the evidence and the 
witnesses (including expert witnesses) that would appear at the tribunal would be giving 
hearsay evidence. In its judgment, the court considered the decision of Keady v 
Commissioner of An Garda Síochána1074 and referred to the dicta of Mr Justice O’Flaherty 
where he stated: 
[T]here is now in place a well charted system of administrative law which requires 
decision-makers to render justice in the cases brought before them and sets out the 
procedures that should be followed, which procedures will vary from case to case 
and from one type of tribunal to another and which, of course, are subject to judicial 
review. Similarly, the rules of evidence may not necessarily be applied with the same 
strictness as in a court of law provided that the decision-making body keeps in the 
forefront of its deliberations the necessity to come to a correct and just verdict having 
regard to the complaints that have to be investigated; the determination to be made 
and the consequences such determination may have for the other party or parties 
appearing before it.1075 
Taking this dicta into consideration, Mr Justice Shanley held that ‘in considering the 
question of the admissibility of hearsay evidence one must look at all of the facts and that 
the rights and, indeed, the interests of all of the parties must, as far as it is practicable to do 
so, be safeguarded.’1076 Mr Justice Shanley was satisfied that the rules of natural justice do 
                                                 
1072 Vogel v Cheeverstown House Ltd [1998] 2 IR 496 (HC). 
1073 ibid 498. 
1074 Keady v Commissioner of An Garda Síochána [1992] 2 IR 197 (SC). 
1075 Vogel v Cheeverstown House Ltd [1998] 2 IR 496 (HC) 499. 
1076 ibid 500. 
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not require that the complainant be produced for examination and cross-examination by the 
proposed tribunal. Mr Justice Shanley balanced the evidence of risk of damage to the 
complainant’s mental health and the risk of injustice to the plaintiff and held that the risk to 
the plaintiff could be avoided by ordering a further validation exercise to be performed by a 
nominated psychologist or psychiatrist by the plaintiff’s representatives. Mr Justice Shanley 
emphasised that the requirements of natural justice depend on the circumstances of each case 
and the nature of each particular inquiry.1077 
Thus, an employer may be justified in refusing to produce a complainant at the disciplinary 
hearing if it can establish that it has balanced the risks to both the discloser and the alleged 
wrongdoer and that the risk of injustice to the alleged wrongdoer can be avoided by the 
taking of some other steps. The Vogel case concerned a complainant, which ties into the third 
issue of concern identified in the Linfood guidelines.  
The Linfood guidelines apply to information received from informants who are not 
complainants and not to informants who are also complainants. An organisation may face a 
situation more complicated than that considered in the Vogel decision, where not only can 
the complainant not be produced and subject to cross-examination at the disciplinary 
hearing, but it may not be possible to disclose any basic details of the allegation against an 
alleged wrongdoer by the complainant in circumstances where in doing so this may reveal 
the identity of the discloser and subject them to serious risk of reprisal. This situation arose 
in the UKEAT decision of Surrey CC v Henderson,1078 where the employer (the appellant) 
had received five statements from different individuals that an employee (the respondent) 
had threatened serious violence against each of them and members of their families. The 
basic details of the allegations were not furnished by the appellant to the respondent on the 
basis that it was necessary to protect the identities of the complainants. The complainants 
feared that they would be subject to reprisals by the respondent if their identities were made 
known and as a result, they would not attend an internal disciplinary hearing. The respondent 
was not furnished with any statements made by the complainants, even in redacted form.1079  
This was the first case in the UK to consider the fairness of disciplinary proceedings in 
circumstances where there was a refusal to provide the basic details of the allegations to the 
alleged wrongdoer. The UKEAT noted that the Linfood guidelines related to the protection 
                                                 
1077 ibid. 
1078 Surrey CC v Henderson (UKEAT/0326/05/ZT, 23 November 2005). 
1079 ibid [9]. 
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of informants who are not complainants and not informers who are also complainants.1080 In 
this case, the UKEAT held that the ET had applied the incorrect test in determining that the 
dismissal was substantively unfair. The UKEAT held that in analysing whether the employer 
had reached a decision to dismiss the employee on reasonable grounds after a reasonable 
investigation, the ET had failed to assess whether the procedure adopted by the employer 
fell within or outside the band of reasonable responses.1081 The UKEAT explained that: 
That band may include some reasonable employers who would have disclosed the 
witness statements taken from the five complainants, either in full or in redacted 
form, or in some other summary form and others who would not, given the promises 
of confidentiality made by the Respondents to those complainants based on their 
fears and concerns for themselves and their families.1082 
The UKEAT found that the ET had substituted their own view for that of a reasonable 
employer by finding that if the complaints were true then the claimant would know whom 
those complainants were, therefore rejecting the respondent's reason for not disclosing the 
statements of the complainants.1083 The UKEAT provided guidance as to the correct 
approach in such circumstances stating that the ET was required: 
[T]o make clear findings as to the extent of the Respondent's investigation into the 
reasons why the complainants insisted on anonymity and then to carry out the 
balancing act between the Respondent's perceived need to protect the identity of 
the complainants and the natural justice requirement that the Claimant should know 
sufficiently the nature of the case against him, applying the band of reasonable 
responses test.1084 
The proposition derived from this authority can be applied to disclosures made under the 
2014 Act where the discloser is also a complainant, and they fear retaliation if their identity 
is revealed to the alleged wrongdoer. Therefore, in assessing whether an employer was 
reasonable in refusing to disclose the basic details of an allegation, including the identity of 
the complainant, to an alleged wrongdoer, requires the employer to undertake a reasonable 
investigation into the reasons why the complainant wishes for their identity to be protected. 
Also, if the sanction imposed at the end of a disciplinary process may be a dismissal, the 
employer must also satisfy the requirement that their action falls within the band of 
reasonable responses when balancing the rights of the complainant to protection of identity 
                                                 
1080 ibid [21]. 
1081 ibid [29]. 
1082 ibid. 
1083 ibid [30]. 
1084 ibid [31]. 
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and the alleged wrongdoer's rights under natural justice to know the nature of the case against 
them sufficiently. 
However, it may not always be possible for an employer to justify non-disclosure of the 
basic details of an allegation and it is likely that such a position could only be adopted if 
there is a real and serious risk of retaliation against the discloser. Therefore, an employer 
would be advised to conduct a risk assessment of a discloser’s claim that they are at risk of 
penalisation. This could be similar to a risk assessment as required under the Safety, Health 
and Welfare at Work Act 2005 regarding hazards in the place of work.1085 There are statutory 
requirements in Australia requiring organisations to assess risks of reprisals against 
disclosers.1086 Prior to the introduction of the statutory risk assessment requirements under 
whistleblowing legislation in Australia, the WWTW study found that public sector 
organisations in Australia rarely used risk-management techniques for dealing with 
whistleblower retaliation.1087 It further found from the interviews conducted for the WWTW 
study that there is a ‘disturbing lack of interest in agencies in establishing procedures to 
assess risk and implementing structures to ensure that risk assessments actually take 
place.’1088 The WWTW Guide acknowledges that undertaking a risk assessment of the 
likelihood of retaliation can be a quite difficult task for an organisation.1089 In order to assist 
organisations in carrying out a risk assessment, the WWTW Guide contains an appendix 
with practical information for conducting a risk assessment that is based on lessons learnt 
from the research undertaken for the WWTW study.1090  
5.5 Data protection 
5.5(a) Introduction 
One glaring omission from the 2014 Act, the DPER Guidance, and the WRC Code of 
Practice is the matter of data protection. The draft EU Commission Directive on 
whistleblowing highlights the importance of data protection in the context of whistleblowing 
schemes and provides: 
                                                 
1085 Safety, Health and Welfare at Work Act 2005, s 19.  
1086 Public Interest Disclosure Act 2012, s 33(2); Public Interest Disclosure Act 2013, s59(1)(a). 
1087 Peter Roberts, AJ Brown and Jane Olsen, Whistling While They Work A good-practice guide for managing 
internal reporting of wrongdoing in public sector organisations (ANU E Press 2011) 60. 
1088 ibid 61. 
1089 ibid 62. 
1090 ibid app 2. 
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Protection of personal data of the reporting and concerned person is crucial in order 
to avoid unfair treatment or reputational damages due to disclosure of personal data, 
in particular data revealing the identity of a person concerned. Hence, in line with 
the requirements of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 on the protection of natural persons 
with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data 
… competent authorities should establish adequate data protection procedures 
specifically geared to the protection of the reporting person, the concerned person 
and any third person referred to in the report that should include a secure system 
within the competent authority with restricted access rights for authorised staff 
only.1091 
This position enunciated by the European Commission is contained in art 18 of the draft EU 
Commission Directive on whistleblowing and requires that any processing of personal data 
pursuant to that Directive be made in accordance with GDPR and Directive 2016/680.1092  
Organisations must be accountable, meaning that they must respect their data protection 
obligations and must demonstrate that they respect those obligations. The EDPS asserts that 
the best way for an organisation to ensure that it is accountable is for it to consider the data 
protection implications at the design stage of a whistleblowing scheme.1093 The issue of data 
protection applies not only to the alleged wrongdoer’s rights but also to the rights of 
witnesses, third parties1094 and the discloser’s rights, however, the Data Protection Working 
Party stresses that the implementation of whistleblowing schemes run a grave risk of 
stigmatisation and victimisation of the alleged wrongdoer in the organisation where they 
work.1095 The Data Protection Working Party emphasise that ‘The person will be exposed to 
such risks even before the person is aware that he/she has been incriminated and the alleged 
facts have been investigated to determine whether or not they are substantiated. The Data 
Protection Working Party is of the view that proper application of data protection rules to 
whistleblowing schemes will contribute to alleviate the above-mentioned risks.’1096 
                                                 
1091 Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of 
persons reporting on breaches of Union law, 2018/0106 (COD) Recital 58. 
1092 ibid art 18. 
1093 European Data Protection Supervisor, ‘Guidelines on processing personal information within a 
whistleblowing procedure’ (EDPS July 2016) 11. The EDPS recommends that the organisation’s data 
protection officer be engaged early in the process of designing a whistleblowing scheme.  
1094 The European Data Protection Supervisor explains that the mere fact that a name of an individual is 
mentioned in a document does not result in all the information in that document becoming ‘data relating to that 
person’. ibid 7. In those circumstances, that individual need not necessarily be notified of the report, especially 
as it may involve a disproportionate effort and therefore a decision to inform third parties should be made on 
a case-by-case basis. ibid 8. 
1095 This view is echoed by the EDPS. ibid 5. 
1096 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party Opinion 1/2006 of 1 February 2006 on the Application of EU 
data protection rules to internal whistleblowing schemes in the field of accounting, internal accounting controls, 
auditing matters, fight against bribery, banking and financial crime [2006] 00195/06/EN WP 117, 7. Opinion 
243 
 
Therefore, there should be a serious consideration of these rules in the context of a 
whistleblowing scheme, in both its development and implementation. Due to the serious risk 
to the alleged wrongdoer in this regard, as highlighted by the Data Protection Working Party, 
the focus of this research is on the rights of the alleged wrongdoer in the context of data 
protection rules under a whistleblowing scheme. 
The issue of the interaction between protected disclosures and data protection was raised by 
a number of public sector bodies in the DPER Statutory Review.1097 For example, the 
Department of Defence highlighted in its submission that: 
In order for the Minister to fully investigate the discloser complaints, on occasion, it 
is necessary to access all the information held on the subject matter of the complaints 
on the Department files, this has not always been possible because to access this type 
of information requires the data subject to be informed that his or her data is being 
accessed for the purposes of carrying out an investigation under the Protected 
Disclosure Act. Depending on the nature of the complaints, the investigator may not 
wish to reveal the identity of the discloser or indeed, even at the screening stage when 
the protector disclosure officer is analysing the complaints to ascertain if it is a 
protected disclosure, the requirement to adhere to the data protection legislation can 
prove problematic. In particular circumstances, it may make it impossible to 
complete the assessment or investigation.1098  
The International Bar Association Working Group emphasise that organisations must be 
aware of their obligations under both whistleblowing laws and data protection laws when 
developing their frameworks for whistleblower protection.1099 It further encourages 
legislators to have regard to data protection laws when drafting or amending whistleblowing 
law to ensure that ‘compliance with one law does not inadvertently result in the 
contravention of another law.’1100 The 2014 Act lags behind other jurisdictions in its failure 
to include this issue.1101 As such, in operating a whistleblowing scheme, it is currently left 
                                                 
1/2006 may have wider application that to the fields mentioned and may apply where the processing of personal 
data is involved. Jeremy Lewis and others, Whistleblowing Law and Practice (3rd edn, OUP 2017) para 19.109. 
1097 The Data Protection Commission; the Department of Defence; the Department of Education and Skills; 
and the Garda Síochána Ombudsman Commission. Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, ‘Public 
Consultation on the Review of the Protected Disclosures Act 2014’ (DPER) <www.per.gov.ie/en/public-
consultation-on-the-review-of-the-protected-disclosures-act-2014/> accessed 6 November 2018. 
1098 Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, ‘Public Consultation on the Review of the Protected 
Disclosures Act 2014’ (DPER) <www.per.gov.ie/en/public-consultation-on-the-review-of-the-protected-
disclosures-act-2014/> accessed 6 November 2018. 
1099 International Bar Association-Legal Policy & Research Unit and Legal Practice Division, ‘Whistleblower 
Protections: A Guide’ (IBA April 2018) 25. 
1100 ibid. 
1101 The issue of data protection is included in the following whistleblowing legislation: (i) Bolivia: Law 458 
for Whistleblower and Witness Protection 2013, art 2; (ii) Czech Republic: Banks Act No 21/1992 Coll, 
Savings and Credit Cooperatives Act No 87/1995 Coll, Capital Market Undertakings Act (Financial Acts) No 
256/2004 Coll; (iii) Ecuador: Criminal Code 1971, art 495; (iv) Hungary: Complaints and Announcements of 
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to the organisation itself to identify its obligations under the 2014 Act and data protection 
rules, to identify where the obligations under both laws conflict, and to determine the best 
way of resolving this conflict. 
5.5(b) Protections for data subjects 
An individual has the right to privacy as an unenumerated right under the Irish 
Constitution.1102 This right was first acknowledged in the Supreme Court decision of McGee 
v A-G1103 where Mr Justice Walsh held that ‘Article 41 of the Constitution guarantees the 
husband and wife against any… invasion of their privacy by the State.’1104 The right to 
privacy was first enforced in the High Court case of Kennedy and Arnold v A-G1105 where 
Hamilton P stated that although it was ‘not specifically guaranteed by the Constitution, the 
right of privacy is one of the fundamental personal rights of the citizen which flows from the 
Christian and democratic nature of the State.’ The case law of the Irish courts demonstrates 
that this is not an absolute right and it must be balanced with other rights.1106  
This right to privacy is also an explicit right under art 8 of the European Convention of 
Human Rights (‘ECHR’).1107 The right to privacy under art 8 ECHR is more than just a 
                                                 
Public Concern Act (the ‘Whistleblower Act’) 165 of 2013; (v) Italy: Legislative Decree 2015/72, s 18; 
Legislative Decree 1993/285, s 52-bis; (vi) Kosovo: Draft Law on Protection of Whistleblowers 2018, art 12; 
and (vii) Serbia: Law on the Protection of Whistleblowers Act, no 2014/128, art 10.   
1102 The right to privacy is not a specific right under the Irish Constitution but is embedded in a number of 
different articles, including the Preamble, which refers to the respect for human dignity and freedom of the 
individual. The right to privacy can be found in the following articles: privacy of the ballot (art 16.1.4); 
litigation privacy (art 34); personal autonomy (arts 40.3.1 and 40.3.2); limited freedom from arrest and 
detention (art 40.4); the inviolability of the dwelling (art 40.5); the rights of citizens to express freely their 
convictions and opinions, to assemble peaceably and without arms, and to form associations and unions (art 
40.6.1); protection of family life (art 41); the rights of the family with regard to education (art 42); the right 
of private property (art 43); freedom of conscience and the free profession and practice of religion (art 44.2.1). 
In relation to these articles, Mr Justice McCarthy in Norris v A-G [1984] IR 36 (SC) 100, explained that ‘All 
these may properly be described as different facets of the right of privacy, but they are general in nature (as 
necessarily they must be in a Constitution) and do not set bounds to the enumeration of the details of such a 
right of privacy when the occasion arises.’ 
1103 McGee v A-G [1974] IR 284 (SC). 
1104 ibid 313. 
1105 Kennedy and Arnold v Ireland and A-G [1987] IR 587 (HC). 
1106 Doe v The Revenue Commissioners [2008] IEHC 5; Kennedy and Arnold v Ireland and A-G [1987] IR 587 
(HC); Bailey v Flood [2000] IESC 11; Haughey v Moriarty [1999] 3 IR 1 (SC); Redmond v Flood [1999] 3 IR 
79 (SC); A-G v Open Door Counselling [1988] IR 593 (SC); People (DPP) v McCann [1998] 4 IR 397 (CCA); 
X v Flynn (HC, 19 May 1994); Maguire v Drury [1994] 2 IR 241 (SC); National Irish Bank v RTÉ [1998] 2 IR 
465 (SC); HSE v A [2011] 3 IR 22 (HC); Marine Terminals v Loughman [2009] IEHC 620. 
1107 Article 8 ECHR provides, ‘1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and 
his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except 
such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national 
security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for 
the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.’ European 
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 4 November 1950, 213 UNTS221 (ECHR) art 8. 
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straightforward right to privacy and has been held by the European Court of Human Rights 
(‘ECtHR’) to be a broad concept.1108 It goes further than just a right to privacy and relates to 
a right to respect for one’s private and family life. This right is not an absolute, however, 
and art 8(2) ECHR provides that it may be limited in certain circumstances.1109  
The right to privacy is also addressed by art 7 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights1110 
(‘EU Charter’) which provides that ‘Everyone has the right to respect for his or her private 
and family life, home and communication.’1111 This right is also a broad concept and is not 
only a right to privacy but also a right to respect for one’s private and family life. The GDPR 
makes specific reference to private life and provides that: 
This Regulation respects all fundamental rights and observes the freedoms and 
principles recognised in the Charter as enshrined in the Treaties, in particular the 
respect for private and family life, home and communications, the protection of 
personal data, freedom of thought, conscience and religion, freedom of expression 
and information, freedom to conduct a business, the right to an effective remedy and 
to a fair trial, and cultural, religious and linguistic diversity.1112 
                                                 
This right is entitled ‘Right to respect for private and family life’ and as noted by Mr Justice Feeney in 
Agbonlahor v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2007] 4 IR 309, 316 ‘Article 8 does not protect 
private or family life as such ... it guarantees a ‘respect for these rights’. In view of the diversity of 
circumstances and practices in the contracting States, the notion of ‘respect’ (and its requirements) are not 
clear-cut; they vary considerably from case to case.’ 
1108 A, B and C v Ireland [2010] ECHR 2032. 
1109 It is for the individual to establish that the State has interfered with their right. The State must then show 
that the action is justified in accordance with law. Thus, the interference must have a basis in domestic law and 
be accessible and foreseeable. If the interference is in accordance with the law, the ECtHR must then be 
satisfied that the interference is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of one of the exceptions 
contained in art 8(2) ECHR. If the interference is not in accordance with the law, then the court is prevented 
from reviewing the legitimacy of the aim pursued by that interference, see: Rotaru v Romania [2000] ECHR 
192 [62]. 
1110 The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2016] was designed to reaffirm existing rights 
deriving from the case law of the CJEU and the ECtHR, as well as constitutional traditions and international 
obligations common to the Member States, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, the Social Charters adopted by the Union, and by the Council of Europe. It was not 
intended to create new rights. The EU Commission explained that the purpose of the Charter is that it 
‘complements existing systems for the protection of fundamental rights, it does not replace them …The 
provisions of the Charter are addressed to the Member States only when they are implementing EU law and 
neither the Charter nor the Treaty creates any new competence for the EU in the field of fundamental rights. 
Where … national legislation … does not constitute a measure implementing EU law or is not connected in 
any other way with EU law, the jurisdiction of the Court is not established.’ Commission, 2012 Report on the 
Application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, Brussels, 8.5.2013, COM(2013) 271 final, 6-7. 
1111 ibid art 7. Although the Charter provides for rights and freedoms that are intended to be the same as those 
provided for by the ECHR, the ECtHR in Strasbourg and the CJEU in Luxembourg may apply them differently. 
It is worth noting that the decisions of the ECtHR are not directly enforceable against Member States, whilst 
the decisions of the CJEU are directly enforceable. 
1112 Council Regulation (EC) 679/2016 of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the 
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General 
Data Protection Regulation) [2016], Recital 4. This can be contrasted with the predecessor to the GDPR, the 
Council Directive (EC) 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the 
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data [1995] OJ L281/31, which specifically 
referenced the right to privacy in Recital 2 stating that the design of data processing systems ‘must, whatever 
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The application of art 8 ECHR in the context of data protection applies to personal data 
contained in correspondence, personal data stored in a person’s home, personal data stored 
by others outside the home, and to photographs taken by third parties.1113 The failure to keep 
accurate personal data has been held by the ECtHR to constitute a breach of art 8 ECHR.1114 
Further, the ECtHR in Nikolova v Bulgaria1115 emphasised that ‘the gathering, storing and 
release of information relating to an individual’s “private life” come within Article 8 of the 
Convention.’1116 A failure to secure an individual’s personal data may be a breach of art 8 
ECHR,1117 as well as a failure to destroy personal data.1118 
The protection of natural persons in relation to the processing of personal data1119 is a 
fundamental right, as provided for in both the EU Charter and the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union.1120 The EU Charter stipulates that EU citizens have the right to 
protection of their personal data and provides that:  
1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her.  
2. Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of the 
consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law. 
Everyone has the right of access to data which has been collected concerning him or 
her, and the right to have it rectified.  
3. Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an independent 
authority.1121 
                                                 
the nationality or residence of natural persons, respect their fundamental rights and freedoms, notably the right 
to privacy.’ Directive 95/46/EC also referred to the right to privacy in Recitals 6 and 10. 
1113 Denis Kelleher, Privacy and Data Protection Law in Ireland (2nd edn, Bloomsbury Professional 2015) para 
3.15. 
1114 Babylonova v Slovakia [2006] ECHR 630. 
1115 Nikolova v Bulgaria [2013] ECHR 1291. 
1116 ibid [105]. 
1117 I v Finland  [2008] ECHR 623. 
1118 Reklos and Davourlis v Greece [2009] ECHR 200. 
1119 Council Regulation (EC) 679/2016 of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the 
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General 
Data Protection Regulation) [2016], art 4(1) defines ‘personal data’ as ‘any information relating to an identified 
or identifiable natural person ('data subject'); an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly 
or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, 
an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, 
cultural or social identity of that natural person.’ The EDPS maintains that personal data not only includes 
identification data, as contained in art 4(1), but also information that relates to the behaviour of an individual. 
Therefore, a recording of the whistleblower’s disclosure is also personal information of the whistleblower since 
it relates to their behaviour. European Data Protection Supervisor, ‘Guidelines on processing personal 
information within a whistleblowing procedure’ (EDPS July 2016) 6. 
1120 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2016] OJ C202/47, art 
16(1). 
1121 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2016], art 8. 
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This right to data protection under the EU Charter is not absolute, however, and may be 
limited in certain circumstances as long as any limitation complies with the requirements of 
art 52(1) of the EU Charter. 
Data protection rules must be interpreted in a manner that is compatible with the right to 
privacy1122 and the right to protection of personal data. The fundamental principles for 
processing personal data are set out in art 5 of the GDPR and require that data be: 
(i) Processed lawfully, fairly, and transparently. 
(ii) Collected for specified, explicit, and legitimate purposes. 
(iii) Adequate, relevant, and limited to what is necessary. 
(iv) Accurate and up-to-date. 
(v) Kept in a form which permits identification for no longer than necessary. 
(vi) Processed in a manner to ensure appropriate security of the data.1123 
The Data Protection Working Party stresses that there must be compliance with EU data 
protection rules when implementing whistleblowing schemes.1124 With the introduction of 
the GDPR on 25 May 2018, organisations must have regard to these rules when establishing 
and implementing their whistleblowing schemes. Many of the provisions in the GDPR are 
not new, however, and obligations for organisations relating to whistleblowing schemes 
already existed under Directive 95/46EC.1125 In Ireland, the GDPR was transposed into Irish 
law under the Data Protection Act 2018. The issue of data protection can be a problematic 
area for organisations when trying to balance the rights and interests of the organisation and 
                                                 
1122 The ECHR became a part of Ireland’s domestic law in 2003 with the commencement of the European 
Convention on Human Rights Act 2003. European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003, s 2(1), provides 
that when ‘interpreting and applying any statutory provision or rule of law, a court shall, in so far as is possible, 
subject to the rules of law relating to such interpretation and application, do so in a manner compatible with 
the State’s obligations under the Convention provisions.’ 
1123 Council Regulation (EC) 679/2016 of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the 
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General 
Data Protection Regulation) [2016], art (5)(1)(a)-(f). 
1124 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party Opinion 1/2006 of 1 February 2006 on the Application of EU 
data protection rules to internal whistleblowing schemes in the field of accounting, internal accounting controls, 
auditing matters, fight against bribery, banking and financial crime [2006] 00195/06/EN WP 117, 6. Opinion 
1/2006 relates to Directive 95/46EC but could arguably apply to the equivalent provisions under the GDPR 
until there is an updated Opinion from the European Data Protection Board.  
1125 Council Directive (EC) 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the 
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data [1995] OJ L281/31. 
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the discloser and the rights and interests of the alleged wrongdoer. The Data Protection 
Working Party highlights this tension between the operation of whistleblowing schemes and 
data protection obligations to an alleged wrongdoer,1126 which will be discussed below.  
5.5(c) Lawfulness of data processing 
When implementing its whistleblowing scheme, an organisation must consider its 
compatibility with data protection rules. The first issue to be considered is the lawfulness of 
the processing1127 of the personal data. Article 6 of the GDPR provides that processing of 
data will only be lawful if at least one of six grounds contained therein apply. These grounds 
are as follows: 
(a) the data subject has given consent to the processing of his or her personal data for 
one or more specific purposes;  
(b) processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject 
is party or in order to take steps at the request of the data subject prior to entering 
into a contract;  
(c) processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the 
controller is subject;  
(d) processing is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data subject or 
of another natural person;  
(e) processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public 
interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller;  
(f) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the 
controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the 
interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require 
protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child.  
Point (f) of the first subparagraph shall not apply to processing carried out by public 
authorities in the performance of their tasks.1128 
For the purposes of processing personal data under a whistleblowing scheme, it may be 
lawful under two grounds, art 6(1)(c) and art 6(1)(f) of the GDPR.  
                                                 
1126 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party Opinion 1/2006 of 1 February 2006 on the Application of EU 
data protection rules to internal whistleblowing schemes in the field of accounting, internal accounting controls, 
auditing matters, fight against bribery, banking and financial crime [2006] 00195/06/EN WP 117, 7.  
1127 Council Regulation (EC) 679/2016 of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the 
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General 
Data Protection Regulation) [2016], art 4(2) defines ‘processing’ as ‘any operation or set of operations which 
is performed on personal data or on sets of personal data, whether or not by automated means, such as 
collection, recording, organisation, structuring, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, 
disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or combination, 
restriction, erasure or destruction.’ 
1128 ibid art 6(1)(a)-(f). 
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5.5(c)(i) Compliance with a legal obligation  
Article 6(1)(c) of the GDPR provides that the processing of personal data obtained may be 
lawful if it is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is 
subject.1129 Commenting on the previous equivalent provision, art 7(c) in Directive 
95/46/EC, the Data Protection Working Party explained that ‘The establishment of a 
reporting system should have the purpose of meeting a legal obligation imposed by 
Community or Member State law, and more specifically a legal obligation designed to 
establish internal control procedures in well-defined areas.’1130 This position adopted by the 
Data Protection Working Party is now enshrined in the GDPR by the inclusion in art 6(3) 
which provides that if data is processed under art 6(1)(c) of the GDPR the basis for the 
processing must be laid down under EU law or Member State law to which the controller is 
subject. For public bodies, this can be satisfied due to their legal obligations under s 21(1) 
of the 2014 Act to establish and maintain Procedures. For other organisations not subject to 
s 21(1) there may be national and EU sectoral legislative provisions that require a 
strengthening of internal controls thereby meeting the legal obligation requirement. For 
example, the UK Corporate Governance Code, which applies to Irish incorporated listed 
companies on the Main Securities Market (‘MSM’) of the Irish Stock Exchange, requires 
the Board of Directors of these companies to maintain internal control systems.1131 Also, the 
Capital Requirements Directive, Directive 2013/36/EU, obliges competent authorities1132 to 
require credit institutions and investment firms to have in place adequate risk management 
processes and internal control mechanisms, including sound reporting and accounting 
procedures in order to identify, measure, monitor, and control transactions with their parent 
mixed-activity holding company and its subsidiaries appropriately.1133 Further, under the 
Companies Act 2014, the board of directors of a ‘large’1134 company must establish an audit 
                                                 
1129 ibid art 14(1)(c). 
1130 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party Opinion 1/2006 of 1 February 2006 on the Application of EU 
data protection rules to internal whistleblowing schemes in the field of accounting, internal accounting controls, 
auditing matters, fight against bribery, banking and financial crime [2006] 00195/06/EN WP 117, 7.  
1131 Financial Reporting Council, ‘The UK Corporate Governance Code’ (FRC April 2016) s C. 
1132 Council Regulation (EU) 575/2013 of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and 
investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) 648/2012 [2012], art 4(1)(40), defines 'competent authority' 
as ‘a public authority or body officially recognised by national law, which is empowered by national law to 
supervise institutions as part of the supervisory system in operation in the Member State concerned.’ 
1133 Council Directive (EC) 2013/36 of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the 
prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, amending Directive 2002/87/EC and 
repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC OJ L176/338, art 123(2). 
1134 Companies Act 2014, s 167(1). 
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committee1135 (or explain in the directors’ report why they are not establishing such a 
committee)1136 who are required to monitor the effectiveness of the company’s systems of 
internal control, internal audit, and risk management.1137  
In addition, art 4(1) of the draft EU Commission Directive on whistleblowing obliges 
Member States to ensure that all legal entities in the private1138 and public sectors establish 
internal channels and Procedures for reporting and following up on reports.1139 If this 
proposal under the draft Directive is adopted, then such legal entities in the private sector 
will also be able to rely on art 6(1)(c) of the GDPR to justify the processing of personal data 
under a whistleblowing scheme. 
As mentioned above, the Data Protection Working Party in their Opinion 1/2006 had 
interpreted art 7(c) of Directive 95/46/EC narrowly, finding that an obligation imposed on 
organisations by a non-EU legal statute or regulation to establish a whistleblowing scheme 
may not qualify as a legal obligation on the basis that to allow this would facilitate the 
circumvention of EU rules contained in Directive 95/46/EC. Therefore, the whistleblowing 
obligations under SOX on the EU affiliates of publicly held US companies and non-US 
companies listed in one of the US stock markets could not be justified under art 7(c) of the 
GDPR.1140 As this position adopted by the Data Protection Working Party is now streamlined 
in the GDPR by the inclusion in art 6(3) that the basis for the processing of data under art 
6(1)(c) of the GDPR must be laid down under EU law or Member State law to which the 
controller is subject, this guarantees that such obligations will not be a valid reason for the 
processing of personal data. 
5.5(c)(ii) Legitimate interests test  
                                                 
1135 ibid s 167(2). 
1136 ibid s 167(3). 
1137 ibid s 167(7)(b). 
1138 Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of 
persons reporting on breaches of Union law, 2018/0106 (COD) art 4(3) provides that this requirement will 
apply to the following legal entities in the private sector:  ‘a) private legal entities with 50 or more employees;  
b) private legal entities with an annual business turnover or annual balance sheet total of EUR 10 million or 
more; c) private legal entities of any size operating in the area of financial services or vulnerable to money 
laundering or terrorist financing, as regulated under the Union acts referred to in the Annex.’  
1139 ibid art 4(1). 
1140 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party Opinion 1/2006 of 1 February 2006 on the Application of EU 
data protection rules to internal whistleblowing schemes in the field of accounting, internal accounting controls, 
auditing matters, fight against bribery, banking and financial crime [2006] 00195/06/EN WP 117, 8. 
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Where an organisation cannot justify the processing of personal data under art 6(1)(c) of the 
GDPR, it may rely on the ground in art 6(1)(f) of the GDPR.1141  
The Data Protection Working Party Opinion 06/2014 stated that a 'legitimate interest' must 
‘be lawful (i.e. in accordance with applicable EU and national law); - be sufficiently clearly 
articulated to allow the balancing test to be carried out against the interests and fundamental 
rights of the data subject (i.e. sufficiently specific); - represent a real and present interest (i.e. 
not be speculative).’1142 Data processing under this ground must be done in the least intrusive 
manner possible.1143 Arguably, whistleblowing schemes pursue legitimate interests, for 
example, the identification of wrongdoing or ensuring the adequate functioning of 
organisations. However, the key concern for organisations is ensuring that there is a balance 
between the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or the third party and the interests 
or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject. The Data Protection Working Party 
advises in its Opinion 1/2006 that this balance of interest test should ‘take into account issues 
of proportionality, subsidiarity, the seriousness of the alleged offences that can be notified 
and the consequences for the data subjects. In the context of the balance of interest test, 
adequate safeguards1144 will also have to be put in place.’1145 The Data Protection Working 
Party in its Opinion 06/2014 addresses some of the key factors that should be considered 
when applying the balancing test, namely: 
(i) The nature and source of the legitimate interests of the controller.1146  
(ii) The impact on the data subjects.1147 
                                                 
1141 Council Regulation (EC) 679/2016 of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the 
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General 
Data Protection Regulation) [2016], art 6(1)(f). 
1142 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party Opinion 06/2014 on the notion of legitimate interests of the data 
controller under art 7 of Directive 95/46/EC [2006] 844/14/EN WP 217, 25. 
1143 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party Opinion 2/2017 of 8 June 2017 on data processing at work [2017] 
17/EN WP 249. 
1144 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party Opinion 06/2014 on the notion of legitimate interests of the data 
controller under art 7 of Directive 95/46/EC [2006] 844/14/EN WP 217, 31, provides that ‘Safeguards may 
include, among others, strict limitations on how much data are collected, immediate deletion of data after use, 
technical and organisational measures to ensure functional separation, appropriate use of anonymisation 
techniques, aggregation of data, and privacy-enhancing technologies but also increased transparency, 
accountability, and the possibility to opt-out of the processing.’ 
1145 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party Opinion 1/2006 of 1 February 2006 on the Application of EU 
data protection rules to internal whistleblowing schemes in the field of accounting, internal accounting controls, 
auditing matters, fight against bribery, banking and financial crime [2006] 00195/06/EN WP 117, 9. 
1146 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party Opinion 06/2014 on the notion of legitimate interests of the data 
controller under art 7 of Directive 95/46/EC [2006] 844/14/EN WP 217, 34-36. 
1147 ibid 36-41. 
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(iii) Additional safeguards applied by the controller.1148 
Therefore, organisations that cannot rely on a specific legal requirement justifying the 
implementation of a whistleblowing scheme can rely on art 6(1)(f) of the GDPR, as long as 
the organisation: (i) carries out an assessment of its interests as being legitimate; (ii) 
determines that the processing is necessary to achieve the interest pursued; (iii) establishes 
a provisional balance by assessing that the data controller’s interest overrides the 
fundamental rights or interests of the data subjects; and (iv) establishes a final balance by 
taking into account additional safeguards. This must all be done in a manner that 
demonstrates compliance and ensures transparency.1149 Organisations should prepare a 
background document analysing this ‘legitimate interest’ test before relying on it to justify 
the processing of an alleged wrongdoer’s data. 
It appears that public bodies will not be able to avail of this ground in art 6(1)(f) of the GDPR 
on the basis of the provision that states ‘Point (f) of the first subparagraph shall not apply to 
processing carried out by public authorities in the performance of their tasks.’1150 
Nonetheless, as public bodies are required under s 21 of the 2014 Act to establish and 
maintain Procedures, they can avail of the ground in art 6(1)(c) of the GDPR, compliance 
with a legal obligation. 
5.5(d) Information to be provided by data controller to data subject when data has not 
been obtained from data subject  
When an organisation decides to process personal data of a data subject on one of the grounds 
contained in art 6 of the GDPR, there are certain further considerations for the organisation. 
Article 14 GDPR addresses the information that should be provided by the data controller to 
the data subject when the data has not been obtained from the data subject. For example, the 
data subject should be provided with information relating to the identity and contact details 
of the controller;1151 the contact details of the data protection officer, where applicable;1152 
the intended purposes of and legal basis for the processing of the personal data;1153 the 
                                                 
1148 ibid 41-43. 
1149 ibid annex 1. 
1150 Council Regulation (EC) 679/2016 of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the 
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General 
Data Protection Regulation) [2016], art 6(1)(c). 
1151 ibid art 14(1)(a). 
1152 ibid art 14(1)(b). 
1153 ibid art 14(1)(c). 
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categories of personal data concerned;1154 the period for which the personal data will be 
stored, or if that is not possible, the criteria used to determine that period;1155 the existence 
of the right to request from the data controller access to and rectification or erasure of 
personal data or restriction of processing and to object to processing concerning the data 
subject;1156 and from which source the personal data originated.1157 Article 14(3) of the 
GDPR sets out the timeframe within which information must be provided to the data subject, 
stipulating that the information must be provided: 
(a) within a reasonable period after obtaining the personal data, but at the latest within 
one month, having regard to the specific circumstances in which the personal data 
are processed. 
(b) if the personal data are to be used for communication with the data subject, at the 
latest at the time of the first communication to that data subject; or 
(c) if a disclosure to another recipient is envisaged, at the latest when the personal 
data are first disclosed.1158  
5.5(e) Limitations on data subjects rights 
Article 23 of the GDPR provides grounds for restriction of the data subject’s obligations and 
rights under art 5 of the GDPR (insofar as its provisions correspond to the rights and 
obligations provided for in arts 12 to 22), arts 12 to 22, and art 34 of the GDPR by way of a 
legislative measure. Section 60 of the Data Protection Act 2018 (‘2018 Act’) purports to be 
a legislative measure provided for under art 23 of the GDPR that restricts the data subject’s 
obligations and rights and sets out the grounds for the restrictions. In order for a legislative 
measure that restricts data subjects’ rights to be lawful, it must comply with art 52(1) of the 
EU Charter, which provides that: 
Any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by this Charter 
must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms. 
Subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are 
necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union 
or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others.1159 
Thus, in order to be lawful, any limitation on the right to protection of personal data and the 
right to privacy must fulfil the following criteria: 
                                                 
1154 ibid art 14(1)(d). 
1155 ibid art 14(2)(a).   
1156 ibid art 14(2)(c). 
1157 ibid art 14(2)(f). 
1158 ibid art 14(3)(a)-(c). 
1159 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2016], art 52(1). 
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(i) It must be provided for by law.  
(ii) It must respect the essence of the rights and freedoms under the EU Charter.  
(iii) It must genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the EU or the need 
to protect the rights and freedoms of others.  
(iv) It must be necessary.  
(v) It must be proportional.1160  
Thus, the restrictions provided for in s 60 of the 2018 Act that limit a data subject’s rights to 
protection of personal data and privacy must comply with the criteria set down in art 52(1) 
of the EU Charter. In the context of a whistleblowing scheme, s 60(3)(b) of the 2018 Act is 
a relevant restriction on a data subjects rights.1161 Section 60(3)(b) provides that the rights 
and obligations of the data subject can be restricted to the extent that ‘the personal data 
relating to the data subject consist of an expression of opinion about the data subject by 
another person given in confidence or on the understanding that it will be treated as 
confidential to a person who has a legitimate interest in receiving the information.’1162 The 
explanatory memorandum to the Data Protection Bill 2018 provides that this provision is 
‘important in the context of protected disclosures and other whistleblowing activity.’1163  
5.5(f) Application of restrictions in the context of a whistleblowing scheme 
A number of the grounds in art 23 of the GDPR could be relied upon for the introduction of 
the s 60 restrictions.1164 Further, a number of the restrictions in s 60 of the 2018 Act could 
be relied upon in the context of a whistleblowing scheme, such as, to safeguard national 
security, defence and the international relations of the State,1165 for the prevention, detection, 
                                                 
1160 European Data Protection Supervisor, ‘Assessing the necessity of measures that limit the fundamental right 
to the protection of personal data: A Toolkit’ (EDPS 11 April 2017) 4. 
1161 There are additional subsections that may be relied upon. However, for the purposes of this analysis, s 
60(3)(b) of the 2018 Act was deemed to be the most appropriate provision to subject to the necessity test. 
1162 Data Protection Act 2018, s 60(3)(b). 
1163 Explanatory Memorandum to the Data Protection Bill 2018 (Data Protection Act 2018) 11. 
1164 For example: to safeguard national security, defence and public security; to safeguard the prevention, 
investigation, detection, or prosecution of criminal offences; to safeguard other important objectives of general 
public interest of the EU or of a Member State; to safeguard a monitoring, inspection, or regulatory function 
connected, even occasionally, to the exercise of official authority in the aforementioned grounds; to safeguard 
the protection of the rights and freedoms of others; and to safeguard the enforcement of civil law claims. 
Council Regulation (EC) 679/2016 of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the 
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General 
Data Protection Regulation) [2016], art 23(1)(a)-(j). 
1165 Data Protection Act 2018, s 60(3)(a)(i). 
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investigation and prosecution of criminal offences,1166 in contemplation of prospective legal 
proceedings,1167 and for the enforcement of civil law claims.1168  
A particularly strong ground for restricting a data subjects rights in the context of a 
whistleblowing scheme can be found in s 60(3)(b), as discussed above. Section 60(3)(b) aims 
to restrict the rights of the data subject to protection of personal data and to privacy on the 
ground provided for in art 23 of the GDPR that it is a necessary and proportionate measure 
to safeguard the rights and freedoms of others.1169 The rights and freedoms of others that 
would be safeguarded in such an instance would be the discloser’s right to have their identity 
protected under s 16 of the 2014 Act and their right to freedom of expression under the Irish 
Constitution1170 and art 10 ECHR. In restricting the data subject’s rights as intended under s 
60, there is a requirement that the ‘essence’ of those rights must be respected. This means 
that the right to protection of personal data and the right to privacy must not be emptied of 
their basic content and the data subject must still be able to exercise those rights. Thus, s 
60(3)(b) of the 2018 Act could be relied upon by an organisation to refuse to reveal the 
identity of the worker who discloses information about another person. It must be noted, that 
the Data Protection Working Party is fervent in its position that the identity of a discloser 
should not be made known to the alleged wrongdoer, stating ‘Under no circumstances can 
the person accused in a whistleblower’s report obtain information about the identity of the 
whistleblower from the scheme on the basis of the alleged wrongdoer’s right of access, 
except where the whistleblower maliciously makes a false statement. Otherwise, the 
whistleblower’s confidentiality should always be guaranteed.’1171 The EDPS is just as 
staunch in this position and argues that: 
When access is granted to the personal information of any concerned individual, the 
personal information of third parties such as informants, whistleblowers or witnesses 
should be removed from the documents except in exceptional circumstances if the 
whistleblower authorises such a disclosure, if this is required by any subsequent 
                                                 
1166 ibid s 60(3)(a)(ii). 
1167 ibid s 60(3)(a)(iv). 
1168 ibid s 60(3)(a)(v). 
1169 Council Regulation (EC) 679/2016 of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the 
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General 
Data Protection Regulation) [2016], art 23(1)(i). 
1170 Art 40.6.1. 
1171 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party Opinion 1/2006 of 1 February 2006 on the Application of EU 
data protection rules to internal whistleblowing schemes in the field of accounting, internal accounting controls, 
auditing matters, fight against bribery, banking and financial crime [2006] 00195/06/EN WP 117, 14. 
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criminal law proceedings or if the whistleblower maliciously makes a false 
statement. If a risk remains of third party identification, access should be deferred.1172  
5.5(g) Delay of notification to data subject 
The Data Protection Working Party in Opinion 1/2006 instructs that where there is a 
substantial risk that the investigation of the alleged wrongdoing or the gathering of evidence 
would be jeopardised if the data subject is notified of the information contained in art 14 of 
the GDPR, then notification can be delayed for as long as that risk exists. The risk must be 
assessed in light of the possibility of evidence being destroyed or altered by the alleged 
wrongdoer. In applying this exception, organisations must do so restrictively and on a case-
by-case basis, taking into account the wider interests at issue.1173 The EDPS also adopts this 
position of deferral of information if the provision of information to the data subject would 
be detrimental to the case. The EDPS advises that each decision must be taken on a case-by-
case basis, and importantly, any decision taken to defer the notification must be 
documented.1174  
Where information is received that on a preliminary screening is not credible, Lewis suggests 
that a common sense approach is adopted and advises against automatic notification as no 
defence needs to be furnished by the data subject and that notification to such an individual 
may cause unnecessary stress.1175 Further, it is arguable that conveying such allegations to 
an employee without undertaking a preliminary screening would be a breach of an 
employer’s duty of confidence and trust.1176 Lewis recommends that an organisation should 
include in its whistleblowing arrangements an explicit statement that a data subject will only 
                                                 
1172 European Data Protection Supervisor, ‘Guidelines on processing personal information within a 
whistleblowing procedure’ (EDPS July 2016) 8. 
1173 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party Opinion 1/2006 of 1 February 2006 on the Application of EU 
data protection rules to internal whistleblowing schemes in the field of accounting, internal accounting controls, 
auditing matters, fight against bribery, banking and financial crime [2006] 00195/06/EN WP 117, 13. 
1174 European Data Protection Supervisor, ‘Guidelines on processing personal information within a 
whistleblowing procedure’ (EDPS July 2016) 7. 
1175 David Lewis, ‘Whistleblowing and data protection principles: Is the road to reconciliation really that 
rocky?’ (2011) 2(1) European Journal of Law and Technology 3 <http://ejlt.org/article/view/53/119> accessed 
1 April 2019. 
1176 For example, see: Gogay v Hertfordshire CC [2000] IRLR 703, where a letter from a local authority (the 
employer) to a residential care worker (the employee) informing her that she was being suspended while 
allegations of sexual abuse by a young person in the care home were being investigated was found to be clearly 
calculated to seriously damage the relationship between them and that, in this case, there was no reasonable or 
proper cause to do this.  
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be notified of a false allegation if there is a reason to believe that the allegations were made 
maliciously.1177 
5.5(h) Maliciously false statements 
If a worker makes a maliciously false disclosure, they cannot avail of the protections of the 
2014 Act, including the protection of identity under s 16. A worker who makes a protected 
disclosure as per the requirements of the 2014 Act is immune from civil liability.1178 
However, this immunity from civil liability excludes a cause of action in defamation.1179 
Nonetheless, if a worker who makes a protected disclosure is alleged to have defamed a third 
party, a worker will have a defence of ‘qualified privilege’ in such circumstances.1180 This 
means that unless the discloser is motivated by malice in the making of a false disclosure, 
they will not be liable for any damage suffered by the alleged wrongdoer. This is provided 
for in s 19(1) of the Defamation Act 2009 which states ‘In a defamation action, the defence 
of qualified privilege shall fail if, in relation to the publication of the statement in respect of 
which the action was brought, the plaintiff proves that the defendant acted with malice.’ 
Thus, the person who is the subject of the disclosure would have to show that the dominant 
factor operating in the mind of the discloser at the time was the improper motive.1181 The 
draft EU Commission Directive on whistleblowing proposes that Member States must 
provide for penalties applicable to persons who make malicious or abusive reports or 
disclosures as well as providing for measures for compensating persons who suffer from 
such reports or disclosures.1182 
Therefore, the discloser’s identity may need to be revealed in order to allow the person who 
was the subject of an alleged maliciously false statement to pursue a claim in defamation. 
This would deprive the worker of the protection of identity before it is determined that they 
did not make a protected disclosure, which would engage the s 16 of the 2014 Act 
                                                 
1177 David Lewis, ‘Whistleblowing and data protection principles: Is the road to reconciliation really that 
rocky?’ (2011) 2(1) European Journal of Law and Technology 6 <http://ejlt.org/article/view/53/119> accessed 
1 April 2019. 
1178 Protected Disclosures Act 2014, s 14. 
1179 ibid s 14(1).  
1180 ibid s 14(2) inserts s 13A into the Defamation Act 2009, pt 1 of Sch 1. This can be contrasted with the 
position in the UK where PIDA is silent on the issue of defamation. For more discussion on the position in the 
UK, see: David Lewis, ‘Whistleblowing and the Law of Defamation: Does the Law Strike a Fair Balance 
Between the Rights of Whistleblowers, the Media, and Alleged Wrongdoers?’ (2017) 47(3) Industrial Law 
Journal 339. 
1181 Bryan McMahon and William Binchy, Law of Torts (4th edn, Bloomsbury Professional 2013) 1331. 
1182 Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of 
persons reporting on breaches of Union law, 2018/0106 (COD) art 17(2). 
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protections. In that regard, the organisation could rely on the exception in s 16(2)(d) of the 
2014 Act that it is necessary in the public interest or it is required by law to disclose the 
worker’s identity. It is in the public interest that maliciously false disclosures are deterred 
and that wronged individuals are entitled to defend themselves from injury to their reputation 
in the eyes of reasonable members of society. However, this position justifying disclosure 
of the worker’s identity when there is an allegation of a maliciously false statement must be 
considered in line with the position adopted by the EDPS. The EDPS has advised that if a 
worker makes a maliciously false statement the personal data of the worker can only be 
disclosed to judicial authorities1183 and those judicial authorities must be competent in 
actions relating to maliciously false statements.1184 
It is recommended that organisations include in their Procedures that it is a disciplinary 
offence to make a maliciously false disclosure and that their identity may be disclosed to 
judicial authorities in such circumstances. 
5.6 Conclusion 
Committing to protecting the identity of a worker has been recognised as the most effective 
way of encouraging potential disclosers to come forward with information of 
wrongdoing,1185 as well as being the cornerstone of whistleblower protection.1186 However, 
in respecting this right to protection of identity and respecting the essence of whistleblowing 
and whistleblowing law, organisations must task themselves with respecting the rights of 
alleged wrongdoers simultaneously. The proposal at EU level for the imposition of penalties 
on organisations that fail to protect a discloser’s identity1187 means that organisations must 
be extremely cautious in their approach to respecting the rights of alleged wrongdoers for 
fear that they may open themselves up to serious ramifications for failing to protect the rights 
of a discloser. As the law currently stands in Ireland, an individual may be personally liable 
if they breach a worker’s right to protection of identity.1188 The research undertaken for this 
                                                 
1183 European Data Protection Supervisor, ‘Guidelines on processing personal information within a 
whistleblowing procedure’ (EDPS July 2016) 5. 
1184 European Data Protection Supervisor, ‘Letter to the European Ombudsman, Case 2010-0458’ (EDPS 30 
July 2010). 
1185 European Data Protection Supervisor, ‘Guidelines on processing personal information within a 
whistleblowing procedure’ (EDPS July 2016) 1. 
1186 Explanatory Memorandum to the Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on the protection of persons reporting on breaches of Union law, 2018/0106 (COD) 11. 
1187 Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of 
persons reporting on breaches of Union law, 2018/0106 (COD) art 17. 
1188 Protected Disclosures Act 2014, s 16(3). 
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chapter was intended to assist organisations in carrying out this delicate exercise of balancing 
rights when dealing with disclosures under their Procedures, whilst respecting the purpose 
of the 2014 Act. 
The explanatory memorandum to the Council of Europe’s Recommendation (2014)7 on the 
Protection of Whistleblowers acknowledges that the principle of confidentiality can conflict 
with the rules of fairness and provides:  
The principle also recognises that protecting the identity of the whistleblower can 
occasionally conflict with the rules of fairness (for example, fair trial and the 
common-law notion of natural justice). Where it is impossible to proceed – for 
example, to take action against a wrongdoer or those responsible for the damage 
caused without relying directly on the evidence of the whistleblower and revealing 
his or her identity – the consent and co-operation of the whistleblower should be 
sought, and any concern that he or she might have about their own position 
addressed. In some cases it may be necessary to seek a judicial ruling on whether and 
to what extent the identity of the whistleblower can be revealed.1189 
The submission by the Houses of the Oireachtas Service to the DPER Statutory Review 
demonstrates the conflict experienced by organisations when balancing the rights of the 
discloser with the rights of the alleged wrongdoer. It stated that: 
The issue of the rights of employees who are the subject of an accusation are not 
dealt with in the context of the current Act. In light of the recent judicial 
pronouncements in cases such as Lyons v Longford and Westmeath Education and 
Training Board [2017] IEHC 272 these rights should be considered. This is 
particularly so in the context of the statutory position of anonymity for the person 
making the disclosure (section 16). It may be these issues should be addressed in 
procedures implemented rather than in any legislative provision but it should be 
noted that those rights can be a critical challenge for an organisation dealing with a 
disclosure made pursuant to the Act.1190 
The difficulty experienced by organisations is also underscored by the answers to the 
prescribed persons’ survey regarding the steps taken by them to protect the worker’s identity. 
                                                 
1189 Explanatory Memorandum to the Council of Europe, Recommendation CM/REC (2014)7 of the Committee 
of Ministers to Member States on the Protection of Whistleblowers, adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 
the 30 April 2014 at the 1198 meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies (SPDP Council of Europe 2014) para 71. 
1190 Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, ‘Public Consultation on the Review of the Protected 
Disclosures Act 2014’ (DPER) <www.per.gov.ie/en/public-consultation-on-the-review-of-the-protected-
disclosures-act-2014/> accessed 6 November 2018. Further the Policing Authority argued in its submission to 
the DPER Statutory Review that ‘The protections contained in the 2014 Act for individuals who make a 
disclosure need to be balanced with some provisions that address the protection for persons who are the subject 
of allegations by a discloser availing of the protections of the 2014 Act.’ The issue was also highlighted by the 
Department of Education and Skills; the HSE; Resolve; and Transparency International Ireland. Department 
of Public Expenditure and Reform, ‘Public Consultation on the Review of the Protected Disclosures Act 2014’ 
(DPER) <www.per.gov.ie/en/public-consultation-on-the-review-of-the-protected-disclosures-act-2014/> 
accessed 6 November 2018. 
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The answers highlighted that there are varying approaches being adopted by organisations 
to protecting a discloser’s identity, thus calling attention to the problem for organisations in 
dealing with the issue of protecting the worker’s identity in isolation. However, when these 
survey responses are coupled with the fact that the overall compliance rate of Procedures 
with the DPER Guidance on the issue of the rights of the alleged wrongdoer was only 29%, 
there is evidence of a significant level of uncertainty experienced by organisations regarding 
their obligations of the issue of protection of identity and protection of rights of the alleged 
wrongdoer.  
As discussed in this chapter, a worker is entitled to have their identity protected under both 
the 2014 Act1191 and under data protection principles.1192 On the other hand, an alleged 
wrongdoer is entitled under natural justice, and fair procedures to cross-examine the 
discloser who is also their accuser1193 and to know the source of the allegations or complaint 
and/or be allowed to confront or question witnesses,1194 which may include the discloser. 
The alleged wrongdoer is entitled to these rights where a concern is made which could 
impinge on an individual’s good name or reputation, as protected under Article 40.3.2 of 
the Irish Constitution,1195 or which could jeopardise any of their personal rights,1196 and 
where it could result in a dismissal.1197 Since the Lyons decision, an alleged wrongdoer is 
entitled to these rights at the investigation stage if an investigation into the disclosure extends 
further than simply investigating the allegations and deciding whether there is a case to 
answer or not.1198 Further, under data protection rules, the alleged wrongdoer has a right to 
privacy1199 and a right to data protection.1200 These rights require that personal data be 
processed in accordance with the fundamental principles contained in art 5 GDPR and the 
processing of the data must be lawful under at least one of the grounds contained in art 6 
                                                 
1191 Protected Disclosures Act 2014, s 16(1). 
1192 European Data Protection Supervisor, ‘Guidelines on processing personal information within a 
whistleblowing procedure’ (EDPS July 2016) 4-5, 8; Article 29 Data Protection Working Party Opinion 1/2006 
of 1 February 2006 on the Application of EU data protection rules to internal whistleblowing schemes in the 
field of accounting, internal accounting controls, auditing matters, fight against bribery, banking and financial 
crime [2006] 00195/06/EN WP 117, 14.  
1193 Re Haughey [1971] IR 217 (SC) 263. 
1194 Industrial Relations Act 1990 (Code of Practice on Grievance and Disciplinary Procedures) (Declaration) 
Order 2000, SI 2000/146 [4(6)]. 
1195 Borges v Fitness to Practice Committee [2004] 1 IR 103 (SC) 113. 
1196 Re Haughey [1971] IR 217 (SC) 264. 
1197 Lyons v Longford Westmeath Education and Training Board [2017] IEHC 272 [95]. 
1198 ibid [96]-[101]. 
1199 An unenumerated right under the Irish Constitution; under the ECHR; and under the Charter. 
1200 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2016], art 8; Consolidated Version of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union [2016] OJ C202/47, art 16(1). 
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GDPR. When a disclosure is made to an organisation, and personal data of the alleged 
wrongdoer is recorded, the alleged wrongdoer is entitled to know from which source the 
personal data originated.1201 
The rights afforded to both the discloser and the alleged wrongdoer are not absolute, 
however, and may be curtailed when balancing them against one another. With regard to the 
right of the discloser to have their identity protected, considering the statutory provisions, it 
is clear that this right under s 16 of the 2014 Act is not absolute.1202 If an investigation is 
more than just an information gathering exercise but makes findings of fact, then the identity 
of the worker may need to be disclosed to allow the alleged wrongdoer to cross-examine 
them at that stage. In those circumstances, the employer can argue that it reasonably believed 
that it was necessary to disclose the worker’s identity for the effective investigation of the 
relevant wrongdoing alleged by the worker.1203 Further, a court may make an order for the 
disclosure of the identity of a worker, for example, where an ‘involved’ third party who is 
‘mixed up’ in the wrongdoing is under a duty to assist a claimant who has been wronged by 
giving him full information and disclosing the identity of the wrongdoers.1204 In such 
circumstances, an employer could also rely on the exception in s 16(2)(d) of the 2014 Act 
that it is necessary to reveal the discloser’s identity as it is required by law. The employer 
could also rely on the defence in s 16(2)(d) that it is required by law to disclose the worker’s 
identity in order to comply with the principles of natural justice and fair procedures as 
derived from the Irish Constitution, statute, contract law, and case law.  
An organisation may also be entitled to curtail the alleged wrongdoer’s rights to natural 
justice and fair procedures, and refuse to disclose the worker's identity to the alleged 
wrongdoer. The case law addressing this issue of balancing the rights of a discloser and an 
                                                 
1201 Council Regulation (EC) 679/2016 of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the 
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General 
Data Protection Regulation) [2016], art 14(2)(f). 
1202 Protected Disclosures Act 2014, s 16(2). 
1203 ibid s 16(2)(c)(i). 
1204 Norwich Pharmacal Co v Commissioners of Custom and Excise [1974] AC 133 (HL) 503-04. This decision 
was referred to by the Irish Supreme Court in Megaleasing UK Ltd, Megaleasing Holdings Ltd and Quantum 
Data SA v Barrett [1992] 1 IR 219 (SC) where Finlay CJ averred ‘I conclude from these speeches that the 
granting of an order for discovery in an action of sole discovery prior to the institution of proceedings against 
any defendant is a power which for good reasons must be sparingly used, though, where appropriate it may be 
of very considerable value towards the attainment of justice. What does seem clear is that in 
the Norwich Pharmacal case considerable stress was laid upon the very clear and unambiguous establishment 
of a wrongdoing. Similar considerations apply to the case of Orr v Diaper, where the issue arose on a demurrer 
and was, therefore, based on an assumption of the establishment of the wrong.’ Thus, the Supreme Court in the 
Megaleasing case unequivocally lays down the principle that the jurisdiction of the court to grant relief in an 
action for discovery only arises where there is very clear proof of the existence of wrongdoing. 
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alleged wrongdoer demonstrates that the protection of identity of the discloser, be they an 
informant who is not a complainant or an informer who is also a complainant, is robust.1205  
Firstly, if the alleged wrongdoer does not raise any issue of fact before their dismissal that 
needs to be referred to a tribunal, then the audi alteram partem rule may not be applied.1206 
Secondly, as demonstrated from the case law, there may be other means by which an 
organisation can proceed with an investigation or disciplinary hearing. If the discloser is 
unwilling to permit their identity to be disclosed to the alleged wrongdoer, an organisation 
may omit information that could lead to the revelation of the discloser’s identity in the 
written recording of the disclosure furnished to the alleged wrongdoer.1207 Also, a 
chairperson of a disciplinary hearing can adjourn a hearing to make further inquiries of the 
discloser if any particular and relevant issue, which should be put to the discloser, is raised 
during the hearing.1208 Further, an organisation can refuse to produce the discloser for cross-
examination at the disciplinary hearing if it can establish that it has balanced the risks to both 
the discloser and the alleged wrongdoer and that the risk of injustice to the alleged wrongdoer 
can be avoided by the taking of some other steps.1209  
Thirdly, if a discloser is also a complainant, and they may be subject to a serious risk of 
reprisal, then the organisation may refuse to disclose any basic details of the disclosure to 
the alleged wrongdoer.1210 In order to stand over such a decision, the organisation must 
undertake a reasonable investigation into the reasons why the complainant wishes for their 
identity to be protected. It must also demonstrate that their action falls within the band of 
reasonable responses when balancing the rights of both parties if there is a risk of dismissal 
of the alleged wrongdoer.1211 It is advisable that organisations carry out a risk assessment in 
order to validate that there was a real and serious risk of retaliation against the discloser.  
                                                 
1205 Note also the decision of the UKEAT in Ramsey v Walkers Snack Foods Ltd [2004] ALL ER (D) 237 (Feb) 
(EAT) where the Linfood guidelines were departed from and the anonymity of the disclosers was preserved in 
circumstances where there were compelling reasons to do so, ie encouraging workers of a factory in a close-
knit community to come forward with information relating to theft in the workplace in circumstances where 
the workers were genuinely in fear and would therefore only speak to one member of management. The 
preservation of anonymity meant that their statements were edited sufficiently to remove any identifying 
features of the discloser and neither the decision maker nor the investigation officer knew the identity of the 
disclosers and were unable to directly test their evidence.      
1206 Mooney v An Post [1998] 4 IR 288 (SC). 
1207 Linfood Cash & Carry Ltd v Thomson [1989] ICR 518 (EAT) 522-523. 
1208 ibid 522-523. 
1209 Vogel v Cheeverstown House Ltd [1998] 2 IR 496 (HC). 
1210 Surrey CC v Henderson (UKEAT/0326/05/ZT, 23 November 2005). 
1211 ibid [30]. 
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Moreover, an organisation can refuse to reveal the identity of the worker under data 
protection rules. It has been highlighted by the Data Protection Working Group that the 
identity of the worker must be protected in order to comply with the security of processing 
operations under art 32 of the GDPR.1212  Further, the alleged wrongdoer’s rights under art 
14 of the GDPR, including their right to know from which source the personal data 
originated, are not absolute and can be restricted under art 23 of the GDPR.1213 Therefore, 
an organisation could rely on the restrictions contained in s 60 of the 2018 Act, the legislative 
measure provided for under art 23 of the GDPR, to justify its actions. In addition to a number 
of potential grounds for restriction contained in s 60(3) of the 2018 Act that may apply to a 
particular type of situation,1214 an organisation could substantiate the restriction of the 
alleged wrongdoer’s rights under data protection law on the ground in s 60(3)(b), which 
provides that the personal data disclosed consisted of an expression of an opinion that was 
given in confidence or on the understanding that it would be treated as confidential by the 
recipient, who has a legitimate interest in receiving the disclosure. However, under data 
protection rules, if a disclosure is suspected of being maliciously false, then the identity of 
the worker can be disclosed to the appropriate judicial authorities.   
5.6(a) Practical steps for organisations 
As can be seen from the research presented in this chapter, an organisation will have to 
consider a range of issues when balancing the rights of each party to a disclosure and this 
must be done on a case-by-case basis in respect of the particular facts. Nonetheless, in doing 
so, it is recommended that organisations approach the issue from the perspective of the 
purpose of the 2014 Act, which is to protect workers who make a protected disclosure. 
Therefore, it is advisable that an organisation should attempt to prioritise the protection of 
                                                 
1212 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party Opinion 1/2006 of 1 February 2006 on the Application of EU 
data protection rules to internal whistleblowing schemes in the field of accounting, internal accounting controls, 
auditing matters, fight against bribery, banking and financial crime [2006] 00195/06/EN WP 117, 14.  
1213 To safeguard national security, Council Regulation (EC) 679/2016 of 27 April 2016 on the protection of 
natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and 
repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) [2016], art 23(1)(a); to safeguard defence, 
ibid art 23(1)(b); to safeguard public security, ibid art 23(1)(c); to safeguard the prevention, investigation, 
detection or prosecution of criminal offences, ibid art 23(1)(d); to safeguard other important objectives of 
general public interest of the Union or of a Member State, ibid art 23(1)(e); to safeguard a monitoring, 
inspection or regulatory function connected, even occasionally, to the exercise of official authority in the 
aforementioned grounds, ibid art 23(1)(h); to safeguard the protection of the rights and freedoms of others, ibid 
art 23(1)(i); to safeguard the enforcement of civil law claims, ibid art 23(1)(j). 
1214 To safeguard national security, defence and the international relations of the State, Data Protection Act 
2018, s 60(3)(a)(i); for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of criminal offences, ibid s 
60(3)(a)(ii); in contemplation of prospective legal proceedings, ibid s 60(3)(a)(iv); for the enforcement of civil 
law claims, ibid s 60(3)(a)(v). 
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the worker’s identity over the rights of the alleged wrongdoer when the opportunity presents 
and it does not breach the latter’s constitutional rights. It is recommended that in order to 
achieve this, organisations take the following practical steps:  
(i) An organisation may wish to make its disciplinary rules and the protected disclosures 
procedures part of the employee’s contract of employment. The benefit of this practice can 
be seen from the High Court decision of Stoskus v Goode Concrete Ltd1215 where the plaintiff 
was seeking a declaration that the procedures adopted by the defendants that led to his 
dismissal were in breach of the rules of natural justice and fair procedures. The plaintiff 
herein had signed a written contract of employment, which incorporated the disciplinary 
procedure to be applied in the event of any alleged misconduct arising. Ms Justice Irvine 
noted that: 
The plaintiff seems to have signed his contract of employment with the defendants 
on 7th June, 2004 and committed himself by its express terms to abide by this 
disciplinary procedure as part of his contract. Prima facie his rights in relation to the 
conduct of a disciplinary hearing should be a matter of private law and defined by 
the contract between the parties. 
The plaintiff had argued that he had been entitled to legal representation at his disciplinary 
hearing. His contract of employment allowed him to be accompanied by a fellow employee. 
The plaintiff had not argued before the court that this clause did not meet the standards 
advised in the Code of Practice on Grievance and Disciplinary Procedures,1216 which 
provides that ‘the employee concerned is given the opportunity to avail of the right to be 
represented during the procedure.’1217 The court noted that the Code of Practice on 
Grievance and Disciplinary Procedures does not provide that this right to be represented 
includes a right to legal representation.1218 The court held that:  
In this respect the plaintiff’s assertion that he was not afforded natural justice and 
fair procedures by reasons of the absence of a right to legal representation places his 
                                                 
1215 Stoskus v Goode Concrete Ltd [2007] IEHC 432. 
1216 Industrial Relations Act 1990 (Code of Practice on Grievance and Disciplinary Procedures) (Declaration) 
Order 2000, SI 2000/146. 
1217 ibid [4(6)].  
1218 Note, however, that the Supreme Court in Burns v Governor of Castlerea Prison [2009] 3 IR 682 (SC) 
has held that a right to legal representation at a disciplinary hearing may be appropriate in certain circumstances 
(discussed above at footnote 1059). Thus, it is important to note that just because a code of practice or contract 
does not allow legal representation at an internal hearing, a discretionary decision can be made in exceptional 
circumstances, which would be determined by taking the six criterion into consideration. This right to legal 
representation, however, has now been extended to investigations under the Lyons decision. Nonetheless, it is 
arguable the criteria approved in the Supreme Court would still have applicability, where appropriate, in 
assisting an employer in its decision whether to afford such a right at the investigation stage.  
265 
 
demands for natural justice at a higher threshold than that provided for in the code of 
practice contained in S.I. No. 146/2000. 
If the Plaintiff had not signed a contract of employment or had signed a contract of 
employment which was silent as to the disciplinary procedure to be followed in a 
case of alleged misconduct, then the plaintiff might be in a stronger position to 
contend that the rules of natural justice and fair procedures should be implied into 
the agreement …1219 
However, organisations should be cautious in adopting this approach as any changes to the 
Procedures cannot be made unilaterally and the employer is bound to follow the Procedures 
also. Therefore, if this approach is adopted, an organisation would be advised to ensure that 
their Procedures comply with the 2014 Act, any relevant codes of practice, and the DPER 
Guidance.  
(ii) Since the decision of the High Court in the Lyons case, which introduced a right to cross-
examine witnesses through legal representation at the investigation stage, an employer 
would be advised to ensure that the investigation into the disclosure that is carried out does 
not make final binding findings of fact and is strictly a fact-finding or information gathering 
exercise, and leaves final binding findings of fact to the disciplinary stage of the procedure. 
This would assist an employer in its efforts to protect the identity of the discloser. 
(iii) A way for organisations to circumvent having to respect the rights and interests of the 
data subject and the associated difficulties with same under a whistleblowing scheme at the 
initial stages of the process would be to avoid recording personal data on receipt of a 
disclosure. The Office of the Data Protection Commissioner has submitted that this position 
should be adopted as a legislative measure, stating that: 
[A]ny legislative amendment made to the 2014 Act should make it clear that the 
default position is that a worker making a protected disclosure should highlight a 
wrongdoing rather [than] make an accusation against a person and that as a starting 
point the processing of third party personal data should be avoided. The processing, 
(in other words obtaining, storing, using, disclosing etc) of personal data of third 
parties should not impinge on the data protection rights of others; 
 
[T]he personal data of third parties should only be processed by a worker making a 
protected disclosure where the use of such personal data is absolutely necessary to 
                                                 
1219 It should be noted that the Stoskus case was an application for an interlocutory injunction and required that 
the plaintiff establish a strong case to support his application. The court noted that the plaintiff may have an 
arguable case but not a good arguable case or a strong one and that the plaintiff’s claim was no more than 
merely stateable. 
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make the protected disclosure; in other words, it would not otherwise be possible for 
the worker to make the protected disclosure without processing the personal data.1220 
(iv) The tension regarding respecting the alleged wrongdoer’s rights under data protection 
rules could also be avoided by not making an electronic or manual record of a report, but 
this may cause difficulties for an investigation or information could become muddled, lost, 
or misunderstood, thus diluting the effectiveness of a whistleblowing scheme. Another 
approach would be for an organisation to subject the personal data to pseudonymisation. 
This involves the replacing of any identifying characteristics of data with a pseudonym, 
which is essentially a value that ensures that the data subject is not directly identifiable.1221 
The GDPR defines 'pseudonymisation' as: 
[T]he processing of personal data in such a manner that the personal data can no 
longer be attributed to a specific data subject without the use of additional 
information, provided that such additional information is kept separately and is 
subject to technical and organisational measures to ensure that the personal data are 
not attributed to an identified or identifiable natural person.1222   
The GDPR at recital 28 explains that ‘The application of pseudonymisation to personal data 
can reduce the risks to the data subjects concerned and help controllers and processors to 
meet their data-protection obligations. The explicit introduction of 'pseudonymisation' in this 
Regulation is not intended to preclude any other measures of data protection.’1223 However, 
pseudonymisation of personal data, which could be attributed to a natural person by the use 
of additional information, is still considered to be information on an identifiable natural 
person and therefore, principles of personal data still apply.1224 The benefit of such an 
approach, however, is that it may be feasible to protect the identity of the discloser when 
referring the disclosure to the data subject and for protecting their identity during any 
assessment or investigation of the disclosure. Further, it allows for different records that 
relate to the same person to be linked without storing direct identifiers in the data.1225  
                                                 
1220 Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, ‘Public Consultation on the Review of the Protected 
Disclosures Act 2014’ (DPER) <www.per.gov.ie/en/public-consultation-on-the-review-of-the-protected-
disclosures-act-2014/> accessed 6 November 2018. 
1221 Data Protection Commissioner, ‘Anonymisation and pseudonymisation’ (Data Protection Commissioner) 
<www.dataprotection.ie/docs/Anonymisation-and-pseudonymisation/1594.htm> accessed 8 April 2018. 
1222 Council Regulation (EC) 679/2016 of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the 
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General 
Data Protection Regulation) [2016],  art 4(5). 
1223 ibid Recital 28. 
1224 ibid Recital 26. 
1225 Data Protection Commissioner, ‘Anonymisation and pseudonymisation’ (Data Protection Commissioner) 
<www.dataprotection.ie/docs/Anonymisation-and-pseudonymisation/1594.htm> accessed 8 April 2018. 
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(v) The EDPS is of the opinion that the placing of a data protection statement on the 
organisation’s website or within a public or internal facing document is not sufficient. It 
recommends instead that a specific data protection statement should be directly provided to 
all individuals (ie whistleblowers, alleged wrongdoers, witnesses, and third parties) affected 
by the organisation’s whistleblowing scheme as soon as reasonably practicable.1226  
(vi) With respect to anonymous disclosures and the risks associated with same for alleged 
wrongdoers, it is recommended that organisations commit to receiving anonymous 
disclosures, but that appropriate safeguards are established to protect the alleged wrongdoer. 
In that regard, it is recommended that Procedures explain that it is a disciplinary offence to 
make maliciously false disclosures and that disclosers will be subject to disciplinary action 
(if their identity is subsequently revealed). It is also essential that recipients of disclosures 
be trained to identify when there is a risk to an alleged wrongdoer who is the subject of an 
anonymous disclosure. Further, if there is no risk to the investigation being jeopardised and 
the recipient of the disclosure believes that there is merit to the disclosure, the alleged 
wrongdoer should be furnished with a written record of it as soon as is reasonably possible 
and given an opportunity to respond.  
5.6(b) Recommendations for statutory and non-statutory changes 
There are a number of statutory and non-statutory changes that should be adopted in order 
to assist organisations with their obligations regarding the rights of the discloser and the 
alleged wrongdoer. The Department of Education and Skills submitted to the DPER 
Statutory Review that ‘It may be necessary to amend or make provisions in the Protected 
Disclosures Act 2014 in light of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the 
associated Data Protection Bill 2017.’1227 This proposal to deal with the interplay between 
the 2014 Act and data protection through a statutory amendment was echoed by GSOC in 
their submission to the DPER Statutory Review. GOSC suggested that there should be a 
balancing test included in legislation to balance potential competing rights under the various 
statutory regimes.1228 These submissions were responded to by DPER in its Statutory 
                                                 
1226 European Data Protection Supervisor, ‘Guidelines on processing personal information within a 
whistleblowing procedure’ (EDPS July 2016) 7. 
1227 Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, ‘Public Consultation on the Review of the Protected 
Disclosures Act 2014’ (DPER) <www.per.gov.ie/en/public-consultation-on-the-review-of-the-protected-
disclosures-act-2014/> accessed 6 November 2018. 
1228 ibid. 
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Review, which confirmed that ‘It is proposed to make a statutory instrument if necessary to 
ensure data protection law and protected disclosures law can continue to work in tandem.’1229 
DPER’s response is welcome, however, it is a conditional commitment, stating that a 
statutory instrument will be developed ‘if necessary’. The purpose of this research was to: 
(i) provide guidance to organisations as to what rules to apply when attempting to protect 
the rights of both parties; (ii) highlight where conflict may arise; and (iii) when a conflict 
arises, provide advice as to best practice to adopt when one party’s rights take precedence 
over another party’s rights. The research undertaken establishes that the interplay between 
the rights of the discloser and the alleged wrongdoer is multifaceted and specific guidance 
is necessary for an organisation to assist them in balancing the rights of both parties.  It is 
arguable that the current DPER Guidance, the WRC Code of Practice, and the Code of 
Practice on Grievance and Disciplinary Procedures are inadequate to address the 
organisation’s obligations regarding the rights of the discloser and the alleged wrongdoer in 
the context of protected disclosures.  
It is recommended that a code of practice that deals specifically with investigation and 
disciplinary procedures, as well as the issue of data protection, in the context of a protected 
disclosure, be developed that addresses the following: 
(i) The rights that apply to the alleged wrongdoer in the context of a protected disclosure 
process. 
(ii) How to balance the rights of the alleged wrongdoer and the discloser under natural justice 
and fair procedures. 
(iii) The application of data protection rules in the context of a protected disclosure process. 
(iv) When and how the identity of the discloser be protected and what are the limitations to 
this protection. 
(v) How to deal with anonymous disclosures. 
It is also recommended that training for recipients of disclosures is designed to ensure they 
are familiar with what is meant by natural justice and fair procedures and to recognise when 
                                                 
1229 Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, ‘Statutory Review of the Protected Disclosures Act 2014’ 
(DPER July 2018) 44. 
269 
 
these rights should be afforded to the alleged wrongdoer, as well as how to balance those 
rights with the right to protection of the identity of the discloser.1230 There should also be 
training on the interaction between data protection rules and protected disclosures. 
In its submission to the DPER Statutory Review, the Office of the Data Protection 
Commissioner suggested that it should be expressly stated in an amendment to the 2014 Act 
that the Data Protection Commissioner ‘is not precluded from investigating an alleged 
contravention of the Data Protection Acts 1988 and 2003 simply because the alleged 
contravention occurred in the context of, or in connection with, the making of a protected 
disclosure.’1231 Such an inclusion in the 2014 Act would heighten an organisation’s 
awareness that they must comply with data protection rules when processing personal data 
under a whistleblowing scheme. 
Finally, s 21(2) of the 2014 Act, which requires all public bodies to provide written 
information in relation to their Procedures to workers employed by it, should be amended to 
reflect the EDPS position that a specific data protection statement should be directly 
provided to all individuals affected by the organisation’s whistleblowing scheme. Arguably, 
this should apply to all organisations, and not just those in the public sector. 
The research undertaken for this chapter highlights that the purpose of the 2014 Act to 
protect workers who make protected disclosures is at risk of not being achieved due to the 
conflict for organisations when endeavouring to respect the rights of both the discloser and 
the alleged wrongdoer. Therefore, the recommendations outlined in this chapter are intended 
to support organisations in their obligations when dealing with protected disclosures in order 
to ensure that the purpose of the 2014 Act is not undermined. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1230 Peter Roberts, AJ Brown and Jane Olsen, Whistling While They Work A good-practice guide for managing 
internal reporting of wrongdoing in public sector organisations (ANU E Press 2011) 66. 
1231 Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, ‘Public Consultation on the Review of the Protected 
Disclosures Act 2014’ (DPER) <www.per.gov.ie/en/public-consultation-on-the-review-of-the-protected-
disclosures-act-2014/> accessed 6 November 2018. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
6.1 Introduction 
The 2014 Act was drafted in light of a recognition that society needs whistleblowers to 
uncover wrongdoing and whistleblowers need protection, including protection of their right 
to freedom of expression, in order to be encouraged to come forward with information about 
wrongdoing. The legislation was also drafted against a backdrop of a long history of negative 
attitudes and perceptions of informers, spies, and traitors as a result of 800 years of 
oppression by Britain, which was often assisted by natives. The 2014 Act was designed to 
remedy the deficiencies associated with the original sectoral approach to whistleblower 
protection. The objective of the legislation is set out in its preamble and provides that it is 
‘An Act to make provision for and in connection with the protection of persons from the 
taking of action against them in respect of the making of certain disclosures in the public 
interest and for connected purposes.’ The central question that was explored in this thesis 
was, is the 2014 Act fulfilling its purpose of providing protection to disclosers, as set out in 
its preamble? In order to answer this central research question, a number of ancillary 
questions were asked, including: (i) What can we learn about how the 2014 Act is operating 
from an analysis of the case law under the 2014 Act? (ii) Is the prescribed persons’ system 
established under the 2014 act operating effectively? (iii) How can organisations balance 
their obligations to respect the rights of both the discloser and the alleged wrongdoer when 
implementing Procedures? The research undertaken for this thesis has identified that the 
purpose of the 2014 Act is not being attained. 
6.2 Summary and evaluation 
Currently, the statutory regime and its non-statutory complementary framework are failing 
to provide adequate protection to workers who make a disclosure of relevant information 
that in their reasonable belief tends to show one or more relevant wrongdoings, and which 
came to their attention in connection with their employment. There are a number of reasons 
for this failure.  
Notably, when a claim under the 2014 Act is initiated, this means that the deterrent effect of 
the legislation for employers against the taking of reprisal against a worker has not been 
achieved. Although there have only been forty-eight decisions under the 2014 Act, this does 
not account for the number of claims that have settled. Of course, it is impossible to know 
how many workers have made protected disclosures and have not had to avail of the 
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remedies under the 2014 Act. Such information would assist in determining the success or 
otherwise of the proactive protection provisions of the 2014 Act. However, despite the 
limitation on the assessment of the success rate of the proactive protection provisions of the 
2014 Act, the evidence that there have been claims under the 2014 Act demonstrates that 
there has been some reprisal against workers for making disclosures, and it has been 
recognised that irrespective of the rates of reprisal, any reprisal is considered too much.  
The case law research indicates a high level of unsuccessful cases. There are a number of 
procedural issues arising as a result of the way in which the 2014 Act has been drafted, and 
this means that certain workers who are entitled to a remedy under the 2014 Act are not 
being afforded it. These reasons include: the six-month time limit for the initiation of claims 
before the Workplace Relations Commission, as well as the treatment of penalisation as 
occurring on the date that it commenced, as opposed to the date when it ceased; the limitation 
on the ability to file both an unfair dismissal and a penalisation claim; the cap on 
compensation; the method by which penalisation awards are calculated and the types of 
damages that can be awarded; the approach adopted in the 2014 Act to address personal 
grievances; and the lack of training for Labour Court members and adequate training for 
Adjudication Officers resulting in a misinterpretation and misapplication of the law. In order 
to remedy these deficiencies, the statutory provisions of the 2014 Act, including the 
procedural rules under the Workplace Relations Act 2015, need to be amended. Further, 
specialised and intensive training for decision makers is paramount to ensure that workers 
who are entitled to remedies under the 2014 Act are not deprived of their rights. 
The 2014 Act is designed to encourage internal reporting, and this appears to be succeeding 
as can be seen from the case law analysis and the results of the IAW survey. However, 
although this is the intention underpinning the 2014 Act, the fact that so few disclosures have 
been made to prescribed persons cannot be explained simply on the basis that the intention 
of the 2014 Act for the making of internal disclosures is being met. Prescribed persons are 
not making information regarding their role publicly available, as well as failing to publish 
their annual reports, and this means that workers are not aware that disclosures can be made 
to them and not aware of the responses that prescribed persons are taking in relation to 
protected disclosures. It appears that organisations were designated as prescribed persons, 
but there was no guidance provided to them or oversight of the system. Further, the finding 
that a number of prescribed persons no longer exist and that some appropriate regulatory 
bodies have been omitted from the prescribed persons’ statutory instrument, as well as the 
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limitation on the remit of certain prescribed persons, means that workers have one less 
channel through which they can make their disclosure. These anomalies increase the 
worker’s risk of suffering retaliation and reduce their chances of availing of the protection 
provisions under the 2014 Act for making a disclosure under s 7. The prescribed persons’ 
statutory instrument needs to be amended and kept up-to-date. Further, there should be a 
statutory obligation imposed on prescribed persons’ to make information about their role 
publicly available. The suggestion of an oversight authority for prescribed persons should 
assist prescribed persons in their role, meaning that more wrongdoing will be disclosed and 
importantly, the risk of retaliation is reduced for a worker who faces such a risk if they make 
their disclosure to their employer. 
For those prescribed persons that have published Procedures, there is evidence that they are 
not complying with their obligation to have regard to the DPER Guidance. The DPER 
Guidance is intended to supplement the statutory protection regime for workers, but 
unfortunately, it appears not to be appropriate for the needs of prescribed persons. The DPER 
Guidance further appears to be causing apprehension for prescribed persons with regard to 
how to provide internal organisational protection to workers who do not fall under the ambit 
of the 2014 Act and for workers who disclose an employment specific/profession specific 
breach that does not constitute a relevant wrongdoing under the 2014 Act. In order to achieve 
the purpose of the 2014 Act, all workers, irrespective of their employment relationship and 
irrespective of the nature of the wrongdoing that they raise, should be protected. Specific 
guidance for prescribed persons is necessitated, in respect of both their Procedures and their 
annual reports, as well as tailored protected disclosures training, in order to ensure that 
workers are protected when availing of this disclosure channel under the 2014 Act. 
The DPER Guidance is also inadequate for addressing the needs of an organisation when 
establishing and maintaining their Procedures in relation to balancing the rights of the 
discloser and the alleged wrongdoer. The purpose of the 2014 Act is to provide protection 
to workers, but when these protections are balanced against the rights of the discloser, 
organisations are unclear as to which takes precedence and when, which ultimately dilutes 
the purpose of the 2014 Act. In order to support the purpose of the 2014 Act, the issues of 
protection of identity, anonymous disclosures, data protection, and natural justice and fair 
procedures need to be addressed in the 2014 Act and the DPER Guidance. Further, a code 
of practice that deals specifically with investigation and disciplinary procedures, as well as 
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data protection, in the context of a protected disclosure, needs to be developed in line with 
the purpose of the 2014 Act in order to assist organisations.  
In order to remedy the weaknesses of the protected disclosures protection system in Ireland, 
the following recommendations for statutory and non-statutory reform are made:  
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Table 6.1    Recommendations for statutory and non-statutory reform 
No Current position Recommendation 
1 Complainants must file their 
penalisation claim within six months 
of the date of the alleged 
contravention.  
The Workplace Relations Act 2015 should 
be amended to reflect: (i) s 48(3)(a) of the 
UK Employment Rights Act 1996 which 
provides that where there may be a series of 
similar acts or failures, the time period for 
presenting a complaint begins on the date of 
the last act or failure; and (ii) 48(4)(a) of the 
1996 Act which provides that ‘where an act 
extends over a period, the ‘date of the act’ 
means the last day of that period.’ 
2 An award of compensation for unfair 
dismissal or penalisation is capped at 
five years’ gross remuneration. 
Section 11(1)(d) and Sch 2(3)(a) of the 2014 
Act should be amended to the effect that 
there is no cap on the amount of 
compensation that can be awarded in an 
unfair dismissal or penalisation claim. 
3 There is no guidance as to how 
damages are calculated by the WRC 
in a penalisation claim. 
1. The 2014 Act should be amended to 
reflect: (i) s 49(2) of the UK Employment 
Rights Act 1996 which provides that 
compensation awarded must be such as the 
tribunal considers to be just and equitable in 
all the circumstances having regard to ‘(a) 
the infringement to which the complaint 
relates, and (b) any loss which is attributable 
to the act, or failure to act, which infringed 
the complainant’s right’; and (ii) 49(3) of the 
1996 Act which provides further that the loss 
referred to in s 49(2)(b) must be taken to 
include ‘(a) any expenses reasonably 
incurred by the complainant in consequence 
of the act, or failure to act, to which the 
complaint relates, and (b) loss of any benefit 
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which he might reasonably be expected to 
have had but for that act or failure to act.’ 
2. Claims of penalisaiton should be 
adjudiated on by the WRC in the same 
manner as discrimination claims. 
 
4 Complainants cannot bring a claim 
for both penalisation (exclusive of 
unfair dismissal) and unfair 
dismissal. 
The 2014 Act should be amended to remove 
this limitation in s 12(2). 
5 There is limited training on the 2014 
Act for Adjudication Officers of the 
WRC and none for Labour Court 
members. 
Comprehensive training on the 2014 Act 
needs to be given to both Adjudication 
Officers of the WRC and Labour Court 
members. 
6 There is no public interest test in the 
2014 Act. 
Section 5 of the 2014 Act should be amended 
to include a public interest test. 
7 Section 21 of the 2014 Act requires 
public bodies to establish and 
maintain protected disclosures 
Procedures for workers employed by 
it. There is no sanction for failing to 
do so. 
Section 21 of the 2014 Act should be 
amended to: (i) impose a sanction on public 
bodies who fail to establish and maintain 
protected disclosures Procedures for workers 
employed by it; and (ii) provide that a failure 
by a public body to establish and maintain 
protected disclosures Procedures for workers 
employed by it will be taken into 
consideration in any proceedings under the 
2014 Act. 
8 There is no obligation on the private 
sector to establish and maintain 
protected disclosures Procedures. 
The 2014 Act should be amended in line with 
art 4 of the draft EU Commission Directive 
on whistleblowing and require certain 
private sector organisations to establish and 
maintain protected disclosures Procedures. 
9 Ten prescribed persons have either 
been dissolved, had a change of 
1. The prescribed persons’ SIs need to be 
kept up-to-date. 
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name, had a transfer of functions, or 
merged with another organisation.  
 
2. The maintenance of an online list of 
prescribed persons in the UK by the UK 
BEIS needs to be replicated in Ireland. 
10 A number of appropriate 
organisations have not been 
prescribed. 
The prescribed persons’ SIs need to be 
amended to include a number of appropriate 
organisations. 
11 The remit of some prescribed 
persons is not appropriate. 
The remit of all prescribed persons needs to 
be reviewed and amended where 
appropriate. 
12 Section 22 of the 2014 Act requires 
public bodies to report by 30 June 
each year the number of protected 
disclosures it received in the 
preceding year. There is no sanction 
for failing to do so. 
1. Section 22 of the 2014 Act needs to be 
amended to reflect: (i) reg 5(a) of the UK 
The Prescribed Persons (Reports on 
Disclosures of Information) Regulations 
2017, SI 2017/507 which provides that the 
prescribed persons’ annual reports must 
contain ‘the number of workers’ disclosures 
received during the reporting period that the 
relevant prescribed person reasonably 
believes are- (i) qualifying disclosures 
within the meaning of section 43B of the 
Employment Rights Act 1996; and (ii) which 
fall within the matters in respect of which 
that person is so prescribed’; and (ii) reg 3(3) 
which provides that the prescribed person is 
‘not required to report on disclosures that it 
reasonably believes do not fall within the 
description of matters in respect of which 
that person is so prescribed.’ 
 
2. Prescribed persons require guidance as to 
the scope and nature of their reporting 
requirements, including advice in relation to 
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reporting on disclosures in their capacity as 
an employer, a prescribed person, and s 10 
disclosures. 
 
3. Section 22 of the 2014 Act needs to be 
amended to include a sanction for public 
bodies for a failure to comply with their 
reporting obligations. 
13 Section 21 of the 2014 Act does not 
require prescribed persons to 
establish and maintain Procedures 
for persons who wish to make a 
disclosure under s 7 of the 2014 Act. 
1. Section 21 of the 2014 Act needs to be 
amended to: (i) require prescribed persons to 
establish and maintain Procedures for 
persons who wish to make a disclosure under 
s 7 of the 2014 Act; and (ii) to amend the 
2014 Act in line with art 10 of the draft EU 
Commission Directive on whistleblowing 
and require prescribed persons to publish 
information regarding the receipt of reports 
and their follow-up in their capacity as a 
prescribed person in a separate, easily 
identifiable, and accessible section on their 
website. 
14 Prescribed persons’ Procedures only 
contained 17% of the issues included 
in the DPER Guidance.  
1. Prescribed persons require specific 
guidance for what should be contained in 
their Procedures for dealing with disclosures 
in their capacity as a prescribed person. 
15 Fifty-three per cent (ten) prescribed 
persons indicated in their response to 
the survey undertaken for this thesis 
that they had received protected 
disclosures’ training. 
All prescribed persons should be provided 
with tailored protected disclosures’ training. 
16 Volunteers do not fall within the 
scope of the 2014 Act. 
The 2014 Act should be amended in line with 
art 2 of the draft EU Commission Directive 
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on whistleblowing and afford the protection 
under the 2014 Act to volunteers. 
17 Employment specific/ profession 
specific obligations do not fall within 
the definition of a ‘relevant 
wrongdoing’ under s 5(3) of the 
2014 Act. 
Section 5(3) of the 2014 Act should be 
amended to include employment specific/ 
profession specific obligations in the 
definition of a ‘relevant wrongdoing’. 
18 The 2014 Act does not provide for a 
referral system whereby the WRC 
can refer a protected disclosure to a 
prescribed person. 
The 2014 Act should be amended to reflect 
the UK Employment Tribunal (‘ET’) referral 
system under reg 14 of The Employment 
Tribunals (Constitution and Rules of 
Procedure) Regulations 2013, SI 2013/1237 
which gives the ET the power to send copies 
of protected disclosures claims to regulators 
with the consent of the claimant. 
19 There is no oversight authority for 
prescribed persons. 
An oversight authority for prescribed 
persons should be established in Ireland and 
provided with the sixteen functions as 
outlined in this thesis.  
20 The current DPER Guidance, the 
WRC Code of Practice, and the Code 
of Practice on Grievance and 
Disciplinary Procedures are 
inadequate to address an 
organisation’s obligations regarding 
the rights of the discloser and the 
alleged wrongdoer in the context of 
protected disclosures. 
A code of practice that deals specifically 
with investigation and disciplinary 
procedures, as well as the issues of data 
protection, protection of identity, and 
anonymous disclosures, in the context of a 
protected disclosure, should be developed. 
21 The 2014 Act is silent on the rights 
of the alleged wrongdoer. 
The 2014 Act should be amended to reflect 
art 16 of the draft EU Commission Directive 
on whistleblowing and provide for measures 
for the protection of the alleged wrongdoer. 
279 
 
22 The 2014 Act is silent on the issue of 
data protection. 
1. The 2014 Act should be amended in line 
with art 18 of the draft EU Commission 
Directive on whistleblowing in relation to 
the processing of personal data.  
2. The 2014 Act should be amended to 
provide that the Data Protection 
Commissioner is not precluded from 
investigating an alleged contravention of the 
Data Protection Acts 1988, 2003, and 2018 
simply because the alleged contravention 
occurred in the context of, or in connection 
with, the making of a protected disclosure. 
23 The 2014 Act is silent on the issue of 
the provision of a specific data 
protection statement to all 
individuals affected by an 
organisation’s whistleblowing 
scheme. 
Section 21(2) of the 2014 Act should be 
amended to requiring all organisations to 
directly provide a specific data protection 
statement to all individuals affected by an 
organisation’s whistleblowing scheme.  
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6.3 Limitations 
The research undertaken for this thesis had some limitations. A limitation arose with regard 
to the case law analysis as the number of cases under the 2014 Act is low and therefore can 
only provide a snapshot of how the 2014 Act is being interpreted and applied. Further, due 
to the infancy of the legislation, the low number of cases means that not all issues associated 
with the application and interpretation of the 2014 Act have come to light at this stage. 
Further, it is unclear what the rate of claims under the 2014 Act actually is as there is no 
information available as to the number of cases that were initiated under the 2014 Act that 
ultimately settled. In addition, it is unclear how the protections under the 2014 Act apply to 
workers other than employees, as there were no decisions in relation to workers under s 13 
of the 2014 Act.  
Another limitation to the research was that the Trade Secrets Directive was only transposed 
into Irish law in June 2018 and as the cutoff point for the research was 16 July 2018, there 
was not enough time to assess the impact of the Trade Secrets Directive on the purpose of 
the 2014 Act. Also, the introduction of the GDPR on 25 May 2018 also meant that there was 
a limited timeframe within which the impact of the provisions under GDPR could be 
assessed in the context of protected disclosures. 
Further, the responses by prescribed persons to the survey were lower than anticipated. This 
means that the findings from the survey are merely illustrative and do not present an overall 
picture of the prescribed persons’ system. However, the responses analysed in conjunction 
with the analysis of the prescribed persons’ websites, annual reports, and Procedures, mean 
that the impact of the responses is greater than if the research had relied solely on the survey 
responses to provide an insight into the prescribed persons’ system. For future research, a 
longer period will be provided for response to the survey.  
6.4 Future research 
There is scope for future research to be undertaken in this area. As the case law under the 
2014 Act increases, further patterns and themes will emerge. Going forward the case law of 
the 2014 Act should be monitored under the same ten headings as used in the research for 
this thesis. This future analysis may confirm the patterns emanating from the analysis of the 
case law undertaken by the researcher in the four-year period since the enactment of the 
2014 Act, or it may contradict some of the findings. When the draft EU Commission 
Directive on whistleblowing is implemented, this may affect the case law analysis findings 
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going forward. For example, if the obligation to implement Procedures is imposed on certain 
private sector entities, this could reduce the number of claims arising under the 2014 Act in 
the private sector as it may mean that organisations create a culture whereby workers who 
make disclosures of wrongdoing are protected from any retaliation for doing so. Further, the 
recent introduction of the Trade Secrets Directive may also impact on the number of claims 
under the 2014 Act as it may exclude a number of workers that would have been entitled to 
protection under the 2014 Act prior to its transposition into Irish law in June 2018 and 
therefore its impact will need to be assessed. Most importantly, however, it will be 
paramount that the decision-making of the Adjudication Officers and Labour Court members 
is subject to continued scrutiny as if there is a sustained misinterpretation and misapplication 
of the 2014 Act this will make a strong case for the provision of comprehensive, specialised 
training on protected disclosures law. 
There is also scope for more research on the prescribed persons’ system. The administration 
of further surveys, the analysis of prescribed persons’ annual reports, the research of the 
websites of prescribed persons, and the assessment of their Procedures, will further inform 
a study of the impact and effectiveness of the prescribed persons’ system. It is also hoped 
that this research will be a starting point for a future collaborative research project with a 
university in the UK where the prescribed persons’ system in Ireland and the UK can be 
compared and contrasted. Further, in order for the prescribed persons’ system under the 2014 
Act to be effective, it is essential that the wrongdoing can be addressed by those who have 
the power to carry out an investigation, to remedy the wrongdoing, and to impose sanctions, 
if appropriate to do so. Therefore, future research would assess whether prescribed persons 
have the appropriate statutory powers to carry out their functions in respect of the 2014 Act.  
The research undertaken for the prescribed persons’ system could also be applied generally 
to the public sector in order to ascertain if public bodies are publishing annual reports, as 
well as to ascertain the rate of internal disclosures in the public sector and the steps taken to 
respond to disclosures. The assessment of the rates of compliance by public bodies with their 
statutory obligation to establish and maintain Procedures and of the content of those 
Procedures could also be undertaken to determine the impact of that obligation and the 
DPER Guidance on the public sector. It will also be valuable to assess the impact of the 
protected disclosures training that has been made available to public sector bodies. 
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Finally, with the expected adoption of the draft EU Commission Directive on whistleblowing 
in July 2019, there is potential for much research to be undertaken in light of the position of 
the protection of workers under the 2014 Act before and after the Directive is adopted. It 
will be crucial to study whether the provisions of the draft EU Commission Directive on 
whistleblowing bolster or undermine the purpose of the 2014 Act.  
6.5 Original contribution to knowledge 
The conclusion reached in this research is that the 2014 Act is not fulfilling its purpose of 
protecting workers who make protected disclosures. The research undertaken herein has not 
been undertaken in Ireland to date. It was designed to identify the deficiencies of the 2014 
Act, in light of its purpose, and it was hoped that by doing this at an early stage, and by 
making recommendations for reform, that this would result in steps being taken to improve 
the legislative system, and its supporting regime, so that the injustices suffered by disclosers 
since the enactment of the 2014 Act can be minimised going forward. The research 
undertaken in this thesis has also developed a framework for whistleblowing research to be 
used by researchers in other jurisdictions, especially after the transposition of the draft EU 
Commission Directive on whistleblowing into national law by Member States. 
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